


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
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Life of Vice-Admiral Edmund, Lord Lyons

1790 to 1858



Demecingsravure

Printed in Paris

1853

*Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons Bart. G. C. B.,
afterwards Vice Admiral Lord Lyons.*

From an engraving

Lampson Low Marston and Company Ltd. London.

Life of Vice-Admiral Edmund, Lord Lyons

G.C.B. (Civil), G.C.B. (Military), G.C.M.G., K.C.H.,
Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour of France,
Grand Cross of the Ottoman Order of Medjidie,
Grand Cross of the Military Order of Savoy,
Grand Cross of the Redeemer of Greece,
Cross of St. Louis of France.

With an account of Naval Operations in the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff
1854-56

By

Captain S. Eardley-Wilmot, R.N. (retired)

Author of

'The Development of Navies,' 'The Next Naval War,' 'The British Navy,' etc.

Illustrated

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON AND COMPANY
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PREFACE

PROBABLY the best history of our navy is contained in the Biographies of those men who have taken a prominent part in the events which successively led to our present maritime position. The lives of Drake, Blake, Hawke, Rodney, St. Vincent, Nelson, and others give to the student of naval history a fairly full account of all the great wars in which this country has been engaged, including those produced by the French Revolution and the insatiable ambition of Napoleon.

Since that time though the British Navy has not been called upon to meet an enemy's fleet at sea, it has taken part in many important operations, and sustained the reputation it then acquired. Among them may be instanced the last great European war in which we participated, that with Russia in 1854-55, and especially the aid rendered by our Fleet in the Black Sea.

Having long felt that this had never received adequate recognition in the published histories of that war, I gladly accepted the office of writing the life of the man who, besides being distinguished in his early career, had conducted so much to the fall of Sebastopol when Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean station.

If the first Lord Lyons had not the opportunity afforded him of leading a fleet into action against the ships of an enemy, his varied service placed him in positions of hardly less importance, where he gave proof of possessing qualities which entitle him to a foremost place in our naval annals. Though forty years have elapsed since he died, many still

remember him with affection and admiration, tribute to which is rendered in many letters to me containing interesting reminiscences for which I desire here to express my gratitude.

The Admiral left an immense mass of correspondence which has remained practically undisturbed until now. This was placed unreservedly in my hands by his grandson, the Duke of Norfolk, a proof of confidence keenly appreciated by me, but which increased my responsibility for a judicious selection. There was sufficient matter for several volumes, but I considered that in these days of voluminous literature compression into one would not be accounted a fault.

My object has been to combine with all that was most interesting in the life of Edmund Lyons, some description of that change in warships which the introduction of steam entailed, and as full an account of the operations in the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff as the personal narrative would admit.

In submitting this volume to the Public, I trust it may not be considered an unworthy contribution to our naval literature, and that it may give the name of Edmund Lyons a place among those eminent men who deserve to be remembered in the history of our country.

S. EARDLEY-WILMOT.

23 *Cranley Gardens, S.W.*
September 1898.

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LIFE OF VICE-ADMIRAL LORD LYONS

CHAPTER I

1802—1811

Birth—Family—Connexion with the West Indies—Enters the Navy—Joins the *Maidstone* and goes to the Mediterranean—War with France—Turns over to *Active*—Arrival of Nelson—Blockading Toulon—Escape of Villeneuve—Chase of Nelson—Visits England and returns to Mediterranean—Squadron ordered to Dardanelles—Burning of the *Ajax*—Passage of the Dardanelles—Engagement with forts—Work of the *Active's* boats—Squadron returns—Engage the forts—Loss and damage to the ships—Returns to England—Goes out to East Indies—Appointed lieutenant of *Caroline*—Transfers to *Barracouta*—Operations against Dutch possessions—Expedition against Banda Islands—Successful assault of Castle Belgica—Surrender of the island—Appointed to *Minden*—Java expedition—Bold Attack on Fort Marrack—Its capture—Opinions on the exploit—Arrival of the expedition—Landing of troops and Naval Brigade—Surrender of Batavia—Defeat of the Dutch at Cornelis—They capitulate and we take possession of Java—Lieutenant Lyons invalids and goes home.

EDMUND LYONS, the fourth son of John Lyons, Esq., of “Lyons” in the island of Antigua, West Indies, and St. Austins, near Lymington, Hampshire, was born at Burton, Christchurch, Hants, on November 21, 1790. His mother, previous to her marriage with Mr. Lyons, was Miss Catherine Walrond, daughter of Maine Swete Walrond, Esq., of Montrath, Devon, and the island of Antigua. Both families had been connected with the West Indies for a considerable period. A George Walrond appears to have gone out to Barbadoes about 1655, and then

settled in Antigua. His grandson was the father of Maine Swete Walrond. The grandfather of Edmund Lyons—John Lyons of Hurlow House, in the county of Huntingdon—married Jane, daughter of Samuel Harman, of Antigua, and died at Bath in 1775. His son John, born in 1760, had a numerous family, of which the following is a list of those children which survived infancy—

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Died	Remarks
Jane Lyons . . .	Feb. 21, 1785, Antigua .	1803	
John Lyons . . .	Sept. 1, 1787, Lyndhurst .	1872	Entered Navy 1798. Midshipman of <i>Victory</i> at Trafalgar. Retired Vice-Admiral.
Theodore Lyons . . .	Oct. 5, 1788, Lyndhurst .	1825	Went out to East Indies.
Henry Lyons . . .	Sept. 30, 1789, Lyndhurst .	1807	Royal Artillery. Killed at Siege of Copenhagen.
EDMUND LYONS . . .	Nov. 21, 1790, Burton .	1858	Entered Navy 1801. Subject of these Memoirs.
Anne Lyons . . .	April 19, 1792, Burton .	1816	Unmarried.
Catherine Lyons . . .	April 16, 1794, Burton .	1857	Unmarried.
George Rose Lyons . . .	May 28, 1796, St. Austins .		
William Mills Lyons . . .	Aug. 13, 1797, St. Austins .		
Maine Walrond Lyons . . .	Oct. 22, 1799, St. Austins .	1827	Entered Navy. Mortally wounded at Navarino.
Caroline Lyons . . .	Oct. 24, 1800, St. Austins .	1879	Married H. S. Pearson, Esq. ¹
Humphrey Lyons . . .	July 8, 1802, St. Austins .	1873	East Indian Army. Retired as Lieut.-General. ²
Bethel Walrond Lyons . . .	Nov. 27, 1803, St. Austins .		

John Lyons married secondly May 17, 1804, Elizabeth Robbins, and had issue—

Samuel Athill Lyons . . .	April 14, 1805, St. Austins .	1885	East Indian Army. Retired Colonel.
Frances Walrond Lyons . . .	Sept. 19, 1806, St. Austins .		Unmarried.
Edward Robbins Lyons . . .	Feb. 2, 1809, St. Austins .		East India Company's Army.

During the old wars and especially at the latter part of the last century, there were keen struggles for the possession of several of the West Indian Islands, and their vicinity was the scene of many hard-fought battles. We usually maintained a strong naval force in those waters, and Mr. Lyons no doubt saw a good deal of the Navy

¹ Father of the late Lieut.-Col. Richard Lyons Otway Pearson, C.B.

² Father of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Algernon Lyons, G.C.B.

during his time at Antigua. There doubtless he met Captain Richard Hussey Bickerton, who in command of the *Invincible* took part in Sir Samuel Hood's action with the Comte de Grasse in 1781. His father, also a distinguished admiral, was created a baronet in 1778, and his son succeeded to the title in 1792. Previous to this he had married Miss Athill of Antigua. They had no children, but Edmund Lyons was their godson, and for the rest of their lives they looked upon him as a son, while he kept up the most affectionate intercourse with both during his career. They were in fact like second parents to him, especially after he lost his own mother in 1803 and his father in 1816. Though it was doubtless an advantage to have such a friend as Sir Richard Bickerton, the position Edmund Lyons attained cannot be attributed to any cause but his own energy and merit. Under these circumstances it is not surprising to find John, the eldest son of Mr. Lyons, entering the Navy in 1798. As a midshipman on board the *Victory* he took part in the Battle of Trafalgar. He rose to the rank of vice-admiral and died in 1872.

Edmund also from an early age determined to go into the Navy, the desire being increased by a cruise he made with Captain Richard Bickerton in 1788, when the latter commanded the *Terrible*, 74, in the Channel. He received his early education at Hyde Abbey School, near Winchester, but as he went to sea when only a few months past eleven years of age, his scholastic knowledge could not have been considerable. It was the custom then to enter boys' names on the books of a ship before they went afloat, which time counted towards obtaining the rating of midshipman. Thus in June 1801 Edmund Lyons was entered as a volunteer, first class, on the books of the yacht *Royal Charlotte*. In January 1802 he joined the *Maidstone*, a 32-gun frigate, commanded by Captain Richard

Hussey Moubray, a cousin of Sir Richard Bickerton. This officer after being promoted to captain in 1797, served as a volunteer with his cousin in the *Terrible*, where he first met young Lyons. It was then settled that upon his getting a command, Edmund Lyons should go with him. He could not start under better auspices. Captain Moubray was an excellent officer and first-rate seaman. Made a C.B. in 1815, he became a rear-admiral in 1821, and K.C.B. the same year. He assumed the surname of Hussey on succeeding to the estates of Sir Richard Bickerton in 1832, and died a vice-admiral in 1842.

Three days after joining the *Maidstone* young Lyons writes to his father, he having previously been staying with his uncle, Admiral Holloway, at Portsmouth—"I came on board last Sunday. I mess with the gunner and carpenter. They are both very good-natured people, and, in short, I like my situation very much indeed. We had a very grand salutation here on account of the Queen's birthday yesterday. All the ships at Spithead fired nineteen guns each.¹ We have a great many youngsters on board, one of which I know very well. Captain Moubray intends taking me and some more of the youngers in his cabin to teach us arithmetic until he gets a schoolmaster. There were four more men hung on board some of the ships here yesterday. I like a frigate much better than a line-of-battle ship. I hope you will excuse my bad writing as the sea is very

¹ It may seem strange to many that a Royal Salute of nineteen guns should be fired. "The Regulations relating to His Majesty's service at sea, 1790," say as regards these salutes—"The anniversary Days of the Birth, Accession and Coronation of the King; of the Birth of the Queen; of the Restoration of Charles the Second; and of Gunpowder Treason shall be solemnised by His Majesty's ships, if they are in Port, with such a number of guns as the Chief Officer shall think proper, not exceeding Twenty One each Ship." It was, therefore, within the power of the Port Admiral to order a salute of nineteen guns on the birthday of the Consort of George III.

rough, and the ship heaves very much. The gunner's name is Martin. I am as happy as a king with him."

Probably as there were a great many youngsters on board, and considering that Edmund Lyons was not twelve years of age, the Captain thought he would be better under the charge of the warrant officers, from whom no doubt he would learn some of the practical work of his profession.

A week later he writes to his mother—"The gunner left me to-day. I mess with the carpenter, Mr. Garbett, who I like very much indeed. I can assure you I will endeavour to learn as much as it is in my power, and every hour in the day shall be spent in some useful employment. I beg you will send me some money as I have a great many things to buy."

On February 6 he informs her—"There are a great many wicked boys on this ship, but I do not associate with them. There is one little boy about my age, who is a very good-natured gentlemanly lad. There are likewise two or three young men who I associate with, and like very much. I can assure you I will do everything in my power to gain the friendship of my officers by behaving well."

These letters appear to me interesting, not only as giving a glimpse of the customs of the service nearly a hundred years ago, but also some insight into the boy's character. They indicate how from an early age he acquired the friendship of many distinguished officers and a knowledge of his profession, which became so conspicuous later on. The *Maidstone* was fitting out for the Mediterranean, and sailed for her destination at the beginning of April. Writing from Gibraltar on April 15, Edmund Lyons says—"We arrived here after a passage of thirteen days. Captain Moubray has not been fortunate enough to get a schoolmaster; but, however, his clerk teaches us to read, write, sum, and spell. I am still under the care of the

carpenter, Mr. Garbett, a very good-natured man as can possibly be ; he pays me every attention."

By such precarious means did midshipmen in the old days complete their education.

At this period, 1802, we were having a short respite from the war which had begun in 1793. The Peace of Amiens had been concluded, but all felt it would not last long. Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton was then in command of the Mediterranean station with his flag in the *Kent*, 74. The *Maidstone* visited various places on the station, and young Lyons always writes in a happy strain. In November he tells his father—"I cannot help again mentioning Captain Moubray's kindness to me, and likewise Sir Richard and Lady Bickerton's. I think myself extremely lucky in being amongst so many friends."

At the beginning of 1803 England began to prepare for a renewal of hostilities. On April 15 Edmund Lyons writes from Gibraltar—"The *Amazon* sails for England to-morrow with the Duke of Kent. I am now signal officer as we are Commodore here. It is a very good situation. I keep no night-watch, but I am on deck all day. There are a great many ships gone home, but I believe we are to be the last."

On May 16 we declared war against France, and two days after Nelson hoisted his flag on board the *Victory* to go out as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. He sailed on the 20th with the *Amphion*, 32-gun frigate, Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy. Nelson was to leave the *Victory* with Admiral Cornwallis, then off Brest, if she was required there, and go on himself in the frigate. On arriving off Ushant Cornwallis was not to be seen, so Nelson shifted into the *Amphion*, and left the *Victory* behind with orders to come on if not wanted. The *Amphion* arrived at Malta on June 15, but not finding the Fleet there proceeded first to Naples and then off Toulon, where Nelson



ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD HUSSEY BICKERTON, BART.

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found Sir Richard Bickerton with eight sail-of-the-line and two frigates, the *Active* and *Phæbe*. A short time previously the officers and crew of the *Maidstone* had turned over to the *Active* a larger frigate of 38 guns, so now young Lyons found himself amid the excitement of blockading work. The brunt of this fell on the frigates, as they had to keep a close watch on Toulon, while the line-of-battle ships made frequent trips to Madalena, the harbour at the northern extremity of Sardinia, which Nelson found so useful during this service. For the rest of 1803 and the whole of 1804 the *Active* was employed on this work, but I have not found any letters of Edmund Lyons during that period. There was doubtless little time for writing, and not many opportunities for sending letters.

At the beginning of 1805 the *Active* was still off Toulon in company with the *Seahorse*, another frigate. On January 17 the French fleet put to sea. Our two frigates hung on their heels and kept them in sight, then one went off to inform Nelson at Madalena, who at once put to sea. In a heavy gale of wind in the Gulf of Lyons we lost touch of the French fleet, which being considerably damaged put back into Toulon. In the meantime Nelson was fretting because he could not find the enemy, but eventually heard of their return, and got back to his old station in the middle of February.

Villeneuve meantime was busy refitting his squadron, intending to go out again as soon as possible. He put to sea for the second time on March 29, and next day was observed by the *Active* and *Phæbe* frigates. The latter was dispatched to inform Nelson, who had meantime gone to the Gulf of Palma. The *Active* followed the French fleet, but lost sight of it in the night. It was not till April 4 that the *Phæbe* met and gave Nelson the news. Then came that second hunt when Nelson could not find out the direction Villeneuve had taken. Well might he

say the want of frigates would be found engraved on his heart. That he should have only two cruisers for such an important duty shows the demand for these vessels in time of war. Yet we had 127 frigates in commission at that moment.

It was not until April 16 that Nelson, then off the southern end of Sardinia, heard that the French had previously passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on the 8th. He was delayed by foul winds and did not anchor at Gibraltar till May 7, just a month after Villeneuve had entered the Atlantic. The French Admiral made for Cadiz, picked up there a Spanish squadron—Spain had joined France at the end of 1804—and early on April 9 the combined fleet sailed for the West Indies. History has related how Nelson lost no time in following. Sir Richard Bickerton, who then was on board the *Royal Sovereign*, shifted into the *Amphitrite* frigate to remain behind in command of the Mediterranean, and that evening—May 7—Nelson left Gibraltar. He went first to Cape St. Vincent, and on May 12 steered for the West Indies with the result well known.

The *Active* had been left behind in the Mediterranean on the search, but followed up Nelson to Gibraltar, when, as she wanted a refit, she was sent home.

From Plymouth on May 29, 1805, Captain Moubray writes to tell Mrs. Lyons he had sent Edmund home on leave, adding—"I could not refrain from sending him notwithstanding the hurry we are in to get the *Active* ready again for sea. I feel myself highly obliged by your very polite letter, and beg to assure you that Edmund Lyons is deserving of more than I can either say or do for him."

The lad had been away three years, and though not yet fifteen, had been at a splendid school to learn his profession. What excellent training was this blockading

work, especially in a frigate, hugging a port crowded with hostile ships, which often came out to try and cut off our cruisers when they came too close ; then the crowding sail and working off perhaps a lee shore. Then the risk if the wind fell light, with the chance of being becalmed, when it would be a case of " out boats " and tow the ship to a safe distance. So day after day, week after week, month after month continued this harassing work ; seldom with fresh provisions, often short of water, to complete with which at the nearest port, and hasten back to their station, was the only relaxation of these cruisers. All this cheerfully borne and made light of. Justly might the words addressed to his soldiers by Havelock during the Indian Mutiny be applied to these men. " Your labours, your privations, your sufferings, and your valour will not be forgotten by a grateful country." There was no competing against men trained in such a school, and here young Lyons learned the art of seamanship which became to him almost a second nature, and which remained with him throughout his life.

After the departure of the French fleet from the Mediterranean, followed by Nelson with the greater portion of our squadron, there was comparative quiet in those waters for the next eighteen months, and the *Active*, which had returned to the Mediterranean, was employed cruising without any special incident to record. Lord Collingwood became Commander-in-Chief after Nelson's death, and Sir Richard Bickerton went home to fill a vacancy on the Board of Admiralty. In the autumn of 1806, it being apparent to our Government that Turkey was coming much under the influence of France, Collingwood was ordered to send a squadron to reconnoitre the Dardanelles. He, therefore, detached Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis on this mission with the *Canopus*, 80, *Thunderer*, 74, and *Standard*, 64. They anchored off

Tenedos Island on December 28, and were joined by the *Active*. Russia was then acting in conjunction with us, but had not at that time a squadron in the locality. Such became the condition of affairs in Constantinople that the Russian Ambassador embarked on board the *Active* on January 29, and was conveyed to Malta, while our Ambassador joined Sir Thomas Louis. It was then considered desirable to strengthen our squadron and come to a clear understanding with the Turks. Vice-Admiral Sir John Duckworth was therefore sent with the *Royal George*, 100 guns, *Windsor Castle*, 98, and *Repulse*, 74. They arrived at Malta on January 30, and the next day the *Active* came in. She was, after landing the Russian Ambassador, at once sent back to inform Admiral Louis of Sir John's approach. The same day arrived at Malta the *Ajax*, 74, Captain the Hon. Henry Blackwood, and on February 2, the *Pompée* with the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith. On February 4 the whole squadron left Malta and joined Admiral Louis off Tenedos on the 10th. Weighing the next day, the Admiral stood towards the Dardanelles, but the wind coming foul for entering the squadron anchored off Cape Janizary, where it was detained for some days. On the 14th occurred the terrible incident of the burning of the *Ajax*, which is thus described by Edmund Lyons in a letter home on February 17—
“Since my last a continued series of misfortunes have attended us too great to be expressed by my pen, and too great to be conceived by any but the spectators. On the 9th the Admiral joined us at Tenedos, and our force, which then consisted of eight line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and two bombs, had every prospect of entering the Dardanelles on the succeeding day when we weighed anchor and prepared for battle. But unfortunately the wind changed just as we were on the point of going in. It increased to a tremendous gale and lasted until Saturday,

the 14th, when it subsided, and the night was quite fine. At about 9 o'clock, it being my watch, I observed the *Ajax*, 80, who was then about 300 yards ahead to windward of us, firing guns. Scarcely a moment had elapsed when we perceived volumes of smoke issuing from her. She then hailed us, telling us to send our boats to save the men, which we did in the shortest time possible. The boats had scarcely left us when she presented to us one of the most awful sights human nature is witness to. The ship was in a perfect blaze; the masts falling, the crew shrieking, some jumping into the water, others swimming about the ship in all directions: our ship surrounded with the unfortunate wretches climbing up the side with ropes, our boats being all gone. Some so languid from the cold that when nearly on board they let go the rope and sunk to the bottom. The *Ajax* having parted her cables and drifting on us obliged us to cut our cables to prevent our sharing her fate. How am I to explain the horror which dwelt on our minds on seeing twenty or thirty miserable creatures hanging on by our side, when we were thus obliged to cut and leave them to perish? The fire having broke out in the stern of the ship the bowsprit was covered with people screaming in the most dreadful manner; among them was plainly to be distinguished two women with each an infant in her arms. Fortunately they were saved, but one woman was burnt being below.

"The boats succeeded in picking up about 460 men, but many of them died through the cold afterwards. On the whole about 400 were saved, and, dreadful to relate, 270 perished. Had it been daytime probably many more would have been saved, but most of the men were gone to bed, and many stifled with the smoke; others on finding the ship on fire jumped out of bed and into the water through the ports.

"Fortunately the Service is not deprived of that valuable

and meritorious officer, Captain Blackwood, who, on finding the ship gone past all recovery, jumped overboard and was picked up by a boat. Four lieutenants were saved and three perished. •

“The fire is supposed to have broke out in the Bread-room, and all the doors being shut, it had gained too great a hold to be put out before it was discovered. Captain Blackwood attended below, and rallied the men as long as he could. Great quantities of water were thrown down which seemed but to increase it, and the flames soon drove every one on deck, and communicating with hammocks, proceeded forward. In less than five minutes the ship was in a perfect blaze, the fire being at the mastheads. She burned until five o'clock, and then drifting on shore on the island of Tenedos blew up with a tremendous explosion. Captain Blackwood had thirty little mids under his care from the age of eleven to fifteen years. Many of them not being able to swim were lost.

“By what I have said you may gain some little idea of the horrid scene, but my pen falls short in expressing half the misery which presented itself. On shore fire is very alarming, but there you have a place to fly for refuge; here you have none. However, it is too dismal a subject to dwell on, but a circumstance occurred which is so affecting that I cannot help mentioning it. A boat belonging to the *Windsor Castle* had been looking for men, but had failed, and on returning, a man was discovered in the water. What must have been the feelings on both sides when the man who picked him up found him to be his brother! The whole affair has made too deep an impression on my mind ever to be effaced. It awakens my sense of duty to God and mankind, and shows how soon we may be called out of this stage on to the other.

“Independent of the concern every one must feel for the suffering men, the loss of so fine a ship at this moment is

incalculable. However the Admiral intends going through the Dardanelles the first fair wind. Sir John Duckworth has promised not to fire the first shot, but if they fire, which is almost certain, he intends returning it.

“18th.—A ship is now going to Malta. The wind is fair, and to-morrow we proceed. I have now four months to serve before my time as mid is expired. I hope soon to hear from you what steps I am to take. If I do not hear I think I had better go to England to pass my examination, as a probability of a peace is talked of, and if I do not gain the rank of lieutenant before the war is over, it will be very difficult then.”

He had been rated midshipman in August 1805.

There is no doubt of the impression the destruction of the *Ajax* made on his mind, and nearly fifty years later he recalls the scene when at the same spot. Fire on board ship in the old days was a terrible thing, as it spread with such rapidity, everything in the construction and equipment being inflammable. In action our seamen dreaded fire more than the shot of the enemy.

On the 19th the squadron weighed and entered the Dardanelles in the following line-of-battle — *Canopus*, *Repulse*, *Royal George*, *Windsor Castle*, *Standard* towing *Meteor* (Bomb), *Pompée*, *Thunderer* towing *Lucifer* (Bomb), *Endymion* and *Active*. As they passed the outer castles guarding the entrance these forts opened fire, but the ships did not reply. On arriving off the inner castles, the ships were again subjected to a heavy cannonade, which they returned. This did not stop their progress, but there was a loss in the squadron of six killed and fifty wounded. Just above the Castle of Abydos, and near Point Pesquies, a small Turkish squadron lay at anchor, which had the temerity to fire upon our ships, so Sir Sidney Smith with the *Pompée*, *Thunderer*, *Standard*, and the two frigates was directed to attack the Turkish ships. These, after half-an-

hour's action, cut their cables and ran on shore. A Turkish battery on the Point continued its fire, to which our ships then turned their attention. It was soon silenced, and then the boats were sent in to destroy the work, the Turkish gunners being driven out by the fire of the ships. Edmund Lyons was one of the officers sent on this service, and assisted to spike the guns.

In the meantime Sir John Duckworth had gone on and anchored off Princes Island, eight miles from Constantinople. The Admiral then made certain demands on the Turks to which they took no notice. The Admiral instead of sending an ultimatum followed up in case of refusal by an attack, dispatched further letters, which rather tended to strengthen the Turks in their defiant attitude. Then Sir John decided to return. On March 1 the squadron weighed and stood towards Constantinople, but at the end of the day turned and steered for the entrance to the Dardanelles. On the evening of the 2nd they anchored six miles above Point Pesquies, where they found the *Active*. These events and what followed are thus described by Edmund Lyons in a letter to his mother, March 7—

“I am exceedingly sorry to tell you that our fair prospects have turned out very unfavourably. On the 19th at daybreak we were highly delighted on finding a fair wind, and still more on seeing the Admiral's signal to weigh and prepare for battle. At three o'clock Admiral Louis in the *Canopus* led the fleet into the Dardanelles. The entrance is about three and a half miles wide, having a strong battery on each side which kept up a continued fire on our ships. We, however, did not return this, reserving our fire for the more dangerous forts of Abydos and Cestos, of which I will endeavour to give you some idea. They are built on the narrowest part of the Dardanelles, being about three-quarters of a mile wide—containing about 100 guns, each of which throw shot of an enormous



DESTRUCTION OF A TURKISH SQUADRON IN THE DARDANELLES, FEBRUARY 19TH, 1807. H.M.S. ACTIVE ENGAGING A TURKISH FRIGATE.
(After a painting by T. Whitcombe from a plan by Captain Moubray.) [To face page 24.]

size. At half-past nine the *Canopus* was between them, when the forts opened their whole fire, which was returned from the *Canopus*, and each ship on passing fired two or three broadsides. As we passed very quickly the damage done to the Fleet was inconsiderable, when we reflect on the extraordinary strength of the batteries. The Turks being unaccustomed to stand fire left their guns occasionally. Our ships were much cut up about the masts and rigging, but the men killed did not amount to more than three or four in each ship. Fortunately we had not a man hurt. About three miles beyond the batteries we discovered one Turkish two-decker, four frigates, and four corvettes. Sir John Duckworth with his division of the Fleet passed through to prevent them making their escape to Constantinople, leaving Sir Sidney Smith's division *Pompee*, *Thunderer*, *Standard* and *Active* to engage them. After firing a few broadsides the Turks ran their ships on shore and all the men left them, and we, finding it impossible to get them off the ground without much loss of time, set fire to them, and in an hour every ship blew up. This ship after a short engagement succeeded in destroying a fine frigate, mounting 52 guns and 460 men. The Admiral and Fleet went on to Constantinople, leaving this ship to destroy a battery of 37 guns, which was accomplished on the 21st, having only two men wounded. I was with Lieutenant Croker in the launch keeping the beach clear of men with an 18-pound carronade.

"Sir John Duckworth, I fancy, intended going into the harbour of Constantinople immediately, but on his arrival found them prepared to give him a warmer reception than he imagined. He therefore anchored five miles from the town.

"The Fleet were in the utmost danger where they were at anchor, the Turks having 16 fire-vessels chained together which the ships expected among them every night. On

the wind coming fair on the 1st, the Fleet weighed and stood in for the harbour, and on coming within gun-shot hove-to in order of battle, endeavouring to bring the Turkish Fleet to action, which they, however, prudently declined. Their force consisted of eleven sail-of-the-line, including three three-deckers, besides many frigates and smaller vessels. Finding it impossible to bring them to action, and our force too small to risk an attack on the town, the Admiral made the signal to make sail for Abydos, when the Fleet very reluctantly left the place without obtaining a single point.

“On the evening of March 2 the Admiral joined us off Abydos, and on the succeeding morning we again weighed to pass the forts. But we found them much better prepared than on coming up. They had erected many new batteries, and kept up a most galling fire on our ships which we returned very warmly.

“Our loss much exceeds the former, each ship having several men killed, and very much wounded in the masts and rigging. This ship was much hurt in the hull, but fortunately the shot struck us too low to kill any man. We had eight men badly wounded. A shot entered our side 2 ft. above water which was 6 ft. 2 in. in circumference. Had it struck us 3 ft. lower we must have inevitably sunk. A marble shot entered the *Windsor Castle*, weighing 808 lbs., and was 6 ft. 11 in. in circumference. We are only indebted to their too great confidence in their batteries for our having passed, it being in their power to fortify the Dardanelles in such a manner as to prevent any fleet passing through the Straits, being no more than three miles wide for twenty miles in length. They were ably assisted at their guns by French engineers. Thus you find we have considered too lightly of the Turks, and are very fortunate in having escaped so well.”

The fact of our Fleet having accomplished the feat of

twice passing through the Dardanelles in face of what were then considered most formidable batteries without losing a ship, prevented the failure of the expedition being seriously noticed. On March 7, Sir John Duckworth was joined by a Russian squadron of seven sail-of-the-line and two frigates, but no further operations against Constantinople were undertaken by the combined force. Our loss in the last passage of the Straits was 29 killed and 138 wounded. This terminated the active service of young Lyons as a midshipman in the Mediterranean. He was appointed supernumerary to the *Bergere* sloop for passage to England in the following May, and arrived home in June 1807.

Young Lyons did not remain long on shore, for having passed his examination, he was appointed midshipman to the *Monmouth*, 74, in September 1807. In this ship he went out to the East Indies, and was then transferred to the *Russell*, flagship of Rear-Admiral William O'Brien Drury. In June 1808 he was given an acting vacancy as lieutenant in the *Caroline*, a 36-gun frigate. Three months later he went in the same capacity to the *Barraouta*, an 18-gun-brig sloop, and in November 1809 was confirmed as lieutenant.

During these two years our ships in the East Indian seas had directed their efforts chiefly against French war-vessels and privateers, as well as towards capturing some of their islands in the neighbourhood of Mauritius. Napoleon having obtained possession of Holland, this country became an enemy, and our attention was then turned to the capture of their important possessions in the East. At the beginning of 1810, Rear-Admiral Drury sent a naval force to attack the principal settlements of the Dutch in the Moluccas. The island of Amboyna was captured in February, and the fall of other islands followed. On May 10 the *Caroline*, now commanded by Captain Christopher Cole; the *Piémontaise*, 38-gun frigate, Captain Charles

Foote; the *Barracouta*, Acting-Captain Richard Kenah, and a transport brig carrying specie and provisions, left Madras for Amboyna. The two frigates carried 100 officers and men of the Madras European regiment for the garrison of that island. Captain Cole had permission to attack some of the enemy's settlements that lay in his route. On the 30th he arrived at Pulo Penang, or Prince of Wales Island, in the Straits of Malacca, and obtained some information respecting Banda Neira—the principal place of Dutch Government in the Banda Islands. This small group is a short distance from the western end of New Guinea.

Having decided to attack Banda Neira, and obtaining at Penang two field-guns, twenty artillery-men, and scaling-ladders, Captain Cole on June 10 continued his voyage. Five days later he met and communicated with a vessel by whom he was informed that the force at Banda was believed to consist of more than 700 regular troops. On the 25th the little squadron arrived off the north coast of Borneo, and Captain Cole, in order to prevent information of his approach reaching the Captain-General of Java, and thus give him time to strengthen Banda, determined to make a detour and proceed round to the north of Borneo. The passage is dangerous, as the coral-reefs are innumerable. It required the greatest skill and vigilance to keep the ships off these reefs, but all got through in safety, and on July 5 anchored at Soolo. Here they took in provisions and water, sailing again on the 10th. They then steered to the eastward until they sighted new Cape of Good Hope on the coast of New Guinea, when the course was altered to the southward, and on July 23 the squadron entered the Java sea. It now took them a fortnight to beat up to the island of Soram, which is only thirty-six hours' sail from Banda Neira. Here two pilots, who knew also the position of the batteries, were obtained, and on the 8th they had



CAPTURE OF ISLAND OF BANDA NEIRA BY H.M. SHIPS CAROLINE, PIEMONTAISE, AND BARRACOUTA.

arrived off their destination. There are ten islands, of which Banda Neira is the capital. It is about two miles long and about three-quarters of a mile broad. The defences consisted of ten sea-batteries and two forts called Castle Belgica and Castle Nassau. The first-named mounted 50 guns, and its position enabled it to command the coast-batteries at that end of the island, as well as the other castle. It was not only exceedingly formidable, and the key of the position, but lay a short distance inland. The garrison of the island consisted of about 700 regular troops and 800 militia. Preparations for the attack were made by the British squadron on the afternoon of the 8th, boats hoisted out and equipped. At sunset the small island of Rosensgen was sighted, and at nine o'clock two shots from it warned the ships their approach had not been unobserved. The fact of there being an outpost on Rosensgen was unexpected by Captain Cole, and it seemed to preclude a surprise during the day with so small a force. As the evening set in dark and squally he therefore determined to attack by night with his boats, believing the enemy would not consider such an enterprise likely. The scheme was soon organized with the other officers, and at eleven o'clock that night the boats with about 400 officers and men under Captain Cole left the squadron and made for the shore. Owing to the darkness of the night and the heavy sea the boats were unable to keep together, and some went astray. On arrival at the rendezvous, three miles from the shore, Captain Cole found only a portion of his force, and as the day would soon break he determined to go on with about 140 seamen and marines and 40 soldiers of the Madras Regiment. The officers, besides Captain Cole, were Captain Richard Kenah, Lieutenants Carew, Allen, Pratt, Walker, Edmund Lyons, and a few others.

On arriving within 100 yards of the beach the boats

grounded on a coral-reef, but fortunately a black cloud at the moment hid them from the shore, while the storm prevented them from being heard in the nearest battery. They were thus enabled to get their boats over the reef undetected. Reaching a sandy beach the men soon landed, and a party was detached with pikes to seize the battery in rear. This was so promptly done that the sentry was killed, and an officer and 60 men made prisoners without a shot being fired, though the enemy was at his guns. It was then intended to attack another battery in the same way, but Captain Cole now determined to assault Castle Belgica by *coup de main* before the island was thoroughly aroused, for the enemy's bugles were sounding. Favoured by the storm the British arrived within 100 yards of the ditch of the castle before they were discovered. The enemy then opened fire from the ramparts, but our men rushed up the intervening ascent, and placing their scaling-ladders between the guns, crowded up, and were almost immediately in possession of the lower works. The ladders were then hauled up to place against the inner wall, but proved too short, and the enemy renewed their fire with several volleys of musketry. At that moment the Dutch opened the gate to admit the Commandant and other officers who lived just outside. At this gateway our men now made a rush. The Dutch Colonel with several of his soldiers fell, and after a short struggle the British colours were hoisted at the flagstaff of Belgica Castle, and the garrison surrendered. As day broke the victors saw Nassau Castle, the town, and sea-defences at their feet. A flag of truce was therefore sent to the Governor demanding the surrender of Banda Neira with its dependencies, or the guns of Belgica would be turned against Nassau, and the town laid in ruins. This was acceded to, and the Batavian flag lowered in the neighbouring castle. In the course of the day 1500 of the enemy's regulars and militia laid down their arms on the

glacis of Fort Nassau. Whilst this had been taking place on shore, the ships had worked up towards the island against baffling winds and adverse currents, but arrived at an anchorage as the English flag was hoisted on Belgica. At the same time the missing boats turned up after a night of much hardship and battling against the sea. In his report to the Admiral, Captain Cole says—"Captain Kenah, Lieutenants Carew, Allen, Pratt, Walker, and Lyons were foremost in the escalade. With such examples our brave fellows swept the ramparts like a whirlwind."

For this achievement Captain Cole received the thanks of the Governor-General of India, while the Government at home showed their appreciation by conferring on him a C.B.

At the end of 1810, Lieutenant Lyons was appointed to the *Minden*, 74, as flag-lieutenant to Rear-Admiral Drury, who died in the early part of the following year, after completing preparations for the conquest of Java. An expedition with this mission sailed from Madras on May 18, 1811, but the surrender of this important island did not take place till the following September.

Lieutenant Lyons had hitherto, though gaining credit for zeal and gallantry, played a subordinate part in the operations which were establishing our supremacy in the East. He was now to be the chief actor in a deed of daring which ranks high in the annals of the British Navy. While the combined naval and military expedition under the joint command of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Achmuty and Commodore William Robert Broughton of the 74-gun ship *Illustrious* was approaching Java, a small squadron of our ships was cruising off Batavia. It consisted of the *Minden*, Captain Edward Wallis Hoare, and the *Leda*, 36-gun frigate; Captain George Sayer of this ship was senior officer. About 70 miles west of Batavia is the harbour of Marrack, then used by French ships for

landing troops. A strong fort standing on a promontory and armed with 54 guns defended the anchorage.

Captain Sayer resolved to make a night attack on this fort with the boats of the *Leda* and *Minden*. Lieutenant Lyons, who had previously reconnoitred Marrack, was to lead the party. Just before, however, the expedition was about to start, intelligence reached them that additional Dutch troops had been posted in close proximity to the fort. The attack was under these circumstances deemed too hazardous and abandoned for the present. On July 25 Captain Hoare directed Lieutenant Lyons to take the *Minden's* launch and cutter and land nineteen prisoners, then on board the *Minden*, at Batavia, with orders "to take the necessary receipts for them, and while there and on his return down the coast to procure all the information possible as to the enemy's movements on this part of Java." Landing his prisoners two days afterwards, Lieutenant Lyons gathered from inquiries that the enemy had no knowledge of an expedition being on its way to Java, and did not expect any present attempt on the island. He therefore conceived the bold idea of attacking Fort Marrack with his two boats, and wrote to his captain on July 28—

"I had some conversation yesterday with several very intelligent residents of Batavia, from which I have drawn the following conclusions—1. I am fully convinced the enemy have no intimation of the expedition being near Java. 2. I am pretty well assured they do not expect them this monsoon. I therefore conceive an attack on Marrack may draw their forces towards that quarter and make a favourable diversion, and for this reason intend storming it on Monday night at twelve o'clock, which I hope may meet your approbation.

"I beg to assure you, sir, Mr. Langton and myself have succeeded in inspiring the men with that confidence

necessary for the undertaking, and have no doubt of a favourable issue."

This letter does not appear to have reached Captain Hoare, as will be seen presently, but it is doubtful if an answer disapproving the operations could have been received in time. At any rate Lieutenant Lyons proceeded at once to put his scheme in operation. How he succeeded is shortly told in the following letter to his captain—

"H.M.S. '*Minden*.' *Straits of Sunda*,
July 31, 1811.

"SIR,—In obedience to your directions to state my reasons for storming Fort Marrack with two boats' crews of H.M.S. *Minden*, I beg to refer you to the annexed letter of the 28th inst., which I regret miscarried, notwithstanding my earnest endeavours to forward it. You likewise desire me to describe the mode of attack. Having made every necessary arrangement during the day, I placed the boats at sunset behind a point which sheltered them from the view of the enemy's sentinels. At half-past twelve, the moon sinking in the horizon, we proceeded to the attack, and were challenged by the sentinels on opening the point. At this instant a volley of musketry from the enemy precluded all hope of a surprise; I therefore ran the boats aground in a heavy surf under the lower tier of guns and placed the ladders in the embrasures, which were mounted with that bravery inherent in British seamen, whilst a few men placed for the purpose killed three of the enemy in the act of putting matches to the guns.

"A few minutes put us in possession of the lower battery, where I formed the men, and we stormed the upper one. On reaching the summit of the hill we perceived the garrison drawn up to receive us. They sustained our fire, but fled from the charge on my calling to them that we had 400 men and would give no quarter.

“At one o'clock the other battery and two gunboats opened their fire upon us, which we returned with a few guns, whilst the remainder of the men were employed in disabling the guns in our possession, and every other part of the battery which it was practicable to destroy. We had completed it by daylight, when I judged it prudent to embark. On reaching the boats I had the mortification to find the launch bilged and beaten so high up by the surf as to leave no prospect of getting her afloat; I therefore felt it a duty incumbent on me to embark the men in the cutter.

“The sun was now rising, and I humbly flatter myself the momentary gratification the enemy may have felt by our leaving the launch, must have vanished when he saw a small boat bearing away his Colours, a public and undeniable testimony of the few men who attacked him, which amounted to thirty-five including officers.

“Having detailed the particulars of this little enterprise, I beg to point out in the strongest terms the conspicuous gallantry of Mr. William Langton (mid), who received a slight wound from a bayonet, and of Mr. C. H. Franks (mid), a young man of only fifteen years of age, who volunteered to hoist the British Flag, a service he performed most gallantly under a heavy fire. I hope the above details will be considered a sufficient panegyric on the bravery of the seamen employed, and have heartfelt satisfaction in adding we had only four men slightly wounded. I imagine the loss of the enemy must have been severe, but only know of three killed.

“Marrack is situated on a promontory, mounting 54 guns—18- 24- and 32-pounders—and garrisoned at that time by 180 soldiers and the crews of three gunboats.

“Your obedient servant,
“EDMUND LYONS.”

In reporting the circumstance to Commodore Broughton, Captain Hoare says—"On approaching Marrack, Lieutenant Lyons's extreme zeal for the Service induced him with the force he commanded to make an attack on that fort, the success of which so very far surpasses all my idea of possibility with so small a force that any comment from me would be superfluous.

"I have directed Lieutenant Lyons to state his reasons for making the attack and his mode of doing so, which I enclose, and have only to add that his conduct on every former occasion, since he has been under my command, has merited my warmest esteem and approbation."

Now Captain Hoare lived to over ninety years, and I have it on the authority of one who saw much of him in later days, that knowing the ardent temperament of his young lieutenant, and how he burned for distinction, Captain Hoare had on this occasion given young Lyons positive orders not to approach Fort Marrack. He had a great affection for his subordinate, but was at the same time a very conscientious man, so that when Lyons returned reporting having assaulted Fort Marrack and lost the launch, his captain felt perplexed whether to try him by court-martial for disobedience of orders, or lay stress principally on the brilliancy of the exploit. In his own words, he lay awake half the night resolving whether his course should be one to make or break a young officer who had gained his affection, and exhibited such daring qualities. His decision was to state in his report to the senior officer that the operation had been undertaken contrary to orders, but soften this by words such as I have quoted. On this report Commodore Broughton did not take any action, but repeated the circumstances to the Admiralty, and that the operation was undertaken contrary to orders.

Putting aside the point of disobedience, when we consider that Edmund Lyons was not then twenty-one years

of age, this enterprise indicates a promptness of action and freedom from fear of responsibility, which were two of his leading characteristics in after years, and contributed materially to the success of his career. The Marrack affair at once established his reputation as a dashing officer, and secured to him early advancement, though it did not come immediately. Owing to the report sent home, the Board of Admiralty took no special notice of this great act of gallantry, but when further details followed, the matter assumed a different aspect. The First Lord, the Hon. C. Yorke, minutes on December 20—"These private letters certainly place Lieutenant Lyons's conduct in a still more favourable point of view than it appears in the *Gazette*, particularly with reference to the actual advantage obtained by this gallant effort. At the same time, as Commodore Broughton expressly stated this affair to have been undertaken 'Contrary to orders,' I fear the Board cannot with propriety promote Lieutenant Lyons on this occasion, but an early opportunity may be taken of sending him a commission of Commander, and likewise another for Mr. W. Langton if he has also passed his time." The time referred to was the period served in the rank of lieutenant and midshipman respectively of the two officers qualifying them for promotion. But at this date Edmund Lyons had left the station, and was upon the point of arriving in England.

That naval officers of the day considered the assault of Fort Marrack to be one of the most daring incidents of the old war is confirmed by a letter to me from Admiral Sir John Dalrymple Hay, K.C.B. He says—"I joined the Navy in 1834, on board H.M.S. *Thalia*, bearing the flag of Admiral Patrick Campbell. James's *Naval History* had lately been published. You may remember that James says that the four bravest deeds performed in the period he describes were Lord Cochrane's capture of the *Gamo* in the *Speedy*; Sir Edward Hamilton's cutting out of the

Hermione; Lieutenant Keith Maxwell's cutting out of the *Chevrette*; and Captain Patrick Campbell's capture of the *Desirée* in the *Dart*. I was dining with the Admiral when these were the subject of conversation, when he said none of them equalled in audacity the taking of Fort Marrack by Lieutenant Lyons."

The expedition for the capture of Java had meanwhile been making its way towards this island. After stopping at one or two places it arrived at the Boomjee islands, a short distance north of the western end of Java in which Batavia is situated. From here two frigates and a military officer were dispatched to reconnoitre the coast, and ascertain the best point for a landing, while the chiefs awaited their return. These ships not having returned by August 2, the expedition set out again on that day, and soon afterwards met the frigates. They reported a spot about twelve miles from Batavia as most eligible for a disembarkation. Here the squadron anchored on the afternoon of the 4th. So complete were the arrangements that before dark the whole of the troops, amounting to upwards of 8000 men, were landed under the supervision of Captain Cole of the *Caroline*, and covered by the frigates and smaller vessels. The landing was, however, unopposed, the enemy not knowing where it would take place. General Jansens, the Dutch commander, had placed his whole army, consisting of between 8000 and 10,000 troops, European and native, in the stronghold of Meester Cornelis, an entrenched camp about nine miles from Batavia, and fortified with over 250 guns.

On August 6 the British force advanced towards Batavia. This town surrendered on the 8th, and we took possession of it. Our squadron and transports then moved to that roadstead.

On the 9th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Stopford arrived in the *Scipion*, 74, and took command of the Fleet,

which now, with transports, etc., consisted of nearly a hundred sail.

On August 10, after a smart skirmish, the British occupied an important post six miles from Batavia on the road to Cornelis, and preparations were made to attack General Jansens. To overcome his defences we had twenty 18-pounders and eight howitzers and mortars. To assist in placing these in position and fighting them, 500 seamen were landed from the squadron under Captain Sayer of the *Leda*, and a detachment of marines also disembarked to reinforce the army, already considerably reduced by sickness. Lieutenant Lyons was attached to the Naval Brigade, but apparently the Admiral had intended to take him as his flag-lieutenant, and therefore he should ordinarily have joined his Chief. Captain Sayer desirous, however, of retaining his services on shore, made an application to that effect to Admiral Stopford, who replied—"I beg you will tell Mr. Lyons from me that I consider myself fortunate and happy in procuring the services of an officer who so eminently distinguished himself by a gallant and successful attack on the very strong fortress of Marrack, and I fully approve of his remaining with you."

On August 20, during the night, the British force broke ground within 600 yards of the enemy's works, and by the following evening our batteries were nearly complete. The next day a tremendous fire was opened upon them by the Dutch, to which our guns replied with equal energy. It was renewed on the 24th, and continued for two days; the losses on each side being considerable. Several of the Dutch guns were dismounted, and their front line of defence much damaged. Our General then resolved to assault the place. This was carried out at midnight on the 24th, the command of the principal attack being entrusted to Colonel Gillespie. A desperate struggle ensued, in which the seamen and marines bore a distinguished part. Our troops

carried all before them, and the enemy was completely defeated. Nearly 5000 were taken prisoners, including three generals and a great number of other officers; more than 1000 dead were found in the works, while many must have fallen in the pursuit which followed. Our losses from the 4th to the 27th of August amounted to 156 killed, 788 wounded, and 16 missing. Of these 15 seamen and marines were killed, 49 seamen and marines wounded, and three seamen missing. No naval or marine officers were killed.

General Jansens escaped with a few cavalry, when he saw the battle was lost, and fled to the east end of the island. A squadron of frigates was therefore sent to Cheribon, about 100 miles east of Batavia, to cut off his retreat.

This place surrendered on September 3, and was garrisoned by our seamen. On the 11th, Taggal, further east, was similarly occupied. Meanwhile our army had followed up General Jansens by land, until on September 16 we pressed him so close that he then, being at Fort Salatiga, 30 miles south of Samarang and 340 miles east of Batavia, offered to capitulate. Terms being arranged, on the 18th Java and its dependencies were surrendered into our hands. Thus ended this most successful campaign, in which the joint and harmonious action of British naval and military forces brought about the desired result, and forms one of the innumerable striking examples of the power conferred by "command of the sea."

After the capture of the stronghold of Cornelis the Naval Brigade re-embarked, and Lieutenant Lyons rejoined the *Minden*. The climate is very trying for Europeans, and he had for some time been indisposed. That his services were appreciated by Captain Sayer is evident by the following letter, dated August 31, from that officer to his late *aide-de-camp*.

"I had your letter speaking of the illness that had

preyed on you during the whole of the service I had the good fortune to have you with me upon, and should have answered it earlier, but was so weak till to-day that I have been unable. Your concealing so long, and under such trying circumstances, your indisposition is certainly laudable, but an officer of your value, if such ever occurs to you again, ought to know better how to appreciate himself.

"I would thank you for your assistance, but could hardly find terms strong enough to convey my meaning. As our acquaintance has now been of some duration I have taken a few liberties with your name to our Admiral, that he may publish to the Admiralty the character of so meritorious a fellow as it deserves to be."

Shortly after this the health of Lieutenant Lyons compelled him to go home, and as the *Caroline* was ordered to England he took a passage in her. In Captain Cole, who was made a K.C.B. for his services in the East Indies, Edmund Lyons found another warm friend, and he continued to correspond with that distinguished officer until his death.



REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHRISTOPHER COLE, K.C.B.

[To face page 30.]

CHAPTER II

1811—1831

Reception at the Admiralty—Promotion—Future wife—Appointed to command of *Rinaldo*—Crossing of Louis XVIII. to France—Treaty of Paris—Promoted to Captain—Half-pay—Employment on shore—Birth of children—Difficulty in getting command—Death of his brother after Navarino—Appointed to command of *Blonde*—Sails for Mediterranean—State of Greece—Ibrahim Pacha—Goes to Gulf of Corinth—Attack on Morea Castle—Naval Brigade—Fall of the castle—Tribute to British Navy by the French—War between Russia and Turkey—Conveys Sir Robert Gordon to Constantinople—Audience of the Sultan—Cruise in the Black Sea—Visits Sebastopol and other places—Leaves the Bosphorus—Tribute by our Ambassador—Transfers to *Madagascar*—Efficiency of both ships—Admiral Elliott's recollections of the *Madagascar*—Returns to Greek waters—Sir Henry Hotham assumes command of the station—*Madagascar* goes home.

ILL and dispirited at the report sent home to the Admiralty of his Marrack achievement, the reception given to Edmund Lyons by the Board on his arrival in December 1811 acted as a tonic. Mr. Yorke said to him—"I shall have great pleasure in rewarding your gallantry and promoting you; and on any future occasion when you may have any request to make of the First Lord you may refer him with confidence to my opinion of your brilliant exploit, which I have recorded in the Journals of the Admiralty." On March 21, 1812, he was promoted to the rank of commander at the age of twenty-one years and four months.

Being now at home for a few months, he took the

opportunity of falling in love. The object of his affection was Miss Augusta Louisa Rogers, the second daughter of the late Captain Josias Rogers. Though the career of that officer had been cut short at a comparatively early age, he had greatly distinguished himself in the West Indies during the war which broke out in 1793. He commanded the *Quebec*, 32-gun frigate, under Sir John Jervis—afterwards Lord St. Vincent—who in conjunction with a land force under General Sir Charles Grey, carried out several successful operations against French possessions in the West Indies. In all of these Captain Rogers took a leading part, and was entrusted by the Admiral with several important operations. Whilst employed in saving Grenada, where an insurgent force, assisted by the French, was endeavouring to wrest the island from us, his great exertions caused him to contract yellow fever, of which he died in 1795, aged 40. He left three daughters, of which one died early and the other two were in 1812 residing at Newlands, Lymington. Their uncle and guardian was Captain Thomas Rogers, also in the Navy, who, on finding his niece returned the young commander's affection, advised them to wait in order that an early marriage might not interfere with the professional prospects of Edmund Lyons, in whom he took the greatest interest. Assenting reluctantly to this, the young man now sought employment, and on April 5, 1813, he was appointed to the command of the sloop *Rinaldo*, attached to the squadron of Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Foley, then stationed in the Downs. This gallant officer had taken part in nearly all the great actions of the war. Commanding the *St. George* in Admiral Hotham's two actions in 1795, he then was captain of the *Britannia* off Cape St. Vincent on February 14, 1797. At the Battle of the Nile he in the *Goliath* led the Fleet and took up a position between the enemy and the shore, which conduced in a great measure to the signal

victory obtained. At the Battle of Copenhagen he commanded the *Elephant*, the ship selected by Nelson to carry his flag on this memorable occasion. Sir Thomas Foley was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Downs, a station which extended from North Foreland to Beachy Head, in 1811. In 1833 he died while port-admiral at Portsmouth.

In 1813—in fact since the Battle of Trafalgar—the resistance of the enemy at sea had been completely overcome, and consequently in home waters at least there was little active service for our ships to perform. The *Rinaldo* had, however, been employed by Admiral Foley on special work, and in February 1814 her commander received the following letter from his chief—"Lord Melville and the Board know how fully your intelligence, zeal, and activity have justified my selection of you for the arduous services you have performed. You are, I believe, one of the very youngest in command of a sloop, both in age and rank, which makes it difficult to promote you at once; but I tell you honestly I think you ought to be promoted, and I have no doubt you soon will be."

An incident then occurred which assisted to secure the step Commander Lyons so much desired.

In March 1814 the power of Napoleon on land was also broken, and on the 31st the Allies entered Paris. The Provisional Government in France invited Louis XVIII., then in England, to assume the Crown, and a preliminary treaty of peace between the two countries was made. Accepting the invitation, Louis XVIII. went to Dover on April 21 to embark for France in our royal yacht. It was made the occasion of great ceremony. The Prince Regent, afterwards George IV., went down to Dover, and the Duke of Clarence, afterwards William IV., hoisted his flag as Admiral of the Fleet on board the *Jason*, to escort the new French King over. The Board of Admiralty also

hoisted their flag in the *Royal Sovereign*. Commander Lyons was directed to place himself under the orders of the Duke of Clarence, Admiral Foley's squadron being also assembled at Dover. On April 24 the Royal Standard of France was hoisted on the yacht, and she proceeded to Calais amid salutes and much waving of handkerchiefs. Louis XVIII. landed the same day and shortly afterwards entered Paris. In another part of France a different scene was to be observed, for on April 28 Napoleon embarked at Fréjus in Provence on board the *Undaunted*, a British 38-gun frigate commanded by Captain Thomas Ussher, and was then conveyed to Elba.

The *Rinaldo* continued under the command of the Duke of Clarence, who on May 31 was in Boulogne roads in the *Impregnable*. Commander Lyons then conveyed Lord Burghersh, the military commissioner to the allied armies, and his suite to England. He also brought over Mr. Planta, Lord Castlereagh's secretary, with the definite treaty of peace which was proclaimed on June 17. Having performed these and all other services to the satisfaction of his Royal Highness and the Board of Admiralty, Commander Lyons was promoted to post-captain on June 7, 1814, being then just over twenty-three and a half years old. He was now destined to be several years on half-pay, and his position being secured, he the following month, July 18, married Miss Augusta Rogers, residing for some time at Lymington. On August 26, 1815, his eldest child Anne Teresa Bickerton was born. Sir Richard Bickerton had left the Admiralty in 1812, and became port-admiral at Portsmouth. Both he and his wife continued to take the most lively interest in the young couple and their domestic concerns. In February 1816 Captain Lyons lost his father, who seems to have been greatly esteemed by all who knew him. The estate of St. Austins was sold the following year. On April 26,

1817, Captain Lyons's eldest son Richard Bickerton Pemell was born. Mr. Pemell was a relation and former guardian of Mrs. Lyons.

In 1818 Captain Lyons became anxious for employment, but was informed by Lord Melville, then First Lord, there was no hope of his getting a ship at present. One result of twenty years of war, and the large increase in our Fleet it had necessitated, was to cause the list of officers on the active list to swell immensely. In 1816 there were 200 admirals, 850 captains, 800 commanders, and 4000 lieutenants on the list. There was an addition of about 750 to the latter grade in the year 1815 alone on the final conclusion of the war. As the reduction of all squadrons then took place, and many ships were paid off, it was very difficult for the surplus officers to get employment. Every year Captain Lyons appears to have made his application for a ship, and received from Lord Melville a courteous letter of regret at his inability to comply.

On June 27, 1819, Captain Lyons's second son Edmund Moubray was born. In this year the family moved to Torquay, and Captain Lyons found his principal recreation in yachting, racing with success a small boat he had had built. He became an honorary member of the Royal Yacht Club—afterwards Royal Yacht Squadron—about this time and was frequently at Cowes. On August 1, 1821, his second daughter and youngest child Augusta Mary Minna was born. He next lived for a short time at Swallowfields, near Reading, and in 1825 took a house in Guernsey. In default of employment at sea, yachting continued to give him occupation and keep his hand in. He also kept up a large correspondence with his former brother officers and chiefs. Admiral Sir Thomas Foley writes to him in May 1827—"Believe me, dear sir, that I can't forget our acquaintance at Deal. Your character has made too deep an impression on my mind to be easily

effaced, and I beg to assure you it will always be a great pleasure to me to continue in your good opinion."

In this year the Duke of Clarence became Lord High Admiral, and Captain Lyons beginning to despair of employment wrote to Admiral Sir George Cockburn, then at the Admiralty, to ask that his name might be submitted to the Duke for a ship. To this he received the usual reply. An incident then occurred, sad though it was, which may have assisted to bring about the fulfilment of his hopes. His younger brother Maine, who had entered the Navy some years later than Edmund, was now a lieutenant on board the *Rose*, a sloop in the Mediterranean—Lewis Davies commander—and was considered an officer of great promise. This ship was in Sir Edward Codrington's squadron which on October 20, 1827, in conjunction with a French and Russian squadron, engaged and destroyed a combined Turkish and Egyptian fleet at Navarino. In this battle Maine Lyons was severely wounded and died shortly afterwards.

Of this occurrence Captain Davies writes to Captain Lyons from Malta on November 29—"The public journals have doubtless informed you of the severe wound your brother Lieutenant Maine Lyons received at the Battle of Navarino. I should be too happy to acquaint you now of his recovery, but it is with the deepest regret I have to inform you he died of his wounds four days after. It will perhaps afford you and the rest of his friends some consolation to know that his loss is deplored by all who knew him for his kindness of heart and evenness of temper. But he was chiefly admired for his cool self-possession in danger, for I assure you that during the sixteen months he served under me he was often exposed to fire from pirates when in command of boats, and was always successful, as I have several times stated in my public dispatches: but at Navarino he eminently dis-

tinguished himself in the command of the *Rose's* boats by towing a fire-ship clear of a French line-of-battle ship under a dreadful fire of grape, which must have, had he survived, gained him promotion." The *Rose* was sent off immediately after the battle to Smyrna on a special mission, and it blew hard on the way. The motion of so small a vessel therefore was very trying to the wounded, and young Lyons succumbed. Having received a kind letter from the Duke of Clarence on this event, Captain Lyons was on January 28, 1828, appointed to the command of the *Blonde*, a 46-gun frigate fitting out at Portsmouth for the Mediterranean. Her lieutenants were Alfred Luckraft, Hon. E. Roper Curzon, Sidney Colpoys Dacres, Thomas Saumarez Brock. Among the subordinate officers were Thomas Matthew Symonds (mid) and G. H. K. Bower, master's assistant. Several of these we shall find associated with him when he hoisted his flag twenty-five years later.

Obtaining a crew was in those days the chief cause of delay after a ship commissioned and before she could sail, so it was not until April 29 that the *Blonde* left Spithead. She arrived at Gibraltar on May 7 and Malta on the 20th. The Commander-in-Chief was then Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, who commanded the British squadron at Navarino. He was just about to be recalled, the Government not being satisfied with the action he took subsequent to that battle, and Vice-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm had been appointed to succeed him. This officer had seen much service in the old war. As captain of the *Donegal*, 74, he accompanied Nelson in his chase of Villeneuve to the West Indies. He then joined Collingwood off Cadiz in October 1805, but was sent to Gibraltar to refit just before the Battle of Trafalgar. Hearing of the combined fleet being at sea, though his ship was quite dismantled, he by dint of great exertions got her ready and left to rejoin

his chief. He arrived only three days after the battle, and rendered valuable assistance to the disabled ships. In July 1821 he became a vice-admiral.

The *Blonde* remained at Malta till June 22, when she proceeded to Navarino to assist in the blockade of that port, which was still being maintained by an English, French, and Russian squadron.

The position of Greece at this time was as follows. After groaning long under the yoke of Turkey, the Greeks rose in 1821 to fight for independence. Hampered by disunion and the personal ambition of their leaders, the struggle continued until 1824, when the Sultan called on Egypt for assistance. Mehemet Ali then sent Ibrahim Pacha with an army and fleet, which turned the scale in favour of Turkey.

In April 1827 Count Capodistrias, a native of Corfu, but who had for some time been in the service of Russia, was elected President of Greece. This step did not, however, produce union among the Greek leaders or improve the chances of the insurgents in the struggle, for at this time the Greeks had lost all power of resistance. Then England, France, and Russia intervened, and on October 20 the Battle of Navarino followed. The result of this and the evident intention of a further active support of Greece by these Powers made Ibrahim's position in turn untenable. He entered into a convention therefore to withdraw his troops from the country, but it required the landing of a French military force in August 1828 to render this effectual. The *Blonde* was dispatched to Alexandria to convoy to Navarino a fleet of transports, and on her return towards the end of September, Captain Lyons superintended the embarkation of the Egyptian troops.¹ On October 1 they left for Alexandria, and Ibrahim also

¹ This experience, as well as that acquired by Captain Lyons in Java, was very useful hereafter in the Crimean expedition.

returned to his own country. Thus the freedom of Greece was practically accomplished.

In a letter to his wife at this time Captain Lyons makes some interesting allusions to this man, whose conduct of the war had given him an ill repute. "To-day we have been to a review of the French army. Ibrahim was present, and the thing went off well. General Maison gave the admirals and captains a breakfast. It was certainly an interesting sight, Ibrahim Pacha and the three admirals in a French general's tent in the Morea. This said Ibrahim is no ordinary fellow. He said many good things, one in particular. On the health of the French Army being drunk, he said, 'Oh, certainly I will drink to the health of such a fine-looking set of fellows, particularly as they are animated by so fine a spirit;' this he accompanied by a significant glance of his fine eyes. But Maison asked him what he meant by the fine spirit. He said, 'You have just established slavery in Spain, and now you come to preach liberty in Greece.' Do not be shocked when I tell you that I became so intimate with Ibrahim as to shake hands most cordially on all occasions." A few days later he writes—"Ibrahim has just sailed out of the harbour, having fulfilled his resolution of remaining until every Egyptian soldier had quitted the Morea."

The *Blonde* and her captain seem to have been taken at once into high favour by Sir Pulteney Malcolm. Her sailing, her smartness, and her appearance excited the admiration of all the foreign officers. Of his chief Captain Lyons says—"The Admiral is all kindness, gets up early and works hard himself, and knows how to appreciate zeal and activity in others; we get on famously together." Hence it was not surprising that as there was likely to be some active work in the Gulf of Corinth, the *Blonde* was soon afterwards ordered to Patras.

When Ibrahim withdrew his army he refused to with-

draw the Turkish garrisons of certain fortresses in the Morea, on the plea that they were there when he arrived. All these places were, however, evacuated by the Turks without resistance on the approach of the French troops, except one called the Morea Castle near the town of Patras in the Gulf of Corinth, or Lepanto. When Patras capitulated about 1500 Turkish soldiers threw themselves into this castle, and refused to give it up without an order from Ibrahim Pacha. As the latter had left Greece for Egypt this naturally could not be obtained.

On October 10 the *Blonde* arrived at Patras, and found there the 28-gun frigate *Talbot*, commanded by Captain the Hon. Frederick Spencer, and a small French squadron consisting of the three frigates, *La Duchesse de Berri*, Captain Duplessis; *L'Armide*, Captain Hugon; and *La Didon*, Captain Villeneuve. Captain Lyons became senior officer of the British naval force, and at once took a lead in the operations, the French commanders acting willingly under his orders.

The General in command of the French troops now decided to attack the castle, and having requested naval assistance, four 18-pounders were promptly put on shore from the *Blonde* with their equipment. On October 20 a naval brigade was landed, and commenced making batteries opposite the castle. On board the *Blonde* were several midshipmen in whose progress and welfare Captain Lyons took the greatest interest. On October 21 he writes to his wife, then at Malta—"I am now going to take all the youngsters to let them smell enemies' powder. I hope their parents may be satisfied; I am sure they ought to be so, for I take great pains with them; they are in tight order, I assure you. I send you a list of the last examination of the first class." The object of the visit to the camp was, of course, to observe the construction of the batteries, but the next day he adds—"I am not so sure

that the papas and mammas would have been much pleased if they knew that in retiring from the batteries a shot fell close to the whole gang of youngsters, and flew along the ground before them in full view. They all started at first, but are now delighted, and no doubt it will form the principal topic in all their next letters."

In the meantime Captain Lyons had asked for the services of the *Etna* bombship, Commander Stephen Lushington,¹ which duly arrived, and on October 22 our batteries opened fire. The account of these and subsequent proceedings are given in the following letter from Captain Lyons to Sir Pulteney Malcolm on October 30—"On the 20th instant Lieutenants Luckraft and Dacres, Messrs. Mockler, Hay, Blair, and Austen, mates, and Messrs. De Saumarez, Kennedy, Hawkins, and Dor, midshipmen, landed with a party of seamen and commenced making the batteries under the direction of the French officers of engineers and artillery. At nine o'clock on the 22nd the battery opened its fire on Morea Castle, and in a few hours silenced the guns opposed to it; but as the army advanced to the breaching batteries the castle opened fresh guns, which made it necessary for the marine (seamen's) battery to fire at intervals for eight days and nights.

"Last evening the guns of the frigates with two 24-pounders, which Admiral de Rigny landed from the *Conquerant* on his arrival, and such of the battering train as the weather enabled us to disembark, were fairly established in the two breaching batteries, named by General Maison, Charles X. and George IV. The French and English guns were promiscuously placed in each, and at daylight this morning, together with the mortar battery and *Etna* bomb, opened such a tremendous fire on the castle as to produce in four hours an unconditional surrender.

¹ Afterwards in command of the Naval Brigade in the Crimean expedition, 1854-55.

"I am sure you will be glad to find that the zeal and professional talent exhibited by Captain Lushington, his officers and ship's company have excited the admiration of all. The *Etna* was worked up in the night under reefed courses and close-reefed topsails, anchored and sprung with such precision within 800 yards of the castle as to enable that intelligent officer, Lieutenant Logan of the Royal Marine Artillery, to throw 102 shells into the castle. Captain Lushington assured me that he received the most valuable assistance from Lieutenant Walker.¹

"I am persuaded, Sir, that in your well-known wish to appreciate and encourage merit I shall find an excuse for dwelling so much on the conduct of my officers and ship's company, and really, Sir, when I reflect on the peculiar situation in which they have been placed, and know that their gallantry in the batteries, their excellent discipline in their tents (which were in the centre of the French army), are highly extolled by the French officers, I feel it to be but fair that it should be reported to their Admiral. Anything I could say in praise of Lieutenants Luckraft and Dacres would fall far short of the universal feeling in the French army in their favour, but perhaps I may be permitted to say that the former has been nearly twenty years a lieutenant. All the mates are highly deserving and have passed many years.

"My duties having frequently called me from the ship, the command devolved on the second lieutenant, the Hon. Mr. Curzon, whose conduct fully justified all I had expected from an officer of first-rate professional talent.

"The French had many casualties in the batteries, but I am happy to add we have only one man severely wounded."

It should be mentioned that the *Talbot* had rejoined the Admiral off Navarino soon after the arrival of the *Etna*.

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Baldwin Wake Walker, who was appointed Surveyor of the Navy in 1848.

I have given this dispatch somewhat at length in respect to the latter portion because it was the first important occasion on which Captain Lyons as a senior officer had to deal with the services of others, and it is an example of that generous testimony which he bore throughout his career to the exertions—when deserved—of all who served under him.

Writing to his wife the same day, he says—"Thank God the castle has surrendered, and our men all came off well but the sail-maker, who is badly wounded in the face: the French lost many men in the same battery as ours. It has all gone off famously, a capital fillip for the ship. I have the most flattering letters from General Maison and Admiral de Rigny; the former has sent me a sword, so I have every reason to be satisfied with the *Blonde's* first cruise. I am delighted I sent for the Bomb (*Etna*). She performed wonders and the French are delighted with us all. I never worked harder and never was better."

Indeed his own energy and zeal had been conspicuous in this affair, accompanied with such tact as to gain him the hearty good-will of our allies without inspiring any jealousy at the position he held as senior naval officer until the French Admiral arrived. Placing then his squadron and himself at the disposition of that officer, all his arrangements were approved and his position practically remained unaltered.

In a Special Order of the Day to the Army on October 31, a handsome tribute was rendered by General Maison to the services of the Naval Brigade. Admiral de Rigny wrote also to Sir Pulteney Malcolm to acknowledge the cordial co-operation of the British naval force, and specially mentioning Captain Lyons, Commander Lushington, and Lieutenant Luckraft. Upon the representation of General Maison and Admiral de Rigny, the French Government granted the Order of Saint Louis

to Captains Lyons, Spencer, and Lushington, and the Legion of Honour to Lieutenants Luckraft, Dacres, and Logan. After some delay Lieutenant Luckraft was promoted to commander for this affair, a source of gratification, not only to himself, but also to his captain, as it was at his instance that Admiral de Rigny made special allusion to the first lieutenant of the *Blonde*—"Qui dans le service des canons à terre a si habilement dirigé ceux de la *Blonde*." Considering in these days the somewhat lavish distribution of decorations for service in the field, it is notable that recognition of the work performed by Captain Lyons on this occasion was limited, as regards his own Government, to an expression of satisfaction from the Admiralty conveyed through the Commander-in-Chief.

On the conclusion of the Morea Castle incident the *Blonde* went to Malta to refit, and in February 1829 sailed on a cruise which eventually brought her into Greek waters again. Captain Lyons had his two sons on board, the eldest, Richard Bickerton (who afterwards became the second Lord Lyons, and the well-known diplomatist), being entered on the books as a volunteer, first class.

At Ægina, Count Capodistrias, then President of Greece, visited the ship and invited Captain Lyons to dinner to meet General Maison, who had not yet left Greece. On placing the two officers next to each other the President said to the General—"Captain Lyons speaks French," on which Maison replied—"When Captain Lyons wanted the post of honour for his guns at Morea Castle he spoke French *famously*; and when we wanted anything from the *Blonde*—whose resources were inexhaustible—he *understood* it perfectly. He was here, there, and everywhere; and always in the right place."

The ship had already established a high reputation for smartness and efficiency, which led to her shortly afterwards being selected for an important duty.

When the Battle of Navarino occurred the Sultan of Turkey was naturally much incensed, and not long afterwards our representative, Mr. Stratford Canning, left Constantinople. Then Russia declared war against Turkey. After a gallant struggle the Turks were beaten and a Russian army occupied Adrianople. An advance on Constantinople seemed imminent, and this would probably have caused England to become an active ally of Turkey. It was desirable therefore for us to re-establish friendly relations with the Porte, and endeavour to obtain for Turkey as favourable terms of peace with Russia as circumstances permitted. Sir Robert Gordon was accordingly sent out from England as ambassador for this purpose. He was a brother of the Earl of Aberdeen, then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir Robert embarked on board the *Revenge*, 76 guns, at Naples, on May 22, 1829, and proceeded to the East. In the meantime Sir Pulteney Malcolm with his squadron had gone to Besika Bay, outside the Dardanelles, where also lay a Russian squadron under Admiral Count Heyden.

The *Revenge* arrived there at the beginning of June, but by an old treaty no ship-of-the-line was permitted to enter the Dardanelles, and it then became a question what vessel should convey the Ambassador to Constantinople. The Admiral selected the *Blonde* for this duty, and having taken Sir Robert and his suite on board, Captain Lyons proceeded to Constantinople, accompanied by the *Rifleman* sloop, Commander F. J. Michell.¹ Their reception by the Sultan was most satisfactory. It is thus described by Captain Lyons in a letter to the Admiral—"I send you a hasty sketch of the audience, which went off admirably, and will not soon be forgotten, as many degrading and humiliating forms were done away with, and some pre-

¹ In command of the *Queen* during Crimean expedition, 1854, and afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir F. J. Michell, K.C.B.

cedents established which an Englishman may be excused for feeling proud of, originating as they did with a British Ambassador in a long and tedious ceremony where points of etiquette arise at each moment. It is not very easy to describe all the circumstances which distinguished it from those of a similar nature which have preceded it, but the general effect instead of being humiliating to the Ambassador and the nation represented—indeed to all Christians—was on the contrary gratifying to all parties. There were, however, two points which deserve particular notice. We were all admitted into the Presence with our swords on, which never happened before, and the officers who accompanied us remained quietly by our sides instead of taking us by the arms and obliging us to bend forward three times. The Sultan far from disdaining to look at us had his eyes fixed on us the whole time, and after the ceremony of the address and reply he asked for the captain of the frigate to be presented to him. This unprecedented mark of condescension arose from his gratification at the *Blonde* having manned yards and cheered him as he passed under the stern the preceding evening, which so pleased him that he sent his first *aide-de-camp* to thank me. The British flag was carried by Lord Clarence Paget (a midshipman of the *Rifleman*), supported by my two boys carrying silk Union Jacks. This occasioned all of them being admitted into the presence of the Sultan. I should tell you that an officer came on board the *Blonde* after the audience to tell me that the Sultan asked for me from his throne as the greatest honour he could confer on me, to show his sense of the manner in which we had saluted him from the frigate, and that he should never forget it."

It is difficult to realize now the treatment accorded to ambassadors at the beginning of the century when they sought an audience of the Ruler of Turkey; but from this

letter some idea may be formed of the lofty position once arrogated to themselves by the Sultans and the power they wielded. At this time the position of the Ottoman Empire was critical. A foreign foe was on the threshold of the capital, treachery brooded within. Strong measures were necessary to combat the latter, and Sultan Mahmoud was equal to the occasion. Having broken the power of the Janissaries in 1826 by extermination, he was now stamping out their adherents. Writing to his wife on August 30, Captain Lyons says—"The Sultan is evincing great firmness and determination, putting down the Janissary party most resolutely. Decapitations take place in the streets of Constantinople hourly. This may appear more barbarous than it really is, for it is a measure in defence of himself and his country, and treason is punished with death in all countries. The police-guards parade the streets with a list of the proscribed in their pockets, and a firman for each hapless individual whom they decapitate with a sabre whenever they meet him, put his head under his arm, and affix the firman to a neighbouring wall, or place it on his breast with a stone on it to prevent it being blown away. I have no doubt of the Sultan retaining his life and throne."

Our Ambassador found the service of Captain Lyons so useful that he kept him in the Bosphorus for some months. At length his active disposition prompted him to suggest a cruise in the Black Sea, on the plea that his men wanted exercising after such long inactivity, but it was in reality that he might visit some of the Russian ports, and especially Sebastopol. Little was known of these places, for hitherto no foreign men-of-war had penetrated into the Black Sea.

Sir Robert Gordon concurring in the proposal—for the political tension had been relieved by peace between Russia and Turkey—the *Blonde* entered the Black Sea on

November 9, and arrived at Sebastopol on the 13th. From here Captain Lyons writes to his wife—"I had scarcely laid down my pen last night when it suddenly came on to blow and rain, and as we were approaching the land I passed a most anxious night. I did not like to stand out lest the weather became worse and oblige us to remain at sea instead of gaining a good port; so I stood boldly on, and have been rewarded by finding myself in one of the finest harbours in the world, sheltered from the gale and snowstorm which is really awful. We find here the Russian fleet of two three-deckers, six two-deckers, and seven frigates. These with two line-of-battle ships and a frigate at Bourgas comprise their Black Sea fleet. Their appearance does not reflect much credit on Admiral Greig,¹ who I am sorry is gone to his house at Nicolaieff for the winter, leaving the squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Bellinghausen, who is all civility to me, tho' we are in quarantine, which I am not very sorry for, as the plague is certainly here, and there is not much to be seen on shore. It would be impossible to describe the sensation our arrival has caused here. When I told the Admiral it was merely to exercise our men after our long sojourn in the Bosphorus, he exclaimed, 'What! volunteer a cruise in the Black Sea at this season. We who are accustomed to it are glad to come into winter quarters. Take care of your frigate; take care of the gales and fogs. The English are the devil at sea, they care for nothing.' *Sunday*.—I did not write yesterday, for the weather was so cold: all

¹ Alexis Greig was the son of Sir Samuel Greig, a native of Scotland and a naval officer, who entered the Russian Navy in 1763, where he served with great distinction till his death in 1788. Alexis was born at Cronstadt in 1775, and followed his father's footsteps. He also became an admiral in the Russian Navy, and bore a distinguished part in the war with Turkey 1828-29. After that he successfully reorganized the Russian fleet, and died in 1845. There is a ship called the *Admiral Greig* in the Russian fleet.

my faculties seemed benumbed. The snow was 14 in. high on the deck this morning. It is now clear but piercingly cold; still I am taking angles, bearings, etc., and hope to present the Admiral (Sir Pulteney) with a plan of the harbour sufficiently correct for all useful purposes. I shall be off to-morrow for Odessa if the wind permits.

Tuesday.—Odessa. Here we are after a beautiful run, tho' the dear *Blonde* in consequence of the badness of the charts has nearly been on shore. Nothing but a most watchful look-out and great attention to the lead saved us from striking. The pilots are even worse than the charts. However I trust to no one but myself, and as mine is the greatest stake, mine is likely to be the best look-out.

"A few years ago (thirty) Odessa was but a fishing village; it has now 45,000 inhabitants, and presents some of the finest buildings I ever saw. They are roofed with iron, and the iron painted green, which had a singular and pleasing effect. The same surprise is excited here as at Sebastopol by our arrival."

Leaving Odessa the *Blonde* went on to Varna, the Turkish fortress which cost Russia so many lives before it was taken. Captain Lyons writes—"Imagine the Russians having lost 12,600 men from plague since January last. The survivors look like ghosts. No one landed but me, as there are still some cases. Oh, war! All the conquerors of this fortress died of the plague within its walls." Bourgas was the next port visited, where he says—"After two most anxious days in which we were once all but on shore, I have accomplished the survey of Bourgas—the great object of my cruise—and have seen the remainder of the Russian Black Sea squadron."

The warning of the Russian Admiral was justified, for the *Blonde* experienced a succession of gales and fogs, which may be expected in the Black Sea after the end of

October, but she returned in safety to the Bosphorus at the end of the month, her captain having acquired a knowledge of those waters, which many years later was of great service to the Crimean expedition of 1854.

With occasional cruises in the Sea of Marmora, he remained in the Bosphorus till August of the following year, when the *Blonde* returned to Malta. On her leaving Turkish waters, Sir Robert Gordon wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen, Foreign Minister — “Captain Lyons being about to quit Constantinople with the *Blonde* frigate to join the Admiral at Malta, I feel called upon to express to your Lordship the very high sense which I entertain of the services which it has been in this officer’s power to render me during his residence in this capital. I have no hesitation in saying that the sound judgment of Captain Lyons, as well as the exemplary conduct of his officers and men, have mainly contributed to the advancement of the British interests since my arrival at Constantinople, and it is not a little owing to their behaviour that we have stood in such high favour with Sultan Mahmoud. I earnestly submit this representation to your Lordship in the hope that you will think proper to advise his Majesty to bestow some special mark of his Majesty’s approbation upon Captain Lyons.” From Sir Pulteney Malcolm, Captain Lyons received the following letter — “Sir Robert Gordon has written to me both publicly and privately, expressing himself in the strongest manner respecting your conduct, and also of that of the officers and crew of the *Blonde*, during the long period which you have been employed with his Excellency. His letter has afforded me much satisfaction, and I will not fail to transmit it to the Admiralty with a confirmation of what he has said, for I feel convinced that your conduct and that of your officers and men—whilst you have been employed on this particular service—has done great credit to our Service, and will be long remem-

bered at Constantinople, where it must have made a strong impression in favour of the British Navy."

Later on in informing Captain Lyons of the satisfaction the Admiralty had expressed at our Ambassador's representation, the Admiral added—"I take this opportunity of assuring you of the gratification I feel in having so efficient a ship as the *Blonde* under my orders." That her captain endeavoured to make her also a happy ship may be inferred from the following extract in a letter to Mrs. Lyons in December—"I intend to invite all the officers (fifty-two) to dine on Christmas Day. It may cost me £20, but I have not had the opportunity of entertaining them much lately, and as I believe the *Blonde* is the *most united ship* in the Navy, it will always be a source of pleasure to feel that *all* my officers dined with me, and that not one heart-burning existed among *them* or one soul in the ship."

But his command of the *Blonde* was now about to come to an end. She would have gone home shortly, having been nearly three years in commission. At the beginning of November 1830, the captain of the *Madagascar*, the Hon. Sir Robert Cavendish Spencer, died at Alexandria, and the Admiral appointed Captain Lyons to the command. She was a frigate similar to the *Blonde*, but a newer vessel, and not having been so long in commission, Sir Pulteney Malcolm secured a continuance of the services of Captain Lyons on the station, and his experience in Eastern matters, especially as regards Greece, which was still in an unsettled condition. The *Blonde*, then on that coast, was in November ordered to Alexandria to convey Sir John Malcolm, late Governor of Bombay, to Malta on his return from India. Having accomplished this service, Captain Lyons took over the command of the *Madagascar* on February 14, 1831. He left his old ship in a high state of efficiency. At the end of 1830 there was a change of Government at home. Admiral Sir George Cockburn, who had been

Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to him in December—"On quitting the Admiralty, I cannot omit writing to thank you for the several interesting communications you have made to me during the period you have been employed on the very peculiar service which fell to your lot, and to express to you the entire satisfaction you gave to us throughout to the moment of our resignation. The reports which we received of the order and efficiency of the *Blonde* were most gratifying, and reflected on you the highest credit. Understanding her to have always been an example of a perfect British ship-of-war, and everybody on board happy and contented, it may be pleasant to you to learn from me (though no longer in office) this favourable opinion of your services and management in the *Blonde*. I do not hesitate to state thus much in this private letter, and to add that on your return to England I shall be happy to renew my acquaintance with you."

Sorry as he was to leave those with whom he had been so happily associated, Captain Lyons found in the *Madagascar* a ship that under an able commander had also acquired a good reputation for efficiency. Sir Robert Spencer—like his younger brother Fred Spencer of the *Talbot*, who became Earl Spencer in 1845—was an officer of distinguished attainments and specially proficient in gunnery. He took great interest in the education of the midshipmen, and kept them to their books somewhat rigidly. To a relative of the deceased officer, the Hon. Major-General Ponsonby, Captain Lyons writes at this time—"It shall be my endeavour in command of the *Madagascar* to fulfil all the wishes of my late friend, and I beg you will assure the relations of these boys who have thus suddenly lost their professional patron, that although I cannot hope to superintend their interests with the same ability as poor Spencer, they may depend upon my watching

over them with a fatherly regard whilst they remain under my command, and that not one of them will be removed to make room for my followers."

Being a splendid seaman, his own predilections were in favour of handling a ship under sail, and in this his young officers could not have had a better teacher. Admiral Sir George Elliot, K.C.B., who was then a midshipman in the *Madagascar*, has given me some reminiscences of his former captain. He says—"They" (the midshipmen) "had greater freedom under Captain Lyons, who, being a thorough seaman, made that acquirement his first object by placing his young officers in positions of responsibility. He made his midshipmen take charge of the watch night and day. I had then been only four years in the Service. One night the weather looked very threatening, and we had royals set, so I went down to the Captain and asked whether I should shorten sail. He turned round in his cot and said, 'Wait till it comes.' I went on deck, and knowing what he would say if any spars were lost, I commenced taking in sail. We were struck by a squall so fierce that I had to put the helm up and get the ship before the wind to get the canvas in. When Captain Lyons came on deck and saw what I had done he gave me great credit, laughed, and said he had tried my nerve and my sailing. When I passed for a lieutenant he gave me a certificate which modesty forbids me to publish." I regret the Admiral's modesty, but such training accounts for the reputation he gained as a frigate captain a few years later in handling a ship. It was only equalled by that also of the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Matthew Symonds, then a midshipman in the *Blonde*, and afterwards with his old captain in the *Agamemnon* during the Russian war. Another midshipman of the *Madagascar* was Cowper Coles, a nephew of Mrs. Lyons—her sister having married the Rev. John Coles of Ditcham Park, Hants—and equally well known

for the inventive genius which in the same war evolved the turret-ship from a raft carrying a 32-pounder for use in the shallow waters of the Sea of Azoff. Edmund Moubray Lyons was now a volunteer first class of the *Madagascar*, having been for some time on the books of the *Windsor Castle* in the same capacity. He had taken a great liking for the sea, which his eldest brother Richard Bickerton had not, as he always suffered terribly from seasickness. Captain Lyons had left the latter at Constantinople under the care of the Embassy when the *Blonde* went to Malta, and he later on adopted diplomacy as a profession.

In February 1831 the *Madagascar* went to Greece, and with his head-quarters at Nauplia, Captain Lyons remained in that part of the station for some months. He maintained most cordial relations with Mr. Dawkins, the British Resident, and gave him valuable assistance in his difficult mission. Stability in the country seemed as far off as ever. Capodistrias did not fulfil the expectations formed of him, nor make himself popular, with the result that on December 9, 1831, he was assassinated and Greece once more plunged into anarchy.

Sir Pulteney Malcolm had now completed his time on the station, and in June was relieved by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, K.C.B., with his flag in the *St. Vincent*. Sir Henry commanded the *Révolutionnaire* in Sir Richard Strachan's action, when the detachment of French ships which escaped after Trafalgar were captured, and as a flag-officer had served at the Admiralty. He was a man of marked ability and amiable character with whom Captain Lyons at once established most friendly relations, much in the same way as Nelson did as a captain with his chiefs. Lady Frances Hotham, the wife of the Admiral, also took a great liking to Mrs. Lyons, which deepened into affection during their residence together at Malta and

the absence of their husbands in the eastern part of the station.

The *Madagascar* had now completed her time in the Mediterranean, and in the autumn was ordered home. She left Malta on October 21, 1831, and arrived at Spithead on November 15. Three years and seven months had elapsed since Captain Lyons sailed from Portsmouth in the *Blonde*. During the interval he had confirmed and added to the reputation established as a lieutenant.

CHAPTER III

1831—1835

Admiralty Administration in 1830—Opposition to steam-ships—Sir Thomas Hardy Senior Naval Lord—*Madagascar* pays off—Her efficiency—Re-commissions, and goes out again to Mediterranean—Death of Sir Richard Bickerton—Visit to Lady Hester Stanhope—M. Lamartine's reminiscences of Captain Lyons—Prince Otho is selected as King of Greece—*Madagascar* selected to convey him—Embarks the Court and Regency at Brindisi—Sir George Elliot's reminiscences of the passage—Arrival at Nauplia—Execution of his mission—Complimentary letters—Death of Sir Henry Hotham—Otho confers on him Order of Redeemer of Greece—Ordered home—Regret of Greek Court—Arrives in England and pays off.

IN the Government which succeeded to power at the end of 1830 Earl Grey was Prime Minister and Lord Palmerston Foreign Secretary. Sir James Graham became First Lord of the Admiralty. To the administrative capacity of this eminent statesman full testimony is borne by the late Sir John Henry Briggs, who was for thirty-five years Reader to the Board of Admiralty, and thus had good opportunities of forming an estimate of the different men under whom he served for so long a period. His reminiscences of successive Boards, published under the title of *Naval Administrations*, 1827—1892, by his widow last year, are most interesting as regards this early period of our modern Navy, of which comparatively little is known by the present generation. Up to 1830 the system under which the Navy was administered did not differ materially from that



THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES R. G. GRAHAM

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established by Henry VIII. He constituted an Admiralty and a Navy Board, and these two offices were still in existence. The Navy Board was located in Somerset House, and comprised branches for construction, stores, victualling, and accounts. Each had its chief, but all were under the direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. The inconvenience of such a system is evident, and Sir James Graham swept away the Navy Board, placing each of its departments under the direct superintendence of one of the Lords of the Admiralty. The work was gradually transferred to Whitehall, but many years elapsed before Somerset House was entirely vacated by the Navy. At this period also there was hardly a single steam-vessel in the Fleet. The Duke of Clarence had commissioned one, the *Lightning*, and would no doubt have extended the use of steam had he continued Lord High Admiral, for in naval affairs his mind was progressive. But his successors, Lord Melville and Admiral Sir George Cockburn, were not favourable to steam-ships and impeded their construction. Sir James Graham took Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, K.C.B., as his Senior Naval Lord, who being as much disposed to progress as his chief, had several paddle-wheel steamers at once laid down. Nelson's well-known captain showed himself no less able an administrator than a capable officer afloat, and many improvements in the Fleet were effected during his time at the Admiralty.

The *Madagascar* was inspected on November 21, and found to be in a highly efficient state. On this occasion Sir Thomas Foley, then Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, wrote to Captain Lyons—"I could not let the report of your ship go to the Admiralty without observing how highly creditable it is; which I own I expected from what I saw of you in the Downs that it would be so." On December 1 the ship was paid off.

Though his life had been a busy one, and the work often arduous, during this period of nearly four years, it would be idle to affirm that Captain Lyons welcomed the termination of his command. He was too devoted to his profession and interested in the special service on which he had been principally engaged to desire otherwise than its continuance. His great wish was to return to the Mediterranean. Moreover the Government now desired him back again in the locality where his experience in Greek affairs, and tact in dealing with the French and Russian naval commanders in those waters, had proved so useful.

A few months before there had been a serious disturbance at the island of Poros and conflict between the inhabitants and the Greek forces. Admiral Ricord, the Russian naval commander in the Levant, held different views in the matter to his English and French colleagues, and could with difficulty be induced to act harmoniously with them. Such was the position when the *Madagascar* went home, and the absence of Captain Lyons was much regretted. To send him back involved a departure from the rules which governed the employment of naval officers, but Earl Grey and Lord Palmerston pressed the matter, and Sir James Graham yielded. There was no other vessel ready, so the Board ordered the *Madagascar* to be re-commissioned, and re-appointed Captain Lyons to the command. He accordingly hoisted the pennant again in his former ship on December 10, 1831.

The compliment to an officer who had already exceeded the usual term of service must be considered great, in view also of the number of other captains unemployed. Such good fortune no doubt caused envy, but it was solely due to his own ability and energy. Those with whom he had served in a subordinate capacity watched his career with affection and interest. His old friend Sir Christopher Coles writes to him—"Your services in the Mediterranean

have placed you on the Public Records as ready, and most fit, for every professional call that may require extraordinary ability and zeal to execute. Go on as you have done hitherto in the profession, and the envy that always attends merit and success can never hurt you."

The usual difficulty in completing the crew delayed the *Madagascar* at Spithead till February 6, 1832, when she sailed again for the Mediterranean. It is difficult to realize now the time often taken formerly before a ship after commission could go to sea owing to lack of men, or the mixed lot which then composed a ship's company. It appears to have been the custom in those days to punish men caught and convicted of smuggling by making them serve five years in a man-of-war. Among the returns to be rendered periodically from ships was one of smuggler A.B.'s carried, and when the *Madagascar* went home her smugglers were discharged to another ship on the station to complete their five years' service.

A smart sailing frigate would take about a month going from England to Malta, and the *Madagascar* arrived there on March 5. Captain Lyons here received the news of the death of his old friend Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, which took place soon after the *Madagascar* left England. Both he and Lady Bickerton looked upon and treated Edmund Lyons as a son, while he had the greatest affection for both of them. One of the last tokens of Sir Richard's regard for Captain Lyons was to send him a handsome silver dinner service when he re-commissioned the *Madagascar*. The estate of Upwood in Huntingdonshire passed to Admiral Hussey, but the widow was left in comfortable circumstances, with the understanding that Edmund Lyons was eventually to be Sir Richard's heir. Leaving his family at Malta, his wife and two daughters having gone out in the *Madagascar*, Captain Lyons joined Sir Henry Hotham at Nauplia on March 29.

Though the state of Greece still occupied the attention of the three allied Powers, more important matters were now taking place in Egypt. Mehemet Ali had rebelled against the Sultan of Turkey, and with an army under Ibrahim Pacha was attacking Turkish strongholds in Syria. The presence of a British man-of-war being necessary on that coast to give confidence to our merchants, the *Madagascar* was dispatched there soon after her arrival at Nauplia. After a visit to Alexandria she went on to Sidon, a short distance north of Acre, then besieged by the Egyptian army. Here Captain Lyons received an invitation from that remarkable woman, Lady Hester Stanhope, to visit her isolated abode. He thus describes the trip to his wife on May 6—

“Jack¹ and I had great delight in a visit to Lady Hester Stanhope, who sent an invitation and mules to convey us, and was unusually civil, begging me to make her house my head-quarters, and from thence make excursions to Balbec, etc. Her ladyship's domain consists of about four acres, walled in like a fortress on the apex of a hill (we should call it a mountain in England) distant some ten or eleven miles from the sea. We approached her apartments by a sort of labyrinth, and found her dressed in man's attire, a large white muslin turban, a pelisse of tea-green stuff, a second one of red silk, and excepting when I caught a glimpse of her stockings, she appeared precisely as a well-dressed Arab of consequence. Her manner when she received us was peculiarly elegant. She never eats but once a day, after sunset, but Jack and I had a most excellent repast in the Arabic style. When we rejoined her after dinner she sent Jack off to take a walk, and then commenced a mysterious confidential conversation with me about the state of feeling in Syria, etc., every now and then breaking off a most clever and comprehensive account by some eccentric

¹ His son Edmund Moubray.

remark, such as, 'I have the horse mentioned in the Prophecies. It has two backbones. I could show it you, but it is out at grass.' Then again, 'I have discovered the proof of the divinity of kings. I acquired my influence with the Arabs by various exploits. I once cut my way on horseback through hundreds of them.' She is tall, has a very handsome prominent nose, a most determined countenance and manner of speaking; very pale from constant bleeding, which she has learnt from the Arabs, many of whom are bled once a week. She talked a great deal of her younger days in London; of Mr. Pitt, Mr. Canning, etc. She kept me till after dark, and even then I got away with difficulty. I believe Swinburne and I are the only Europeans she has admitted for years."

From Sidon Captain Lyons visited Ibrahim Pacha's camp with some of his officers, and from the breaching batteries viewed the renowned Acre. The Turkish gunners seeing the group dropped three shells pretty close to them, so they retired. Not long after Acre was captured by the Egyptians. In July the *Madagascar* went to Malta to refit. Here an instance occurred illustrating Captain Lyons's kindly nature. M. de Lamartine, the eminent French writer, had chartered a brig for a tour in the Mediterranean with his wife and daughter. Having reached Malta in July, he heard he was liable on the passage to Athens and Smyrna to be attacked by Greek pirates. Captain Lyons being then about to proceed to Nauplia, offered to convoy the brig there, and tow her if she did not sail as well as the *Madagascar*. The offer was gladly accepted, and they sailed on August 2. In his book, *Travels in the East*, 1839, M. Lamartine says he shall never forget this kind act to a stranger and foreigner. He thus gives his impressions of Lyons—

"This officer, who came sometimes on board of us to ascertain our state of comfort, appeared to me one of the

most loyal and open characters whom I ever met with. Nothing reminded one of that pretended rudeness of a sailor, but the firmness of a man accustomed to struggle with the most terrible of the elements was admirably blended in his still fine youthful countenance, with mildness of temper, elevation of thought, and gracefulness of disposition."

They arrived at Nauplia on August 8, and found there Sir Henry Hotham, who had now an important mission to confide to the captain of the *Madagascar*. Ever since the assassination of Capodistrias the three protecting Powers—England, France, and Russia—of freed Greece had been seeking a new ruler for that country. The people desired a king, a somewhat difficult matter, because he was not to be of English, French, or Russian nationality. At last the choice fell on Prince Otho, the second son of the King of Bavaria, and a lad not yet eighteen years of age. Negotiations with his father took some time, but eventually all was arranged. There was to be a Regency of three till Otho came of age, and he was to be accompanied by a detachment of Bavarian troops. That the new Greek Court should arrive with as much pomp as possible, it was decided to convey it by sea in an English, French, and Russian warship. For our representative Sir Henry Hotham selected the *Madagascar*, a choice which had an important influence upon the future career of Captain Lyons. He was moreover to be the senior officer of the combined squadron, and thus most of the arrangements would fall into his hands. There was some competition for this of course with our allies, but Sir Henry Hotham had by his ability and charm of manner obtained such a position with his French and Russian colleagues that he had no difficulty in securing this for Captain Lyons. He knew the service would be well done; with honour to the country and with credit to the profession.

Greece sent a deputation of three representatives—of

whom the principal was Admiral Miaoulis—to greet its new king, and they embarked on board the *Madagascar*. She sailed for Trieste on September 6, accompanied by the *Cornélie* and *Anna*, where they arrived on the 20th. Various delays took place until in the beginning of November Captain Lyons decided to go to Munich, and by personal communication with the authorities expedite the embarkation. His visit was opportune. Writing to his wife from Munich on November 8, he says—“Nothing could exceed the flattering reception I have met with from the King (of Bavaria), King Otho, the Regency, and the Ministers. I have settled the affair. I am to remain at Trieste with the ships till the troops are embarked in the merchant ships. Then the ships-of-war will convey them to Corfu, and return to Brindisi to embark the King and the Regency. I am as you may suppose delighted to take Otho. The Russian and French ships must take a few troops. I cannot, as I shall be brimful of Royalty. It is as well that I came here, as the arrangements could never have been made by letter.” In fact Captain Lyons found that something more than conveying the Regency was expected. Writing to the Admiral to explain the reason of his visit—for the regulations do not authorize a captain going so far from his ship without permission—he says—“On the day I expected the Regents might arrive at Trieste, I received a letter from the Ministers of the Alliance at Munich, which in my opinion rendered it very desirable that I should proceed at once to that capital, where I learnt for the first time that not only the families of the Regents proposed to embark in the *Madagascar*, but also his Majesty the King of Greece and his suite. When the enclosed lists were put into my hands I at first hesitated, on account of the extreme difficulty of accommodating and entertaining so many distinguished passengers. But when I found not only the King of Greece and the Regency, but

also the King and Queen of Bavaria attached great importance to all the persons they had assigned to the *Madagascar* being embarked in her, I thought it would be inexpedient to interpose at that critical moment any obstacle to the settlement of this long-pending and anxious question. I thought it best to say at once to Count Armansperg that I had received instructions from you to meet his wishes on all points, and would do my best to accommodate them handsomely and comfortably." He was not the man to make difficulties, though to provide for fifty or sixty people in a 44-gun sailing frigate—especially with a king and three semi-royal Regents, besides women and children—was a formidable undertaking. So on his return to Trieste every carpenter he could get was set to work; cabins were built and furnished in a style fitting the occasion, and soon all was in readiness for the party to form the new Court of Greece. King Otho desired to embark at Brindisi in order that he might make a tour through Italy before settling down to his royal duties.

At the beginning of January 1833 a portion of the suite embarked, and the troops being now on board the ships destined for them, the squadron left Trieste on the 5th. Leaving the transports off Corfu, the *Madagascar* with her two consorts steered for Brindisi, arriving on the 13th. The next day the King and remainder of suite went on board the *Madagascar*, making sixty-two people in all. The Regents were Count Armansperg, President, Chevalier de Maurer, General de Heideck, and an extra member, Chevalier de Abel. On the staff and belonging to the household, secretaries, etc., eighteen persons. The ladies—eleven in all—included Countess Armansperg and her daughters, Madame Heideck, etc. There were also eighteen men- and eight women-servants.

With this party the *Madagascar* set out on January 15 for Greece. No bad weather marred the enjoyment of all

on board, games and dancing being the principal amusement. The middies were in great request and made much of. Sir George Elliot says of this time—"Captain Lyons was very kind to me, and took me with him to Munich, and then sent me to Berlin, where my uncle Lord Minto was Ambassador. I remember an incident at Munich which showed his diplomacy. At a ball a young lady daughter of an influential member of the Court was talking with him, when accidentally with her sleeve she upset a valuable statuette standing on a little table, which fell and broke into pieces. I was near at the time, and saw what had occurred and the distress of the lady. Captain Lyons at once caught hold of me and charged me with the offence, thus making me the scape-goat to spare the lady, and drawing all eyes upon me as the offender. I saw the object at once, but discipline prevailed, and later he brought the lady up and made her dance with me, which he said was sufficient reward. We brought King Otho and his Prime Minister Count Armansperg and family to Greece. The Count's daughters were quite young and pretty, and the middies used to dance with them on the quarter-deck. Of course some jealousy arose, and whilst it was my watch on deck I went down to make myself smart for the evening dance, for which irregularity I was mast-headed by the officer of the watch. Being a good dancer I was asked for by one of the young ladies, and Captain Lyons hearing what had become of me told the young lady of my default, and pointing to the mast-head said that she might call me down. When I perceived her efforts my pride compelled me to resent such an insult, and I would not come down until ordered by the captain, when I found the young lady in tears."

The young King thoroughly enjoyed this cruise. Captain Lyons writes of him as "a most amiable, cheerful, sensible, and agreeable person," but adds, "The only dis-

comfort I have is the King's sitting up till one or two o'clock laughing and amusing himself, which is too much for the servants." An incident occurred one night about eight o'clock as they were beating up to Corfu, in the King's secretary falling overboard. A life-buoy was at once dropped, the ship hove-to, and a boat lowered. A man of the captain's boat's crew (White) jumped into the sea and saved the secretary's life by taking him to the life-buoy, Captain Lyons writes of this to his wife—"The night was one of the darkest I ever saw. The (to them, his guests) unaccountable bravery of this act of White's; the promptitude with which the life-buoy was let go, and the boat launched, astounded them, and if anything had been wanting to make them think the *Madagascar* perfection this was sufficient. The King took his watch off and gave it to White, promised him an order of merit, etc." They remained at Corfu three days, and then with the transports proceeded to Nauplia, where they arrived on January 30, where all the leading people of Greece had assembled to greet their new sovereign. Among foreigners none were more distinguished in bearing than our own Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Hotham. Captain Lyons writes—"The Admiral managed to give the best effect to our arrival. He saluted exactly at the right time; he came on board exactly at the right moment and in the right way; he looked so like a British admiral, so superior to his colleagues, that loving and honouring him as I do, I was thoroughly gratified, and the impression he made on the King and all the Bavarians was just what I could have wished. The day was sublime and the scene gratifying to all. What then must it have been to me after all my worry to arrive with all the transports and all in good humour! Every horse in the most perfect condition." His reward was in the testimony borne to the manner in which he had executed the mission. On disembarking, which took

place on February 6, Count Armansperg wrote to thank the Admiral for his arrangements, adding—"I take this occasion to express to your Excellency the particular satisfaction of the King and of the Regency of the choice you made in Captain Lyons to conduct his Majesty to Greece and direct the expedition. Independent of the care which he gave to the embarkation of the troops at Trieste, it is to his activity and ability that we owe the successful arrival of the expedition at its destination. Moreover, the attention, politeness, and kindness of his proceedings have earned him the gratitude of his Majesty and the Regency, while he has secured their affection and esteem by his personal qualities. They trust you will continue to station one of his Majesty's ships in these waters, and that it may be one commanded by Captain Lyons. We should see in such an act a further proof of the friendly feelings of the British Government to which we attach so much value." On this occasion Sir Henry wrote to the Admiralty—"Their Lordships' secretary will be informed by the Report I have now the honour of making, of the successful and complete execution of the difficult and responsible service of transporting from a distant country all the elements of Government, and all the means for consummating the benevolent work of the august allied sovereigns in erecting Greece into a new and independent kingdom.

"This service, performed as it has been with so much ability and indefatigable exertion, has done credit to his Majesty's Navy and honour to the officer who has so successfully conducted it. As Captain Lyons's recent relations with the King and the Regency will render his presence more acceptable to them than that of any other officer, and as his acquaintance with, and acknowledged qualification for, the peculiar duties connected with the interests of this country are materially increased by the advantages he derives from his position at the commence-

ment of the new era, I consider that he will be in all respects the most eligible officer under my command to be charged with the duties of this part of the station ; and therefore I shall arrange for his being the senior officer of the ships whose services may still be required on the coasts of Greece, as soon as the *Madagascar* shall have been revictualled and prepared for that service."

A few days afterwards Captain Lyons proceeded to Malta and had a pleasant spell of three months in the society of his wife and daughters. Both were, however, deeply grieved by the death of Sir Henry Hotham, which took place on April 19. He was a man loved by all, and a great loss to the Navy. Sir Thomas Hardy in a letter to Captain Lyons says—"In the death of poor Sir Henry Hotham the Service has lost one of its best officers." In the friendship of Mrs. Lyons, Lady Frances found some consolation at this time, as her affection had given comfort to Mrs. Lyons a short time previously when she lost her only sister, Mrs. Coles.

Sir Pulteney Malcolm was selected for the vacant command and went out in May.¹ At the end of that month the *Madagascar* returned to Greece, and Captain Lyons had a most enthusiastic welcome when he arrived at Nauplia. (This was still the capital, though shortly afterwards the Court transferred to Athens.) King Otho informed him that he was deputed by the King of Bavaria to invest him with the Bavarian Order of Merit. Also that he had determined to institute the "Order of the Redeemer" for the purpose of distinguishing those persons whose services had contributed to the regeneration of Greece, and that he anticipated great pleasure when the decorations arrived from Munich, in investing with his own hands the officer who had brought him to Greece. Captain

¹ This was only a temporary arrangement, there being a difficulty at the moment in filling the appointment.

Lyons informed the King that our regulations precluded his accepting the Bavarian Order, but that having received the Order of Saint Louis for services to Greece in 1828, he would probably be allowed to accept the Redeemer. This turned out to be the case, and he was made a Knight Commander of the Redeemer of Greece. Otho now wanted a little change, and asked Captain Lyons to take him to Smyrna in the *Madagascar*, a request which could not well be refused, so they sailed on June 13. After a few days at Smyrna they visited some of the islands, returning to Nauplia on July 11, where Otho disembarked. In September he took another cruise with Captain Lyons, visiting Navarino and the Gulf of Corinth. If there was any idea of the Admiralty relieving Captain Lyons when the special mission terminated on which he came out, it disappeared as our Government saw the advantage of retaining on the station a man so acceptable to the new Government in Greece. At the end of 1833 Vice-Admiral Sir Josias Rowley was nominated to succeed Sir Pulteney Malcolm. He had commanded the *Raisonnable* in Sir Robert Calder's action with the combined French and Spanish fleets, July 1805, and was made a baronet in 1813. Sir Josias took command of the station in March 1834, but did not disturb the arrangement of his predecessor, by which the *Madagascar* was kept in Greek waters until that ship was ordered home in October. On her leaving Nauplia Count Armand wrote to the Admiral in terms of regret, and expressive of his high sense of the services of Captain Lyons. In forwarding this to the Admiralty Sir Josias added—"I cannot permit this opportunity to pass without assuring their Lordships that I fully concur in the encomiums which Count Armand has passed on Captain Lyons." The Count also wrote to Lord Palmerston—"Je ne puis laisser partir Monsieur le Capitaine Lyons commandant la Frégate *Madagascar* sans dire

à votre Seigneurie combien cet officier distingué s'est concilié l'affection du Roi et l'estime de son Gouvernement, par la conduite qu'il a tenue pendant tout le cours de la commission dont il fut chargée, par les procédés nobles et bienveillans, et par les services qu'il a rendus, et sans exprimer à votre Seigneurie en ma qualité de Président de la Régence tous nos remercimens du choix qui fut fait de lui pour remplir les intentions bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Britannique. C'est avec un véritable regret que nous voyons Monsieur le Capitaine Lyons s'éloigner de nous ; regrets que personne ne partage plus que moi qui lui ai voué l'estime et l'amitié dues à ses rares qualités."

Calling at Malta, the *Madagascar* proceeded on her homeward voyage on November 23. Delayed by contrary winds and bad weather, she did not reach Gibraltar till December 6. Leaving this port on the 10th, she was three weeks on the passage to England, not arriving at Portsmouth until January 1, 1835. She was then paid off. Captain Lyons had been in command of the *Madagascar* for nearly four years, and constantly employed since he commissioned the *Blonde* in January 1828. During this time he had served under four Commanders-in-Chief and found favour with all. He was now well known in the Service, and none stood higher in reputation than the officer whose Marrack exploit was still remembered.

CHAPTER IV

1835—1843

Reception at home—Made a K.C.H.—Kindness of William IV.—Mission to King of Greece—Leaves England—Arrives in Athens—His reception—Report on Greek affairs—Appointed British Minister at Athens—Greek politicians—Lord Palmerston's views on Greece—Difficulties of our Minister—King Otho takes a tour and returns with a bride—The Queen of Greece—Changes at Court—Bickerton Lyons appointed to Mission—Marriage of Miss Minna Lyons to Lord FitzAlan—Miss Lyons marries Baron Philip de Wurtzburg—Keeps touch with the Navy—King Otho and Crete—Made a baronet—Change of Ministry in England—Condition of Greek politics—Otho's interference—Sir Stratford Canning visits Athens—State of Greece—Outbreak in Athens—A bloodless revolution—Otho grants a Constitution—Behaviour of the Queen—Joy of the country—The Constitution—Opening of the National Assembly.

JUST before the *Madagascar* left the Mediterranean Captain Lyons received an offer from Rear-Admiral Sir Graham Hamond to go with him as flag-captain in the *Dublin* to South America, to which command the Admiral had just been nominated. Though desirous of now seeing more of his wife and family than had been possible during the last six years, and unwilling to go to a station which involved further separation so soon, the offer was one difficult to refuse from a professional point of view. Captain Lyons therefore wrote to accept it, but on his arrival in England circumstances arose which determined him to decline the appointment. His desire was that if additional employment came to him it should be on his old station. He

knew the Greek Government had written to ask that he might be retained in those waters, or sent out again. Affairs were still unsettled in the East, and he felt that distinction was more likely to come in that quarter than in any other locality. There is no doubt that the idea of a diplomatic career had entered his mind. He had always taken great interest in the political affairs of the countries he visited. This interest had been increased by his connexion with Sir Robert Gordon, at Constantinople, and his late duties in Greece, which required considerable diplomacy and tact. At this time, moreover, there seemed little indication of a renewal of those great wars which gave so fine an outlet for the ambition of an able and energetic officer. After the passing of our Reform Bill of 1832 all seemed to think that a perpetual peace would prevail, and our Navy was reduced to the smallest possible dimensions, while the large list of officers precluded all hope of any captain becoming an admiral at an early age. To Captain Lyons the outlook in the Navy was not promising. The foregoing impressions were confirmed by his reception at home. A change of Government had just taken place. Sir Robert Peel became Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington Foreign Secretary, and Lord de Grey First Lord of the Admiralty. William IV. had always remembered with interest the officer who served under him as a commander. A few days after the arrival of the *Madagascar* at Spithead, Sir Robert Gordon writes to Captain Lyons—"I dined at the Pavilion yesterday, and the King said, 'Write to Lyons and tell him I have made him Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.H., and that I will do my utmost to get him nominated C.B. But he had better not go to South America, and that he must come and pay me a visit when his ship is paid off, when we will talk of his going Minister to Greece.'"

To be a Knight Commander of the Hanoverian Guelphic

Order was a distinction much prized in those days. Lady Lyons—as she now was—had remained at Malta, not being in good health when her husband came home, and to her he writes of his reception—“Lord de Grey kept me with him an hour and a half. He was very decided about my not going to South America, and in the most flattering way, too. I was with the Duke of Wellington a long time. He sucked my brains well, and said—‘Leave your address here, I must see you often!’ Backhouse, the Under Secretary, told me no naval officer could stand higher in the estimation of all public men of all parties than me. I was with the King an hour and a half both mornings of the days on which I dined there. He had it on the tip of his tongue to ask me if I would go to Greece as Minister, but Sir Robert Gordon, who was present, said he knew he would not commit himself on that point, as he had never been known to do so on a diplomatic subject. The King’s speech on knighting me was universally complimentary. The promptitude with which he sent me the K.C.H. enhances its value, though I must tell you there are no bounds to the efforts made to get it by first-rate people; and I am, in truth, delighted to get it, my Lady!”

In April 1835 another change of Ministry occurred, and Lord Palmerston became Foreign Secretary. On the 31st he sent for Captain, now Sir Edmund, Lyons, and in the most complimentary terms proposed that he should be the bearer of a letter of congratulation from William IV. to King Otho on the latter attaining his majority. He added—“It would not be treating you with the confidence I feel, if I were not to tell you that we have it under consideration whether our engagements will enable us to ask you to remain in Greece as Minister.” Sir Edmund Lyons accepted the mission, but requested the other matter should remain open without any pledge on either side until he got out, and could judge whether he considered

he was likely to be useful in such a capacity or not. The understanding was that the appointment would not be filled up until Sir Edmund made a report from Athens to Lord Palmerston on the condition of affairs in Greece.

Our Minister there was Mr. Dawkins, formerly British Resident in Greece. His position was a difficult one. England, France, and Russia had created a new kingdom, and the representatives of those countries each strove to acquire as much influence as possible in its governance. There was doubtless much with which to find fault, and in the interest of both King and nation it was necessary for our Minister to speak in warning notes. Hence the relations between him and Count Armandsparg had become rather strained, and Mr. Dawkins had expressed a wish to be relieved. Of this Sir Edmund Lyons was aware, for the two had worked together and were great friends.

No objection was made by the Admiralty to Sir Edmund proceeding on this mission, and he was granted a year's leave of absence. The letter he was to convey to Otho from the King was in the following terms—

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—The approach of the period at which your Majesty, in pursuance of the stipulations of the Treaty of May 1832, will assume the Reins of Government in Greece, affords me a welcome opportunity of expressing the sentiments which I entertain towards your Majesty. The ties of friendship by which I am connected with your Majesty, and the intimate relations which subsist between the kingdom of Greece and Great Britain, alike impel me to offer to your Majesty my heartfelt congratulations on this auspicious occasion.

“I entertain the most perfect confidence that your Majesty, in the discharge of the high functions upon which you are about to enter, will manifest all that wisdom

and firmness which the state of affairs in your kingdom so essentially requires.

"Your Majesty cannot doubt the peculiar interest which I feel in everything which can contribute to the prosperity of your reign, or the sincerity of the wishes which I form, in common with your Majesty's people, for the preservation of your Majesty's valuable life, and for your uninterrupted welfare and happiness.

"I flatter myself that your Majesty will receive with pleasure the expression of these wishes and congratulations, dictated by that lively interest which I take in everything that concerns your Majesty, and by the cordial attachment and esteem with which I am,

"Sir, my Brother,

"Your Majesty's good Brother,

"WILLIAM R.

"Windsor Castle, The 30th of April, 1835."

Sir Edmund Lyons arrived at Athens in the last week of May, travelling overland, the journey having taken eleven days and fifteen hours, which in those days of no railways was considered marvellously expeditious. Of his welcome he writes to his wife on May 26—"It would be impossible to give you any idea of the excessive joy of all the Armanspergs. Everything the Count said was most flattering. The King did not wait for letter, or anything, for the moment he heard of my arrival he sent in all directions for me. Otho's joy at seeing me was excessive. So all has begun well."

On June 2 he wrote his first diplomatic dispatch in a report to Lord Palmerston on the state of affairs. It is too long to quote in full, but the following are the salient points: Considerable stress is laid upon the relations which existed between the King and Count Armansperg. The Count had enemies who sought to undermine his influence

with Otho, so that he might be deposed from his position when the King became head of the Government. They had succeeded to the extent that the Count on the eve of this event did not know officially whether he was to be Prime Minister in the future. The arrival of Sir Edmund was opportune, for being a firm believer in the integrity and ability of Armansperg, with also a great influence on the young King, he was enabled to defeat the cabal against the Count, and reinstate him in Otho's favour. The difficulties of Greece are then alluded to—such as the want of money, and population, the habits of the people, and their internal jealousies. Little is said as to the character of the King, but his defects had not yet become apparent to the man who had only known him as a boy just emancipated from tutelage. He then appeared bright and amiable; but his early education was not calculated to assist him when thrown so young into a position of responsibility. He had become suspicious and indolent, so that his Ministers had great difficulty in getting him to sign any documents until the last minute. Though the throne of Greece had been accepted for him with an assumption, if not a pledge, that the country should as soon as possible have a representative Government, little had been done in this direction, and the continued denial of this eventually brought trouble. The choice of the Allied Powers in 1832 proved an unfortunate one; and it is to be regretted for the sake of Greece that a sovereign from a country where liberal institutions had long flourished could not have been selected.

The reply of Lord Palmerston on July 3 to this report was—"I have very great pleasure in announcing to you that the King has been pleased to appoint you his Minister in Greece, and I have detained the packet a couple of days in order to be able to make to you that communication. I have not time now to send you any general detailed instruc-

tions in an official dispatch, and indeed you seem to be fully imbued with our sentiments, and to be acting in strict conformity with our views." At the same time he received a letter from Mr. Backhouse, Under Secretary of State, saying—"The moment Lord Palmerston received your important and interesting report he determined to submit your name to the King, who most willingly acceded to what every friend of England and of Greece must rejoice at." Thus Sir Edmund Lyons, at the age of forty-five, and a post-captain of twenty-one years' standing, quitted for a time the service in which he had gained so much distinction to enter upon a diplomatic career. It lasted for over eighteen years, when his country being again plunged into war, he was called upon to resume the sword which had so long been put aside.

On the diplomatic services of Sir Edmund Lyons I do not propose to dwell at length. That they were valuable may be assumed from the approbation of his chiefs and the honours with which his sovereign distinguished him. But the greater portion of this time was spent in Greece. Though its affairs attracted much attention at the time they are now ancient history, and innumerable dispatches on trivial affairs would only weary the reader. At the same time our representative in that country had a very difficult task. That he satisfied Lord Palmerston is a proof of success.

That statesman, with the sound common sense which distinguished him, saw the danger to Greece if the present system of government was persisted in. Writing to Sir Edmund on August 1, he says—"Pray press on Arman-sparg and on the King the absolute necessity of establishing some form of Representative Government in Greece. The habits and genius, and geographical distribution of the nation: their ancient history and recent struggle: their National Assemblies during the War of Independence:

the expectations they have been encouraged to form—all these things combine to render it utterly impossible that they can be contented to go on under an Absolute Monarchy. King Otho has it now in his power to give them Chambers moulded and organized according to his view of what is best. If he delays, Chambers will be extorted from him, moulded and organized according to what the most violent and least enlightened of his subjects may think best." Prophetic words. They were fulfilled eight years later.

The three leading Greeks in the country at this time were M. Coletti, M. Mavrocordato, and M. Tricoupi. M. Coletti was Minister of the Interior, and one of the first acts of Count Armansperg was to remove him from office. The reason given by our Minister for this step was that M. Coletti was the chief of a turbulent party, and that during the time he was in office the country had been in a constant state of agitation. There seems no question of his ability, but the head of the Government as well as the King desired there should be no element of discord in the new *régime*. Coletti therefore was sent to Paris as Greek representative.

Mavrocordato and Tricoupi were both able and patriotic men. But for some reason Count Armansperg at this time did not seek their assistance in his Ministry. Mavrocordato went to Constantinople as envoy, while Tricoupi was similarly employed in London. Indeed the latter would not take office under a foreign domination. I find in a letter to Sir Edmund he says—"Let me repeat to you that I will by no means accept office at home unless Greeks are to be governed as a free people, to legislate for themselves, and not to be ruled but by themselves. Armansperg, Rudhart, all of them, are the same to me in this respect. They cannot speak Greek to me, and I will never learn German. Greek legislation and German, still less Bava-

rian, do not agree. They will never agree." There can be no question of the patriotism of these sentiments.

The finances of Greece were also a source of trouble at this time. When Otho became King the three Powers guaranteed a loan to Greece, of which two instalments had been paid and a third was much required. But obstacles were raised in certain quarters, and unanimity did not prevail among the Powers on this point. Another question was a wife for King Otho. More than one family aspired to supply a Queen of Greece, but the question of nationality produced discord among them. In fact Greek affairs absorbed an inordinate amount of attention from the Cabinets of Europe, and its capital became for some years a stage on which political intrigue was a never-ending play. France supported Coletti; England inclined to Mavrocordato; while Russia favoured the Nappists—as they were called—who were the followers of the late Capodistrias. They wanted to oust Count Armansperg and replace him with a Russian nominee. There was naturally some discontent at the amount of money spent in salaries of Bavarian officials and soldiers, while these foreign troops did not—to put it mildly—seek to conciliate the Greek population. I mention these points as allusion is made to them by Lord Palmerston in his letters to Sir Edmund Lyons, which are thus rendered clearer and show the practical and straightforward methods of that statesman's diplomacy. Writing on December 1, he says—"I have received your letter and dispatches up to the 5th of November, and am glad to find from them that things are going on so well in Greece. There is a grand European cabal against Greece and Count Armansperg, but you may be quite sure that I shall neither give in to it, nor give way to it, and if Count Armansperg is true to his promises and stout in his purpose, I will engage that England shall bring him and Greece through all difficulties. The French

Government still continue to maintain that all the reports I receive of the tranquil state of Greece are erroneous. Only yesterday Count Sebastiani assured me that Greece is discontented and there will be disturbances. I said that as to discontent, that exists more or less in all countries and at all times, because there are always a number of active people who wish for power which they do not possess. That as to disturbances that are to be, it was enough in human affairs to deal with those that are. We argued much the third instalment. I find from him that France wants as a condition to that the grant of a Representative Constitution. I pointed out that this would be to set up a new condition not warranted by, or contemplated in, the Convention, and therefore not quite consistent with good faith. That I was convinced Count Armansperg meant to give a Constitution, but that some preparatory measures were requisite. In conversation with Metternich, he also always represents Greece as on the verge of ruin, and declares the utter impossibility of ever keeping it as an independent Power among the nations of Europe. I cannot learn what his feelings might be as to a marriage between Otho and a daughter of Archduke Charles, but I suspect the French Court wish to have that young lady as a wife for the Duke of Orleans. Your account of Otho's mental qualities is indeed lamentable. The three Powers are quite agreed as to the necessity that the King of Greece should be King of Greece, and should renounce all reversionary claim to the throne of Bavaria, and this you may state without hesitation. It is certainly unlucky that Armansperg should have kept or sent abroad those Greeks who are best known to Europe as men of business, such as Tricoupi, Mavrocordato, Coletti. With regard to the latter, you have stated reasons, and it is difficult for anybody at this distance to judge of their validity. But it is to be expected that Greeks of ability and information

who have played a part in the Revolution of their country, should feel dissatisfied at finding that now, when the independence of Greece is won and its institutions are about to be consolidated, they are sent as strangers to foreign lands and strangers are settling the affairs of Greece. It strikes me that if Armansperg could collect these men round him and work them as instruments, he would gain increased means of accomplishing his ends, but I should like to hear what he has to say on this point."

By the end of 1835 Sir Edmund had settled down to his new work and transferred his family to Athens. Of his sons the eldest, Bickerton, was an undergraduate at Christchurch, while the youngest, Edmund Moubray (Jack), was a midshipman on the station. His daughter Annie was now twenty years of age, while the second daughter, Minna, was just fourteen.


His dispatches home clearly indicate the difficulties that beset the new kingdom, and the intrigues which were at work to overthrow Count Armansperg, and to gain ascendancy over the mind of the young King. That Sir Edmund was acquitting himself well in his work may be inferred from Lord Palmerston's letters to him. On February 1, 1836, he writes—"Nothing could be more satisfactory than your last accounts from Greece: both your private letters and public dispatches. We are entirely satisfied and pleased with your manner of performing your difficult duties." Again on March 2—"I can assure you that I see every day more and more reason to be satisfied at having asked you to take charge of our interest in that quarter." And on April 22—"Your dispatches are excellent. They are so full and yet so clear. Nothing can be more judicious than the conduct you have held."

In the summer of 1836 King Otho on the advice of his physicians started on a tour through Greece, and then proceeded to Germany for a course of baths. During his

absence he contracted a marriage with the daughter of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. This province, originally Danish, was ceded to Russia by Christian VII. in exchange for Holstein Gottorp. The Princess Amelie was young and beautiful. Lord Erskine, our Minister at Munich, writes to Sir Edmund Lyons on October 29—"Otho will not leave this until the middle of next month for Oldenburg. The marriage will take place on November 22, and after staying a short time there, and two weeks with us, he will set out from hence January 2, and sail from Venice about the 10th or 12th. Every account agrees in favour of the charming and amiable qualities of the future Queen. I hear that she is really what the Dowager Queen calls a Pearl."

The marriage accordingly took place on November 22, and at the beginning of 1838 the royal party embarked on board H.M.S. *Portland*, Captain D. Price, in which ship they were conveyed to Greece, arriving at Athens the first week in February. Of Otho's bride, Sir Edmund writes to Lord Palmerston—"The Queen is very pretty, and her countenance and manners are engaging. She is, I am told, sharp and clever, with a quick temper. She is extremely tenacious of etiquette, and very proud of her connexion with the reigning family of Russia."

Otho had not only brought back a wife, but also a new Minister. The position of Count Armandsparg had during the last year become extremely difficult, and those opposed to his policy at last triumphed. He asked to be relieved of his functions, and a M. Rudhart came with King Otho to take his place. Into the merits or demerits of Count Armandsparg I do not propose to enter. He was warmly supported by Sir Edmund Lyons, and from the correspondence of the latter it would appear that the Count was desirous of gradually conferring representative institutions upon the Greeks. To any liberal measure of these his successor



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QUEEN AMÉLIE.



KING OTHO

and the King were opposed. Of the new Minister Sir Edmund writes—"M. Rudhart is a man of violent and fretful temper, and half his time is taken up in repairing the mischief he commits when under the influence of these feelings. I see no safety for the future but in a Constitution, and in Tricoupi and Mavrocordato administering the country."

On September 28 he writes to Mr. Backhouse—"My position here is not the least difficult imaginable. M. Rudhart's incapacity for the task he has undertaken surpasses belief. King Otho must send all the Bavarians away if he wishes to remain himself, and he must make his election of a Minister, taking Metaxa and the Nappists; Coletti and the Colettists; or Tricoupi and Mavrocordato, and the Constitutionalists."

M. Rudhart resigned at the end of the year, and for some time no Prime Minister was appointed, but M. Zographo undertook the direction of Foreign Affairs, and another Greek became Minister of Finance.

The year 1839 was a notable one in the private life of Sir Edmund Lyons and his family, for it witnessed the entrance of his eldest son into diplomacy and the marriage of his two daughters. Bickerton Lyons in January was attached to his father's mission at Athens. In making this appointment Lord Palmerston writes to Sir Edmund—"I do so as a mark of approbation of the manner in which you have performed your public duties in trying, difficult circumstances."

As regards the marriage of his younger daughter, among the visitors to Athens towards the close of 1838 was Lord Fitzalan, eldest son of the Earl of Surrey, and grandson of the Duke of Norfolk. He naturally made the acquaintance of our Minister and his family, and became engaged to Sir Edmund's second daughter Minna. His parents offered no opposition when he came home to obtain their consent.

Indeed they were well pleased from all they had heard that their son had made so worthy a choice, and this was increased on making her acquaintance. As Lord Fitzalan was a Member of Parliament, and his services could not be dispensed with at this time, Lady Lyons and her two daughters came home, and the marriage took place in London on June 19. Sir Edmund did not feel justified in asking leave to come home on this occasion, and Lord Palmerston writes to him—"I congratulate you very sincerely upon your daughter's marriage, and from all I have heard of her I am convinced I may also justly congratulate the Surreys upon the marriage of their son. I think you have judged right in not quitting your post. The sacrifice of private feeling is no doubt great, but on the other hand, in the state of our affairs in the Mediterranean I should have been very sorry to have had you come away without an absolute necessity for your doing so."

Lady Lyons and the eldest daughter rejoined Sir Edmund in the autumn.

At the Court of Otho was a young Bavarian nobleman, Baron Philip de Wurtzburg. His uncle had been reigning Prince, but suffered spoliation, like many others, at the hands of Napoleon, who joined his principality to the kingdom of Bavaria. The young Baron was brought up with the King of Bavaria's children, and became *aide-de-camp* to Otho on his coming to Greece. He was intimate with Sir Edmund's family, and an attachment sprang up between him and Miss Lyons. The only objection the parents had to the match was the Baron being a foreigner, but seeing their daughter's happiness involved, and having a sincere regard for the young man, they consented to the union. At the end of the year, therefore, Miss Lyons became Baroness de Wurtzburg.

It must not be supposed that Sir Edmund Lyons, though much engaged in his diplomatic duties, and harassed by

his earnest endeavours to induce the young King to rule wisely, had lost interest in, or touch of, his old profession. Nothing delighted him more during brief intervals of official relaxation, than to take an occasional cruise in one of our ships that visited the port. At his house officers were always welcome, and his hospitality was proverbial. Admiral Sir Erasmus Ommanney gives me the following reminiscences of this time—"My earliest recollections of Captain Lyons were in 1828, when I was a midshipman in the *Revenge*. He commanded the *Blonde*, and I only remember him as a smart, active, bright captain. In after years, when I commanded the *Vesuvius*, 1841-44, I served some time in Greek waters, and was stationed at Athens, where I became very friendly with Sir Edmund Lyons. He was most kind and hospitable, full of fun and anecdotes. It required a man of considerable ability and tact to hold his own amidst the intrigues of other foreign Ministers, and he proved himself to be a clever diplomatist. He took a cruise with me once in the Archipelago by way of change from the fatigues of office. He was quite at home afloat, keeping a sharp look-out, and was on the paddle-box soon after daylight. He proved a good pilot amongst the islands." Admiral Sir John Hay also writes—"In 1842, being then a mate in the *Benbow* stationed in the Piræus, I was the recipient, with my brother officers, of much kindness when Sir Edmund Lyons was Minister in Greece. His constant and generous hospitality to the Navy and others was, I see in Lord Stanmore's *Life of Lord Aberdeen*, rather the subject of rebuke by that Foreign Minister, but it was most acceptable to all of us. Sir Edmund presented us at Court, to which we were all frequently commanded, and we received much attention from the other legations. France, represented by M. Linois, Russia by M. Catacazy, and Austria by Baron Prohesch d'Osten, afforded us introductions when those

distinguished diplomatists were met in other parts of the world, which was very beneficial to young naval officers, and Sir Edmund Lyons laid himself out to bring forward those of his own profession whenever he had an opportunity. He frequently came on board the *Benbow*, was always full of fun, and set us all at our ease. He continued his diplomatic career, but kept up his acquaintance in a marvellous way with the Navy and its changes."

Ever since Greece obtained its independence the question as to whom the island of Candia or Crete should belong has cropped up periodically and given trouble. It would take too long to discuss the Cretan question here, but it may be of interest to record that though the Greek treasury was usually empty at this time, King Otho had an idea of purchasing the island with our approval. It is more interesting to know our Foreign Minister's objection to such a proceeding. Sir Edmund writes to Lord Palmerston on February 13, 1840—"King Otho has particularly requested me to mention to your lordship that he wishes to purchase Candia from the Porte with the remainder of the loan, and that he has reason to believe he should succeed if you would sanction it. I promised his Majesty to state the circumstance to your lordship, but I gave him no sort of encouragement to consider the project practicable, nor did I conceal from his Majesty that his course was by no means sufficiently marked in conformity to your wishes to entitle him to expect that you would, without clearer manifestations on his part of liberal policy, contribute towards bringing more people under his sway." Lord Palmerston replies on March 10—"Pray express to his Majesty the high gratification which I feel at this mark of confidence on his part, but at the same time I must request you to say how very much concerned I feel that it is not in the power of the British Government to afford any facility to his Majesty towards the accomplishment of this

wish. In the first place, the third instalment of that part of the loan which Great Britain has guaranteed is very nearly exhausted, and the time is now come when it will be necessary that either Great Britain or Greece should out of its own revenue pay the interest of that part of the 60,000,000 francs. But it is quite impossible for me, or for any other British Minister, to propose to Parliament that Great Britain should pay that interest, and therefore it is absolutely and urgently necessary that Greece should do so without any further delay. Therefore the loan would not afford King Otho the means of purchasing Candia even if the Sultan were willing to sell it.

“But I can decidedly undertake to say from my general knowledge of the feelings and of the policy of the Porte, that no sum of money which Greece could offer would be accepted by the Sultan as the price of Candia. That island is very important to Turkey as a military position, and the Sultan would be very unwise if he were to cede it to any foreign Power whatever. But even if the Sultan were willing to sell Candia, I must frankly confess to King Otho that the British Government would in the present state of things advise him not to do so.

“When in 1830 the limits of the kingdom of Greece were to be fixed, I was strongly for giving Candia to Greece, and I spoke in the House of Commons in favour of such an arrangement. But at that time the prospects of Greece were different from what they are now. At that time Greece was to have been governed by Prince Leopold, and was to have had a representative Constitution. Prince Leopold's personal character afforded to England and to Europe a sufficient guarantee that under his rule Greece would have been politically independent, and the Constitution would have been a security that the Greek nation would have been happy. Therefore the larger the territory of Greece under such a Government the better for the

balance of power ; and the more numerous the subjects of the King of Greece the better for the happiness of mankind.

“ But unfortunately King Otho has not pursued that course of political independence which Prince Leopold would most certainly have followed, and up to this time the kingdom of Greece, instead of forming, as it ought to do, an element in the balance of power of Europe, has been generally regarded as a mere dependency of Russia and of Bavaria, following the impulse given to it by the Nappist faction and by the Bavarian Camerilla, and not acting in any degree according to the real and natural interests of Greece itself.

“ Moreover, the Constitution which was solemnly and publicly promised to the Greek nation by the three Powers and the King of Bavaria has been hitherto withheld ; and not only has the Constitution been withheld, but the system of the Greek Government has every day been drawn away from Constitutional principles, and has approximated more and more both in its mode of administration and in the character of its acts to an arbitrary and despotic Government.

“ By this means the Greek nation have not only been deprived of the benefits which the promised Constitution would have afforded them, but have been positively made to suffer many inconveniences and miseries from which even the Razats under the Turkish Government are exempt ; nor has there as yet been any change in this system, although King Otho has announced his intention of changing it.

“ In the present state of things therefore it is manifest that the Greek subjects of the Porte are practically in a better situation than are the subjects of the King of Greece, especially since the Hatti sheriff of Gulhani, and since the commencement of the many reforms which the Turkish Government is making in its administration.

"Consequently it would be no benefit, but on the contrary an injury to the inhabitants of Candia, to transfer them from the dominion of the Porte and to add them to the kingdom of Greece; and as regards the balance of power in Europe, the British Government would be very unwilling to transfer from the Sultan to the kingdom of Greece the military and naval position of Candia, because while that position is in the hands of the Sultan the British Government know pretty well what use will be made of it, but if that position were placed in the hands of the Government of Greece it might not be so easy to say what use might be made of it, in many cases not difficult to be foreseen.

"I can have no objection to your showing this letter confidentially to King Otho, if you should think it well to do so; for her Majesty's Government cannot give to his Hellenic Majesty a more indisputable proof of goodwill, than by frankly stating our opinions upon matters which relate to the interests and relations of the two countries."

This letter is given in full not only as dealing with the question of Crete, but to show generally the position taken up by our Government on Greek affairs and points urged by our Minister, with a pertinacity which placed him in opposition to the King's Bavarian counsellors and other foreign representatives. He trusted to receive support from his French colleague in persuading the King to initiate reforms, but found little help in that quarter, so the struggle was an up-hill one. It was therefore very gratifying to Sir Edmund to find his services recognized by her Majesty conferring on him a baronetcy, which occurred on May 20 of this year. Replying to a congratulatory letter from Lord Palmerston on this occasion, Sir Edmund says—"I am deeply impressed and encouraged by the honour and favour which has been conferred upon me."

Among other letters of congratulation came one from

Lord Ponsonby, then Ambassador at Constantinople. "I must offer my congratulations upon the mark you have received of the satisfaction of her Majesty's Government. Nobody can be more convinced than I am of the merit of those services which are thus acknowledged, and nobody—or at any rate few persons—knows better than I do that the difficulties you have had, and still have to struggle with, are great and manifold. I have found great aid in my affairs here from your exertions, and I have therefore an additional cause to rejoice that they are felt at home."

Another event which also gave him great pleasure was the birth of his grandchild Victoria Alexandrina, daughter of Lord and Lady Fitzalan, who was born on July 3, 1840, and for whom her Majesty was graciously pleased to stand sponsor.

In September 1841 there was a change of Government at home: Sir Robert Peel became Prime Minister and the Earl of Aberdeen Foreign Secretary. On leaving office Lord Palmerston wrote to Sir Edmund—"Whether our official relations are to be suspended for a long or short period, I trust they have laid the foundation of a lasting personal friendship. I can assure you that often when time and distance have prevented my sending you instructions, I have been spared much anxiety by the conviction that you would be sure to do exactly the right thing." Sir Edmund was much grieved to lose his chief, and writes on September 21—"I really do not know which feeling predominates in my mind at this moment. Sorrow at parting for a time at least from such a chief as your Lordship, or gratitude for the encouraging kindness and indulgence I have invariably experienced at your hands for the six years and a half I have had the honour, advantage, and happiness of being your representative here. I must hope that your Lordship, in looking back upon the many errors of judgment I have committed, will generously continue to give me

credit for good intentions, and believe that I am with the greatest esteem your sincere friend—Edmund Lyons.” In reply Lord Palmerston, after renewing his former assurances, says—“ Nothing could have been more entirely satisfactory to me than the whole of our official connexion. I have always found you taking the most just and clear-sighted view of men and events in Greece. I certainly made a great mistake when I persuaded France to give way to the wishes of Russia in favour of Prince Otho, but we heard a promising account of him as a boy, and we thought that a Bavarian prince would be more likely to be imbued with constitutional ideas and feelings than a prince taken from States where the form of government was more despotic. I suppose the end of it will be that some fine day Otho will have to go back to Munich, though if he were thoroughly convinced that such would be the consequence of any particular system of policy he would alter the course which tended to so disagreeable a result.” Prophetic words, though not fulfilled until more than twenty years had elapsed.

At the beginning of 1841 M. Mavrocordato became principal Minister, and it was hoped that a more constitutional *régime* would be inaugurated. But the King was unwilling to part with any of the power he had hitherto wielded, and an incident in which this was conspicuous led to the resignation of the Minister in July. M. Christides took his place, who was supported by the French party in Athens, and to France the King now looked for money. The difficulties of Sir Edmund's position at Athens during his time as Minister have never been realized except by a few. The great preponderance of our commerce in the Levant, our position in the Ionian Islands at this time, and as one of the Allied Powers which gave Greece independence and territory, brought the British mission in Athens in contact with the Government a hundred times oftener than

all the other missions together. The Government was the King, who, however trifling the matter, had everything submitted to him, and then neglected for weeks to pay any attention to it. No wonder then that our Minister became unpopular by his persistence in pressing settlement of long-standing grievances, or that he should ardently desire a change in the system.

At the end of 1841, Sir Stratford Canning was appointed Ambassador to Turkey, and directed to call at Athens with a view to imparting some good advice to Otho. He arrived in January 1842, and was received with enthusiasm. The King listened with attention to much outspoken counsel from Sir Stratford, promised to carry out several things suggested, but when his counsellor departed relapsed into his old ways.

From this time Sir Stratford became from Constantinople a constant and friendly correspondent of Sir Edmund's, by whom he was kept informed of the state of affairs in Greece. He saw where the country was drifting, and writes on October 13—"The kindness and constancy of your correspondence, of which your letter of the 10th affords a fresh instance, is not thrown away upon me in so far as you are concerned. But the state of Greece under its present Government is so hopeless, and the state of its affairs at this Court so unsatisfactory, that I cannot turn my thoughts in that direction without a sinking of the heart and spirits.

"In my humble opinion the Powers have much to answer for with respect to Greece. Whatever delicacy and forbearance it may have been right for them to manifest at first, they are bound in the end to see that the Royal Government answers the purpose for which it was created. The term of patience has long since expired and nothing is done. Towards the people, towards the Powers, and—considering past occurrences—towards the Porte, King Otho is

worse than a failure, for he promises to be a source of greater and perhaps irremediable mischief. His separate connexion with France is an outrage upon the Alliance. But nothing of all this can last. I only hope it may not terminate in a catastrophe and a crime."

I quote this letter from one well acquainted with Greek affairs and lately on the spot, because when Lord Aberdeen became Foreign Secretary he was disposed to think our Minister's representations exaggerated. In his first letter to him he says—"I must begin by expressing a wish to see you on a better footing with our allies. The Governments of Austria and Prussia have made a formal and official demand for your removal from Athens, and Russia and France have given me to understand that they would see it with pleasure. I shall not yield to this desire, but it cannot be right that the English Minister should be thus regarded by the Governments with whom we are acting in concert. I presume you have always followed the instructions you have received from this office, and I am not aware how far these may have differed from what have been sent to your colleagues, but I apprehend the great ground of objection is a restless spirit of perpetual interference in trifles; and a determination to magnify all the peccadilloes of the Greek Government. I believe the sins of the Greek Government to be great enough; possibly they may deserve all you impute to them, but still some degree of deference is due to the King whom we have placed there ourselves. I am sure you will see the necessity of great caution and circumspection in your conduct, and you will thank me for giving you this friendly notice in order that you may act accordingly.

"I would recommend you not to be too much influenced by personal considerations, either in favour of or against those who may be employed by the King. Of course it is necessary to make a just estimate of the character of

those with whom you have to deal, but I think that I have perceived the effects of prejudice in some of your dispatches.

"I have no time to write more at present, but I was unwilling to allow the mail to depart to-night without a few words of friendly caution."

Whatever he felt on receiving this letter Sir Edmund's reply did not indicate any resentment. He says—"I have just had the gratification of receiving your private letter of the 30th ultimo, and beg to convey you the assurance that I am deeply sensible of the kind interest you take in my conduct, being such as you may be able to approve and to cordially support.

"Before this reaches your Lordship I trust that you will have been convinced that the want of tact, the want of conciliation, the impatience, the restlessness, the imprudence in fact which has been attributed to me by my political opponents, are qualities not only foreign to my natural character, but altogether incompatible with the approbation I have been fortunate enough to receive during a professional life of forty years.

"I am, I believe, precisely on the terms your Lordship would wish me to be with my Austrian, Russian, Bavarian, and Ottoman colleagues, and although M. Lagrené (French Minister) has isolated himself in political matters, our social relations with him are not affected by it. As for M. Brassier de St. Simon (Prussian Minister), we are all on terms of civility and courtesy with him, but he is looked upon as a dangerous man.

"With respect to the Court, the Prince Royal of Bavaria (King Otho's elder brother) told me that he saw clearly that all that had been said to my prejudice was false and absurd.

"Still, my Lord, I have no doubt that Russia would not be sorry to see removed from Greece a Minister who

is not afraid of incurring the Emperor's displeasure by reporting to his Government what he knows. And it is very clear from the united efforts of MM. Piscatory and Lagrené to hoodwink me, that there are French politicians who would be glad to have a British Minister here who would be a dupe in reality, or who would take warning by my fate, if I should be recalled, and shut his eyes.

"I may sometimes, in my anxiety to keep your Lordship well informed, write warmly what I feel, but I conscientiously believe that my language here is more cautious than that of any of my colleagues."

M. Piscatory had been sent on a special mission from France to Greece in 1841, and at the end of 1842 was appointed French Minister at Athens. During the latter year there was a conference in London on Greek affairs, chiefly relating to finance, for, as might be expected, some of the Powers were not as favourably disposed to representative government as Great Britain.

Though Lord Aberdeen, whose views on foreign policy differed from those held by Lord Palmerston, more than once wrote in a similar strain to Sir Edmund, he did not fail on other occasions to testify to the able manner in which our Minister carried out his duties. In a letter of April 15, 1843, he says—"I am happy in being able to bear the most unequivocal testimony to the value of your own services. Since I have been in office I have had every reason to be perfectly satisfied with your whole conduct. Your position has often been irksome and difficult, but I think you have always acted with ability and discretion. I trust that the course which you have consistently and conscientiously pursued will continue to be appreciated by your colleagues."

In my brief and necessarily imperfect description of the state of affairs in Greece during the past eight years I have endeavoured to show that the system of government, or

want of government, pursued by King Otho was at variance with the views of some at least of the Powers that placed him on the throne, and entirely against the wishes of his people. He had brought the finances of the country into a deplorable condition, a large amount of money being absorbed by his Bavarian army and the remainder frittered away no one exactly knew how, for no correct budget was ever put forward. Brigandage was rife throughout the provinces. Justice as exercised in the courts became a mockery, while torture of prisoners received no condemnation. Provincial councils had been initiated, but now because they ventured to approach the sovereign with grievances and petitions for economy they were dissolved. The patience of the people being exhausted and no help coming from without, they determined to take the matter into their own hands.

On September 9, 1843, Sir Edmund writes to Lord Aberdeen—"As far as talking goes revolution is already rife, for it is in every man's mouth (and even more so in the provinces than in the capital) that the King must carry on the government on the principles upon which the monarchy was founded, or abdicate. In truth his Majesty appears to be spellbound, for neither reasonings nor warnings, even from those whose responsibility and interests are linked with his, have any effect." On the night of the 15th the nation rose, and with one voice demanded a Constitution. The movement had been arranged quietly and thoroughly. Supported by the troops, who at the same time preserved order, success became certain. Shortly after midnight the whole population of Athens began collecting round the Palace, and soon the building was surrounded by soldiers who controlled all ingress and egress. The Council of State drew up certain demands for consideration by the King and his signature. In the presence of a united nation resistance was hopeless. Most

of the Bavarian troops were distributed throughout the provinces, while the Greeks prevented those in Athens from approaching the Palace.

In a letter to his wife, who had gone away, according to her usual custom, to escape the heat of the Greek summer, Sir Edmund thus on the 16th describes what came under his own observation—"Last night my colleagues and I left the Minister after a long conference, and M. Christides told us that the Convention we had just signed would ensure the tranquillity of the country. At two in the morning Bickerton and I, who were in bed heard a few musket-shots and the drums beating to arms. Shortly afterwards artillery passed our house on the way to the Palace under the deafening cries of 'Constitution!' Again in a few minutes the cheers at the Palace were tremendous. Kalergi, who commanded the troops, sent to me to say they had surrounded the Palace, which they would respect as well as the persons of the King and Queen. That the Council of State were deliberating on the conditions to be made with the King. At eight this morning these conditions were carried to the Palace by Metaxa, General Church, and Londos, handed by them through the window, and one hour given to the King to accept them or abdicate. Soon afterwards another deputation from the Council of State went into the Palace and told the King the conditions were signed by the whole Council, and would be enforced. At the last moment the King signed. The army then demanded an amnesty, and the Diplomatic Corps found the King discussing that point with his Ministers. He told me he would abdicate rather than sign it. S—— came in and said that Colonel Kalergi would give only twenty-five minutes. We urged the Ministers to give up the point of the signing and insist on the fact. They said it was impossible. S—— came again and said that only a quarter of an hour remained, and that the ladders were placed at the windows, and the

cannon pointed to the door. The King cried and signed. We then accompanied him to the window, when the troops and populace cheered. We stayed half-an-hour with the King and Queen. She looked flushed and indignant at the noise without, but melted into tears when we expressed our sympathy. They had some notice of the probability of a rising, she told me, and did not go to bed, so she had not taken her clothes off. Madame P—— said the Queen had not left her husband for a moment during the night, and had evinced great courage. The fact is she did behave admirably. Wurtzburg was sleeping at our house for the first time and did not hear the row, so I had not the heart to awake and expose him to danger. But when I found there was little risk I did so, and he set off for the Palace, where of course he was not admitted; but as he is very popular with the Greeks he was kindly treated. 10 *p.m.*—The town is brilliantly illuminated and the joy excessive. Thus has come to pass what I foretold to King Otho on board the *Portland* the day he arrived with his Queen in February 1837. All is quiet and orderly." On the 19th he writes to Lord Aberdeen—"The Greek Government have received accounts of the new order of things having been accepted at Nauplia, in the Negropont, at Patras, and at Syra with excessive joy certainly, but without the slightest disturbance or interruption of business, and what is remarkable is that the chief Grigiottis, who was on his way to the capital with more than 1000 irregular troops, no sooner heard of the object having been accomplished than he engaged his followers to return home, coming himself alone to obey the law and not to give it. The King and Queen may kneel down and thank God they are in their Palace, and that the wrath of a million of men has been turned into hope. It now depends upon themselves to live in harmony with their subjects for the future."

The principal conditions accepted by the King were :

Appointment of a new Ministry ; convoking a National Assembly within thirty days ; dismissing all foreigners from the service of the State ; thanks to the Army for preserving order on the 15th, and granting a medal to all who took part in the movement. It was the last condition the King naturally found most difficulty in accepting. The Queen grasped the situation, however, and overcame his reluctance. By her conduct on that day her influence over him greatly increased.

M. Metaxa became chief of the new Ministry, for M. Mavrocordato was then Greek representative at Constantinople. He shortly after returned to Athens, and, later, M. Coletti arrived from Paris. On November 20 the new National Assembly was opened by the King in a speech received with hearty cheers. There seemed every prospect that Greece had now thrown off the bonds which impeded her progress, and that internal bickerings would be replaced by peace and prosperity.

CHAPTER V

1843—1853

The Greek Constitution—Debate in House of Commons on Greek affairs—Sir Edmund receives the Grand Cross of the Bath and of the Redeemer of Greece—Sir Richard Church—The Queen of Greece—The Don Pacifico incident—House sacked—Greek Government delay redress—Other lawless proceedings—Birth of Sir Edmund's grandson, present Duke of Norfolk—Greece and Turkey—Treatment of Musurus—Arrival of Sir Stratford Canning—His rupture with Sir Edmund—Lord Palmerston's opinion on the controversy—Sir Edmund appointed Minister to Swiss Confederation—Leaves Athens—Demonstrations of respect at his departure—Arrives in England—Impression at home—Lord Palmerston's tribute to his services—Goes to Berne—Advance to Rear-Admiral of the Blue—Returns to England—Death of Lady Bickerton—Goes to Cherbourg—Appointed Minister to Sweden—Goes to Stockholm—Death of Lady Lyons—Review of Sir Edmund as a Diplomatist—Opinions of Statesmen and others.

FOR the first few months the National Assembly was employed in drawing up a Constitution for Greece. To make this acceptable to King and country involved much discussion; but on March 30, 1844, it received the royal assent. It provided for the establishment of the Greek religion, the civil rights of the Greeks, and the form of government. The legislative power was to be exercised collectively by the King, a Chamber, and a Senate. The person of the King was to be sacred and inviolable, his Ministers being responsible. Representatives for the Chamber were to be elected triennially. Senators were to be appointed by the King for life. The Council of

State to be dissolved when the new Chamber commenced its sittings. Having completed this work the National Assembly dispersed, and fresh elections under the qualifications of the Constitution took place. Then came the duty of forming a Ministry. It was at first hoped that this would include both Mavrocordato and Coletti, who were the two principal men in Greek politics, and who had hitherto been working harmoniously together to secure the fruits of the revolution. But now Coletti refused to take office, and Mavrocordato became Prime Minister. Unfortunately political intrigues then began again, which eventually led to a change and a condition of affairs which did not promise a smooth path of progress.

In England Greek affairs continued to occupy public attention, the interest being naturally augmented by the recent events in that country. In a debate in the House of Commons on March 14, 1844, Lord Palmerston praised the conduct of Sir Edmund Lyons, and took credit to himself for appointing him to Greece. Sir Robert Peel in reply took equal credit for retaining him in his post, and stated that the Government reposed in him full and entire confidence. Sir Edmund was much gratified at this support, and expressed his thanks to Lord Palmerston, who replied on May 7—"I can assure you that it gave me very great pleasure to have an opportunity of speaking of you as I think in the House of Commons, and it was extremely gratifying to hear from all sides such unanimous expressions of approbation of your public conduct. I can assure you that it very seldom happens to an official man employed in difficult transactions to be so handsomely spoken of, and without a dissentient voice, in the House of Commons."

From Lord Aberdeen Sir Edmund received a more practical mark of approbation. The former writes on June 1—"You will have seen from my correspondence,

as well as from declarations made in Parliament, that your services in Greece have been fully acknowledged, and the difficulties of your position justly appreciated. It is right, however, that you should possess some more permanent and unequivocal proof of the approbation of her Majesty's Government, and I have had great pleasure in submitting to the Queen the propriety of conferring upon you the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. Her Majesty having been pleased to acquiesce in this recommendation, I have now the satisfaction of communicating to you the intelligence and of offering to you my sincere congratulations." On the same date and the anniversary of King Otho's birthday, Sir Edmund received from him the Grand Cross of the Redeemer of Greece.

The troubles of our Minister were far from being at an end. In August Mavrocordato resigned, and Coletti was called upon by the King to form a Ministry. This he could only do by entering into a coalition with M. Metaxa and his party, an arrangement which Sir Edmund reported was fraught with danger to the country. His French colleague, M. Piscatory, with whom he had up to then been working in harmony, now separated himself from the English mission, and we hear once more recrimination and complaint on which it would only weary the reader to enlarge. Our Minister reports to his Government in February 1845—"The state of affairs in this country is becoming daily more alarming. An anxious feeling of insecurity and apprehension of impending danger agitates the public mind. The arbitrary conduct of the present Government, the open contempt it has manifested for the law, and the violence of the party by which it is supported, excite the worst fears. While the friends of constitutional liberty who had been returned to the Chamber by large majorities are expelled in obedience to the will of the Minister and exiled from the capital, it is observed with

dismay that ordinance after ordinance is published granting the royal pardon to the most notorious brigands, and that this encouragement to the violators of the law is carried so far that the pardon is extended to all their accomplices without specifying their names or offences." Of Otho he writes later to Lady Bickerton—"The young King is not yet convinced that honesty is the best policy, and I despair of his mending his ways until the fruits of his errors are very bitter." His behaviour to Sir Richard Church was unwise and ungrateful. This officer went to Greece in 1827, and fought in the War of Independence. In 1836 he had been made Inspector-General of the Army, and in the Revolution of 1843 he acted as an intermediary, and rendered good service in this capacity. Coletti, however, persuaded the King to dismiss Church in 1844, owing to the influence he exercised with the Constitutional party, and this act made Sir Edmund, who was a great friend of the General's, very indignant, and called forth a strong dispatch from Lord Aberdeen. In his difficult task Sir Edmund found a sympathizer and consoler in Sir Stratford Canning, whose letters from Constantinople would fill a volume. He writes on October 28, 1845—"Your Prime Minister appears to stand roasting better than the poor shepherds. I presume, however, that he cannot last much longer. We are old enough to remember the defeat of impudence and deceit equal to his even when allied with consummate ability and equal success. I have had scoundrels to deal with as well as you, and under the same kind of patronage. Their rule is over and nothing of them remains but the mischief which they did, and which I trust that Reschid Pacha, who is now recalled to his former post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, will be able in due season to repair. Such is the force of sound principles, and of an honest adherence to them!"

At the beginning of July 1846 there was a change of

Government at home, and Lord Palmerston again became Foreign Secretary. Writing to congratulate him, Sir Edmund says—"In 1841 your Lordship left me *la bête noire* of this and other Courts because I was considered an obstacle to the consolidation of the German system of government in this country; and now you find me grown blacker and blacker in the eyes of the same persons because I am looked upon as an obstacle to the recovery of absolute power. In my humble opinion it is more probable that King Otho will lose his throne than that the Greeks will lose their Constitution." A few days later he gives Lord Palmerston an interesting account of the Queen of Greece's influence. After narrating her action on the night of the revolution, when she saw at once the King must yield or abdicate, and persuaded him to adopt the former course with a good grace, he says—"Her Majesty's ascendancy was thus established, and the greatest pains were taken by those who had access to her to lead her to exert it prudently. But it soon became evident that her whole heart and soul were bent upon the recovery of the lost power of the throne. Unfortunately she has no child to engage her attention, no accomplishment except that of dancing, which she does beautifully; and seldom reads anything except a newspaper. In fact her whole time is taken up in the party politics of Greece. It is indeed provoking to reflect that if King Otho's Queen had possessed one grain of Queen Victoria's qualities, Greece might have been in a very different situation from that which we are now deploring."

In 1847 occurred the Don Pacifico incident, which with other irregular acts that remained unredressed for several years led to an immense correspondence, and eventually exhausted the patience of the British Government. One of these had already been pending for many years. In 1830 Mr. Finlay, the historian, purchased some

land in Athens, and when a palace for the King was built in 1836 a portion of this land formed part of the royal grounds. Mr. Finlay claimed compensation at a rate the Greek Government considered exorbitant, and refused to pay, suggesting as an alternative to appoint an arbitrator or leave Mr. Finlay to obtain redress in the law courts. This under the circumstances he declined, and preferred to rely on the good offices of his own Government in supporting his claims. They were still unsettled. The next matter was more serious. At Athens there resided the Chevalier or Don Pacifico, who as a native of Gibraltar could claim to be a British subject. He had also some connexion with Portugal, and at this time acted as consul for that country in the Greek capital. He was of the Jewish faith.

Now it had been the custom in Athens for some years to burn an effigy of Judas on Easter day, but this year, owing I believe to a visit of Baron C. M. de Rothschild, the Greek Government ordered that it should not take place. A number of ruffians took advantage of this to spread a report that Don Pacifico was the cause of the custom being discontinued, and excited the people to attack his house that they might plunder it. About noon therefore on Easter Sunday a mob of about 300 went and battered in his door, then, having ill-treated the family, proceeded to break all the furniture and carry off everything of value they could find. While this was going on for over an hour the police made no attempt to restrain the rioters or protect the owner. Information of the outrage reached Sir Edmund while at church, and he sent at once to ask the Minister of the Interior to stop these lawless acts, but so dilatory was the latter in taking the necessary measures that the mob had completed their work and carried off the plunder before any restraining authority arrived on the scene. Committed thus in the broad light

of day, soldiers and police looking on impassively, it was an incident not only monstrous, but substantiating all that had been said by our Minister as to the state of the country produced by bad government. Its gravity as an act against an inoffensive citizen of another state was augmented by the inexcusable delay of the Greek Ministry in giving redress and awarding compensation. Having informed the responsible Minister of the deed in progress, and thinking he would at once administer justice, Sir Edmund waited three weeks before urging upon M. Coletti that Don Pacifico's losses should be made good. On July 9 he informs Lord Palmerston that no notice had been taken of his letter, who instructed him to demand compensation. Thus began a long correspondence which went on until after Sir Edmund left Athens, and only ended by the British fleet being ordered to adopt an action which brought about a settlement of all claims. By that time—1850—there were four distinct matters for which we urged in vain attention and compensation. Two have been mentioned. Another was the plunder in 1846 of six boats belonging to natives of the Ionian Islands at the Greek port of Salcina. This scandalous act was also perpetrated in open day. A band of twelve men beat the Custom House officer, and made him hail the captains of these boats to bring their papers on shore. On landing they were set upon and bound, while the robbers went off and took everything out of the boats they could find. The authorities took no steps to discover and punish the offenders.

Then there was the case of an Ionian subject at Patras, who having been taken into custody on suspicion of stealing was tortured in a barbarous fashion in order to extort a confession from him. Stones of large size were placed on his chest, the police jumped upon them, varying the treatment with bastinado severely applied, and other ancient Turkish forms of torture. Lord Palmerston demanded

retribution in language befitting the occasion. "Her Majesty's Government had hoped that such practices as these, which are unauthorized by the law and Constitution of Greece, and are reprobated by the general consent of all civilized nations, had ceased to disgrace the Executive Government of Greece." He desired Sir Edmund to demand the dismissal of the offending police and compensation to the victim, trusting that by the next packet he would be informed of the compliance of the Greek Government. This body, however, took no heed. When after years of evasion our Government resorted to force to obtain a settlement, there was quite an outcry against our high-handed proceedings against a weak country. But Lord Palmerston dispelled these allegations, and his *Civis Romanus Sum* speech on that occasion will ever remain as a memorial of principles establishing the right of a British subject however humble, and in all parts of the world, to the protection of his Government.

The death of M. Coletti in September 1847 did not bring the change many would have wished in Greek administration. He was succeeded by the Minister of War, General Tzavellas, a brave soldier, whose creed was a hope some day to see the Greeks in possession of Constantinople, and passive obedience to his sovereign.

The only incident of note in Sir Edmund's family at this time was the birth on December 27 of his grandson, the present and fifteenth Duke of Norfolk. There had been three daughters previously. Since he left England in 1835 Sir Edmund had not once been home, his continuous efforts being directed to avert the blow which later fell upon the sovereign of Greece. Besides the special points on which we had claims against this Government already enumerated, there were other matters that demanded constant representation. The finances of Greece seemed hopeless. The interest of the loan guaranteed by the

Protecting Powers was always in arrear, and when pressed for payment the only proposition that the financial advisers of the King seem to have made was that a new loan should be obtained out of which to pay the accumulating interest of the old one. As for making revenue cover expenditure and interest on debt, no serious effort had yet been made.

The relations between Greece and Turkey were also a constant source of anxiety. Then as now an invasion of Thessaly appeared natural and right to many who only recently had received a considerable slice of Turkish territory. Like in recent times the Greeks believed themselves fully capable of meeting and beating their old masters in the field. Being friendly with Turkey, and as one—if not the most prominent—of the Powers which had created this troublesome State, the Sultan looked to us to curb its energy on his frontier. With commendable patience he put up with much, but his representative in Greece, the amiable Musurus, had a difficult task. Indeed in 1847 he left Athens owing to a public affront received from the King. It required nearly a year of European diplomacy to obtain amends and get him back to Athens. The incident became a misfortune when two months after his return a fanatic Greek attempted to assassinate him, and succeeded in lodging a bullet in his arm, causing a troublesome wound, but not interrupting the peaceful relations between the two countries. Sir Stratford Canning went home in 1846, but at the beginning of 1848 was requested to resume his position as Ambassador at Constantinople. He had a special mission from Lord Palmerston to call at the principal capitals of Europe on his way out to discuss matters with our representatives, and especially he was to visit Athens, and endeavour to improve political affairs in Greece. This was previous to the gathering of that extraordinary wave of revolution which rolled over the greater part of Europe in 1848.

Attached to this mission was Lord Augustus Loftus, who published his *Reminiscences* in 1892, and gives an account of its proceedings which is useful for these memoirs, because the visit to Athens led to an unfortunate rupture of those friendly relations which had existed between Sir Stratford and Sir Edmund for so many years.

There is always some risk of such an occurrence in sending a leading diplomatist to a Court at which there is a duly accredited representative. Curiously enough Lord Palmerston had shortly before recognized this, for Sir Edmund having heard a rumour to that effect the previous year wrote deprecating such action, and received the following reply from Lord Palmerston—

“ Foreign Office, April 14, 1847.

“ I can assure you that I have no intention of sending a special mission to Athens. There is nothing for us to learn as to the state of Greece which has not been told us in your dispatches. I am sure that you can effect more on any point than a new-comer could accomplish, and I have a dislike on general principles to sending a special mission unless in the occasional absence of the regular Minister at any Court, because, as you say, such a special mission is liable to be understood as indicating want of confidence in the regular Minister, and must therefore diminish his power to be useful.”

This should be remembered in the light of subsequent events.

Our Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna were Lord Westmoreland and Lord Ponsonby. There are many letters from both to Sir Edmund Lyons, and Lord Augustus says that neither of them quite liked the visit of Sir Stratford. From Vienna the latter went on to Munich, the capital of Bavaria, where at the Court no doubt he heard much of Otho's alleged grievances, and his differ-

ences with the Constitutional party. Apparently in Germany they sought to persuade him that the British Minister at Athens was a personal enemy of the King of Greece.

Sir Stratford seems to have made up his mind that on arrival he would treat all parties alike, and not show any partiality even to his own countrymen. Unfortunately he did not previously tell Sir Edmund this, or Sir Richard Church, who was another very old friend of his, but an incident revealed it. The party landed at the Piræus about nine o'clock in the evening of June 2, where General Church had met them. Sir Edmund had sent his carriage for the party, and on Lady Canning getting in she unwittingly invited the General to take a seat. Thinking it would defeat his plan to be seen driving up to Athens on arrival with one of the principal members of the Constitutional party—for General Church was a member of the Greek Senate—Sir Stratford appealed to the English Consul in his difficulty, for he would not get into the carriage. Eventually Lord Augustus Loftus had to tell the General, and he got out. The Cannings then drove up to the hotel at Athens, having declined our Minister's hospitality owing to the size of their party. This Sir Edmund at first thought kind and natural. But when the Piræus incident transpired, and some expressions Sir Stratford had unguardedly used to the Consul, as well as some remarks said to have been made by him before reaching Athens, came to Sir Edmund's ears, he broke off friendly relations with his old friend, and the two had little communication after the first few days of Sir Stratford's three weeks' stay at Athens.

It must be remembered that by his long correspondence with Sir Stratford at Constantinople he had every reason to believe his policy at Athens was concurred in by that statesman. Nay more, that if he came it would be in open support of that policy which had received the appro-

bation of the British Government, and which he firmly believed was the only policy that could save the country from another revolution or ruin. When Sir Stratford turned his back on Church, and acted independently of the British Minister, it seemed as if he now disapproved of their proceedings and accepted the assertion that the latter had not treated the King properly.

I have read the whole correspondence that passed between the two, as well as what went home on the subject, and it is not my intention to reproduce any portion. One rises from the perusal with the exclamation—"Oh, the pity of it!" The natures of the two men had something in common which was a bar to conciliation. Each was impulsive and easily moved to anger at what appeared to be a departure from the right track. Both were tenacious of their opinions, while Sir Edmund was a man who never accepted a slight, real or supposed, even from the highest, without vigorous retaliation or demand for explanation. In this instance, rightly or wrongly, he was touched to the quick. To avoid giving an opinion as between two men whose memory the country justly honours, but in case any vindication is necessary of him whose life is recorded in these pages, I find it in the following letter from Lord Palmerston to Sir Edmund of July 24, 1848—

"You may assure Tricoupi that I have not altered an iota of my opinions and views about Greece; though I have better hopes than I had as to her welfare. For now that Constitutional government is established throughout Europe from west to east, and from south to north, it is quite impossible that Greece can long continue to be the practical exception. Besides which the present system of arbitrary and corrupt government in Greece has lost the support which it has so long received from Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, and its support from Munich will necessarily be much less stout than it has heretofore been. The only

political sympathy which King Otho can now look for must come from Petersburg, and I believe that even there his system is considered unwise and impolitic. However, as the King of Greece has made one step in advance, we ought to encourage him to go on, and without expressing ourselves entirely satisfied with what he has done, we should treat it as an earnest of better things. Especially if the new Ministers should show by their conduct that they mean to pursue an improved system of government.

“With regard to Sir S. Canning’s differences with yourself, Church, Mavrocordato, and others, he evidently meant well, but I think he was mistaken. He practically acknowledged a belief that the objection of King Otho to yourself and the others I have mentioned is founded on personal grounds, whereas it is evident that this dislike is founded on political grounds. He, the King, dislikes men who are attached to Constitutional principles of government, and as he cannot confess that reason, because it would be his own condemnation, he puts forward personal feelings of which no one can in argument pretend to be a judge but himself. I think that Canning would have had a better chance of success if he had at once put aside all question about personal feelings, which a Constitutional sovereign has no business to give way to even if he should happen to entertain them.

“I think, however, that Canning was right in not going to your house, because the communications of many people, whom it was right for him to see, must obviously be more free and easy with him at an hotel than at the house of the English Minister.

“Perhaps on the whole, both you and Church attached more importance than you need have done to the course which Canning adopted, because it was evident that that course was taken by him under the idea that it would best enable him to perform his duties at Athens, and had

nothing to do with any change of personal feeling towards Church or yourself, and you might as well perhaps have let him take his own way in a matter in regard to which the responsibility rested with himself."

It may be stated here that when Sir Stratford and Sir Edmund met again in December 1853, at Constantinople, under circumstances which demanded putting aside all personal feelings, and required hearty co-operation for the benefit of their country in a great operation, their old friendly relations were at once renewed. Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the intercourse between them during the whole period of the Russian war.

Fourteen years had now elapsed since Sir Edmund Lyons came to Greece as British Minister, during which period he had not once left the country, devoting his best efforts to carrying out the instructions of his Government, and striving to ameliorate the condition of the nation in which he took so much interest.

He had never lost hope that in time success would reward those efforts, notwithstanding much anxiety, frequent disappointment, and strenuous opposition. Success came in due course, but not in his lifetime; and it may have been delayed by other hands taking his place at the helm. On January 30, 1849, Lord Palmerston wrote to him—"I have been able to make an arrangement which will relieve you from the confines of civilization and will bring you more into the centre of European diplomacy. I have taken the Queen's pleasure for appointing you Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Confederation, and think you will find this post in many respects more agreeable than that which you now hold. Your successor at Athens will be Mr. Wyse, lately one of the members of the India Board. Mr. Wyse has travelled much in Greece and in the Levant, and speaks modern Greek with ease, and he will pursue the same line of policy which you have invari-

ably followed. He will be ready to go out very soon. With regard to yourself, I should like to know what your wishes are as to going direct to Berne or coming home first on leave."

If the King and Queen of Greece rejoiced at the removal of a personage who had never ceased to urge them to adopt a policy for which they had no inclination, they regretted losing a man who had brought them to Greece, and who was associated with the earliest recollections of their adopted country. King Otho remembered always with pleasure his host in the *Madagascar*, probably the happiest time of his life, and the young Queen who had stepped practically from the schoolroom to a throne knew that though often opposing, none had their prosperity really more at heart than Sir Edmund Lyons. In the revolution of 1843 she had turned to him for counsel, and following good advice saved the throne to her husband. The farewell of both to the retiring Minister was cordial in the extreme. On March 26, Sir Edmund embarked on the King's yacht, lent by his Majesty, and left the Piræus for the last time. Mr. Philip Griffith, Secretary of Legation, remained in charge of the British Mission, and he thus reports this event—

"Sir Edmund Lyons has himself informed your Lordship of the gracious bearing of the King and Queen of Greece towards him on his departure from Athens. It is now a most agreeable duty for me to report that all the Greek authorities vied with each other in showing an earnest wish to be of use to him, and to prove the respect with which his eminent services to Greece has inspired them, and it has been most gratifying to see the deep sense of gratitude which all classes of Greeks have manifested towards him during the interval which has elapsed since he received his letters of recall. The departure of Sir Edmund Lyons was attended by a demonstration of public

feeling most gratifying to the heart of a high-minded man, and most honourable to the British name. The numbers of people of high station who accompanied him to the Piræus, and the number that waited for him there, showed in the most flattering manner the respect and attachment with which he was regarded. His departure has produced a general feeling of sorrow, and indeed I may say a certain degree of despondency, not only amongst the friends of Constitutional freedom but even amongst its opponents, who are apprehensive that in the event of another outbreak similar to that of September 1843, they will be placed in a very critical position, for they are well aware that the preservation of the throne on that occasion, and for several months subsequently, is mainly attributable to his firmness and to the influence he possessed over the leading men of Greece."

Of all those who regretted the departure of Sir Edmund Lyons, none so much as his fellow-worker and loyal supporter Sir Richard Church, who on that day wrote as follows—"All I could say if I wrote a volume to you could not tell what I feel on separating from you and Lady Lyons. The loneliness I felt at times when after our heaviest disasters in the war against the Turks, when I had, I may say, the fate of this nation on my responsibility, never affected me as I now feel. There was then the noble feeling of contending against difficulties on the field to support me, to animate me; there is nothing now.

"Be happy wherever you may be: this is my sincere desire, and you leave this bearing with you the best feelings of the Greeks in general. No man ever left a country under more honourable circumstances than you do."

When Sir Edmund Lyons arrived in England he found an impression prevailed in certain quarters that our Government was not altogether satisfied with the manner in which

he had latterly carried out his duties in Greece. After an interview with Lord Palmerston, he wrote him a letter asking for an assurance that such was not the case. Lord Palmerston's answer on July 28 fully dispels the idea. He says—"In reply to your letter of the 17th inst., which pressure of business has prevented me from answering sooner, I can say with great pleasure that your public conduct in Greece during the whole time you were there, and from the commencement of your mission to the day of its termination, was such as to merit my entire approbation.

"The position in which you were placed during a great portion of that time was, from a combination of various circumstances over which you could have no control, one of great difficulty. The instructions which you had to execute were often unpalatable to the Government to which you were accredited, and frequently at variance with the policy which the majority of your diplomatic colleagues were instructed to support, and while you executed with fidelity the instructions which you received from your own Government, I never had reason to think that you rendered those instructions unnecessarily distasteful by your manner of carrying them into effect.

"The signal marks of the favour of the Crown which you received during the period of your mission, fully attest that your services were approved, and I can have no hesitation in assuring you, in compliance with your wishes, that I entertain still, and without any abatement, the same good opinion of those services, which was repeatedly expressed to you by myself and by Lord Aberdeen during your residence at Athens."

With testimony so full and complete from such a distinguished statesman I may leave the services of Sir Edmund Lyons while at Athens, simply adding that having gone through an immense mass of correspondence and dispatches connected with that period, and of which only

a very small portion could be given here with interest to the reader, it appears to me as an independent reviewer, that but for the consistent attitude of our Minister, Greece must have either lost its independence or passed through a violent convulsion of order with perhaps an equally disastrous result. As we all know Otho had to abdicate in 1862. That this took place quietly and that his misrule did not weaken to any extent the desire of the Greeks for a king, was probably due to the efforts of the man who during those first fourteen years of the Monarchy persistently instilled into the minds of all in Greece that a Constitutional sovereign and representative government were not only compatible but gave most promise to a nation like the Greeks of prosperity and development.

Various matters detained Sir Edmund Lyons in England until the end of the year, when he left to take up his new appointment at Berne. On January 14, 1850, he was promoted to Rear-Admiral of the Blue, after thirty-five and a half years' service as captain, and being then just over fifty-nine years of age. Thus notwithstanding his rapid advancement in the lower grades he did not obtain this step until four years after the time when in the present day a captain, if not promoted, would be retired. The long period in that rank which then prevailed resulted from the great number of officers accumulated during the old wars, no serious steps having yet been taken for their reduction. Few admirals were made under sixty years of age, and were therefore old men when they attained to command of fleets. It was not easy to find among them the vigour essential for war service, though capable of executing the ordinary peace routine of a station. Sir Edmund seems to have been recognized as an exception, and a general opinion prevailed that he would hoist his flag sooner or later. The letters of congratulation to him clearly indicate this. Captain George Elliot, of H.M.S.

Phaeton, writes on January 15, "I wish to be one of the first to express to my old captain the pleasure I feel in calling him Admiral, and I hope sincerely to see his flag flying where so few are at the present day capable of serving with credit to our noble profession. There is not one, can be almost said. We live in odd times and we may want such a man as my old captain; and may I sail under his flag is all I now ask—and the sooner the better."

At the beginning of March Sir Edmund had to return to England owing to the illness and death of his more than dear friend, Lady Bickerton. For fifty years their mutual attachment had continued without a break—she viewed him as a son, and his children as her grandchildren; while his feelings towards her had always been of a filial nature. A few years before her mind had given way, and therefore he did not latterly see so much of her; but none the less he deeply mourned her loss. She carried out the wishes of her husband—and her own—in making Sir Edmund her heir. Though simple in his own tastes, the addition to his income thus secured was acceptable, enabling him to maintain what he considered a fitting position as British Minister, as to which he held a strong view. Generous by nature he was always most hospitable—no less when captain of a frigate as when in charge of a mission—because hospitality was not only a pleasure to him, but in his opinion essentially a duty attached to the position in which he was placed.

Sir Edmund remained in England during the summer, principally on account of a discussion in Parliament on Greek affairs owing to the action taken by the Government in employing our Fleet to obtain settlement of long-standing claims. Lord Palmerston was glad to have the assistance of one so intimately acquainted with these questions, and he emerged triumphant from the debate.

In September Sir Edmund went over to Cherbourg for a review of the French Fleet held by the President, Louis Napoleon, who showed him great attention. He sent a description of the Fleet to Lord Palmerston, who replies—"Many thanks for your very interesting account of the Cherbourg review. I am glad to hear what you say of the French ships. That which deserves more attention on the part of the people of this country than it has yet met with is the great facility which Cherbourg will afford the French in time of war, and in the beginning of a war, of collecting a great naval and military armament under good shelter within a few hours' sail of our coast." This statesman, usually so clear-sighted and practical, saw the menace but confused the remedy. His vision included a possible armament crossing to attack, but did not take in the proper defence—a superior fleet—for some years afterwards he, to guard against such a possibility, spent several millions in forts instead of devoting them to iron-clads. Sir Edmund returned to Berne towards the end of the year. He, however, felt his present post to be only a stepping-stone to something better, and to which his past diplomatic services entitled him. Berne was no advance professionally on Athens, besides being then an unpleasant town in which to reside. He had not long to wait, for on January 4, 1851, Lord Palmerston writes to him—"I wish to know whether it would be agreeable to you to be transferred to the vacant post at Stockholm. If so I am authorized by the Queen to offer it to you." The appointment being advantageous in every respect was accepted, but owing to it being then winter—and the Baltic blocked with ice—as well as on account of the health of Lady Lyons, Sir Edmund did not arrive at the Swedish capital until the end of June. The tranquil waters of Scandinavian politics were a pleasant change after the continuous political strife that had attended Sir

Edmund's stay in Greece. The only question which caused some little anxiety at this time in Northern Europe was that of the succession to the Danish throne. This was, however, settled by the treaty signed in London on May 9, 1852, by which the choice of Prince Christian of Glucksburg was affirmed—a choice which has been amply justified in the long and happy reign of the present King of Denmark. But Sir Edmund this year suffered a great blow in the death of his wife, which occurred at Stockholm in the early part of March. Never very strong, her health of late years had given cause for anxiety, and doubtless the severity of a northern winter had tried her constitution. A devoted wife and mother, Lady Lyons seems also to have been beloved by all who knew her. The letters which passed between husband and wife when separated, even for brief intervals, are couched in terms which indicate the deepest attachment, and were carefully preserved, evidently as cherished possessions of each of them.

In October 1852 Sir Edmund became a Rear-Admiral of the White. A report the year previously connected him with the Mediterranean command, but at present the demand had not arisen for his services, and he assured Lord Palmerston that though he would accept a command if offered one, it would be on the assumption that his Lordship was a willing party to the arrangement. In February 1852, however, Lord Palmerston was succeeded as Foreign Minister by the Earl of Malmesbury, and at the end of the year another change led to the Earl of Aberdeen becoming Prime Minister, with Lord John Russell as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Later on Lord Clarendon took that department. As, however, the time is approaching when Sir Edmund Lyons is to quit the paths of diplomacy for, to him, a more congenial sphere, we may now consider the position he had taken as a

diplomatist. I have generally been satisfied with recording the opinions of such statesmen as Lord Palmerston, the Earl of Aberdeen, and Sir Stratford Canning, though further support could have been obtained from an immense correspondence with many others, such as Lord Cowley, Lord Ponsonby, Lord Seaton, and the Earl of Westmoreland.

Sir Henry Bulwer—the late Lord Dalling—in his *Life of Lord Palmerston*, speaking of Sir Edmund Lyons, did not consider the choice of him as Minister to Greece a good one. He evidently did not approve going outside the regular diplomatic profession to obtain a representative, and this, perhaps, influenced his opinion. Great importance is attached by him to previous experience of the business, though it is evident that the duties of admirals and officers in command of ships are frequently diplomatic when they are on detached service and out of the reach of the telegraph. However, whatever Sir Henry's opinion of Sir Edmund as a diplomatist, he bore ample justice to his other qualities. Speaking of the time when Captain Lyons conveyed King Otho to Greece, he says—"Of all the men I was ever acquainted with, I know none whose manner and appearance were more calculated to captivate than this officer, then in the prime of life. His countenance (a fact of which he was conscious and proud) bore a marked resemblance to that of Lord Nelson, which it typified and beautified—frank, gay, natural, happy in showing an easy respect for superiors, and exacting it with the same unstudied facility from inferiors, he was equally liked by those above and below him, which is the surest way of being esteemed by equals." It may be that the characteristics which marked the progress of his naval career were those not best suited for what are usually considered the attributes of successful diplomacy. He was perhaps too impulsive, too little prone to suspect wrong when right was clear, and

too easily moved to wrath at any deviation from the straight path. That he satisfied the requirements of Lord Palmerston seems clear from what is recorded in these pages. All can form an opinion of their own from the correspondence here set forth, and on this evidence I am content to leave the verdict whether Sir Edmund was, or was not, an able diplomatist. An energy which never tired required, however, a more active outlet than could be afforded by the internal politics and intrigues of a small State. He was now to be employed in another direction, where this energy could have freer scope, and in which his talents for command were as conspicuously displayed as during that early career already described.

CHAPTER VI

1853

Beginning of Eastern Question—Sir Edmund offers his services afloat—Progress of events in the East—Sir Edmund offered second in command in Mediterranean—Accepts, and proceeds to England—Reception—Given *Agamemnon* steam line-of-battle ship for flag-ship—His staff—Goes out in *Terrible* paddle-frigate—Recognition of diplomatic services—Arrives in the Bosphorus—Reception—State of affairs—Destruction of Turkish squadron at Sinope—Bravery of the Turkish seamen—Effect of news in England—Orders for the combined squadrons to enter the Black Sea—Arrival of *Agamemnon*—Our Fleet enters the Black Sea.

EARLY in 1853 the Eastern Question began to loom upon the political horizon, originating in the disputes connected with the Holy Places in Palestine and the Sultan of Turkey's control over the Christian religion in his dominions. Whether English statesmen then foresaw the trouble that was to arise later I know not, but it is curious that Sir James Graham, who had again become First Lord of the Admiralty, in a letter to Sir Edmund Lyons in February, said—"I hope that you are not lost to the Navy: you can be ill spared from the effective admirals' list." There is no doubt Sir Edmund looked forward to some day returning to his old profession when any opportunity of active service occurred, and this letter enabled him to express his desire to the head of that Service. On April 10 he replied to the First Lord, explaining the circumstances of his diplomatic service, and concluding—"I think it desirable to put you in possession of my motives and feelings, past

as well as present, and will only add that if at any time it should appear to you and Lord Clarendon that I might be more useful afloat than ashore, I shall be ready and willing to obey your commands. I must, however, disclaim any pretension to qualifications better than those of my brother officers other than what may arise from my being, I believe, less advanced in age of any of my standing on the list, and being blest with a strong constitution and remarkably good health."

In the meantime affairs in the East had not improved. Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was directed to return to Constantinople at the end of February, and arrived there during the first week in April. Prince Mentschikoff had been dispatched on a special mission to the Porte, but failed to obtain what he wanted, and left Constantinople at the end of May. The French squadron had previously gone to Greek waters; and in the beginning of June both English and French Fleets were ordered to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardanelles. From his quiet post at Stockholm Sir Edmund was no doubt watching these events with great interest, and he now felt the time had arrived to make a definite offer of his services. Accordingly on June 6 he wrote to Sir James Graham as follows—"The state of things at Constantinople reminds me that I was a midshipman in a ship that had an active part in the forced passage of the Dardanelles in 1807; that in 1829-30 I commanded the *Blonde* for more than a twelve-month in the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, and that in the same frigate I was guilty of an escapade in the Black Sea, where I visited the ports of Sebastopol, Odessa, Varna, Bourgas, and Sezaboli. I trust that the present act of the Eastern drama may end peaceably, but if it should be otherwise I shall be ready and willing to serve as a junior flag-officer in a fleet, or indeed in any way in which her Majesty's Government may

think that my local knowledge and humble services might be useful." Sir Edmund at the same time sent a copy of this letter to Lord Clarendon, saying that his offer to serve afloat was of course dependent upon the wishes of her Majesty's Government. Replying on June 14, Sir James Graham wrote—"I agree with you in hoping that affairs in the East may end peaceably, and that we may not need the services of officers having local knowledge of the Black Sea. Should, however, such an emergency arise, the handsome offer which you have made of your services shall not be forgotten."

The course of affairs in the East, however, during the next few months did not tend towards peace. At the beginning of July the Russian forces passed the Pruth, and occupied the Danubian principalities. France began to press England to take further action with their respective Fleets, and urge that they should go to Constantinople. This was carried out in September. The two countries were now practically in alliance for the purpose of protecting Turkey against its powerful neighbour. At such a juncture the time had arrived when it was desirable that the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean should have a second admiral to assist in any future development of affairs, or emergency that might arise. On September 27 Lord Clarendon wrote to Sir Edmund as follows—"I have only time to say that Sir James Graham wishes you to come home immediately in order that he may have you second in command to Admiral Dundas, and ready to supply his place in case of accident. This is the sort of service which, as I gather from your letter received yesterday, will be agreeable to you, and make a return to your profession as desirable to yourself as it will be advantageous to the Service.

"Sir James Graham writes from Cork. I fear you have nobody with you just now with whom you could leave

archives, etc., but I will endeavour to send you somebody immediately. If you have any one with you, then don't wait, for Graham is evidently anxious for you to be afloat, as he may have troublous times oncoming."

To a man of Sir Edmund's ardent temperament, to such a letter there could be but one response. Though it involved giving up a career to which he had devoted nineteen years, and in which further advancement might reasonably be anticipated; though the emolument as Minister in Sweden was more than double what he would receive as second in command of a fleet, and at an age—he was then just upon sixty-three—when, considering the changes that had taken place in the Navy by the introduction of steam since 1835, he might not unnaturally prefer to continue in diplomacy, Sir Edmund did not hesitate, as the following reply shows—

"Stockholm, October 7, 1853.

"DEAR LORD CLARENDON,—I have this moment—just as the post is going—received your Lordship's private letter of the 27th of September, and I have only time to say that I will start by the first opportunity, and that I hope to pay my personal respects to your Lordship at latest two days after this letter reaches London. As the Court and all the royal family are absent from the capital, there will be no inconvenience in leaving the archives in charge of the Consul, Major Pringle. May I beg your Lordship to assure Sir James Graham that I shall be willing to proceed on the very day of my arrival in London.

"EDMUND LYONS."

Accordingly Sir Edmund and his son "Jack"—who was staying with him at the time—left Stockholm on October 11, and arrived in London during the night

of the 16th. The reception of Sir Edmund by Lord Clarendon, Sir James Graham, and the other members of the Board of Admiralty was very gratifying to him. He requested that the ship to carry his flag should be a steam line-of-battle ship, and the *Agamemnon*—a two-decker of 91 guns, and a speed of 11 knots—was detailed for this service. Orders were given to Plymouth, where she was, to fit her for an admiral, and it was settled that Sir Edmund should proceed at once to the Mediterranean in the paddle-frigate *Terrible*, one of the most powerful steamers of this type we had constructed. She was commanded by Captain McCleverty, an able officer who afterwards in this well-known vessel rendered extremely useful service.

For flag-captain Sir Edmund desired to have Captain Thomas M. C. Symonds, a former midshipman of the *Blonde*, who then commanded the *Arethusa* in the Mediterranean. It was therefore arranged that Captain William Robert Mends should take the *Agamemnon* out and then exchange with Captain Symonds—unless the latter should prefer to keep his own ship. Lieutenant Cowper Coles, the Admiral's nephew, was destined to be flag-lieutenant. He was then senior lieutenant of the *Sybille* in the East Indies, and the Admiral wrote to tell him to join him at Constantinople. In the meantime Lieutenant Frederick A. Maxse was appointed to the *Terrible*, as acting flag-lieutenant.

The appointment of secretary the Admiral offered to Mr. Frederick Cleeve, paymaster, an officer with whom he was personally unacquainted, but whose name had been previously mentioned to him as one well qualified to fill the post. The offer was accepted and the choice fully justified. Mr. Cleeve secured not only the confidence, but the affection of his chief, on whose staff he remained as secretary until the Admiral's flag was hauled down in 1858. Sir Edmund Lyons hoisted his flag as Rear-Admiral of the White at the mizzen on board the *Terrible* at Spithead on

November 5, 1853, and sailed the next day accompanied by his flag-lieutenant and secretary. His orders were to proceed to Malta, coal, and then join Admiral Dundas in the Dardanelles. Being desirous of seeing his future flagship, he had permission to call at Devonport, and having done that the *Terrible* finally left England on November 7.

The circumstances under which Sir Edmund thus entered once more upon a naval career were peculiarly gratifying to him. His own profession gave him a cordial welcome, the Government were glad to secure his services in a more active direction, and the Treasury granted him a pension of £900 a year for his nineteen years spent in diplomacy. That these had been of benefit to his country may be assumed from the following letter—

“Foreign Office, November 18, 1853.

“SIR,—I have received and laid before the Queen your Dispatch No. 36 of the 5th inst., reporting your intention to assume the post to which you have been appointed as Second in Command of her Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean, and I have received her Majesty's command to convey to you her Majesty's gracious approval of the zeal and ability which you have at all times displayed in the discharge of your duties at the Courts to which you have been accredited as her Majesty's representative.

“CLARENDON.”

Moreover though Sir Edmund was going in a subordinate position as second in command, he had a distinct assurance that he would eventually become Commander-in-Chief, and that the present holder was glad to know an active colleague would speedily join him. Writing to his son Bickerton on November 6, when off the Needles, Sir Edmund says—“Sir James said over and over again to me that he and his colleagues in the Cabinet considered

me the fittest man to have the chief command if it were vacant, and he gave me to understand that I should be so on Dundas' time being out in January 1855 if he were in office. The probability is that Dundas will come home sooner. In his last letter to Baillie Hamilton he said—'I am very glad that Lyons is coming, and when this Eastern affair is over, pray have me recalled and let him succeed me; the work is too harassing for a man of sixty-eight!' In a former letter he said—'Why not send Lyons out and relieve me from this harassing work? at all events do so when this Eastern Question is settled.' The kind welcome that I have received from the Navy of all ranks is most gratifying." In his next letter from Malta, where the *Terrible* arrived on November 18 after staying a few hours at Gibraltar, also to his eldest son, there is a touching allusion to his wife. "I found your letters of the 1st and 11th, and delighted I am with all you say. It cheers me up in the sadness I feel in revisiting these scenes of happy, happy days. Nothing could possibly exceed the kindness I receive from all quarters, all showing the esteem in which your best of mothers was held. We start for the Bosphorus in half-an-hour."

The *Terrible* arrived at Constantinople on November 24, and writing next day to his son Sir Edmund says—"I have been cordially welcomed by Admiral, Ambassador, and many old friends in the Fleet. The Turks are so elated by Omer Pacha's little successes that they will not listen willingly to the advice of their real friends, but Lord Stratford thinks that he made some impression on the Sultan three days ago, when he said to him that he had on a former occasion recommended him not to make undue concession, but that now he in the same spirit of solicitude for the integrity of the Ottoman empire implored him to assent to the new note drawn up by England and France with the knowledge of Austria and Prussia. Lord Stratford

is all for peace, and so say of course the representatives of other Courts, so we may hope that identical feelings and identical language will have good effect." An incident, however, occurred a few days later which rendered almost impossible further effort to bring Russia and Turkey to terms, while it materially tended to draw England and France into the war. This was the attack on a Turkish squadron at anchor in the Bay of Sinope by a portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, resulting in the destruction of the former. How this misfortune occurred was as follows.

Turkey having virtually declared war against Russia on October 23 had to consider what action she should take with her Fleet. She could either send it into the Black Sea in force and challenge an encounter, or adopt the same policy Russia did later with the Allies—place it out of reach and act on the defensive. In view of the superiority of Russia at sea the latter was obviously the course to pursue. But unfortunately it was decided to send a light squadron of Turkish frigates and corvettes into the Black Sea. Moreover a prolonged cruise was contemplated, for a council of naval officers was ordered by the Capitan Pacha to report upon a place in the Black Sea for such a force to winter in. The report was to the effect that Sinope was the only roadstead in which vessels could lie safely as regards weather, but owing to its proximity to Sebastopol they would be exposed there to attack. This warning was unheeded, and the squadron sailed about the middle of November. It consisted of six frigates, two corvettes, and two small steamers under the command of Osman Pacha. The Turkish Navy at this time had hardly recovered materially or morally from the overwhelming defeat it had sustained at Navarino. New ships had been built and seamen levied, but the force was ill-organized, and the majority of officers had no great energy or experience.

British.

French.

Agamemnon.

Turkish. Egyptian.



BRITISH, FRENCH, TURKISH, AND EGYPTIAN FLEETS IN BEICOS BAY.

(From a picture by M. Shranz.)

[To face page 130.]

The head of the Navy was the Capitan Pacha—or Lord High Admiral—who held an exalted position, but who does not appear to have conceived any clear ideas of what his force could or could not do. He even was not sure what attitude to adopt, for orders were given to the captains of these ships that they were not to fire upon the enemy unless first assailed.

In perpetrating such a blunder as sending a weak force to a port within 180 miles of Sebastopol, where there lay in readiness several line-of-battle ships, Turkey probably relied upon the previous Russian circular of October 31, that she would abstain from taking the offensive as long as her dignity and interests would permit, while the Admirals of the allied Fleets may have thought their presence at Constantinople, and the fear of precipitating events, would deter Russia from striking. At any rate they do not appear to have pointed out the risk, and our Ambassador, still intent on negotiating, did not discountenance the proceeding.

The sea defences of Sinope consisted of four small batteries armed with smooth-bore 20- and 14-pounder guns, throwing solid shot. They could not materially assist a squadron at anchor in the bay against a superior force.

Almost immediately after Osman Pacha arrived at his destination he was reconnoitred by a small Russian squadron, which no doubt carried back to Sebastopol full particulars of his force. Then four Turkish steam-frigates arrived on their way to Constantinople, after landing ammunition for the Circassians on the coast of Abasia. One steamer remained at Sinope and the others proceeded. They carried a dispatch from Osman saying—"Six Russian sail-of-the-line are off the port. If reinforcements are not sent to us, and our position continues the same for some time, it may well happen, may God preserve us from them, that the Imperial Fleet may incur disasters." This reached

Constantinople on November 24, but no notice was taken of the appeal. No one seemed conscious of the danger. All appeared to have forgotten what a state of war meant.

On November 30 a large force was observed standing towards Sinope under sail. It was a Russian squadron under Admiral Nachimoff, consisting of six ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and three steamers. At noon they stood into the bay under all sail. It recalls the incident of Nelson similarly standing into the Bay of Aboukir to attack an anchored fleet. But how different in other respects the situation. Then the opposing forces were fairly well matched, here comparison became absurd. A few frigates could not hope to contend successfully against a compact force of battle-ships. Osman would have been justified in surrendering at the first shot. If the Russian Admiral had any intention of giving the enemy such a chance it was frustrated by the action of the Turks. They, determining to sell their lives dearly, were the first to open fire. The Russian ships shortened sail, anchored, and then a tremendous cannonade ensued between the two squadrons. Awful execution followed. The fire of the Turkish ships was speedily silenced, some burst into flames and blew up, others slipped their cables and drifted on shore, but there was no cessation of the storm of projectiles against a foe now incapable of effectual resistance. In a little over an hour the whole of the Turkish squadron, except two vessels, was destroyed. One had escaped, the other was found too injured to retain as a prize, so was burnt the next day. The batteries on shore had little effect on the action. One was destroyed in five minutes by the fire of a single ship, the others were either silenced or deserted.

Though the garrison on shore did not strive with any heart there was no shrinking from the guns afloat, though not all the Turkish officers exhibited conspicuous gallantry. One captain landed before a shot was fired, another followed

suit early in the action. The remainder of the officers and men displayed great bravery and fortitude. The captain of the *Navik* blew up his ship after telling the crew to save themselves, and many other incidents to the credit of the officers came out at the examination of the survivors before the Naval Council held afterwards to ascertain the facts. The crews met their fate in a manner worthy of the race. Of the Turkish seamen might be said as Kinglake writes of their comrades on shore—"In truth they were a devoted soldiery, and fired with so high a spirit that when brought into the right frame of mind they could look upon the thought of death in action with a steadfast, 'lusty joy.'" With good leaders they were capable of great exploits, and at Sinope there was no murmuring at the decision to engage against such overwhelming odds. The vessel which escaped was the steamer *Taif*. This was the one left behind, as already mentioned, from the squadron that called at Sinope. She slipped her cable and steamed out amid the smoke, then making a detour steered for Constantinople, where she arrived with the news on December 2. On that day the Russian squadron, having completed its work of destruction, sailed for Sebastopol.

Though intelligence of this disaster caused anger and consternation at Constantinople at what appeared a breach of faith, it did not interrupt the efforts of the foreign representatives to secure peace. There was some talk of sending the allied Fleets into the Black Sea, and on December 7 Sir Edmund writes to the Secretary of the Admiralty—"My opinion has been asked this morning, in common with that of Admirals Dundas, Hamelin, and Jacquinot (Admiral de Tinan is at Constantinople), as to navigating the Black Sea in winter. The question was put to us collectively by the Ambassadors of England and France 'as a purely naval question.' I said that if we should be called upon by the Ambassadors to put to sea

for any determinate object, whether for the purpose of defending the Ottoman empire from attack, or for the purpose of producing a moral effect in aid of the policy of our Government, I thought that we should go, for I did not consider that the Black Sea presented greater danger than our Fleet had often braved, but that I thought at the same time that their Excellencies would do well to take into consideration the risk that would be incurred, particularly in a protracted cruise, of impairing the efficiency of our ships, whilst the Russians would be husbanding their resources in the snug harbour of Sebastopol and be all ready for work in the spring.

"It was no business of the admirals—at all events no business of the junior admirals—to offer any opinion on the *policy* of taking the combined squadron into the Black Sea; whether the anything but sedative effect that it must infallibly produce in the Emperor Nicholas might not more than counterbalance any good that could reasonably be expected from it, etc., etc.; but we did ask questions that elicited proofs that if we should go to sea without more definite instructions than the Ambassadors are prepared to give, we might be reduced to the alternative of bringing on a war, or of cutting a very sorry figure indeed. My own humble opinion is that the dread of your being '*top sawyers*' in the Black Sea next spring may induce the Emperor of Russia to come to terms; but that viewing it as a *fait accompli* he would burn with desire to avenge so heavy a blow to his prestige, and become desperate.

"I am supposing what I hope and believe to be the case, namely, that a peaceful solution of this question is what our Government desires. Let us then avoid all causes of irritation and provocation as far as possible, and then if war is forced upon us we can go at it with clear consciences and dry powder. But in any case it is an awful alternative to contemplate."

These sensible words appeared to have had some weight, for no immediate steps were taken to send the Fleets into the Black Sea, but shortly afterwards direct orders came from home to carry out this operation, and thus produced the very irritation Sir Edmund desired to avoid.

While the admirals were discussing the feasibility of navigating the Black Sea during the winter months, and the Ambassadors were submitting another note for the Sultan's assent, the people in England, greatly stirred by the news of the disaster at Sinope, pressed for a more energetic policy which the Government were unable to resist. This is clearly indicated by the following extracts from a letter written by the First Lord of the Admiralty on December 24 to the Commander-in-Chief of our Fléet. Instructions had previously been sent for a combined squadron to enter the Black Sea for the purpose of protecting the Ottoman flag and territory, but now something more was demanded of our Fleet. Its execution still further reduced the chances of peace.

"The attack on Sinope has produced an immense effect on the public mind both in France and England. It is difficult to put any restraint on the national desire to avenge what is regarded as a contempt and defiance of our flag.

"The precise circumstances of the attack are still unknown to us. Enough, however, is known to justify the course taken by the Ambassador in requesting you to send some ships-of-war into the Black Sea. Fresh instructions will be sent by this mail to the Ambassadors of France and England which will direct the immediate occupation of the Black Sea by the combined Fleets, to the exclusion of Russian ships-of-war, and if no collision has taken place before you receive this letter, the execution of the new instructions may probably lead to that result.

"It is probable that war may be declared by Russia, or that some indignity may be offered to the British flag in the Black Sea which it may be necessary to punish. Should any such opportunity present itself I conclude that you will have your eye on Sebastopol. That is a place where a blow might be struck which would be memorable in Europe, and which would settle the affairs of the East for some time to come. I am rejoiced to hear that you and Sir Edmund Lyons go on so well together. If you come to decisive measures, his presence and assistance will be invaluable to you. Captain Brock¹ will be sent out to superintend the survey both of the Sea of Marmora and the Euxine. He has also some knowledge both of Odessa and of Sebastopol, which he visited with Sir Edmund Lyons in the *Blonde*; but Sir Edmund in his own person concentrates more knowledge of these important points from his own personal observations and inquiries than any other English officer now living.

"I have been one of the most strenuous advocates for peace with Russia until the last moment, but the Sinope attack and recent events have changed entirely the aspect of affairs. I am afraid that a rupture with Russia is inevitable, and if it must take place it is important to bring it to a close with decision and promptitude, so that the struggle may be ended in the Black Sea before the Baltic opens.

"This letter is full and explicit, but it leaves the largest discretion to the free exercise of your own judgment. I wish to force nothing upon you in opposition to it; but I will share your responsibilities, and I will not leave you in the lurch when you have given full effect to your own sense of public duty in a great emergency."

Before this letter reached its destination the *Agamemnon*,

¹ Captain T. Saumarez Brock was a nephew of Admiral Lord de Saumarez.

commanded by Captain Mends, arrived at Constantinople, and Sir Edmund Lyons shifted his flag to her on December 28. Writing to his son Bickerton on the 30th he says—“The Sultan has given his assent to the note of the Four Representatives; and these four Elchi Beys still say they have no doubt that the Emperor of Russia will also assent, and yet a combined squadron of English and French ships, comprising ten sail-of-the-line and ten steamers, is to go into the Black Sea to-morrow and dispatch a steamer to Sebastopol to announce to the Russians that the object of our cruise is to protect the Sultan’s dominions from hostile aggressions, and to express a hope at the same time that the Russians will not take any step that might lead to any breach of the peace that now exists. I fear that our appearance in the Black Sea will give mortal offence to the Emperor, but I suppose that Lord Stratford, after balancing between conciliation and intimidation, has come to the conclusion that the latter course gives the best chance for the success of our policy. He has hitherto been unable to obtain the assent of the French Ambassador to send more than a squadron of three sail-of-the-line and six large steamers under my command. A day or two afterwards, however, came a telegraphic message from Paris to the French Ambassador—‘Faites paraître a concert avec Amiral Dundas les deux Escadres dans la Mer Noire afin de protéger et avitailler le côte d’Anatolie.’ This is no doubt the annoyance of the first news by telegraph of the disaster at Sinope, which, without all the circumstances being known, must have appeared a monstrous aggression and a breach of faith after Nesselrode’s circular dispatch—an opinion which will probably be much modified when all the facts are known. But the consequence is that the squadrons are augmented to proportions that render it obligatory on the Commanders-in-Chief to go themselves, and we shall be off to-morrow if

we can get out of the Bosphorus. I am charmed with my ship and all belonging to her. Symonds, Cleeve, and Maxse are all I could wish. The Admiral can find no words to express his thankfulness for what I do for him. Nothing could exceed the kindness of all the captains."

Head winds prevented the sailing-ships getting through the Bosphorus the next day, but on January 3, 1854, the combined British and French squadrons entered the Black Sea. From that moment, and for the first time, the Fleets of the two Western Powers dominated a sea hitherto reserved to the war-ships of Russia and Turkey.

CHAPTER VII

1854—JANUARY TO APRIL

Our Navy in 1854—Slow advance of steam—Types of steam-ships—Composition of Fleets which entered the Black Sea—The Admirals—Peculiar position of the allied Fleets—Captain Drummond's mission to Sebastopol—Sir Edmund detached with a steam squadron to coast of Asia—Captain Drummond's report on Sebastopol—Fleets return to the Bosphorus—Displeasure of British Ambassador—Sir Edmund's support of Admiral Dundas—Sir Edmund again detached with a squadron—Visit Sinope, Trebizonde, and Batoum—Reconnoitres Russian coast—Seamanship of the Turks—Returns to the Bosphorus—Fleets again enter the Black Sea—Proceed to Kavarna Bay—Receive news of war declared against Russia.

ALTHOUGH when Sir Edmund Lyons paid off the *Madagascar* at the beginning of 1835, steam had been introduced into the Navy, it made slow progress. Previous to the year 1830 the Government only possessed a few small steamers principally employed for towing purposes and packet service. The paddle-wheel vessel was then the only form of steamship, and in 1830 the Admiralty determined to build some as men-of-war. They were of about 850 tons and 220 horse-power.

The Navy owed this advance to the clear view of naval requirements taken by Sir Thomas Hardy, supported by Sir James Graham. But those who followed—and the Navy generally—did not look upon steam with favour for

war-ships, and hence our efforts were chiefly directed towards improving types of sailing-vessels.

Then came the invention of the screw propeller, which old seamen considered equally obnoxious, fighting against its introduction with great pertinacity, though without success. Our first man-of-war fitted with a screw—in 1844—found favour, chiefly because she could keep company under sail with a fleet in all weathers.

Still both in paddle and screw steamers experience brought improvement. The *Cyclops*, launched in 1839, of 1200 tons and 320 horse-power, was considered a splendid specimen of the paddle-wheel class. She carried a 68-pounder at bow and stern, and several 32-pounders on the broadside. An essential feature was a full rig, as all our early steam-ships had to sail as well as steam.

This type was eclipsed, however, by the paddle-wheel frigates, of which the *Terrible* may be considered the finest representative. With 1850 tons displacement and 800 horse-power, she carried 21 guns, 68- and 32-pounders. Her powerful machinery for those days rendered her invaluable for towing, which sailors then considered the proper function of a steamer.

We had then no screw frigates of larger dimensions than the *Terrible*, for they had not advanced beyond 1600 tons, and only a few of these existed. The *Highflyer* of 1200 tons was about the only representative of screw corvettes launched previous to 1854. In fact the Surveyor of the Navy, Sir William Symonds, had no love for steam-ships, his affection being concentrated on those beautiful sailing craft in the construction of which he effected so many improvements. Of these he had produced some beautiful specimens, such as the *Queen*, the first three-decker launched after her Majesty came to the throne. Of 3100 tons, she carried 110 guns, principally 32-pounders.

She sailed wonderfully well. Of two-deckers the *Albion*, 91 guns, was practically the same size as the *Queen*, and also good under canvas. On one occasion with the wind abeam and under double-reefed topsails, she attained a speed of thirteen knots an hour. Under the circumstances one can understand the reluctance of these men to disfigure—as they considered—these beautiful vessels with funnels, and to spoil their sailing qualities with screw propellers. To them the steam line-of-battle ship seemed the last straw, and they delayed her advent as long as possible. But she arrived though not to stay. First we put engines into some old two-deckers called block ships, and then into worthier types. Of the latter the *Sanspareil*, 70 guns, launched in 1851, was the earliest, and she had gone to the Mediterranean. The *Agamemnon*—a larger vessel—followed. Both were laid down for sailing-ships, but completed as steamers. At the beginning of 1854 we possessed several steam two- and three-deckers, but reserved most of them for the Baltic.

What marvellous changes in fleets of war has the present generation seen. What a revolution in all branches of naval equipment has taken place during a brief period of forty years. In 1857 sails triumphant, steam knocking humbly at the door. In 1897 at that magnificent review of our Fleet not a sailing-ship to be seen. In 1857 wood supreme for construction; iron suspect and discarded. In 1897 iron rapidly being superseded by steel. Even more wonderful the transition from 32-pounder guns to the wire-wound ordnance, which can throw a projectile to a distance of twelve miles. The Fleet which entered the Black Sea, and the vessels which joined later, comprised the following :—

Ship	Guns	Sail or Steam	Officer in Command
<i>Britannia</i> . . .	120	Sail	{ Vice-Adl. Deans Dundas, C.B. Capt. Thomas W. Carter.
<i>Trafalgar</i> . . .	120	"	" H. F. Greville.
<i>Queen</i>	116	"	" Frederick T. Michell.
<i>Agamemnon</i> . .	91	Screw	{ Rear-Adl. Sir E. Lyons, G.C.B. Capt. T. M. C. Symonds.
<i>Albion</i>	91	Sail	" Stephen Lushington.
<i>Rodney</i>	90	"	" Charles Graham.
<i>London</i>	90	"	" Charles Eden.
<i>Vengeance</i> . .	84	"	" Lord Edward Russell.
<i>Bellerophon</i> . .	80	"	" Lord George Paulet.
<i>Sanspareil</i> . . .	70	Screw	" Sydney C. Dacres.
<i>Arethusa</i> . . .	50	Sail	" W. R. Mends.
<i>Leander</i>	50	"	" George St. Vincent King.
<i>Tribune</i>	31	Screw	" Hon. S. Carnegie.
<i>Curacoa</i>	31	"	" Hon. G. Hastings.
<i>Retribution</i> . .	28	Paddle	" Hon. James Drummond.
<i>Diamond</i>	26	Sail	" William Peel.
<i>Terrible</i>	21	Paddle	" Jas. J. McCleverty.
<i>Sidon</i>	21	"	" George Goldsmith.
<i>Highflyer</i> . . .	21	Screw	" John Moore.
<i>Furious</i>	16	Paddle	" William Loring.
<i>Tiger</i>	16	"	" H. Giffard.
<i>Niger</i>	13	Screw	Commdr. Leopold Heath.
<i>Sampson</i>	6	Paddle	Capt. L. T. Jones.
<i>Firebrand</i> . . .	6	"	" Hyde Parker.
<i>Wasp</i>	6	Screw	Commdr. Lord John Hay.
<i>Fury</i>	6	Paddle	" Edward Tatham.
<i>Inflexible</i> . . .	6	"	" G. Popplewell.
<i>Cyclops</i>	6	"	R. W. Roberts, Master.
<i>Vesuvius</i>	6	"	Commdr. Ashmore Powell.
<i>Spitfire</i>	5	"	" T. A. Spratt.
<i>Triton</i>	3	"	Lieut. H. Lloyd.
<i>Lynx</i>	4	Screw	" J. P. Luce.
<i>Simoom</i>		Troopship	Capt. H. Smith.
<i>Vulcan</i>		"	" E. P. Von Donop.
<i>Megæra</i>		"	" J. O. Johnson.

I cannot give a complete list of the French Fleet as it was eventually constituted, but the following entered the Black Sea :—

Ship	Guns	Sail or Steam	Officer in Command
<i>Ville de Paris</i>	120	Sail	Vice-Adl. Hamelin.
<i>Valmy</i>	120	"	Rear-Adl. Jacquinot.
<i>Friedland</i>	120	"	
<i>Jena</i>	Ships-of-the-line	"	
<i>Jupiter</i>		"	
<i>Henri IV.</i>		"	
<i>Bayard</i>		"	
<i>Napoleon</i>		"	
<i>Charlemagne</i>		"	
<i>Gomer</i>		Paddle	Rear-Adl. de Tinan.

Vice-Admiral Dundas, our Commander-in-Chief—originally James Whitley Deans—born December 4, 1785, was now sixty-eight years of age. He entered the Navy in 1799, and became a captain in 1807 at the early age of twenty-two. A year later he married his cousin, the Hon. Miss Dundas, daughter and heiress of Lord Amesbury, when he took the name of Dundas. Towards the end of 1841 he obtained his Flag. After service at the Admiralty he accepted the command of the Mediterranean Station in succession to Sir William Parker at the beginning of 1852. At that time there seemed no indication of a European war. Approaching his three-score years and ten, Admiral Dundas was not in good health at this time, and the burden now imposed upon him was no light one. The assistance of an active second in command became therefore indispensable. Though Sir Edmund Lyons had entered upon his sixty-fourth year, he possessed at this period great activity of mind and body. Rather below the medium height, with a well-knit figure, his step was firm and elastic; the expression of his countenance denoted a sanguine temperament with much decision of character, while his manner and conversation were exceedingly pleasing, unaffected, and intelligent. Such is the description given by one who saw much of the Admiral at this time.

The circumstances under which the combined Fleets entered the Black Sea, and the mission they had undertaken were peculiar. Charged with the duty of protecting the ships and territory of one belligerent, they had not broken off friendly relations with the other. A state of war existed between Russia and Turkey, but as regards England, France, and Russia, peace still prevailed between them. Such a condition of affairs was not only anomalous, but placed a tremendous responsibility upon the chiefs of the allied Fleet. They were bound to remain inactive, unless Russia assumed the offensive, and thus they were under the disadvantage which always attaches to the side deprived of taking the initiative. It gave the power to Russia to strike if and when she pleased. The position was such that a very slight incident could produce a tremendous war, which statesmen were still trying to avert. This was prevented either by the forbearance of Russia, or the feeling of her admirals that against such a force as was now protecting Turkey at sea it was futile to contend. At any rate the Russian Fleet remained in its own waters.

Thus escorting five Turkish steam frigates laden with troops and ammunition, the combined Fleet made its way to Sinope, while the *Retribution*, Captain Hon. James Drummond, was sent to communicate with Sebastopol.¹

¹ Captain Drummond was the bearer of the following letter to the Russian Admiral.

“*H.B.M. Ship ‘Britannia,’*

“*Bosphore, January 4, 1854.*

“MONSIEUR L’AMIRAL—L’Escadre sous mes ordres étant sur le point de paraître dans la Mer Noire, de concert avec celle de France, et l’objet de ce mouvement étant de protéger le territoire et le Pavillon Ottoman contre toute agression ou acte d’hostilité ; j’en avertis votre Excellence dans le but de prévenir toute collision pouvant nuire aux relations amicales qui existent entre mon Gouvernement et le vôtre, relations que nous désirons conserver et que vous tenez aussi, sans doute, à maintenir.

“Je serais heureux d’apprendre que votre Excellence animée des mêmes intentions pacifiques, a bien voulu donner aux Commandants des

Sinope was reached on January 6, and then Sir Edmund Lyons was directed to convoy the Turkish squadron to Trebizonde and Batoum, having under his orders the *Sanspareil*, *Sampson*, and *Terrible*. He was also accompanied by Rear-Admiral de Tinan and a French squadron consisting of the *Gomer*, *Descartes*, and *Mogador*. All were steamers. Before leaving the Admiral wrote to his eldest son, giving the following account of Captain Drummond's mission to Sebastopol—

“‘*Agamemnon*,’ *Sinope*, January 8, 1854.

“Here we are with eighteen sail-of-the-line and twelve frigates in command of the Black Sea. We are accompanied by a squadron of Turkish steam frigates, and while we occupy for the moment the scene of desolation caused by the late attack of the Russians, the *Retribution* English steam frigate is gone to Sebastopol with letters from Admirals Dundas and Hamelin to the Russian Admiral, announcing that the combined squadrons are in the Black Sea for the purpose of protecting the Ottoman territory and flag, and expressing hopes he will not take any measures that might disturb the peace at present existing between England, France, and Russia. I am now getting under way with a steam squadron for Batoum, the frontier fortress of Turkey, to warn off all Russian vessels, and to take them if they should persist in blockading or otherwise inflicting injury on the Ottoman territory or flag. When I

Forces Russes dans la Mer Noire, des instructions destinées à prévenir tout événement qui pourrait compromettre la paix.

“Agréez Monsieur l’Amiral,

etc. etc. etc.

“J. W. D. DUNDAS.

“Vice-Amiral Commandant-en-Chef de la Flotte
Royale Anglaise.

“À Son Excellence le Commandant-en-Chef de la
Flotte Impériale Russe, Sebastopol.”

say 'take *them*' I am supposing that my squadron of eight large, powerful steamers will be equal, if not superior, to any Russian force we are likely to meet. I have *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Terrible*, and *Sampson* of our squadron, and Admiral de Tinan will be under my orders with a screw ship-of-the-line and three large steam frigates. A fine ubiquitous force to sweep the Black Sea with, to say nothing of the five Turkish frigates which also compose part of my squadron.

"P.S.—I open this to tell you that Drummond is come back in the *Retribution* from Sebastopol. A fog favoured his getting near the harbour unperceived, but he had not advanced far before a small steamer threw herself across the entrance, hoisted a quarantine flag, and waved to him to stop. He, however, acting upon the good old principle of 'going on never minding,' went on, and on reaching the entrance between two strong forts three blank cartridges were fired, and men were seen running to the guns, so he merely anchored. He had hardly done so when an officer put off in a boat, and said that the steamer must at once retire out of gunshot, and that the Russians were prepared to fire if he did not do so. Drummond said that he had letters to deliver to the Governor of the Crimea, and letters from the English and French Admirals for Admiral Nachimoff. The officer said he could receive no letters until the *Retribution* should be removed from under the batteries, and he repeated that the guns were manned. Drummond then weighed and withdrew about a mile, and after the lapse of an hour and a half a Health Officer arrived and took charge of the letters, saying that Prince Mentschikoff was absent at Kherson, and that Admiral Nachimoff was also absent. He also said that the squadron in the harbour, consisting of two three-deckers, three two-deckers, and a frigate or two, was commanded by Rear-Admiral Istomin (promoted for the affair of Sinope),

who had no authority to open letters, but that he would forward them, and promise that answers should be sent to Constantinople. Under these circumstances, and finding that he was liable to fourteen days' quarantine, Drummond saluted the Emperor and Admiral and came away. He observed that the harbour was very strongly fortified, and that the ships were sprung with their broadsides commanding the entrance. He inferred from what he heard that Admiral Nachimoff was in Kaffa Bay with ten sail-of-the-line and several frigates and steamers. The performances of the *Agamemnon* both under sail and steam are really wonderful. I am very proud of her, and feel that if I were at Stockholm, or indeed anywhere but here, I should be fretting myself all day long. Drummond's salutes were returned and the *suaviter in modo* observed throughout. 'But,' said the Russian, 'your Fleet is at Constantinople.' They not having opened the letters did not know the Fleet was in the Black Sea."

The adroit and bold manner with which Captain Drummond performed his mission enabled him to have a good look at the sea defences of Sebastopol, and to judge whether they were such as to preclude an attack by the combined Fleets alone, as had been alluded to, if not suggested to Admiral Dundas, by the First Lord of the Admiralty in his letter of December 24. It must be remembered we possessed very little reliable information about either the forts or garrison of Sebastopol, and hence it was desirable to obtain such by any means in our power. What we now learnt was sufficient to convince the Admiral that should war break out, and the enemy's Fleet seek the shelter of this well-protected harbour, an attack from the sea alone would have little chance of success. This I take it was the opinion he formed after receiving Captain Drummond's report, which after describing the batteries, which we were to make acquaintance with later, goes on

to state—"From the position I anchored in at the entrance I counted about 350 guns bearing on the ship, besides the concentrated fire of five sail-of-the-line at anchor in the harbour.

"I consider the fortifications so strong as opposed to ships, that it would be impossible to enter the harbour and destroy the ships at anchor and the arsenal without the almost certain destruction of the attacking force.

"Sebastopol might be easily blockaded, and steamers might be employed in throwing shell at night into the forts, arsenal, and town. The only way to destroy the place completely would be to employ a large land force with artillery to co-operate with the ships.

"The north side presented some favourable points for the disembarkation of troops under the ships' guns, and I think that in carrying the position of E (Star) fort on the height the place would fall immediately. From its position I consider it to be the key of the works on the north side commanding the anchorage, arsenal, town, and forts on the opposite shore.

"On the south side, along the coast from Khersonese lighthouse to the entrance, there are small creeks where troops and heavy guns might be landed. The land is low, clear of wood and enclosures, presenting a barren appearance."

In view of the controversy later as to the relative chances of success in attacking the north or south side of Sebastopol, and especially as to the importance of the north or Star fort, these observations are very interesting.

When Sir Edmund Lyons was detached from Sinope, on this occasion in command of an English and French squadron, he was directed to "convoy the five Turkish steamers to their destination, and having caused them to land their troops, etc., with all expedition you will see them safe back to this anchorage. In the event of your meeting

a superior Russian opposing force, you are to return to the main squadrons, sending a steam frigate in advance with the information. In all other respects you must be guided by the instructions of his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte (copies of which you have already received from me), and until further orders you are not to resort to hostile measures except it may become absolutely necessary to carry out the service upon which you are detached." In a private note Admiral Dundas said—"If you fall in with a superior force you must return to Sinope. If you find an inferior force warn them off, and if they persist in attacking the Turks you have nothing left but to use your guns. *Let that be the last resort.*"

The service was of a delicate nature, for it was impossible to say what action the Russian Fleet might take when seeing an enemy's squadron convoyed by a still friendly Power. But they abstained from interference, and nothing occurred during the cruise. The squadron arrived at Trebizonde on the 10th, landed troops and ammunition, and then went on to Batoum which was reached the next day. Landing the remainder of the troops, the squadron left Batoum and arrived safely at Sinope on the 13th, to the relief and satisfaction of both French and English Commanders-in-Chief.

It was now a question what should be the next move of the combined Fleets. Though the use of steam had demonstrated that any definite service could be performed, and that, if circumstances required it, sailing-ships could cruise in the Black Sea during the depth of winter, in the latter case liability to damage always existed owing to the severe storms which were frequent at that period. The advantage of thus employing the Fleet was doubtful, especially as the Russians seemed inclined to nurse their ships, thus keeping them efficient for any given moment

or service. Orders had now been received by our Admiral to constrain any of these met with to return to Sebastopol, or the nearest Russian port; but as they apparently meant to remain on their own coast the utility of the order was somewhat doubtful. The Admirals therefore decided to return to the Bosphorus. The combined Fleets left Sinope on January 17, and after a cruise of five days anchored in the Bosphorus on the 22nd.

This decision and action did not meet with the approval of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who apparently had been given a considerable control over the Fleet's movements. On January 24 he writes to Admiral Dundas—"The vast importance of the service on which we are respectively engaged imposes upon me the duty of expressing without reserve or circumlocution, the opinion I entertain as to the return of the combined squadrons under present circumstances to the Bosphorus.

"I have read with attention your statement of the motives which decided your conduct in that respect, and I cannot conceal from you that the impression remaining on my mind is one of dissatisfaction and regret.

"It is not for me to determine the value of your reasons in so far as they are strictly nautical, but as you wrote to me for transports to supply you with coal on the 13th inst., and announced your intention of returning to the Bosphorus on the 15th, I naturally expected to learn that your reasons for doing so were derived from the 'events and letters' to which you alluded in the latter dispatch, and not from such nautical considerations as you had already set forth in your Memorandum of the 29th ult. The only events of which I perceive any mention in your dispatch are the operations conducted by Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons between Trebizonde and Batoum, and the damage sustained by the two ships belonging to one or other of the squadrons.

"On these I have to remark that the detachment

under Sir E. Lyons did not happen to fall in with any Russian squadron, and that the two vessels stated to have been damaged might have returned without impairing the effective power of the combined squadrons.

“With respect to the second notification addressed under your signature and that of Admiral Hamelin to the superior naval authority at Sebastopol, it never was understood that you were to suspend your operations until it had been delivered, and still less until an answer had been received. From any such necessity, had it ever existed, you would have been released by the delivery of the first notification and the kind of reception given at Sebastopol to H.M.S. *Retribution*.

“Looking to the instructions under which, by order of H.M. Government, you are called upon to act, I am at a loss to understand how they can be effectively carried out by squadrons stationed in the Bosphorus, which with the prevailing wind is notoriously under the disadvantage of being more or less to leeward of almost everything in the Black Sea.

“After the declarations made by order of H.M. Government both here and at St. Petersburg, we are bound to maintain the command of the Black Sea, protecting therein the flag and territory of the Porte. You are the best judge of what amount of force is necessary for those purposes in the present presumed condition of the Russian Fleet. On this point the responsibility rests of necessity with you. But in the exercise of a paramount duty I must adhere to my former instruction as to the above-mentioned objects being secured, if that be possible, by the employment of the forces under your command.

“At this moment I know but of two vessels in the Black Sea belonging to the combined squadrons, namely the *Prométhée* at Varna and the *Fury* dispatched to Odessa. According also to such information as I have

received, a considerable portion of the Russian Fleet is absent from Sebastopol, either at sea or in some other port or roadstead.

“Such being the case it is evident that the protection of the Turkish flag and territory depends at present upon the discretion of Russia and not upon our command of the Black Sea. I perfectly understand what risks the service involves at this season to the shipping employed on it, and doubtless if the service can be efficiently performed without such risks the advantage is great. But I have no reason to suppose that H.M. Government contemplated the postponement of the service until a finer season and more settled weather should set in. I have only therefore in conclusion to confirm my previous instructions on this subject.

“STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.”

It must be admitted that such a letter from our Ambassador to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, directly calling in question his professional ability, if not his courage, was in its terms quite unjustifiable. The Admiral had been directly charged with a certain duty, viz. to protect the Ottoman flag and territory. On him now rested the responsibility for doing this efficiently, but it was not for the Ambassador to question his methods. He did not grasp the laws of naval strategy which forbade an attack on territory with a strong opposing fleet within measurable distance. As for the Ottoman flag, it was practically non-existent in the Black Sea at this time. I have, however, only introduced this letter because it led to an excellent reply from Sir Edmund Lyons. Writing to him on January 28 Admiral Dundas says—“Having made you acquainted with every order and letter, public and private, which I have received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and also others in official situations, I request to know your

opinion, as an officer so well acquainted with the navigation of the Black Sea, if the manner in which I have conducted and stationed the squadron of H.M. ships under my orders appears to you to call for the observations contained in the enclosed letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe."

Sir Edmund's reply next day was as follows—

"The dissatisfaction expressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe appears to be caused by your not remaining in the Black Sea at the risk, as his Excellency seems to admit, of impairing the efficiency of the squadron, and after experience has proved to you and Admiral Hamelin that the best mode of carrying out the intentions of the two Governments as expressed by the Ambassador is that set forth in your minute of the 29th ult., viz. to keep the sailing-ships in the central position of the Bosphorus ready to act for any definite object and on any great occasion, whilst the powerful steam force of the combined squadrons acts in the Black Sea.

"I confess that I cannot account for the dissatisfaction expressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe when I recollect the forwardness you have always evinced to operate in the Black Sea. On November 4 you proposed going into the Black Sea yourself with three steam-vessels from each of the combined squadrons, but Lord Stratford de Redcliffe decidedly objected to this, and when he came forward himself with a similar proposition a week afterwards the French Admiral had no steamer ready to send. Thus the opportunity was lost for showing the Russians our flag in the Black Sea, and the catastrophe of Sinope took place.

"Immediately on the arrival of the disastrous news from Sinope you proposed to go at once with the whole squadron off Sebastopol, but that proposal was not agreed to and three weeks of inactivity ensued. Even after the telegraphic message arrived on December 24, ordering the

squadrons into the Black Sea, another week was lost in consequence of the two Ambassadors not having sent instructions to the Admirals; and when at last those instructions were sent on December 31 they showed that the Ambassadors had not been able to come to an understanding on this important question; for while the French Ambassador authorized his Admiral to proceed to sea with five sail-of-the-line, even *sans le concours* of the British squadron, and said that he would take upon himself the responsibility of that measure, the British Ambassador on the contrary wrote to you that he had learnt from the French Ambassador he had written to Admiral Hamelin to say that he would be content to share the responsibility of sending out a combined squadron of ten sail-of-the-line, half under each flag, but that he (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) wished it to be clearly understood that he would take no part in such responsibility.

“In that state of the case you and Admiral Hamelin, taking into consideration that a week’s time and a fair wind which would have carried the squadrons over a large portion of the Black Sea had already been lost, and finding that the Ambassadors appeared to be as far as ever from coming to an agreement, determined to proceed to sea with the whole squadron and by cordial co-operation carry out to the best of your ability the wishes of the two Governments.

“Eighteen days’ experience in the Black Sea having convinced you and Admiral Hamelin, and I believe I may add every officer in both squadrons, that Sinope is in every respect a very unfit anchorage for the general rendezvous of the combined Fleets, and that the best mode of carrying out the wishes of the two Governments is that set forth in your minute of the 29th ult., you returned to the Bosphorus, and have already commenced acting on the principle laid down in that minute by sending two steam

frigates of each nation to the coast of Roumelia and to the Crimea under the orders of Rear-Admiral de Tinan.

“In short Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has made you acquainted with the intentions of H.M. Government, and very naturally divested himself of responsibility in all ‘nautical’ considerations. You accept that responsibility and are acting under it to the best of your ability and with the entire concurrence of your French colleague; but you cannot control the elements, nor create harbours nor supplies, nor bring the English and French dockyards within reach of the combined squadrons.

“EDMUND LYONS.”

No doubt Admiral Dundas showed this letter to the Ambassador, who does not appear to have urged the matter further, for the sailing-ships remained in the Bosphorus until shortly before the outbreak of war two months later. This circumstance somewhat marred the harmony between the two principals concerned, but Sir Edmund Lyons strove to smooth matters and the action of the Admiral was approved at home.

Naturally, however, a passive attitude was little to the liking of Sir Edmund, and he welcomed another cruise in the Black Sea with a steam squadron. On February 4 he was directed to convoy a Turkish squadron and transports conveying troops and stores to Sinope, Trebizonde, and Batoum. His own squadron consisted of the *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Terrible*, *Highflyer*, and *Inflexible*, accompanied by the French ships *Charlemagne*, *Mogador*, and *Descartes*. The convoy consisted of eight Turkish war-steamers, under Admirals Mustafa Pacha, and Muchaver Pacha (Captain Slade, R.N.), and eight transports.

This flotilla left the Bosphorus on February 7, and proceeded first to Sinope, where three of the store-ships were left. They then went on and landed 4000 troops at

Trebizonde, after which on the 12th they arrived at Batoum. Here were landed the remainder of the troops, 3000 in number, with stores and ammunition. While this was going on the Admiral with the *Agamemnon* and a portion of the squadron ran along the coast as far as Redoute Kaleh to reconnoitre the Russian forts and to show the British flag. Large bodies of men were observed at Redoute Kaleh, constructing a gabion battery on the beach, but the sea defences were not of a formidable nature. It appeared, however, a place of some dimensions, and several Russian merchant ships were observed at anchor in the estuary of the river, where the town lies. The information thus acquired was of use later on.

Returning, the Admiral picked up the remainder of his squadron, and steered for Sinope. On the way they encountered a gale of wind in which the ship of Mustafa Pacha lost her rudder, and the ships got scattered, but all met together at Sinope on the 15th. A new rudder was there prepared, but the Admiral was not impressed with the seamanlike qualities or resources of his Turkish colleagues. Writing to Admiral Dundas on the 18th from Sinope he says—"These Turkish mariners are miserable fellows to deal with. When the Pacha's rudder went, he illuminated the Black Sea with his rockets and blue lights, and from the effect produced upon his captains, one would be led to suppose that the purport was, 'Abandon me and leave me to my fate,' for they all made off at full speed. When they were ordered out again to their Admiral's assistance I must say I never saw anything to equal their *empressement* to avoid obeying the order; nor would they have gone at all if I had not gone on shore and urged the land Pacha to have some pity on his brethren of the sea." A temporary rudder being fixed to the frigate the Admiral returned to the Bosphorus.

The combined squadrons now remained awaiting the

issue of the negotiations still being carried on by the Powers. Russia did not appear inclined to recede, and was indeed preparing for an invasion of Turkey. Peace seemed further off than ever. Meanwhile Sir Edmund was much gratified by the news of his son's¹ appointment to a ship, conveyed to him in the following letter by Sir James Graham—"I have had great pleasure in appointing your son to the command of the *Miranda*, a screw sloop-of-war; and while you are sustaining the honour of the flag in the Black Sea, he will be the rival of your exertions in the Baltic. I have made this appointment as a proof of my approbation of the readiness with which you accepted unconditionally the post of Second in Command of the Mediterranean, and of the effective and generous support which you have given to Admiral Dundas, in difficult circumstances.

"It is most desirable that the British authorities should not be divided either in their councils or in their intercourse at a distance from home in so trying an emergency. I wish that peace could be restored at Constantinople between the British Embassy and the Fleet. I care nothing for the hostilities of Russia, or for the Fleet at Sebastopol, if the Allies and their respective agents, both civil and military, can be induced once more to pull well together."

It was now evident that pledged as they were to protect Turkish territory from hostile aggression, France and England must to carry this out effectively take more decided action. Our troops were already collecting at Malta. A declaration of war was inevitable. The Admirals were desirous of being actually in the Black Sea when this occurred. Accordingly, on March 24, the combined Fleets left the Bosphorus and proceeded to Kavarna Bay, where they arrived on the 26th, and anchored off Baljik. Here they remained until on April 9 they received news that war had been declared between England, France, and Russia.

¹ Captain Edmund Moubray Lyons.


CHAPTER VIII

1854—APRIL TO JULY

First ideas of attacking Sebastopol—Other operations which could be undertaken—Aid to the Circassians—Attack on Odessa—Sir Edmund detached with the squadron to open communications with Circassians and act against fortified Russian places—Visits Kaffa Bay, Anapa, and other places—Leaves Captain Brock at Bardan—Attacks Redoute Kaleh, and takes possession of it—Rejoins Commander-in-Chief—Loss of the *Tiger*—Our troops arrive—Construct lines at Gallipoli—Russians retreat from the Danube—Decision to attack Sebastopol—Influence of Sir James Graham.

WHEN maritime States engage in war the squadrons and ships of one of the contending parties usually seek out those of the other belligerent with a view to their capture or destruction as a means of paralyzing their power for mischief. It has also been observable in the past that the other side does not usually accept the gauge of battle unless he possesses a clearly-defined superiority, but either temporarily shelters himself within a secure harbour, or adopts a policy directed against some possession of the enemy, not his ships-of-war.

In the case of the Allies, they naturally desired to meet the Russian Black Sea Fleet in open combat, and the first impulse was to seek it. But the presence of a foreign squadron in alliance necessitated arrangements being made, not only for co-operation on the day of battle, but also for communicating with each other at all times. Plans for sailing and navigation to bring different methods of signal-



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ling and tactics into harmony have under these circumstances to be organized, and though much had been done towards this end during the time the two squadrons lay together in the Bosphorus, it required a few days after war had actually been declared to complete them. When people talk glibly about the strength conferred by an alliance, they little know how difficult it is to make things go smoothly, especially when the forces are acting side by side, so that I trust we shall always be prepared, and strong enough, to defend ourselves unaided ; though it is satisfactory to record that on this occasion, as far as the British and French Fleets were concerned, there was hearty co-operation throughout the war. When an enemy's fleet is sufficiently weakened to be no longer a serious factor as regards taking the offensive, then operations against territory may be undertaken ; and, perhaps, the most potent in subjugation would be the destruction of his principal naval arsenal.

We have seen that for months past an attack on Sebastopol had been in the mind of at least one member of the Cabinet. The capture of this important base and the destruction of the Russian Fleet was in the belief of the First Lord of the Admiralty the measure required to bring about any lasting peace. Taking shape first in his mind as an operation which might be accomplished by the combined Fleets alone, the idea, as the difficulty of this was made manifest to him, began then to assume the form of a combined naval and military undertaking. Sir James Graham had an ardent supporter in Sir Edmund Lyons, who, in writing to him on April 6, before news of the declaration of war reached the East, said—"I remember that when you spoke to me of the defences of Sebastopol in October last, I said that it appeared to me that people in general thought too lightly of them. It now appears to me that too much is thought of them, and an opinion.

is gaining ground that the place is invulnerable. To me the bare idea of our not striking a successful blow at Sebastopol is painful. It haunts me in my solitary evening walks on the deck of this splendid ship, for I am convinced that if we do not leave our mark in the Black Sea this time we shall have to do the work over again before many years elapse. It is a question of men and money, as was that of the campaign of Waterloo when the country came forward with a hundred millions once for all, and purchased the peace which has lasted some forty years. You have made a glorious beginning, and astonished the world with the rapidity with which you have sent forth fleets and troops; and if even the Emperor of Russia were to knock under at the eleventh hour, you will have reason to rejoice in the expense incurred, for you will not only have the satisfaction of knowing that your powerful armaments awed the Emperor and preserved peace, but the effect will make all the world very chary of rousing the British lion for the future.

“But the little knowledge I have of human nature leads me to believe that the Emperor will not knock under until he has had some hard blows, and certainly one of the hardest blows he could have would be the destruction of his Fleet and arsenal of Sebastopol. There is nothing of which I am more convinced than that it would be real economy, and a great saving of blood and treasure, to fit out an expedition for that express purpose this summer. The measures already taken are sufficient for ensuring the safety of the Dardanelles and Constantinople; and the same energy on the part of the Government, the same generous feeling on the part of the nation, which have produced this effect would, I have no doubt, be equally successful now for a second expedition; but if delayed until next year the case might be very different, for it can hardly be expected that the enthusiasm which now prevails in

England will not subside to some extent, nor can we suppose the Russians would not employ the interval in strengthening their defences."

Besides the two great objects of destroying the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the arsenal of Sebastopol, there were other operations which our Fleet could undertake calculated to cause serious injury to the enemy. It was desirable to establish a blockade of all his ports. Without such being declared, neutral vessels not carrying contraband of war could trade with Russian ports. For some reason this blockade was not immediately notified or enforced, though, as our flag practically dominated the Black Sea, it is doubtful whether a notification of blockade would have added greatly to the strength of our position. Then, though Sebastopol was the only large seaport in the Crimea, there were other Russian fortified places on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea, the capture or destruction of which might be productive of serious consequences to that country; for several of these places were on the coast of Georgia and Circassia, and afforded the means whereby Russia held in check the warlike tribes of those countries. For a long period the rulers of Russia had been striving to bring under subjection the inhabitants of Georgia and Circassia, but had not yet completely succeeded. It is said that their attempts had cost them 20,000 soldiers annually. Communication with Russia over sea was maintained by a series of detached forts along the whole seaboard of the Circassian range; and to cut this off was therefore desirable. It was also considered that advantage might be taken of the well-known hostility of these half-savage but warlike races to Russian rule, to get them to combine and rise against their old enemy, for which we were ready to assist them with arms and any other means in our power. The most powerful of these chiefs was Schamyl, whose dominions bordered on Daghestan, on the shores of the

Caspian Sea ; but there were others nearer the coast of the Black Sea who might be disposed to join such a movement.

During the month of March Captain Brock, R.N., had taken a passage in the *Sampson* for a cruise in the Black Sea, and had examined all these places as far as it was possible to do so from the sea, and during what could be only a very brief inspection. The information he obtained on this visit proved of considerable value after war was declared. This officer had been appointed at the end of 1853 as additional Captain to the *Britannia* for surveying-service, and had already performed useful work in that capacity. He was now to be entrusted with the mission of entering into communication with the chiefs of Circassia.

The first duty, however, that devolved upon the combined Fleets was to seek reparation for an act on the part of Russia which certainly seemed unjustifiable. A short time previously, and before a knowledge that war had broken out reached the Admirals, the *Furious* had been sent to Odessa under a flag of truce—a precaution considered desirable since a declaration of hostilities was daily expected—to bring off our Consul and any other British residents who desired to leave. Whilst embarking they had been fired on from the shore, and the allied Admirals determined to punish the proceeding. Leaving Kavarna Bay on April 19, the combined Fleets anchored off Odessa the next day. A summons to the Governor to surrender all Russian ships, and to send out French and British vessels under threat of a bombardment produced no reply. Arrangements for an attack were then made, and the light-draught steamers entrusted with the principal share of the operation. The scheme involved a new departure in the bombardment of land works. Instead of anchoring, each vessel was to steam in, deliver her fire, and retire out of range while another vessel took her place, carrying out the

same operations. Thus the enemy would have little opportunity or time for fixing the range of his assailants, who might so hope to escape without serious damage; for the batteries on shore presented a formidable object, Odessa being a town even then of importance and well defended. Its harbour, formed by jetties projecting into the sea, sheltered many vessels, and an outlying defence of some strength on the principal mole menaced with effect a hostile approach from the sea.

On the morning of the 22nd the *Sampson*, *Terrible*, *Retribution*, and *Furious* (British), with *Mogador*, *Vauban*, and *Descartes* (French), steamed in and opened fire upon the Mole Fort and Government store-houses. They engaged in pairs, delivering their broadsides in succession. After a time the *Arethusa* was directed to reinforce the steamers. Captain Mends executed his mission with the greatest skill and gallantry, approaching under sail, and discharging his heavy guns with effect, then standing off and repeating the manœuvre until recalled by his Admiral. Towards noon the effect of our fire became evident in the flames that burst out in different places on shore. At one o'clock the fort on the Imperial Mole blew up. Our squadron then approached nearer, and with rocket-boats directed their fire upon the shipping inside the Mole, and the Government store-houses. These were set on fire, a large quantity of stores and ammunition being destroyed.

At the close of day our squadrons withdrew, but the fires on shore were observed burning throughout the night. The ships only suffered slightly. The *Terrible*, which had taken a prominent part in the engagement, had two men killed and five wounded: the *Retribution* and *Sampson* three and five wounded respectively. The *Vauban* was set on fire by a red-hot shot. She had two men killed and one wounded. The attack was gallantly and skilfully

conducted, and the resistance reflected credit on the enemy, though ineffectual.

The allied Fleets left Odessa on April 26, and proceeded towards Sebastopol. They were off this port on the 29th, and remained in its vicinity until May 5. As there appeared no chance of the Russian Fleet coming out to accept the gage of battle, it was determined to send a squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons to harass Russia in the direction I have already indicated. Admiral Dundas accordingly directed the Rear-Admiral to take under his orders the *Agamemnon*, *Sampson*, *Retribution*, *Highflyer*, *Firebrand*, and *Niger*, and proceed along the coasts of the Crimea, Circassia, and Georgia, as far as the Asiatic boundary near Batoum, to attack and destroy the various batteries and forts which might be assailable, but to abstain from attacking open towns or defenceless places, and to inflict as little injury on private property as possible. The main object at the time was to open communication with the Circassian chiefs, with a view to obtaining their assistance in such attacks, and also to ascertain if any good port existed nearer than Constantinople for the use of the allied Fleets.

Captain Brock and a force of marines were to be left as a garrison for the purpose of conferring with the chiefs, after which the detached squadron was to rejoin the Fleet at Varna. A French force was to accompany Sir Edmund, composed of the *Charlemagne*, *Mogador*, and *Vauban*, under the command of Captain Vicomte de Chabannes.

Already the power conferred by command of the sea had demonstrated its influence. Doubtless, foreseeing isolated places on the coast must succumb, the Russians had evacuated and destroyed several of these fortified points soon after the declaration of war. A few of the most important they retained, and which would require the co-operation of a land force for their capture and permanent possession. There was no great object in shelling a place

and driving the garrison out temporarily, if it could not be taken possession of ; for on the ships leaving the occupants would return and at once proceed to rebuild the batteries. Throughout the war Sir Edmund was strong against making attacks on places which could not also be occupied. Moreover, it would enable the enemy to claim having driven off the ships, though far from the fact.

On May 5 Sir Edmund and his little squadron parted company from the Admiral, and having picked up their French consorts off Balaclava proceeded along the south coast of the Crimea. No doubt he had a look at the entrance [of the little harbour, afterwards to become so famous, but the passage in being narrow and tortuous the interior cannot be seen from the sea. The first point to visit was Kaffa Bay, a large stretch of water not far from the Straits leading into the Sea of Azoff. The Admiral evidently had some idea that this port might come under consideration for the landing of troops, for in his report he says—"I entered Kaffa Bay at the east end, and steered slowly round it out of gun-shot. Three insignificant little forts fired a few shots, of which I took no notice ; for although the smallest vessels under my orders could easily have destroyed these forts, I was withheld from permitting it, on seeing that there were churches and numerous private dwellings in the line of fire ; and on reflecting that we should only show the enemy his weakness, and induce him to erect batteries which might afford real protection to shipping and obstruct the landing of troops."

In the meantime a small detachment of ships under Captain Moore of the *Highflyer* had gone towards Kertch, and reconnoitred the Straits, but no Russian vessels were seen. The rest of the squadron then proceeded to Anapa, the first considerable fortified place on the Asiatic side. Here about 8000 troops were observed exercising near the town, and it was evident the squadron alone could not

capture the place. The Admiral then went on to Ghelendjik, one of the points the Russians had evacuated after destroying the fortifications and setting fire to the town. It now presented a sad scene of desolation. Here the Admiral remained until the 14th, and entered into communication with the Circassians with a view to a combined attack on Soujak Kaleh, another strongly fortified place. But he found it impossible to get the Circassians to guarantee any considerable force, or in fact work together. Captain Brock's experience was the same, and eventually the idea of deriving any assistance from these people, or getting them to combine together, was abandoned. Leaving Ghelendjik, and dropping Captain Brock and his party at Bardan, the Admiral went on, passing in succession the forts of Navaguisko, St. Douka, Gagri, Pitsounda, and Bombori. These had all been demolished, and apparently abandoned in great haste, iron guns being left in most of them, and in some brass ordnance of considerable calibre. Each fort may be said to have been a compact military colony containing well-built houses and store-houses, laid out with great taste, but usually in low unhealthy situations. Large sums of money must have been expended on them, for they were built of stone brought from the Crimea, and therefore it was no inconsiderable blow to bring about their destruction.

Soukoum Kaleh was reached on the 16th, and here the Admiral found that the place had been evacuated by its garrison of 3500 Russian troops. This had taken place on April 13, and everything was left untouched except the guns, which were spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the sea. On their departure the town was occupied by 2000 Circassians under an officer deputed by Mohamed Emin Bey, the naïb or lieutenant of Schamyl in this part of the country.

Having heard at Soukoum Kaleh that Redoute Kaleh



CAPTURE OF REDOUTE KALEH, MAY 19TH, 1854.
 (From a sketch by Captain Cowper Coles, R.N.)

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was still in the hands of Russians, and that they attached great importance to maintaining this possession as a means for supplying their army inland with stores and ammunition from the magazines, the Admiral determined to attack this place. To effect its occupation and cut off the retreat of the garrison the co-operation of troops was necessary, so to obtain them the squadron went first to Tchefketel (St. Nicolai), where a Turkish force lay encamped. But the Pacha commanding this said he had no soldiers to spare, so Sir Edmund went on to Tchourouksoo, near Batoum, to try another Pacha, who told the same tale. Another man would then probably have given up his purpose, but Sir Edmund, not daunted, insisted on a messenger being sent to Selim Pacha, the Commander-in-Chief in that district, and awaited the result, as it involved a journey of six hours. Success rewarded his pertinacity, for an answer arrived next morning placing 800 Turkish infantry and three field-pieces at Sir Edmund's disposal.

Having embarked these on the ships of the squadron they arrived off Redoute Kaleh on May 19. The troops were landed about two miles from the town, and Lieutenant Maxse took on shore a summons to the Governor to surrender. No answer being received the *Agamemnon* and *Charlemagne* stood in and opened fire upon the forts and quarters occupied by the garrison. A brief and ineffectual fire was returned, but speedily silenced, and the Russian troops retired, when the Turkish soldiers advanced rapidly along the beach and took possession of the batteries. In their retreat the Russians set fire to some of the magazines and the town, which stood back some way from the sea, so that in the morning this once flourishing place presented a sad scene of desolation. War cannot, however, be waged without such incidents, and this one had been the means of driving the enemy from a place of importance, and depriving him of an extensive dépôt of military supplies.

The next thing was to put Redoute Kaleh in a state of defence again, for the Turkish garrison we intended to leave there. This was done, and the *Sampson* detached to remain as a further means of protection. The Admiral then proceeded to Sinope for coal, and rejoined the Commander-in-Chief at Baljik on May 28. This cruise, though not marked by any great events, had been useful as evidence to the tribes bordering on the coast of the power at sea of the two European States, who were now at war with their ancient enemy. As the squadron passed along the coast with their colours flying the natives flocked to the beach, and testified their joy by firing muskets and waving flags. On landing the officers were welcomed as deliverers, but the inhabitants appeared reluctant to take any initiative unless some great chief like Schamyl should place himself at their head.

All that could be done had been effectively accomplished by Sir Edmund, and he received the warm approval of Admiral Dundas and the Admiralty of his proceedings. These operations had been rendered easier by the cordiality which reigned throughout between the English and French commanders. Writing to Captain Vicomte de Chabannes on May 26, Sir Edmund says—"I cannot separate from you without begging you to accept my sincere and hearty thanks for the cordial co-operation which has materially contributed to the success of the interesting service we have been engaged in, and which has been a constant source of satisfaction to me, that I shall think of it with pleasure for the rest of my life. In any future service I may be employed upon I hope it may be my good fortune to have the *Charlemagne* with me."

It was by such kindly appreciation of the services rendered by all associated with him in this campaign, that Sir Edmund not only secured the affection and stimulated the zeal of our own officers, but established what was no

less important—the most cordial relations between both Fleets. Since Sir Edmund had parted from the main body of the squadron a lamentable incident occurred on May 12 in the loss of the *Tiger*. Left to guard the coast when the Fleets left Odessa, she ran aground in a fog on a headland, about four miles south of that town, and when her position became known to the enemy they assailed her with field-guns and musketry. Captain H. W. Giffard was ill with fever at the time, but came on deck to superintend her defence, and the measures taken to float her. He was struck by a round-shot and disabled. The position of the ship was such that the enemy's fire could not be effectively returned, and as all efforts to get her off proved unavailing the colours were hauled down and the ship set on fire. She blew up soon afterwards. The crew were previously removed on shore, and the wounded well taken care of, but Captain Giffard died of his injuries.

While these events were taking place the English and French troops intended to assist the Ottoman empire against a Russian invasion had arrived in the East. The first position assigned to them was on that narrow strip of Turkish territory which forms the northern side of the Dardanelles. It was deemed essential to secure at any rate that important waterway on the land side. I gather, moreover, that a strong position there was considered a guard over Constantinople, and General Sir John Burgoyne had been sent out early in the year to concert measures to this end. Writing to Sir James Graham on March 23, Sir Edmund says—"Sir John Burgoyne does not give a very encouraging account of the state of affairs on the line of the Danube, but he seems to have no doubt of the English and French troops being in time to occupy positions that will protect Constantinople as effectually as the lines of Torres Vedras protected Lisbon."

In the month of February Sir John, accompanied by a

staff of French and English engineer officers, proceeded to Gallipoli to survey the ground on which such defences should be constructed. In this operation he was assisted by Captain Spratt, in command of the *Spitfire*, an officer of great ability, who rendered conspicuous service afterwards, and whose journals and letters home, kindly lent to me by his son, Colonel Spratt, R. E., have afforded valuable information on many points.

The line of defence chosen by the General and agreed to by the French officers was north of Gallipoli—where the peninsula is very narrow—near the village of Pliari, or Bouliar, as it is more generally called. The defences thrown up here afterwards were the now well-known Bouliar Lines. It was at Gallipoli the troops were landed on arrival from England, France, and Malta, though a certain number went on to Scutari. This step appears to have been due to an exaggerated idea of what the Russian army would accomplish when the Danube was crossed, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the Turks were not credited with being able to offer the resistance of which they proved themselves capable. It was considered their territory would be speedily overrun and their capital menaced.

On crossing the Danube, however, the Russians found themselves confronted with the strong fortress of Silistria, on each side of which were the fortified places Rustchuk and Hirsova. Beyond was the entrenched camp of Shumla, all presenting obstacles before an advance on Constantinople could be undertaken. The first operation therefore for the Russian army was the siege of Silistria. The Turkish forces on the south side of the Danube had Omer Pacha for Commander-in-Chief, a man sprung from humble origin who had had a varied career, but who undoubtedly possessed military talent. As the Turks were making a good resistance on the Danube and the

fortress of Silistria continued to hold out against all attacks, it was decided to move the allied troops to Varna, a town on the Black Sea east of Shumla. From here an army supported by our Fleet commanding the Black Sea, and protecting the position, would be able to operate on the left flank of the Russian forces should they advance upon Shumla. It was calculated that Silistria would not be able to hold out for any length of time. Early in June therefore the allied armies moved to Varna, and there commenced the friendship between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, whose vigorous and straightforward opinions soon won the affection of that high-minded nobleman. On his side the Admiral conceived at once a great regard for the General. Writing to his eldest son on June 28, he says—"I have a high opinion of Lord Raglan, and I foresee that if the two armies remain long together *he* will be the man looked up to by *all*."

The retreat of the Russians from before Silistria and their recrossing the Danube freed the allied armies from the necessity of co-operating with the Turkish army for the defence of the Ottoman empire in Europe, at any rate for a time, and then the idea of a descent upon the Crimea began to take practical shape. We have seen that the opinion was largely held at home that no lasting peace could be secured until Russia's power had been weakened. Writing on June 13 to Sir Edmund, Sir James Graham says—"I congratulate you sincerely on your success on the coast of Circassia. The operation was well performed, and all was done which was possible with the means at your command. I am of your opinion that no decisive blow will have been struck by the allied Powers in the East while Sebastopol remains intact and the Russian Fleet unassailed. These objects are not within our reach unless a large army be prepared to co-operate with the Fleet, and any such operation must depend on the

tide of war in Bulgaria. But Sebastopol is the point to which our views and ultimate efforts should be directed, and I am persuaded that you never will lose sight of it. Every preparation should be quietly made which is necessary to the success of disembarkation in the Crimea ; so that if at any moment the opportunity should present itself the means may not be wanting." Again on July 2 he writes—"My fixed purpose from which I have never swerved is the capture of Sebastopol, and the destruction of the enemy's Fleet. You agree with me in this, and we must never rest until this grand object is accomplished. The choice of the best place for disembarkation in the Crimea is a matter of great urgency. I have written to Admiral Dundas very fully upon it, and I doubt not that he will communicate to you my views. I hope that Lord Raglan will cordially adopt them. The Emperor of the French is entirely of your mind, and has written to Marshal St. Arnaud in this sense. My belief is that the sooner the attack is made the better, and from Varna the descent may be so sudden as to partake of the character of a surprise. The landing must, I think, be made between Eupatoria and Sebastopol, and the nearer to the latter place the better ; but you must find if possible a safe anchorage which you can hold during the summer months, and from which the landing in boats may be covered by the guns of the ships. I place great reliance on your energy and prudence. Your presence in the Fleet inspires me with confidence ; and I trust that Admiral Dundas will avail himself to the utmost of your advice and co-operation, which you have given and will continue to give for the good of the Service and for the success of this great cause to the best of your judgment and ability." We may presume that this undertaking was similarly urged in the Cabinet at home with equal persistency, and we can imagine the effect it must have

produced. In the mind of one member of that body at least there was no hesitation, no fear of success, no doubt as to what should be done at this juncture. The influence of a man who knows his own mind is always great. In this case I doubt not it turned the scale. The expedition to the Crimea was decided upon, and orders to that effect dispatched to Lord Raglan. Mr. Kinglake in his interesting history of the war depicts the Cabinet as irresistibly lulled to slumber when this momentous dispatch was read to the members, inferring they did not realize the importance of this decision. My interpretation is that if the tendency to sleep at that moment is a fact and not a literary embellishment, the First Lord of the Admiralty had so frequently put the matter before his colleagues, that their decision being now made they regarded the dispatch as rather a formal if necessary proceeding conveying the actual orders to do something which had been frequently discussed at their meetings.

CHAPTER IX

1854—JULY TO SEPTEMBER

Disembarking the Army at Varna—Tribute to services of Navy from Lord Raglan—Captain Mends becomes Flag-Captain—Affair on the Danube—Death of Captain Hyde Parker—Gallantry of Lieutenant Algernon Lyons—Expedition to the Crimea decided upon—Inspection of the coast to determine landing-place—The *Fury* examines coast—Sir Edmund directed to organize means for disembarkation in Crimea—Goes to Constantinople with General Sir George Brown—Their exertions—Our transport service—Difficulties overcome—Assistance from Malta—Cholera breaks out in allied camp—Ravages—Extends to Fleet—General depression—Sir Edmund's cheery views—Services of naval party under Lieutenant Glyn and Prince Leiningen on the Danube—The Army embarks—Work of the sailors.

IN the instructions furnished to the Admiralty by the Duke of Newcastle on the declaration of war, and transmitted to Admiral Dundas, it was stated that having entered the Black Sea he should be guided by the movements of the Russian Fleet and army as to the line of operations he should first undertake. If the Russian army had passed the Danube in force his duty was to bring his Fleet, or a portion of it, to bear on the left flank of that army, for the purpose of upholding the fortress and town of Varna; the cutting off supplies by sea to the Russian forces, and opening communications with Omer Pacha—the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army in Bulgaria. At the same time no opportunity was to be lost of bringing the Russian Fleet to action if it should

venture to appear in the open sea. When therefore it was evident that the Russian Admiral had no intention of coming out from Sebastopol, the combined squadrons returned to Kavarna Bay in pursuance of the aforesaid instructions. Here they remained during the month of June, affording material assistance in the disembarkation at Varna of our troops from England and Gallipoli. This was going on continuously up to the middle of July. A generous tribute to the exertions of the Fleet is given in a letter from Lord Raglan to Admiral Dundas on July 13—"Although the disembarkations in this Bay have not entirely ceased, yet they are drawing so nearly to a close that I cannot with justice to my own feelings, or my sense of what is due to the Fleet, any longer refrain from expressing to you my earnest thanks for the able assistance you so readily afforded to the army under my command, and my admiration of the manner in which both the officers and men of the Royal Navy devoted themselves to the discharge of the onerous duty of landing the troops, military equipments, and stores, with that cheerfulness, constancy, and dexterity for which the Royal Navy is always so peculiarly distinguished. When it is remembered that the numbers disembarked consisted of very many thousands, besides artillery, horses, baggage, ammunition, and stores of every description; and that the troops who were landed were not exclusively English, but also French; likewise that no accident occurred, and no difference arose between either of the two professions, or the two nations, it can occasion no surprise that I view the service rendered as one in the highest degree important and effective, and as reflecting the greatest credit on the Navy, and especially upon the officer, Commander Frere, who was so judiciously chosen by Lord George Paulet to carry out the details.

"The zeal displayed by Lord George Paulet of the

Bellerophon, Lord Edward Russell of the *Vengeance*, Captain Eden of the *London*, and Captain Mends of the *Arethusa* demands my warmest acknowledgments." The exertions of Commander J. J. B. E. Frere, who, Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown stated, was "never off the jetty from four in the morning till eight at night," were still further alluded to by Lord Raglan in another part of this letter, and he requested that his conduct might be specially brought under the notice of the Admiralty. This officer was shortly afterwards promoted to captain.

Previous to this date—it was at the end of June—Captain Mends exchanged with Captain Symonds, and thus became flag-captain to Sir Edmund Lyons, Captain Symonds reverting to the command of his old ship the *Arethusa*. After several years of independent command in which he had achieved great reputation as a skilful seaman, it was difficult for him to assume the position of flag-captain, and the duties were not congenial to his temperament. The change satisfied all concerned, and caused no unfriendly feeling on either side.

It may be asked, Why was not a combined naval and military expedition sent against the strongholds of Anapa and Soujak Kaleh? The reasons are given in a letter from Sir Edmund Lyons to Admiral Dundas, soon after the former's return from the coast of Circassia. Speaking of Anapa he says—"I have no doubt that the garrison—which consists of 10,000 good and well-appointed troops of all arms—might be shelled out by our naval forces. But would it be desirable to do so? I think not, unless we could be sure of cutting off the retreat of the garrison of Anapa, as well as that of the neighbouring fortress of Soujak, which comprises 8000 excellent troops of all arms, and with which Anapa is connected by a good military road. Those 18,000 men where they now are can have no effect in a military point of view on the issue of the war, but at

Sebastopol or on the Danube they might possibly turn the balance against us, and therefore in my very humble opinion it would be unwise to disturb them. In truth, always having in view the cardinal point of the destruction of the arsenal and the Fleet at Sebastopol, I am apprehensive of hearing any day that the Emperor Nicholas, in order to concentrate his forces, has directed Anapa and Soujak to be evacuated in the same manner as the other places on the coast.

“A cursory view of the locality on the chart and maps leads one to suppose that the possession of Anapa would facilitate operations in the Sea of Azoff, but in reality it is not so; Kertch is the key to the Sea of Azoff; not that I would recommend a premature attack upon that, or any other place, for fear of showing the enemy his weak points, and prompting him to take measures that might increase our difficulties when the time arrives for the combined Fleets and Armies to strike the deadly blow at Sebastopol.” The allied Generals agreed with this view, and hence no such operation was undertaken.

Though obliged to acquiesce in a policy of inactivity for the Fleet until the great project should be accomplished, Sir Edmund found some compensation in the knowledge that he was furthering this by establishing most cordial relations between the chiefs of the allied forces—naval and military—and acquiring, by his diplomatic experience, tact, and energy, much influence in their councils.

Another source of gratification at this time was the excellent reports he was receiving from his sailor son. Captain Lyons, after his return home with his father from Stockholm in October 1853, went to Woolwich to study steam, considered then essential previous to commanding a ship. Great preparations were made at the beginning of 1854 to equip a fleet for the Baltic, where it was believed the chief honour and glory would fall to the Navy. Captain Lyons was naturally anxious to get a ship, and as we have

seen he was appointed at the end of February to the *Miranda*. She was a steam screw-sloop of 1070 tons and 15 guns. With this command he was greatly pleased. Like his father, with an energetic and sanguine temperament, he made light of difficulties, and undertook cheerfully any duty he might be called upon to perform. The *Miranda* had been dispatched on a special mission to the Baltic, and then joined a squadron for service in the White Sea, under Captain Ommanney, of the *Eurydice*. In this he gained great credit from the Admiralty, and heard pleasant things of his father. Never was such a united family. Praise to any one of them afforded the keenest pleasure to all. Father and sons were more like brothers, with a touching faith in each other nothing could weaken.

Another source of gratification to Sir Edmund at this time was the gallant conduct of his nephew, Algernon Lyons,¹ who had been appointed by Admiral Dundas acting-lieutenant of the *Firebrand*. The affair in which he took a leading part was as follows. On June 1, the Admirals of the combined Fleets declared a blockade of the river Danube and all its mouths. To render it effective the *Vesuvius*, *Firebrand*, and *Fury* were detached for this service under the orders of Captain Hyde Parker of the *Firebrand*. At the beginning of July this officer, when off the Sulina mouth of the Danube, organized an expedition from the squadron to go a short distance up the river and destroy some works constructed by the Russians. A strong party of boats from the *Vesuvius* and *Firebrand*, led by Captain Parker in his gig, accordingly proceeded on July 8 for this purpose. Lieutenant Lyons was in a pinnace attached to the leader's division of boats. A heavy fire from some houses and a strong stockade on the right bank was soon directed on Captain Parker's boat, which

¹ Now Admiral of the Fleet Sir Algernon Lyons, G.C.B.

was riddled, and some of his men wounded. He then directed a detachment of seamen and marines to land and storm the place. As they advanced, led by Captain Parker, they encountered a tremendous fire, and their gallant leader, who by his eagerness was much exposed, fell shot through the heart. The command then devolved upon Commander Powell¹ of the *Vesuvius*, who directed the boats with guns and rockets to keep up a well-directed fire upon the enemy, which soon silenced him. The storming party then advanced and carried the work. It was a large battery, enclosing about fifty Government store-houses and magazines. After the death of his captain, Lieutenant Lyons took command of the *Firebrand's* division of boats, and Commander Powell in his dispatch stated—"they were most skilfully managed under circumstances of great difficulty." The Senior Lieutenant of the *Firebrand* in his report to the Senior Officer present said—"Mr. Lyons has displayed much courage and ability on more than this occasion since joining this ship." Being in advance, the pinnacle of the *Firebrand* came in for the principal part of the enemy's fire, and had five men wounded—three severely. Mr. Carey, second master of the *Vesuvius*, was also wounded. Captain Hyde Parker was an able officer, and much beloved by those who served under him. In reporting his death Commander Powell said—"Thus died an officer whose merits, sir, are well known to yourself. His conduct on this occasion leaves an example of valour that can never be erased from the memory of those who were present." Lieutenant Lyons had been confirmed in that rank before the dispatches relating to this affair reached England, or he would have been promoted for "special services"—a more valued advancement.

The dispatch sent by the Duke of Newcastle on June 29, directing an expedition to be sent to the Crimea, unless

¹ Commander Richard Ashmore Powell.

some insuperable objection existed, reached Lord Raglan on July 16. A conference to decide the matter was held on the 18th, attended by the principal generals and admirals of the allied forces. Some I believe were against such an undertaking for different reasons. The time was short if the aim was to capture Sebastopol during that summer, and no one seems to have contemplated a winter campaign, or prolonging the operations to a second year. Or the objection might arise from the want of accurate knowledge of the strength of the Russian forces in the Crimea. It was, however, decided to at once prepare for the expedition. One present at least felt no doubts in the matter. Writing to Sir James Graham on July 19, Sir Edmund says—"Since the decision we came to at the conference yesterday everything appears *couleur de rose* to me. Not that I suppose there are not difficulties to be overcome in this as in all glorious enterprises, but that I trust and believe that with the blessing of God they will be overcome in this just cause. I am much more hopeful with regard to water for the troops in the Crimea than my good chief is, but I will nevertheless second him to the utmost of my power in his measures for meeting the emergency if it should arise. We have, to be sure, but scanty information as to the force of the enemy, but what we do know is that we have twenty-five sail-of-the-line and 70,000 troops."

Having thus agreed upon the expedition, the next point was to determine the landing-place. Several localities had been discussed, but very little information respecting the Crimea existed on our side. Water for the troops after landing was a serious question, and we were ignorant of the small rivers in this part of Russia. In the light of present information accumulated on such subjects by Intelligence Departments, it is astonishing to find, not so much the ignorance that then prevailed on such important matters,

but that no special steps had been taken either at home or at Constantinople since hostilities commenced to obtain some reliable data which would justify and facilitate such an undertaking.

An inspection of the coast near Sebastopol by naval and military officers was decided upon. Sir Edmund Lyons and General Sir George Brown were the English officers, General Canrobert and Colonel Trochu the French officers, selected for this duty. The Fleets sailed on this mission on July 21, and stood over to the Crimea. On the night of the 25th the *Agamemnon*—which carried the reconnoissance party—with the *Fury* and other steam vessels pushed on for Sebastopol. Being off this port the following morning, Sir Edmund Lyons and the other officers went on board the *Fury*—Commander Edward Tatham—so as to get as close inshore as possible, and make a thorough inspection of the harbour and coast. The result is given in the following letter from Sir Edmund to Admiral Dundas—

“‘*Fury*,’ off *Eupatoria*, July 26.

“MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—It may be interesting to you to have a short account of the doings of the reconnoitring party on board the *Fury* since we left you last evening. The *Fury*, *Terrible*, and *Cacique* were so close off the harbour of Sebastopol at daybreak this morning, that a corvette at anchor in the entrance found it prudent to weigh and stand into the port. A few minutes afterwards several ships-of-the-line made all plain sail, braced for casting, and were on the point of slipping their moorings, but furled sails and held fast on the combined squadron being signalled from the hill.

“We then commenced our reconnoissance of the coast between Sebastopol and Eupatoria, and I thought it justifiable to risk the effect of a few shots from the guns that were

visible in order to discover whether there were any masked ones, and I conclude there were none, for those only that we saw were fired, and I am happy to say without doing us any material injury—the *Fury* having been struck by one shot only (weighing 39 lbs. English), and that being between wind and water was too low down to hit any one. Nor did the *Terrible* suffer any damage beyond having a shroud shot away.

“You will be glad to know that Generals Brown and Canrobert, as well as the staff-officers of both armies, who are with me on board the *Fury*, are of opinion that the Bay of Katscha, where the river of that name runs into the sea with a volume and velocity that discolours the salt water at a very considerable distance from its mouth, offers a highly favourable place for the disembarkation of the forces.

“Thus are resolved the two important questions of finding water for the troops and a place for landing them. I may mention that Colonel Trochu and I went aloft and traced the river in its tortuous course through the plain with our own eyes, and that having in the morning made the signal to the *Terrible*, ‘Send an officer aloft to look out for water,’ Captain McCleverty signalled when abreast of the Katscha, ‘We see a river.’

“We had seven fathoms water at half-a-mile from the beach, thus making sure of our vessels of war being able to cover the landing of troops very effectually. I avoided sounding more at this place than is usual in sailing along a coast, for there were people bathing, who had no doubt come from Sebastopol in carriages that we saw on the beach.

“We have taken a good look at Eupatoria and its anchorage. Thus you see, my dear Admiral, that your determination to bring the squadron to support the reconnaissance has had all the good effect you anticipated. I cannot tell you how much I am pleased with the efficiency of the *Fury*, or how highly I estimate Commander Tatham’s

zeal and intelligence, as well as his knowledge of his profession and his love for it.

“EDMUND LYONS.”

Writing to Sir James Graham the same day, Sir Edmund says—“The report of the reconnoissance can hardly fail to remove the doubts of those persons who apprehend that no convenient place can be found near Sebastopol for disembarking the allied forces, nor any water for them if even they can be landed. I had no doubts on these points myself, nor can I admit that the unsupported opinion of those who estimate the Russian forces in the Crimea at 75,000 is of the same value as the opinion of those who put them at less than 45,000, and adduce the corroborative testimony of Consul-General Yeames, and that of a Russian custom officer captured off Eupatoria, whose account of the Fleet in Sebastopol turns out to be correct. I have never heard a better reason given than that ‘the Russians would not be such fools as to have fewer.’” Writing again on the 29th, after the Fleets had returned to Varna, he says—“Having brought over from the coast of the Crimea the reconnoitring party, we had a conference at Marshal St. Arnaud’s yesterday, and you will no doubt hear through Lord Raglan that it was resolved to push all preparations with as much activity and vigour as if the attack on Sebastopol were irrevocably determined upon, and I only hope that circumstances may enable us to proceed when ready, for, although I am by no means one of those men who hold an enemy cheap, I feel very confident of success.

“The Admiral having acceded to Lord Raglan’s wish, and my request that I might have the direction of the reconnoissance, has enabled me to speak *en connaissance de cause* on some material points, and it gave me the opportunity of witnessing the great respect and deference justly paid to Sir George Brown’s experience and ability by

General Canrobert and other French officers of rank. I hope the embarkation may take place on August 10, though I tremble lest the halt of Austria should cause delay."

Thus endeavouring to inspire all who wavered with his own energy, and to instil some of that confidence, without which no great enterprise can succeed, Sir Edmund accepted with alacrity the task of preparing for the embarkation. On July 27, Admiral Dundas writes to him—"I have to request that you will take upon yourself the charge and direction of the embarkation and disembarkation of the forces that may be ordered for service in the Crimea, and to this end you are to take under your immediate orders the following ships and vessels, viz.—*Agamemnon*, *Bellerophon*, *Sanspareil*, *Leander*, *Highflyer*, *Diamond*, *Fury*, *Niger*, *Simoom*, *Megæra*, *Cyclops*, *Apollo*, *Triton*, and the *Danube* and *Circassia* (tenders), together with all the steam and sailing transports.

"The remainder of the squadron under my orders will also convey such portion of the army as may be necessary, and will after landing them act as a covering squadron, and when practicable assist in the general disembarkation, etc. Rear-Admiral Boxer will remain at Constantinople to assist and act under your orders in arranging the transports, with whose capacities, etc., he is well acquainted." Previous to obtaining Flag rank in March 1853, Rear-Admiral Edward Boxer had been employed for ten years at Quebec as resident agent for transports and harbour-master. On war breaking out with Russia he was appointed in April 1854 Admiral-Superintendent in the Bosphorus, with chief charge of the transport service in the East. Attached to him for assistance in this work were Captain Peter Christie and Commander William Hoseason.

It would be difficult to find a single war in which Great Britain has engaged in which the transport of troops by sea, often on a considerable scale, did not occur. It has

been by the action of combined naval and military expeditions that our Empire was extended and our position as a nation maintained. The conveyance of soldiers to distant shores was a matter of frequent occurrence in the old wars, and continued up to the peace of 1815. A few years previously we had sent a large expedition to Walcheren; an army had been landed in Portugal; and a considerable force occupied Sicily. The institution of a Naval Transport Board dates from 1689, when three captains were appointed for the duty. Modifications in the management of this office took place from time to time until 1817, when the Board was abolished and the duties transferred to the Commissioners of the Navy. Among the several changes made by Sir James Graham during his first tenure of office as First Lord of the Admiralty, was to appoint in 1832 a Comptroller of Victualling and Transport Service. Of course there is at all times a certain amount of work devolving on such a department, for we maintained troops in several parts of the world for whose periodical relief, bringing home invalids, and sending out stores, arrangements had continually to be made. These matters during the peace which reigned for forty years had not brought any undue strain on the department. It was obviously very different when a formidable expedition had to be prepared. But whatever failing there may have been in the land transport, either after the disembarkation at Varna or after the landing in the Crimea, no fault can be found with the organization of that flotilla by which our army was transported to the East, or moved from one point to another at the will of the Commander-in-Chief. It excited at the time unqualified admiration. And yet during all these years of peace, a great change had been taking place in the appliances for sea transport. Steam had progressed with greater rapidity in the Mercantile Marine than it had in the State Navy. Dating its entrance from 1820, by 1844 the

number of merchant steamers in this country had grown to nearly 1000, with a total of 125,000 tons. In 1854 they had risen in number to 1700, and the tonnage to 326,000. The dimensions of merchant steamers were likewise increasing, so that in 1853 the Government were able to acquire that fine vessel the *Himalaya* of 3500 tons from the P. and O. Company, and which has only recently terminated her useful career as a troop-ship. Great as had been the advance of steam shipping, this source could not supply all the requirements of such an undertaking, and a number of sailing-ships had to be hired principally to carry stores and ammunition.

Though the daily hire of a steamer exceeded that of a sailing-ship, owing to the cost of coal on a voyage, it was cheaper because the work could be more expeditiously performed. A steamer of 2500 tons taken up then at 50s. per ton per month, would with coal cost about £380 a day. She would carry 1500 men and 500 tons of stores. At 10 knots the passage to the Black Sea would take about 14 days, and the total cost be about £5000. A sailing-ship of 1000 tons at 30s. per ton per month would take 60 days to get to the Black Sea, and cost £3000.

The work of forwarding troops to the East had begun in February, and though the first detachments only went at that time as far as Malta, they had later to be conveyed to Scutari and Varna. Then the work of the transport service became very arduous, and an immense number of transports—sail and steam—had to be obtained.

But in landing a force on a hostile shore a great deal more has to be provided than the vessels to carry it. There are people who discuss an invasion, and who seem to have an idea that the matter is limited to crowding a number of soldiers on a ship and directing them to be landed at a certain place. There is no consideration of how they are to get on shore with their arms, guns, and

ammunition ; that merchant-ships have only a few boats, and that artillery cannot be transferred from ship to beach without any previous preparation. When we consider that notwithstanding the support and resources of a large combined Fleet and the presence of transports, more than a month of hard work was required before an army of 50,000 men could be landed in the Crimea, we are justified in doubting those who assert—the more positively when knowing least about it—that the invasion of our shores with 150,000 or 200,000 men is not only within the bounds of possibility, but by no means so difficult an undertaking as is often stated.

It was the means for landing artillery the force at Varna now lacked, and for which no provision had been made. Such a contingency does not seem to have struck those at home who directed the expedition, and hence it became necessary to improvise the means in the neighbourhood and on the station. Having had the task entrusted to him of embarking and disembarking the army, Sir Edmund Lyons set about the work with his accustomed energy. On August 1, accompanied by Sir George Brown, he started off in the *Agamemnon* for the Bosphorus, arriving the next day. Then these two set to work in Constantinople to acquire small steamers and boats for making pontoons. To provide the latter, an idea of Mr. Roberts, master and commander of the *Cyclops*, was adopted. It was to take two of the long Turkish boats, place them side by side a certain distance apart, and then plank them over. This formed an excellent raft or pontoon, drawing little water, on which a battery of guns or a company of infantry could be placed. Promptness in decision and execution are essential under such circumstances, but a long period of inaction had much inclined our officials to red-tape formalism. They revel in demands, requisitions, signatures, and approvals by high authorities.

The purchase of a pound of nails could not be achieved without a long correspondence in orthodox fashion. Such a procedure could not suit the impatient energy of the men now urging forward the expedition, and they speedily overcame all obstacles of this nature. How effective were their measures and complete their proposed arrangements may be inferred from the fact that in a week from his arrival at Constantinople, Sir Edmund was able to write to Admiral Dundas—"For the embarkation and conveyance of the troops from Varna to the place of destination, I have the satisfaction of assuring you that we have found the means at our disposal ample. The arrangements for the disembarkation of the troops have got to be made when Lord Raglan and you have matured your plans, but it is satisfactory to know that the boats of H.M. ships and those of the transports, together with the pontoons and steam vessels of light draught of water recently procured at Constantinople, afford ample means for landing at one time 5000 men and a fair proportion of field artillery." This letter also contained a complete disposition of the army for the voyage, drawn up in conjunction with Sir George Brown, Captain Mends, and the transport officers at Constantinople.

Previous to this Sir Edmund had written to Malta for any boats and suitable stores in the dockyard there. In Sir Houston Stewart, the Admiral-Superintendent there, Sir Edmund had not only an old and valued friend, but a man of similar characteristics as regards energy. Replying on August 7 he says—"I have made a desperate stir and hunt for boats, of which we have absolutely none in the dockyard but the *Apollo's* launch. But we have collected some of the largest yet lightest of the Malta boats, which will carry numbers yet not draw much water, and can either pull or be towed. The *Emperor* takes them up in a string. She also takes a lot of plank, gang-boards, and

nails : also a good number of mules and 49 Malta carts. What you will think of the boats I send you I am somewhat anxious about. Had I got an inkling just six weeks ago I would have had 40 or 50 flat-bottomed boats built and ready for you now." It was just that absence of warning and preparation that caused delay and nearly brought the enterprise afterwards to ignominious failure.

Having thus put everything in training to carry out the movement of the troops, Sir Edmund returned to Varna in the *Agamemnon*, and from that time to the end of August he was actively employed preparing for the expedition. Writing to him on August 13 from the *Britannia* at sea, Admiral Dundas says—"I entirely approve of your proceedings, and am much pleased with your report of the ample and efficient means we possess of embarking and disembarking the army whenever it may be required, as well as of the arrangements you have proposed for those services." This visit to Constantinople in the energy it inspired was at once productive of good results. On August 11 Admiral Boxer reported the dispatch of 14 pontoons, and the next day that the remainder of the 20 ordered to be got ready were leaving that evening. Three steam tenders were hired and two others purchased. On August 19 the *Emperor* arrived from Malta with 14 boats in tow, and a further number came with the *Trent*, which also brought 300 mules from the coast of Spain for the army. Transports with stores, ammunition, and additions to the army were daily arriving.

Thus all seemed to bid fair for an early start of the expedition when came that dreadful visitation of cholera. It first appeared in the French army about the middle of July, and then rapidly spread through all portions of the expedition, our allies being the greatest sufferers. At the beginning of August the disease attacked the Fleets at Baljik, and for a time several of the ships were completely

disabled. The *Britannia*, which had over 100 cases, put to sea, hoping thus to lessen the scourge, and other ships did the same. The French flagship suffered even more severely, and several cases occurred among the transports. The *Agamemnon*, having gone to Constantinople on August 1, had only a few cases after her return, as the epidemic declined towards the end of the month. But it had seriously weakened the strength of both Services. To those who from the first were against invading the Crimea, the loss and sickness we sustained became additional arguments not to proceed with it. Sir Edmund, however, never wavered or slackened his exertions. Bringing all his influence to bear on those around him, and perhaps fearful that too great an impression should be made at home by the ravages of this terrible disease, he writes to Sir James Graham on August 14 as follows—"I have no doubt that exaggerated accounts of the cholera will be written by this mail. Some people are carried away by their fears lest their hopes of a brilliant enterprise should be disappointed. Others make the most of it because, however bravely they might, and no doubt would, conduct themselves if once under fire, they have a habit of looking on the dark side of things and dwelling on difficulties. It is bad enough certainly, for the mortality among the French troops amounts to 4000 (not 7000 as is broadly asserted), and in the *Montebello* three-decker, 140 died in three days. With us the loss is, thank God, *much* less. Lord Raglan told me yesterday 400, with a small proportion of officers included, and up to yesterday the deaths in the Fleet were 64. The great mortality in the French army may be ascribed to a reconnoissance on a great scale in the Dobrudscha, against which I heard Lord Raglan remonstrate with Marshal St. Arnaud, and positively decline to allow our troops to take any part in it on the ground that it was exposing the men to unnecessary privation, fatigue, and

exposure to the sun. The meagre diet and poor wine of the French, too, favour the propagation of the disease. It is, however, on the decline, and if the ships be free from it before the season is too far advanced (and that we may reasonably hope will be the case), I see no reason whatever why the enterprise should be abandoned ; on the contrary, every reason why we should endeavour to put the troops and ships in good winter quarters at Sebastopol, and for my part I have no doubt that fewer lives would be lost than by being idle elsewhere. The timely reinforcements arrived, and arriving, more than make up for the deaths, which I am assured do not amount, from cholera and all other causes included, to more than the average number in a healthy army of this size in a healthy place. You are of course fully aware of Lord Raglan's feelings on all these points. I found Marshal St. Arnaud yesterday alone, and he spoke very decidedly, saying—' If the Fleet can take us we will go. If they should not be able to take us I shall feel much more disappointment than it will be prudent to show. It is now a question of cholera, and surely the disease cannot last so long on board the Fleet as to oblige us to abandon the glorious enterprise ! ' This is what he says, and what he writes, I believe, and I dare say what he feels at the time ; but there are moments when he is certainly less confident. He was reading a letter from the Emperor which he had received in the morning, and he gave me to understand that he was speaking in the sense of that letter.

"Everything is ready. We have a month before us for the cholera to subside, and I hope for the best. The result of the most searching inquiries is, that operations may be carried on against Sebastopol as late as the 20th, or the end of November. Marshal St. Arnaud said amongst other things—' You were right in saying the Russians had not so large a force in the Crimea as we supposed : they have not

50,000!’ This I believe he learnt from the Austrian officer who came here from General Hoss. The *Agamemnon* is in a perfectly healthy state so far.” Again on the 19th he writes—“The preparations for the embarkation, conveyance, and disembarkation of the two armies are highly satisfactory. There is a marked improvement in the health of the Fleet as well as in that of the land forces, and all speculations as to the Russian army being able to act on the offensive against Turkey in Europe are at an end for this campaign, so that even those who did not take an encouraging view of things now begin to look up. Some reverse of the picture we must expect but not dwell upon. I have within this half-hour had reported to me the death from cholera of Captain Smith of the *Simoom*, who dined with me yesterday and left me at nine o’clock in high spirits, and begging me to employ him in any way that I might think he could be useful. I have found him zealous, intelligent, and cheerful, and I lament his loss very much.

“Admirals Dundas and Hamelin have summoned Admiral Bruat and myself to a conference on board the *Ville de Paris* at Baljik to-morrow, and I shall have the satisfaction of telling them that Lord Raglan was present this morning at a rehearsal of embarkation and disembarkation of men, horses, and guns, etc., and that he was very much pleased.

“Lieutenant Glyn and Prince Leiningen came back from the Danube yesterday, bringing with them the whole party of seamen in high health and high good-humour, after having accomplished all that was required or expected. Lord Raglan is very much satisfied, and says that Omer Pacha is equally so.

“The *Emperor* steam transport is just arrived from Malta with additional fruits of Admiral Stewart’s untiring zeal and great intelligence. Really if he had the command

of the expedition with his honour and credit depending on the issue he could not work harder or more usefully for its success than he now does. I enclose a letter I have received from Lieutenant Glyn giving a succinct account of his proceedings, and I enclose also a return of the sick in the squadron under my orders here; the latter being hardly more than the average of five per cent."

The service on the Danube alluded to in this letter was as follows—When the Russians raised the siege of Silistria and withdrew across the Danube, Omer Pacha desired to follow them up. To effect this it was necessary to bridge the river, and such an operation being beyond his resources he applied for assistance to Lord Raglan. A force of 30 seamen was therefore detached from the *Britannia* for this service under Lieutenant H. C. Glyn of that ship, and a midshipman, Prince Ernest of Leiningen, in addition to an equal number of sappers under Captain George Bent, R.E. The party went overland to Rustchuk, arriving there during the second week of July. Here Hassan Pacha was in command of 40,000 Turks. He placed at Lieutenant Glyn's disposal some small gunboats, and with their assistance drove out the Russians from, and occupied, the island of Globenzie, which was in front of the town of Giurgevo on the opposite side of the river held by the Russians in force. Then Giurgevo was attacked and captured. A bridge across the Danube was next constructed by Lieutenant Glyn's party and the sappers. About fifty vessels generally employed on the river carrying grain were moored head and stern about twenty yards apart. It was a difficult matter owing to the strength of the current and the river being nearly three-quarters of a mile broad at that part. Their work had also to be carried out under a ceaseless fire of field artillery brought down to the bank by the Russians. Having securely moored the vessels they were planked over and the bridge thus completed in three weeks. Omer

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Pacha, now in command, then crossed with 80,000 men, and captured Bucharest. Lieutenant Glyn and his companions went down the river to Silistria in the gunboats and destroyed some Russian forts on the way, so that the Turks now held the whole of the river between Rustchuk and Silistria. At the latter place the party disembarked, and travelling overland rejoined the Fleet. For this service Lieutenant Glyn was made a commander, and Prince Ernest promoted to lieutenant, while the Sultan conferred medals on the whole detachment.

On August 20 the chiefs of the allied Armies and Fleets met in conference, and decided to commence embarking the expedition. At the same time they settled the plan of this operation, and, if possible, to start on September 2. The French army was to embark at Baljik under the superintendence of Admiral Charner, while the British army embarked at Varna. We had collected sufficient transports to carry over infantry, cavalry, and artillery without having to place any on board our ships-of-war. This was not the case with the French. They had few steam transports; most were sailing-vessels of comparatively small dimensions, and hence it would be necessary to embark most of their infantry in ships of the Fleet. Under these conditions their fighting efficiency would be impaired in the event of a determined attack on the expedition by the Russian Fleet in Sebastopol. Owing also to the insufficiency of transport no French cavalry could be embarked, and therefore, as the generals considered it desirable that a division of cavalry should form part of the expeditionary force, it fell to the lot of the British to provide it. To embark men and guns in an open roadstead on a large scale is not an easy matter, to put horses on board ship under these circumstances is exceptionally difficult. Though the operation, owing to a swell which prevailed for some days, caused some delay, and prolonged the time when all should have been completed

beyond September 2, it was accomplished by the seamen of the Fleet in a manner which displayed their innate aptitude for such matters, and called forth the admiration of all who witnessed the operation. In his letters home at this time Sir Edmund records the progress made almost day by day. Writing to Captain Baillie Hamilton, Secretary to the Admiralty, on August 29, he says—"I snatch a moment just to say that our embarkation is going on prosperously. A long pull, a strong pull, and a pull altogether, is the pervading *animus per mare et terram*. To-day we shall embark in this open roadstead more than 10,000 men with all their baggage, tents, etc., and with the greatest comfort, thanks to the little steamers that I worked so hard to get at Constantinople.

"I hope and trust that we shall be off on Sunday the 3rd, for although the general feeling is what I have described, there are some who catch at straws in hopes of delay being the prelude to the expedition being given up; Lord Raglan is a trump and a host in himself, always calm, dispassionate, consistent, and cheerful. I see a good deal of him, and I consider every hour spent in intercourse with him an advantage to me." On September 4 he writes to Sir James Graham—"Notwithstanding the inconvenient swell that has been setting into the bay the last few days we have nearly completed our embarkation; and as the French appear to be completing theirs, I trust that the whole expedition may be assembled at Baljik to-morrow, and that we shall start the moment the N.E. wind changes. At present we should make more way towards the Bosphorus than towards the Crimea; but this is the third day of the strong winds, and they seldom last longer at this season of the year.

"The French, who had no cavalry to embark, are much struck by the way in which we have got ours on board under the difficulties presented by a swell in an open bay.

We have had no accident, they on the contrary have had many."

It was not only the French who were struck with the skill of the sailors in this matter—officers of our own army were equally astonished. In *Letters from Headquarters by a Staff-officer*, published after the war, I read under date September 6, 1854—"Sunday last 80 staff horses were embarked on board the *Ganges*. The sea was very rough, and it took us some time getting alongside, and then no little difficulty in putting the slings on to the already frightened horses. I never saw anything like the pluck of the bluejackets, they hauled about the horses in a manner that no groom or *bâtman* dare do. One horse would not allow the slings to be put under him, and kept on lashing out with one hind-leg in a most furious manner (it was too rough for him to kick with both, as he would have fallen). This beast was delaying the embarkation of the other horses, so one sailor called out to his mess-mate, 'Jack, next time he kicks, lay hold of his leg,' which Jack very coolly did, and to our utter astonishment the horse stood perfectly still and only snorted; in another second he was swinging in the air half-way up the ship's side. The horse, I suppose, was so surprised at this uncommon freedom on the part of 'Jack,' that he fancied he had found his match and surrendered accordingly."

A generous tribute to the work of the navy is given in Lord Raglan's dispatch of August 29—"The embarkation is proceeding rapidly and successfully, thanks to the able arrangements of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons and the unceasing exertions of the officers and men under his orders. It is impossible for me to express in adequate terms my sense of the value of the assistance the army under my command derives from the Royal Navy. The same feeling prevails from the highest to the lowest: from Vice-Admiral Dundas to the lowest sailor: an ardent

desire to co-operate by every possible means is manifest throughout, and I am proud of being associated with men who are animated by such a spirit, and who are so entirely devoted to the service of their country."

It was indeed a work of great magnitude and difficulty, this embarkation of a complete force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with all their stores, ammunition, and siege appliances, in addition to food for man and beast, an operation moreover not effected in a home port with all the resources of a Portsmouth or Southampton, but on a foreign shore, with no facilities but such as were created on the spot; in an open bay and at a considerable distance from any base. As the day approached during the first week in September when the last detachments were being embarked, the whole Fleet had reason to be proud of the achievement. It was a day of triumph to the Rear-Admiral, for he saw now what he had striven for, and never swerved from when all looked gloomy, actually within reach. The nation at home had gathered a good deal of what was taking place on the shores of the Black Sea, but it did not know all. Only a few then did, but we may now give the opinion of one who thoroughly appreciated what Sir Edmund had accomplished, and it is necessary to record here his words. Writing on September 4, Sir James Graham says—"I am greatly indebted to you for many most interesting and satisfactory letters. They breathe the right spirit and they inspire me with some hope in the midst of much which is disastrous and most discouraging. The long inactivity of the Fleet, and the ravages of cholera, which is the consequence of that inactivity, have led me sometimes almost to despair; but your letters have re-animated me, and while you are on the spot the great prize of Sebastopol need not be regarded as beyond our reach. I have told Admiral Dundas that I consider nothing done in the Black Sea while that remains undone. The Duke

of Newcastle has written to Lord Raglan in the same sense, and Sir John Burgoyne as well as you are witnesses that I have pointed to Sebastopol from the beginning as the mark to which every effort should be directed.

"But I need not stimulate you on this head. You are the life and soul of this great enterprise. Long ago you have declared that all is ready, at Malta and at Constantinople. Admiral Stewart and Admiral Boxer by noble exertions have sustained the character of the naval Service, and have provided all that the army can require both for embarkation and landing. You have pointed out the spot where, after a close reconnoissance, you are satisfied a landing can be effected. Your part has been well performed. I hope that others will now proceed to rival you. It is not the wish of Admiral Dundas to remain much longer on foreign service. His health is failing, and he wishes to be relieved as soon as it can be done consistently with his honour. My intention is that you should be his successor.

"I destine the *Royal Albert* for flagship as the successor to the *Britannia*, and I shall send out *Algiers* and *Hannibal* as soon as possible to replace *Trafalgar* and *Bellerophon*. *Calcutta* and *Powerful* will follow to replace *Albion* and *Vengeance*. *Dauntless* will relieve *Arethusa*, and a screw line-of-battle ship from the Baltic will perhaps relieve *Sanspareil*. Will it be wiser to keep *Sanspareil* in the Black Sea for another year, or to send her home at once? But none of these movements can take place until we know what you do with Sebastopol. If this grand attack be indefinitely postponed, nothing will be left for *me* but to retire with shame and disgrace from a post where I have failed to command the services which this nation had a right to expect.

"Yours very truly,

"JAS. G. GRAHAM."

CHAPTER X

1854—SEPTEMBER

Organization of the flotilla—Departure of the Expedition—Doubt as to landing-place—Conference on board *Ville de Paris*—Indecision of the French—Go on board *Caradoc*—Lord Raglan settles the matter—Goes himself to inspect coast—Fixes landing-place at Old Fort—Rejoins flotilla—Anchor off Eupatoria—Proceed to Old Fort landing-place—Disembarkation of the Army—Tribute to Navy by Lord Raglan—Troops move onward—Battle of Alma—Navy assists wounded and supplies Army with stores—Reason for inaction of Army—Occupation of Eupatoria—Measures for its defence.

ON September 4, Admiral Dundas wrote to the Admiralty—“Our troops are all embarked and ready for sailing to the Crimea immediately the weather will permit.” The next day the transports left Varna and proceeded to Baljik so that all might start together. The work of embarkation had been facilitated by the zeal and intelligence of the men who commanded these transports. They combined those qualities which have aided so materially in raising the mercantile marine of this country to its present position of eminence. Often depreciated, they were a sturdy, self-reliant body of men who shine best in moments of emergency, or in such enterprises as that now about to be undertaken. French officers used to say—“Your Fleet is all very well, but your Transport Service is absolutely unrivalled.” Captain Christie, R.N., who had come up from the Bosphorus to Varna, was the principal officer of transports during the embarkation. To him on

September 2, Sir Edmund wrote—"If an opportunity should occur after all the vessels are assembled, I shall be happy to call all the commanders around me and explain my views to them. But at all events I beg of you to assure them that the zeal and intelligence shown by the Transport Service in the preparations for the expedition inspire me with confidence of success, and convince me that those valuable qualities will not be found wanting in the execution of it." To other officers of the Royal Navy who had assisted in the work he wrote in a similar sense.

Though putting nearly 30,000 men, 2000 horses, and 54 guns, in addition to the necessary stores, on board a number of transports was no easy task, under the circumstances, it formed but a preliminary to the more difficult operation of transferring such an armada across the sea in safety, and landing it on a comparatively unknown coast. Though the general principles were decided by Sir Edmund Lyons in conjunction with Lieut.-General Sir George Brown and captains of ships, the immense mass of details it involved fell to the hands of Captain Mends, who worked them out with minuteness and excellence few could have equalled. The duties of the commander of a line-of-battle ship give a man knowledge and methods of organization which can be applied on a larger scale when required. Captain Mends had not long previously held this office, and gained a reputation for smartness and organization which he now fully justified. All the transports were arranged in six divisions. Each carried a division of the army complete. There were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and light divisions and the cavalry divisions, thus forming six lines of about fifteen vessels—a steamer to every two sailing-ships and towing them. A small detachment of six ships carried medical department, siege train, and extra reserve of ammunition. The small steamers purchased at Constanti-



THE BRITISH PORTION OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITION CROSSING THE BLACK SEA.
(from a picture by Commr. James Rawstorne.)

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nople, and now named *Minna*, *Brenda*, *Danube*, *Circassian*, *Varna*, and *Shark*, were used to help the weak brethren and whip up stragglers. They had been simply invaluable at Varna towing laden boats, pontoons, and taking off troops to the transports.

When our flotilla arrived at Baljik on the evening of the 5th, the French and Turkish Fleets had sailed that morning. They carried—as before stated—the bulk of their armies owing to the insufficiency of their transport. The rendezvous for all to assemble was forty miles N.W. of Cape Tarkan. This is the most westerly point of the Crimea, but in the northern portion of it on one side of the Gulf of Perekop. From thence the expedition could coast down to the required landing-place.

Unfortunately next day the weather was unfavourable for starting, so the flotilla remained at anchor. The French Fleet had meantime made its way leisurely to the north expecting to be joined shortly by us. Admiral Hamelin seems to have been put out by our non-appearance. I have before me a copy of the *Ville de Paris* log for September 6 and 7, signed by Comte Bouet-Willammez—chief of staff to the Admiral—with the following entries.

“*Sept. 6, 6 a.m.*—No English sail yet in sight. *Sept. 7, 5 a.m.*—The Admiral not seeing any English sail in sight decided to send the *Primauguet* back to say that the wind being fair we were going to continue our voyage towards Serpents Isles, where we would await the English squadron.” The *Caton* had also been sent back the night before with General Rose, who was attached to Marshal St. Arnaud’s staff, to inform Lord Raglan of the delay in the departure of the English squadron. The fact was the French had got into fine weather, whereas at Baljik it came on to blow hard during the 6th. On the morning of the 7th, the breeze having subsided in the night, our Admiral made the signal to weigh. By 10.30

all the vessels had got into their respective stations, the steamers taking the sailing transports in tow, and proceeded out of the bay. All describe it as a magnificent spectacle; over one hundred vessels moving out simultaneously to sea in compact order on a beautiful day, the sun shining and reflecting the blueness of the sky on the sea in a way that belied its name. It was a propitious start. If any were inclined to lag there was Sir Edmund—as Captain Spratt in his diary says—“in *Agamemnon* cruising in and out of the crowd of shipping as easily as a boat, having a keen eye over the movements of all and whipping in the slow.”

The French and Turkish Fleets were sighted on the morning of the 8th, and thus all parts of the expedition were now united. The English squadron of nine line-of-battle ships and five frigates acted as a guard. Here occurred the first opportunity for the Russian Fleet to attack. They might in such a venture, though beaten, have inflicted such damage on our war-ships and transports as to have broken up the expedition and defeated its purpose for that year at any rate. This opportunity they lost.

Up to this time the place of landing decided upon had been the Katscha, as recommended by the officers who made the first reconnoissance. The choice did not find universal acceptance, and now while approaching the enemy's shores the question was again brought forward. When the English and French Fleets came together on the 8th, about thirty miles south of Serpents Isles, Admiral Hamelin signalled that Marshal St. Arnaud wished to see Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas, the Marshal being himself then very unwell. It being difficult for Lord Raglan to get up the side of the *Ville de Paris* with one arm, Admiral Dundas went on board accompanied by Colonel Steele, military secretary. On arrival a paper

was laid before them dealing with the place of disembarkation and objecting to the Katscha. They then decided to transfer the conference to the *Caradoc* for Lord Raglan's opinion. Several accounts have been given, but I do not remember to have read one by any of the principal officers present. The following letter from Sir Edmund to Sir James Graham has therefore special interest—

“*H.M.S. ‘Agamemnon,’ off Eupatoria, September 13.*”

“Here we are at last within twelve miles of Old Fort in lat. 45°, where it is decided that the disembarkation shall take place to-morrow, and in the meantime the town of Eupatoria is to be summoned and occupied. Thus all the much-talked-of difficulties of the passage have been overcome—as we had every reason to expect—in fine weather and in six days.

“I am quite sure you will do me the justice to say that amidst all the discouragements by which I have been beset by those who look with disfavour on this expedition, I have not written an unkind or disparaging word of any one, nor will I do so now. A circumstance has, however, occurred that really obliges me in justice to myself and in the interest of truth to speak out a little to you.

“The day after we sailed from Baljik I was summoned to a conference at sea on board the *Caradoc*, where I found Lord Raglan, Generals Canrobert and Rose and Colonel Trochu,¹ who is looked upon as the Emperor's friend (*ami*) by this army. Admirals Dundas, Hamelin, and Bruat were also present.

“Colonel Trochu proceeded to read a paper which he said had been agreed to by Generals Canrobert and Rose, and some superior officers in the French army. That paper professed to set forth in an impartial manner the

¹ Afterwards General Trochu who commanded in Paris during the siege in the Franco-German War.

advantages and disadvantages of disembarking the allied armies at Eupatoria, Katscha, Yalta, and Kaffa, with an unmistakable tendency in favour of Kaffa, though it was not denied by any one—excepting General Rose—that the disembarkation at that place was tantamount to putting off an attack on Sebastopol until next year.

“But what particularly concerns me in this matter is that the paper professed to be founded upon the *pré-occupations* of the Admirals. On hearing this I asked, ‘What Admirals?’ and on receiving no answer, Admiral Bruat and I solemnly protested against our ever having said a syllable, or done anything, that could authorize any such expression. It was at once admitted that we had in fact never wavered in the slightest degree from the decided opinion we had given at the first conference at Varna, and Colonel Trochu said to me afterwards that those persons who had drawn up the paper felt that nothing they could say could possibly affect my character, since every man and boy in both fleets and armies knew that I was the person of all others who had confirmed the wavering, converted opponents, and had in tow many who were willing to shape their course by my compass.

“You will readily believe that the paper found no favour with Lord Raglan, who put it aside at once by asking whether it was founded on anything that had come to the knowledge of the authors of it since the expedition sailed, so that when we all met together again on board the *Caradoc* for the reconnoissance two days afterwards, it was not reproduced. Admiral Dundas was in total ignorance of the paper until he heard it read, and he then expressed a strong objection to Kaffa.

“As I value your good opinion, and think it right you should be fully informed, I have written this to save an opportunity for letters I have just heard of, and in great haste.

“The most perfect good-humour prevails amongst us all, French and English of all ranks, and though it cannot be denied that we have a tough job before us I am full of hope, and come what may I feel sure that it was right to undertake it.”

It was indeed a curious incident. Here at the eleventh hour, when nearing the enemy's country, the Generals meet in conclave to discuss where they should go! It was a striking instance of the difficulties attached to allied expeditions and a divided command. Marshal St. Arnaud was, however, loyal to his colleague. He did not support the propositions put forward, but left the decision to Lord Raglan. That officer now showed the greatest tact—as indeed he did in all his dealings with all our allies. He did not brush aside the new proposals at once, though he might have pointed out that any such views should have been put forward before sailing, and during the month they were at Varna. He decided to examine the coast himself and select the landing-place. Though this would cause delay no better course could have been pursued. The discussion turned then on the method of carrying this out, and it was determined that next morning a small detachment of the Fleet should make a last reconnoissance of the Crimea. It was to consist of the *Agamemnon*, *Primauguet*, *Sampson*, and *Caradoc*. At 9 a.m. on the 9th, therefore, this little squadron left the flotilla—then making its way towards the rendezvous—and steamed for the Crimea. That evening the French Generals from the *Primauguet* and Sir Edmund with Sir George Brown from the *Agamemnon* joined Lord Raglan and Sir John Burgoyne on board the *Caradoc*. Being small this vessel could go closer in than the others, while the big ships acted as a guard in case of interruption by the enemy. Land was made at daylight in the vicinity of Sebastopol and the harbour approached, but not within gun-shot.

First they explored to the southward of Sebastopol and observed the heights above Balaclava, but this part is too steep for a landing. Then they passed again in front of Sebastopol and steamed slowly along the coast to the northward. Each possible place for landing was examined in succession, being pointed out by Sir Edmund and Sir George Brown from the experience gained in their former visit. The beach at the mouth of the Katscha was now considered too limited in extent, in addition to other objections. Passing the mouth of the Alma, a large encampment was observed in the valley and several small ones on various parts of the coast. A few miles to the north of this they observed a stretch of beach which seemed well adapted for a landing. Sounding, deep water was found close in, so that war-ships could anchor near enough to the land to cover with their fire our own troops, or harass the enemy if he came near. An old fort marked the spot, and here Lord Raglan decided with the concurrence of the others the disembarkation should take place. This point at last settled to the satisfaction of everybody they proceeded to rejoin the flotilla. This in the meantime had proceeded steadily towards the rendezvous, where they arrived on the 9th and anchored. To those who did not know what had occurred, this anchoring, in what seemed almost the middle of the Black Sea, must have appeared an extraordinary proceeding. It was to await a decision as to their destination. On the 11th Lord Raglan rejoined them, and at noon the flotilla weighed again to proceed to the Crimea. In the evening it again anchored about 12 miles from Eupatoria. In his report to Admiral Dundas on the late reconnoissance Sir Edmund informed him—"The result is that Lord Raglan decided, subject of course to the acquiescence of Marshal St. Arnaud, who was too unwell to leave the *Ville de Paris*, that the beach at Old Fort in latitude 45° north is in his opinion the most eligible spot

for the disembarkation of the army, and that his Lordship is of opinion that Eupatoria should be simultaneously occupied." Why the flotilla anchored on the evening of the 12th I cannot say. It meant another day's delay, for on the 13th the flotilla proceeded and anchored again in Eupatoria Bay, instead of going straight to the landing-place. So far the expedition had been favoured with beautiful weather. Any day, however, considering the time of year, it might change, and the effect of a gale of wind would be disastrous. As it was these two days' delay had afterwards the effect of considerably prolonging the disembarkation. To those in charge of the transport flotilla it entailed great labour, for to get this immense convoy under way took some hours and continuous effort in seeing that all were working with a will. Sir Edmund Lyons did not spare himself in this service, for he had no intention of resting until the whole expedition was safely landed. That he fretted over each check can be readily understood, but it did not diminish his efforts, and so on the morning of the 14th he was early about, for at last they were *en route* for the landing-place. By 6 a.m. all were under way, and led by the *Agamemnon* steamed down the coast. Two hours afterwards the flotilla anchored off the Old Fort. Thus the voyage across the Black Sea had been made without interference or casualty of any sort.

The plan for disembarking the expedition had been drawn up by Captain Mends at Varna after frequent consultations with Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown, being finally approved by them. It was very complete and utilized all the boats of the Fleet with definite duties, and to each of which some portion of the army was allotted for landing. When laden the boats were to form line abreast by signal, then advance in that order to the beach on a second signal being made from the *Agamemnon*. About 7000 men could thus be landed at once, when the boats

would return for a fresh load. It was desirable also to place a certain number of guns on shore with the first contingent in case of any attempt to oppose the landing.

But this plan could not be carried out in the order designed, because the covering fleet of war-ships anchored about two miles off, and hence it was some time before their boats arrived alongside the transports. After waiting some time and observing the French had already begun their disembarkation, Lord Raglan, after consultation with Sir Edmund, decided to commence, and the signal went up for our troops to land. The first detachments had to be taken on shore with the resources at hand in the boats of the flotilla and the small steamers. No enemy being in sight to disturb the operation, the boats were ordered to go in without the preliminary signals to "Form" and "Advance." Later on the boats of the squadron arrived, and such progress was made that by sunset nearly all the infantry and about half the artillery, with a proportion of the horses, had been disembarked. Nothing could exceed the exertions of both officers and men of the navy in carrying out this operation; exertions that were keenly appreciated by all in the army. Lord Raglan remained on board the *Agamemnon* throughout the day watching the landing, and frequently expressed his admiration at the way the sailors worked.

On the following morning the ill effects of the delay between September 12 and 14 became apparent. After raining heavily in the night a southerly wind sprang up which caused a considerable swell to tumble in on to the beach, rendering the landing of either artillery or cavalry a matter of great difficulty. But little could be accomplished that day. On the 16th the surf after mid-day had diminished, and by dint of great exertions most of the remaining guns and cavalry were landed. The disembarkation was practically completed the next day, only a

few horses and some necessary stores remaining to be landed on the 18th. During these four days the men and boats of the Fleet had been working from three in the morning, and in addition the ships had been supplying the army—30,000 men and 4000 horses—with water, a service which entailed much extra labour on the seamen. This was undergone cheerfully by all, the only feeling prevailing being to assist their comrades-in-arms to the best of their ability. No words of commendation could be stronger than those employed by Lord Raglan in referring to this operation. In his dispatch of September 18, he says:—“Thanks to the great exertions of the navy under the able and active superintendence of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was charged with the whole arrangement, every obstacle has been overcome, and I am now able to report to your Grace that the disembarkations have been completed.

“I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to those of the troops I have the honour to command, if I did not bring prominently to the knowledge of your Grace the deep sense entertained by all of the invaluable services rendered by her Majesty’s navy. The spirit by which both officers and men were animated made them regardless of danger, fatigue, and indeed of every consideration but that of performing an arduous and important duty, and that duty they discharged to the admiration of all who had the good fortune to witness their unceasing efforts to land horses and gun-carriages with the utmost expedition and safety under frequently the most trying circumstances.”

On September 19 the allied armies began their march towards Sebastopol, while the Fleet got under way and proceeded down the coast in the same direction, keeping as close in as the depth of water would permit, so as to cover the right flank occupied by the French and Turkish troops. On the next day—September 20—was fought

the battle of the Alma. Our Fleet watched the engagement with intense interest, a clear view being obtained from aloft with telescopes. So many accounts have been given of this battle that I do not propose to add my version. There are some who consider that a chance was thrown away when the Russians were not followed up after the Alma. But the struggle did not cease until about an hour before sunset, when the ground was covered with the dead and wounded. The latter were in most cases so far from the beach that they could not be put on board ship that night. Lord Raglan was not the man to leave the brave fellows who had fought so well for him until their safety and welfare was provided for. This is shown by the following extract from the diary of Captain Spratt—H.M.S. *Spitfire*—"As soon as Sir Edmund Lyons saw that the battle was over he sent his flag-captain—Mends—accompanied by Captains Dacres and Moore and Mr. Cleeve, on shore to Lord Raglan, who in pulling in passed close to the *Spitfire* and made a sign that they were going up to the army.

"I soon followed, landing nearer the mouth of the Alma. As I did not think the army would now advance, I went to the semaphore mound, and saw the Russian dead lying all round it to within 200 or 300 yards.

"It being my first sight of a battle-field, I was much struck with the singular attitude of some of the dead, as if they had become rigid the instant they were shot, one or two lying with their arms extended as if still holding their muskets to the 'present.' As I was hastening on I was startled by the whirr of a bullet near me, fired no doubt by one of the wounded or pretended dead, but I could not discern from what particular spot, on turning round, as I saw no smoke anywhere. Neither did I stay to scrutinize the ground till another followed, for I was alone, no one moving within sight. This no doubt was

the temptation of the rascal to try and be revenged for his wound or defeat.

“A few hundred yards more and the great entrenchment was before me. As I had seen what took place in front and by the side of it, I could not help staying a few minutes to contemplate the scene that there presented itself, and particularly at the close lying together of many of our poor fellows, lying apparently as they fell. One officer, a captain of the 96th or 95th, I forget which, I well remember pausing over with astonishment at the calm expression of his fine handsome face, as he lay on his back with just a spot of blood only by the side of his mouth to indicate that he was in any way hurt. A little English terrier too was lying in front of the entrenchment, shot or bayonnetted, as he no doubt had closely followed his master or regiment in their close conflict here with the Russians. I had not ascended the valley but a short way when I saw Lord Raglan, almost alone, riding back to the Alma. He was rather surprised, but seemed pleased to see me there. I offered his Lordship my congratulations on behalf of the Fleet for the grand victory, saying it was a magnificent sight as I saw it all from the masthead of the *Spitfire*. When I thus met Lord Raglan, after his parting from St. Arnaud, and it had been decided not to advance, his mind was evidently more dwelling upon the care of the wounded than upon the great victory. He asked me if the Admiral was going to send up for the wounded. I told him it would be impossible to embark any of the wounded to-night with the heavy surf there now was on the shore from the afternoon's westerly breeze. As he knew something of the nature of the surf along this coast from his detention on the day of landing in the Crimea, his Lordship seemed satisfied, especially when I said I knew Captain Mends had landed from Sir Edmund Lyons with some communication for him, and was now looking

for him to know his wishes in regard to the assistance from the Fleet.

“Although the shortness of their ammunition was one reason against the advance of the army, the safety and care of the wounded was no doubt the principal reason that ruled Lord Raglan’s decision, and the saving them from the Russian Cossacks, as there was a general impression in both armies that their barbarous nature led them to kill the wounded always. This I knew to be a very strong belief among officers and men, before landing, as one of the prospects of campaigning in the Crimea.”

Many have urged that the allied armies ought to have advanced immediately after the Alma, or at any rate the next day, leaving the Fleet to take care of the wounded and guard them from the Cossacks. But some of these poor fellows were nearly four miles from the beach, beyond the range of ships’ guns, and hence a force on land was necessary to guard the field of battle while working parties were transporting the wounded. The Russian Fleet was still intact, and therefore our ships could not be denuded of men for the purpose. Whether a force could not have been detached from the allied armies for this duty, while the main body pushed on for Sebastopol, is a military question on which I express no opinion. If Lord Raglan erred through excess of humanity, his name will not suffer in the minds of Englishmen on that account.

Though circumstances prevented the wounded being removed that evening, the next day energetic measures were taken to alleviate their sufferings. From the Fleet 2000 men were landed, to carry them down to the beach and take them off to transports detailed for this purpose. Nothing could exceed the tenderness and skill with which our sailors carried out their sad mission, evoking loud expressions of gratitude not only from the poor sufferers themselves, but also from the army which witnessed it.

Sir Edmund Lyons was busy all day in the arrangements for embarking and transporting the wounded to Constantinople. English, French, and Russians were cared for alike, and it can be imagined what the work was carrying each man down to the beach from such a distance. Fortunately, as if Providence now smiled on our efforts, the surf had ceased, and smooth water facilitated the work of embarkation, otherwise the sufferings of the wounded would have been much increased. Such progress was made that on the 23rd Admiral Dundas reported to the Admiralty—"The *Vulcan* and *Andes* with 800 sick and wounded sailed for Constantinople yesterday; and to-day the *Orinoco* and *Colombo* with 900, including some 60 or 70 Russians, will follow; another vessel (by the request of Lord Raglan) with about 500 wounded Russians will also proceed, under charge of the *Fury*, to land them at Odessa.

"All the medical officers of the different ships have been usefully and zealously occupied in attending them, and I have been obliged to send several assistant surgeons in the vessels with the wounded to Constantinople." Except for the assistance of the navy many more must have succumbed, for the Army Medical Department could not cope with the tremendous demand thus put on it. A number of the wounded had been for hours without anything to eat or drink, so the ships sent on shore quantities of hot cocoa, tea, and biscuit. Naval surgeons performed numerous operations, and assisted to the utmost of their power. Provisions and ammunition were landed as demanded. If the army wanted to be free of any encumbrance it was sent off to the ships. Tents were landed one day and re-embarked the next. No request was refused, and hence, in spite of all difficulties, and because this continued to the end, our triumph was eventually secured. Lord Raglan never lost an oppor-

tunity of testifying his gratitude to the navy. In his dispatch after the Alma on September 23, he writes—"I should be wanting in my duty, my Lord Duke, if I did not express to your Grace, in the most earnest manner, my deep feeling of gratitude to the officers and men of the Royal Navy for the invaluable assistance they afforded to the army upon this as on every occasion where it could be brought to bear upon our operations.

"They watched the progress of the day with the most intense anxiety, and as the best way of evincing their participation in our success and their sympathy in the sufferings of the wounded, they never ceased from the close of the battle till we left the ground this morning to provide for the sick and wounded, and to carry them down to the beach; a labour in which even some of the officers volunteered to participate, an act which I shall never cease to recollect with the warmest thankfulness. I mention no names, fearing I might omit some who ought to be spoken of, but none who were associated with us spared any exertion they could apply to so sacred a duty.

"Sir Edmund Lyons, who had charge of the whole, was always most prominent in rendering assistance and providing for emergencies."

Before proceeding further it is necessary to go back a few days, and describe another incident connected with the expedition.

It may be remembered that after the final reconnoissance of the Crimea, it was decided that simultaneously with the landing Eupatoria should be occupied, presumably with a view to its becoming a base of operations for the allied armies acting north of Sebastopol, from which it was distant about forty miles. When therefore the flotilla arrived at that place on September 13, we sent on shore a summons to surrender. To this the Russian Governor readily acceded, for he had no troops and there were no

fortifications. We did not then occupy Eupatoria in force ; but on the 15th the *Retribution* and *Vesuvius* were sent there to take possession of the town. We followed this action up on the 18th by sending a detachment of marines from most of the large ships, comprising a total of 12 officers and 418 men, under the supreme command of Captain Brock, R.N., whose orders were "to act in conjunction with the French afloat and ashore, in securing and protecting the town of Eupatoria from incursions and attacks from the enemy." Also in view of transports anchoring there, to take measures for defending the bay and town, and to be prepared to re-embark in case of necessity. We then contemplated having several vessels of war constantly in the bay.

At this time Eupatoria was a large straggling place, open and defenceless, without fortifications of any description. It extended in a semi-circle nearly a mile and a half entirely exposed to attack. The inhabitants received us very well, and the first thing Captain Brock did was to establish a police. He next proceeded to construct three defence works, selecting for these the lazaretto at the southwest extremity of the bay ; a large house in the centre ; and a strong stone magazine at the eastern extremity. These were strengthened by sand-bags, loop-holing, and breastworks, and thus would afford protection to the defending force. Nor had they to wait long, for on the 19th a body of Cossacks attempted an attack, but were repulsed without any loss to the defence.

On the 23rd, 300 French marines reinforced our small force there, which enabled the points of defence to be increased and made more self-supporting. The Turks also landed 200 marines, a welcome addition to the garrison. On the 26th the *Leander* arrived, and by the aid of her artificers Captain Brock was enabled to construct palisades, etc. This ship also landed 100 men, so that

the place became strong enough to resist an attack in force. At no period, however, was Eupatoria used as a base of operations for our army acting in the Crimea, because the original plans of its chiefs had now undergone material change.

CHAPTER XI

1854—OCTOBER

Army advance towards Sebastopol—Sinking of Russian ships at entrance of harbour—Advantage of this step—Army encamps on the Belbec—Flank march decided on—Lieutenant Maxse's ride—Arrival at Balaclava—Meeting between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund—*Agamemnon* enters the harbour—Its choice as a base justified and Sir Edward Hamley's attack on Sir Edmund refuted—Advantages of Balaclava—Landing of siege train—Illness and death of Marshal St. Arnaud—Marines land and occupy heights above Balaclava—Naval Brigade formed and landed—Guns landed from the Fleet—Work of the seamen—Sir Edmund in Balaclava superintends operations—Desires to come out in view of an attack on land and sea defences—Squadron sent to seek supplies—Ill success—*Sidon's* operations at Ochakoff—Action of Eupatoria.

HAVING landed and defeated the enemy in the field, the next operation was to advance on Sebastopol. This the allied armies proceeded to do on September 23, and that afternoon the Fleet followed down the coast, anchoring off the mouth of the Katscha, where the armies had halted for the day. The *Himalaya* arrived and disembarked here the Scots Greys.

In the meantime an event occurred which exercised a powerful influence upon the future course of the campaign. On the 22nd Captain Lewis T. Jones of the *Sampson*, watching outside Sebastopol for any movement of the Russian Fleet, reported a great alteration in its position. Seven ships, including one three-decker, four two-deckers, and two frigates, were shifted and moored across the

entrance of the harbour. The other ships which had hitherto been lying with their broadsides to the entrance had now their heads pointing outwards. The next evening the *Highflyer* signalled to our Fleet that the ships at the entrance to the harbour had been sunk. This was done by order of Prince Mentschikoff on his arrival at Sebastopol after the Alma, he no doubt anticipating an immediate combined attack by sea and land on the fortress, in which our ships might penetrate into the harbour notwithstanding the batteries. It is said that the Russian Admiral begged to be allowed to take his Fleet out and attack the allied squadrons. If defeat came it would not be an inglorious one. But the Prince was firm. In the crisis that had arrived, the entrance to the harbour must be obstructed at once, and the crews of the ships sunk would be available to defend the arsenal from the land side, while he with the army would remain outside to fall upon the invaders when opportunity offered. It cannot be said that this measure was an unwise one. The Russian Fleet had not utilized two occasions when it might have acted with advantage and risked defeat. First when the invading flotilla was on its way; second when the allied armies were landing. The troops on shore and the French war-ships thus again in fighting trim, the odds were too great to give the Russian Fleet any chance of success. To then sink their ships came no doubt as a bitter blow, but it added immensely to the resisting power of the fortress when threatened by the approach on the land side of a victorious army. To many in the allied Fleets it seemed as if this act of the Russians would effectually prevent our ships co-operating in the grand attack. Though probably Sir Edmund desired keenly to participate in a great action at sea, and saw with great disappointment this hope disappear, his buoyant mind at once sought for another direction in which the Fleet could assist. Such was the elasticity of his spirit, that he

at once began to find advantages to our arms in the step taken. Writing to his eldest son on September 24 he says—"The Russians have sunk five sail-of-the-line outside the boom at the entrance of the harbour. It seems to me to be a deep humiliation, and after all a false step, for altho' it places the crews of the ships disposable for the defence of the fortress, it will I trust be considered by Admirals Dundas and Hamelin that it enables us to land 1500 marines and 250 or 300 guns. What a magnificent thing 300 ships' guns in battery! I do hope it may come to pass. You will be glad to hear that all is *couleur de rose* with me, and I feel confident of success." Thus we find nearly every step taken later foretold or suggested by the subject of these memoirs. On September 25 the allied armies advanced further towards Sebastopol and encamped on the heights above the Belbec river. The Fleet remained at the Katscha. Then arose the final question as to how the attack should be made. There can be no question I think, that the idea all along hitherto had been to assault and get possession of the north side of the harbour after landing. It must be assumed that when the invasion was decided upon at Varna, all contingencies were discussed. The expedition might be attacked *en route*. The English Fleet would meet that eventuality. The landing might be opposed. The guns of the ships would sweep the approaches in that event. They might have to meet an army in the field after disembarkation. This must be fought and beaten. If a reverse took place the squadron could cover a re-embarkation. Except in the last case the invading force marches on Sebastopol. Can it be supposed the chiefs of the expedition would wait until after landing before fixing the point of assault? Everything points to the northern side as being the objective of the allied armies up to this time. I am not concerned with the reasons which caused the chiefs to change their plans and

make the celebrated flank march round the harbour to the south side, but in his book on the Crimea the late Sir E. Hamley denies that there was ever any serious intention of attacking the north side, and makes some strong remarks on the action he assumes Sir Edmund Lyons to have taken in urging an attack in that quarter upon Lord Raglan. I can find nothing in his letters to show he did so. His view no doubt was that the invasion and capture of Sebastopol should be in the nature of a *coup de main*, and therefore they should strike as speedily as possible, and at the nearest point; but to suppose that in a military question of this sort he would go strongly against the views of experienced military men, seems as ridiculous as to suppose Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud would attach any special value to such an opinion. Indeed since the Alma Sir Edmund had not seen much of Lord Raglan, as he had been very busy looking after the wounded, and when the armies marched the English were furthest inland, as the French and Turks maintained their position on the right, nearest the beach.

At any rate it was determined to make a detour of the harbour, seize Balaclava for a base of operations, and attack the south side of Sebastopol. This was settled at a conference held on the morning of the 25th, and at once put into operation. The English being on the left, when they turned inland they became head of a long column marching into an enemy's country, the first portion of which march was through a thick wood. The compass had to guide them. That evening they arrived at and bivouacked by the Tchernaya river, the centre of the army being at a stone bridge called Tractir. Whilst Lord Raglan and his staff were dining off a leg of wild boar found in one of the Russian wagons captured early in the day—for they were without rations—and in good spirits at the success so far of their movements, Lieutenant Maxse,

who had just been appointed Naval A.D.C. to Lord Raglan, arrived with letters and dispatches. He had left the *Agamemnon* in the morning and followed up the army. Lord Raglan was anxious Sir Edmund should know of his success, and that he expected to be at Balaclava the next morning, when he would be glad to have the co-operation of the Admiral in the attack he thought it might be necessary to make to secure that place as a base of operations. He could ill spare any of his staff, so Sir Richard Airey asked Lieutenant Maxse if he would undertake the mission. Lieutenant Maxse at once consented to go back and communicate with Sir Edmund. He started on his venturesome journey at ten o'clock on a troop-horse, accompanied by an orderly, and reached the Katscha safely early next morning. The previous evening Sir Edmund dined with Admiral Dundas, and on returning to the *Agamemnon* the ship's company assembled on deck to say that, having had all the labour and fatigue, they hoped they might be allowed to engage the batteries. This was in consequence of a rumour that Sir Edmund was going to do something in the *Highflyer* against Sebastopol. The Admiral assured them that wherever he went the *Agamemnon* should go too. From the way in which this ship went in places that it had not been customary to see line-of-battle ships venture before, the *Agamemnon* had been named Sir Edmund's brougham, and her crew had every confidence that their gallant chief would be as good as his word.

On receiving Lord Raglan's dispatches the whole steam squadron weighed, and accompanied by transports carrying provisions and stores for the army, proceeded to Balaclava. Here they arrived outside the harbour at ten o'clock, and in a few minutes the skirmishers of our army appeared on the top of the high hills which surround the place. It was practically undefended, except by an old Genoese castle at the mouth of the harbour which mounted a few small guns.

These fired a few rounds to make a show of resistance, and the boom of the *Agamemnon's* guns in return told the advancing force that the Fleet was at hand. Then the castle displayed a flag of truce, its occupants surrendered, and Balaclava passed into our possession.

The meeting between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund does not indicate any disapproval of the flank march by the latter. A distinguished officer¹ of the army who was present writes to me—"I have a vivid recollection of seeing Sir Edmund Lyons land from a sloop-of-war in Balaclava harbour *immediately* after our troops had occupied the town, and going up to Lord Raglan in his hearty way, shaking hands and congratulating him on the success of the campaign up to that point. This was about midday on September 26. The following morning the *Agamemnon* came into the harbour, to the wonderment and admiration of all beholders. That same afternoon Sir Edmund brought his diplomatic instincts to bear on a French officer, who, in charge of a detachment of French chasseurs, coolly endeavoured to annex some half-dozen small Russian ordnance captured by the English troops in the old Genoese castle the day previous. Lord Raglan and the staff were all away at the moment on a reconnoissance, but some one told the Admiral of the act in progress. He quietly landed, and going up to the French officer thanked him in very polite and courteous terms for the trouble he and his men had taken in bringing down the small mortars from the heights above, and said he had just landed a party of marines to take possession and receive them on board his flagship. The Frenchman looked unhappy, not to say foolish, but our trophies were handed over without any remonstrance. The French had attempted to bag one of the Russian field-guns our people captured at the Alma, so it was necessary to look out sharp."

¹ Lieut.-General the Hon. Somerset Gough Calthorpe.



H.M.S. AGAMEMNON ENTERING BALACLAVA HARBOUR. LORD RAGLAN AND STAFF CHEERING THE SHIP.
(From a painting by the late Captain Cowper Coles, R.N.)

One cannot help being struck with the confidence and nerve displayed by Sir Edmund in his handling of the *Agamemnon*. Steam was then in its infancy; the power of movement it conferred had not yet been fully realized, but this man after being ashore for nineteen years at once grasped the situation, and made the new motive power as subservient to his desires as his skill in handling a ship under sail had been proverbial. To enter Balaclava in such a large ship as the *Agamemnon* required much nerve and judgment in the use of engines and rudder. As the *Agamemnon* was seen threading her way in, Lord Raglan and the soldiers turned out and gave her three hearty cheers. They knew the ship, and instinctively felt the chief on board was with them heart and soul.

The reason for this step is given in the following letter to Sir James Graham on September 28—"Yesterday the transports with the siege guns arrived, and I found it so impracticable to carry out all the details for co-operation with Lord Raglan from without, where the water is too deep to anchor with safety, that I determined to bring the *Agamemnon* in, and here we are moored with a stern fast to the shore, and our poop overlooking head-quarters. We have not room to swing, but we can get out at the shortest notice with any wind. The *Highflyer*, *Niger*, *Triton*, and *Spitfire* are also here, and all our resources are required for landing the siege train, in which we shall have made considerable progress this evening. The night march by which Lord Raglan reached this place, *steering by compass* through a thick wood, astonished both friend and foe, and it is considered by both French and English to have been a splendid military operation. Three of our advanced divisions occupy heights about four miles to the southward of Sebastopol, and when the rest of the army moves on, Admiral Dundas has consented to occupy the heights that command this little port with 1000 marines. Yester-

day Lord Raglan, who is as active and joyous as ever, made a reconnoissance within two and a half miles of Sebastopol. We have had remarkably fine weather until to-day, and even now, although it blows hard and seems likely to become an equinoctial gale, it is from the N.E., and we can desire nothing better than that the equinoctial gales should be from that quarter. In this haven we are sheltered from all winds ; but a S.W. gale might oblige our Fleet to gain an offing. I hope that my next letter may announce that our batteries are playing on Sebastopol."

When the French army following ours round the harbour arrived on the south side, we were already not only in possession of Balaclava, but actively engaged in landing in it the siege train and stores. The port did not afford sufficient accommodation for both armies, so it was decided that the French should take the left of the position the Allies intended to occupy outside Sebastopol, and utilize the Bay of Kamiesh as a base for their Fleet. Under the circumstances a natural arrangement to make, though it entailed our having to bear the brunt of attacks made by an army acting outside the fortress, and having to defend a larger area than could be justly allotted to the force we had available. In his book on the Crimean War already alluded to, Sir Edward Hamley speaks in strong terms of what he considers the evil counsel of Sir Edmund Lyons in urging Lord Raglan to retain Balaclava, and the right of the position ; stating this choice "brought untold miseries on his army." On other occasions too he deplores the influence of Sir Edmund upon Lord Raglan in a manner almost partaking of personal antipathy, whereas it is evident that the partiality of the General for the Admiral was that in the latter Lord Raglan found a man who never made a difficulty ; was always cheery, not despondent, and gave him loyal support. Had Lord Raglan lived to the end of the war his testimony would

have been such, I am sure, as to permit hereafter no depreciation of any action taken by Sir Edmund Lyons during the time they were associated together. But as regards Balaclava. It had long previously been pointed out as a possible base of operations. In Sir John Adye's interesting *Review of the Crimean War* he gives the instructions of the Emperor Napoleon to Marshal St. Arnaud, date April 12, 1854, in which the different courses before the army are dealt with. One was to seize upon the Crimea. As regards this the instructions say—"When within reach of the place do not omit seizing upon Balaclava, a little port situated about four leagues south of Sebastopol, and by means of which easy communication may be kept up with the Fleet during the siege." As we have seen, Lord Raglan made for Balaclava as a base of operations when the flank march was executed. The extent and capabilities of the harbour were not much known at the time. It must be remembered also in considering what occurred later, that the belief then prevailed that Sebastopol would fall in a few weeks at latest, in which case the occupation of Balaclava would be temporary. If winter quarters should be required for the troops, and a secure harbour for the Fleet, it was anticipated Sebastopol would afford them. In fact a proposal was made to assault the fortress directly on arrival at the south side. Little had been done hitherto to strengthen the defences here, though the garrison, like a swarm of ants, were seen almost immediately, and daily afterwards, adding works until they completely encircled that side. The Generals, however, rejected an immediate assault. For an operation involving only a few weeks' duration and for landing a siege train with a limited amount of stores, Balaclava was quite suitable. As an inlet of the sea rather than a harbour its area appeared less to the eye owing to the high land on each side. To a spectator looking down on it from these heights the water space appeared as they

described it, a mere pool, but having deep water close to the sides every inch could be utilized. Hence with skilful management in berthing this depreciated pool was at one time affording accommodation for close upon *two hundred* vessels, while still leaving a clear passage for ingress and egress. Being completely land-locked the harbour was beautifully sheltered, and its surface only ruffled by the squalls that came over the high surrounding land. The adjacent Bay of Kamiesh—which we are now reproached for not taking instead of giving up to the French—had not this advantage.

At the beginning of November, Lord Raglan, writing to ask Admiral Dundas for some more marines to protect Balaclava, says—"The position is admirable . . . I need not trouble you with any observations on the importance of retaining Balaclava: suffice it to say that for three days the French have been able to make no use of Kamiesh Bay." A little later the Admiralty instructed the Admiral—"that the bays in the neighbourhood of Cape Khersonese (Kamiesh, Kazatch, etc.) being exposed to the prevailing northerly winds, can afford no such certain means of communication with the army on shore as will be necessary." It is easy to be wise after the event, but under all the circumstances I do not see what other course could have been adopted, and consider that the condemnation of Balaclava later is not justified. If the distance from harbour to camp was great, and difficulty therefrom intensified by the absence of a good road when winter came upon them, they were not matters for which reflection could be cast upon the Admiral. He at all times could say with truth that no delay occurred in landing the vast quantities of stores that afterwards daily poured into Balaclava. It lay with others to see they were promptly transferred to the front. I have dealt with this question—which might otherwise seem out of place here—in order



ESTACIÃO, HARBOR OF CALLER, CAL. LOOKING TOWARDS THE BAY
(From a picture by W. Simpson. Inq. Museo, Callifolia)

to refute once and for all what I consider to be an unjust attack by a distinguished military writer upon one who, long since gone, had from the beginning to the end of this campaign but a single thought, how he could best assist the work, alleviate the sufferings and add to the comfort of his comrades on shore. It is time justice to this extent should be rendered to his memory.

The small village of Balaclava comprised a few straggling houses on the eastern side of the harbour, and here Lord Raglan took up his quarters for a short time while the allied armies were getting into position. Here also Marshal St. Arnaud was brought previous to embarking for France. He was then in a dying state.

On September 29 Sir Edmund wrote to Admiral Dundas—"Lord Raglan and I have just taken leave of the Marshal. He appeared to us to be almost at the close of all worldly cares. By leaning over him we could distinctly hear him say, 'Adieu, cher Général; Adieu, cher Amiral,' and he held out his hand to us, which we pressed. In half-an-hour he will be on his way to the Bosphorus in the *Bertholet*, without much hope on the part of his medical advisers of his living to take final leave of his wife. What a lesson this is, my dear Admiral, to a reflecting mind; but I must not indulge in the impression it has made on me." This gallant soldier, who for some weeks had been enduring an incurable malady, but with wonderful courage and tenacity went through without flinching all the anxiety and work connected with the landing, followed by the battle of the Alma, died the day after the ship left. His remains were conveyed to France, and interred with great ceremony.

In accordance with the request of Lord Raglan, previously mentioned, a force of marines was landed on September 28 to assist in the protection of Balaclava. It consisted at first of 25 officers and 988 non-commissioned

officers and men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Hurdle, R.M. Two days later this force was strengthened by a further draft of 10 officers and 212 men, thus bringing the total up to 35 officers and 1200 men. The marines formed into two battalions were established on the heights, about 1200 feet above the sea, and at once proceeded to construct a continuous entrenchment about two miles long, extending to Kadikoi, a small hamlet where later Sir Colin Campbell—who was entrusted with the defence of Balaclava on the land side—had his headquarters. At intervals along this entrenchment batteries were made, and in them a varied assortment of guns mounted—from the 6-pounder field-piece to the 32-pounder ship-gun. To work these guns a certain number of marines were allotted from the two battalions.

As moreover it had been decided to put a number of guns in position to overcome the outlying defences of Sebastopol on the south side, for which the land artillery was insufficient, Lord Raglan appealed to Admiral Dundas for a supply of 32-pounder guns from the ships to be worked by seamen. This led to a Naval Brigade being formed. It was composed of detachments from different ships, of which the *Britannia*, *Agamemnon*, *Albion*, *Queen*, *Rodney*, *Trafalgar*, *Bellerophon*, *Vengeance*, *London*, and *Diamond* each furnished a contingent. The total consisted of 18 lieutenants, 18 mates or midshipmen, and 1000 seamen. Captain Lushington was placed in command, and detailed to act under his orders were Captains Peel and Moorsom, with Commanders Randolph¹ and Burnett. The medical staff attached to the brigade comprised Mr. John Rees, surgeon of the *Britannia*, with Assistant-Surgeons Mason and Evans. The men were armed with cutlasses, one-third having pistols in addition with ten rounds of ammunition. Their kits were not extensive, and consisted of

¹ Now Admiral Sir G. G. Randolph, K.C.B.

an entire change of clothing, a monkey-jacket, and two blankets. Each had a haversack and a water-bottle. The order to land was greeted with enthusiasm. All the officers desired to take part in this service. In his reminiscences of the Crimea, Sir Evelyn Wood, then a midshipman of the *Queen*, gives an amusing account of how he got included, and what they did. I can only briefly refer to the part the Naval Brigade played in this great campaign as the several events occur in succession. A volume might be written on the subject. The force well sustained the reputation of the navy.

From the day after the occupation of Balaclava the men of the Fleet had been working hard landing the siege train and stores. They now had to land their own guns. These consisted of six 32-pounders from *Britannia*, *Albion*, *Queen*, *Rodney*, and *Trafalgar*. They were the lighter nature of this ordnance, weighing 40 to 42 cwt., usually carried on the upper deck. As the *Diamond* was completely armed with these, 20 were taken out of her. This ship was moored inside the harbour, and then prepared for the reception of sick and wounded.

Landing guns entailed sending a supply of ammunition for them. This comprised 150 rounds of shot and 30 common shell for each gun, with powder in proportion. Seventy rounds per gun were also supplied for use with the field-pieces landed. Some heavier guns being required, four of the *Terrible's* 68-pounders, each weighing 95 cwt., and two of the *Beagle's* Lancaster guns were also landed for use with the army. On October 3 Sir Edmund writes to Sir James Graham—"We have landed the siege train with all its accompaniments. The task has been herculean owing to the materials having been packed without reference to the facility of disembarking them; but it has been accomplished principally by the untiring zeal and great intelligence of Captain Mends of this ship, whose mind is

full of resources. All is gone off to the front, and I hope it may soon come into play notwithstanding the rocky nature of the ground.

“The promises I ventured to hold out with confidence as to the passage and the landing have now been fulfilled, but I trust the navy may still be able to render useful aid. Our guns, under the direction of Captain Lushington and that most promising young officer, Captain Peel, are already on their way to the front, whilst the marines on the hills ensure our safety here, and enable Lord Raglan to send on his troops to recruit the ranks that have been thinned by the battle of Alma and by cholera.” It was hoped that but a few days would elapse before a heavy fire could be opened on the southern defences, every day getting stronger, of Sebastopol, but the rocky nature of the ground caused delay; and more guns were required. On October 12 Sir Edmund writes to Admiral Dundas—“Lord Raglan has seen this evening a remarkably eligible place for ten ships’ guns. He will be much obliged to you if you will let him have as soon as may be as many more of the *Terrible’s* guns as can be spared, and the remainder of the ten to be 32-pounder 36-cwt. guns. The position for these guns is on the extreme right of the line which is occupied by a division of the French army. The guns would therefore be under the protection of the French, but manned and worked by British seamen.” To all requests of this nature Admiral Dundas promptly acceded.

Up to this time Sir Edmund in the *Agamemnon* had remained at Balaclava expediting these disembarkations with his usual energy. Seeing the day approach when fire would be opened, and anticipating the ships would take part, he now desired to leave the harbour. On October 8 he writes to Sir James Graham—“As Lord Raglan has moved his quarters to the front, and the siege train with all other warlike material are landed, I am naturally very

anxious to rejoin the Fleet and take part in the attack on the batteries, which should, of course, take place simultaneously with the assault of Sebastopol by the army." His request was not at once acceded to, as he writes again on the 13th—"I am not in very good spirits, for Admiral Dundas writes me that after having 'deeply considered' my wish to rejoin his flag, he cannot sanction my quitting Balaclava. It is true that he makes no allusion to attacking the batteries, and I hear that he thinks it would not be safe or proper to do so, but I know that Lord Raglan intends to ask him how far he can count on the co-operation of the Fleet on the day of assault, and if he should find it consistent with his duty to co-operate, as I hope and trust he may, I could hardly believe he could leave me here, so I live in hopes that all may come right. Two of the steam transports that I sent to the Bosphorus for Turkish troops have just arrived with 2600 fine young men well equipped, and they tell me that an equal number will be here in the other vessels I have sent for them. Lord Stratford has brought his influence to bear with great effect in support of Lord Raglan's requisition in this matter, and I am now dispatching the *Victoria* steamer for more. These troops may be relied on in the defence of positions, and then our noble fellows are available for the siege."

Though from the time of landing in the Crimea until arrival on the south side of Sebastopol the army had been kept well supplied with provisions from various sources, of which the Fleet was not an unimportant one, it had now become a more difficult task to feed such a number of mouths on a bleak promontory in a hostile country. It was especially so in the case of the French, whose sea-transport consisted principally of sailing-ships. General Canrobert, who had succeeded to the command after Marshal St. Arnaud, therefore proposed to Lord Raglan that a small squadron of ships should proceed along the

southern coast of the Crimea and endeavour to collect supplies. Lord Raglan acceded to this on condition that any supplies, the property of individuals, should be paid for, and accordingly the *Sanspareil*, *Tribune*, and *Vesuvius* under Captain Dacres, with a French squadron under Admiral Charner, were dispatched on October 3 for this purpose. They proceeded to Yalta, which was taken possession of without opposition, a small number of Cossacks and infantry leaving the town as the vessels anchored in the bay. Then parties were sent out to look for cattle and provisions. There was great temptation to pillage. On the one side a beautiful villa of the Empress, on the other a shooting-box of Prince Woronzow; but Captain Dacres had sentries placed on them, so they escaped injury, and we made every endeavour by strict payment to secure the confidence of the neighbouring farmers. Only a few bullocks and a small quantity of wine could, however, be obtained, and the squadron returned without further search.

One disadvantage of quitting the northern side of Sebastopol was, that it left open the route from other parts of Russia by which reinforcements could be sent to strengthen the garrison of Sebastopol, or a Russian army acting in its neighbourhood. Our ships endeavoured to impede this when an opportunity occurred. On October 4 Captain George Goldsmith of the *Sidon*, then stationed on the coast near Odessa, reported a large force—at least 12,000, with artillery—had left that place *en route* for the Crimea. They marched to Ochakoff, opposite the peninsula of Kimburn, and then crossed over in light-draught steamers. Captain Goldsmith, to thwart their progress, determined to attack Fort Nicolaieff, which covered the embarkation, being supported by two French vessels, the *Cacique* and *Caton*. This small squadron engaged the fort for two hours, a spirited fire being returned. It had the

effect of driving the small transports higher up the bay where our ships could not follow, so they discontinued the action. They only sustained slight damage during this engagement. Captain Goldsmith further reported that 30,000 more troops were collected at Odessa, of which the greater part he believed were destined for Sebastopol. At Eupatoria affairs remained fairly quiet up to October 12. On that day a force of Cossacks, apparently about 800 strong, were observed advancing towards the town. Captain Brock mounted thirty marines, and taking a 12-pounder howitzer with some Tartar horsemen, sallied out to meet the enemy. When within 600 yards the Cossacks opened out, and four horse-artillery guns emerged, which opened a brisk fire. Captain Brock then retired his little force and took up a defensive position. After firing a few more shots the enemy retired. The following day the *Firebrand* (Captain Stewart) arrived; and a timely reinforcement of 400 men sent by the Egyptian Admiral, with some 24- and 12-pounders from the Fleet, added considerably to the defensive power of the place. It was not until a month later that the enemy made a serious attempt to recapture Eupatoria.

CHAPTER XII

1854—OCTOBER CONTINUED

Day of attack approaches—Desire of the Fleet to participate—Lord Raglan requests co-operation of the Navy—Admiral Dundas assents—Fleets prepare to engage—Unjust view taken by Sir Edward Hamley of Sir Edmund's action in this operation—Views refuted—Objection of Admiral Dundas to French plan—Arrangement of the Fleets—Their position off the Forts—The Admiral's memorandum—The Sea-Forts of Sebastopol—Morning of the 17th—Fleet weighs—Arrival of the *Sphinx*—Ships advance—Forts open fire—Movements of the inshore squadron—Position of the *Agamemnon*—Subjected to heavy fire—Support of the *Sanspareil*—Assistance required—Lieutenant Coles's mission—*Queen* and *Rodney* come to support—Casualties—*Rodney* grounds—Action terminates—Squadron returns to the Katscha.

WHEN after arrival on the south side of Sebastopol, and having observed its outlying defences, the allied Generals decided not to risk an immediate assault, but to get the siege and other heavy guns into position for a preliminary bombardment, hopes prevailed that a few days would suffice to carry such an operation into effect. They did not realize the arduous nature of the task until the work began, when the want of suitable transport, as well as the absence of a good road, terribly impeded getting ordnance of heavy calibre from Balaclava to the plateau on which the armies were encamped. Every hour's delay, moreover, enabled the Russians, under the able supervision of Colonel Todleben, to increase and strengthen the works on which depended the security of the place.

Hence, not until October 13 could the Allies definitely say the time of attack was at hand. It then became a question how the navy could assist in the operation. In both Fleets a strong desire existed to share in the great struggle then imminent. The seamen having responded with the greatest alacrity to every demand made upon them to assist their comrades on shore, were now eager to support them in any fighting that might ensue. Kinglake speaks of this feeling as if it were almost irresistible, and might, if thwarted, lead to insubordination. This is absurd. The men, being baulked of a fight at sea, and having worked hard as a sort of transport corps, were now keen for work of another description. No doubt the Generals were aware of this, and naturally anxious to show their appreciation of the assistance so freely rendered from the beginning by officers and men. They felt also that an attack by sea would facilitate their own operations. On October 13, Lord Raglan wrote therefore to Admiral Dundas, stating that he attached great importance to the active co-operation of the combined Fleets upon the day on which the French and English armies opened their fire. That day was fast approaching, and both General Canrobert and himself felt that if the enemy's attention could be occupied on the sea front as well as upon that of the land, there would be a much greater chance of making a serious impression upon their works of defence, and of throwing the garrison into confusion. He anticipated advantageous consequences from a combined attack by sea and land. The Royal Navy had already done much for the army, and their presence would go far to make all feel that victory would be nearly a matter of certainty.

He expressed in the strongest terms his sense of the aid afforded to him by Sir Edmund Lyons at Balaclava, but now all that was chiefly required being landed, he should do an injustice to that officer if he urged the further

detention of the *Agamemnon* in the harbour when there was a chance of that noble ship distinguishing itself under his able guidance. It was now, he said, the middle of October, and there was not much time left to capture the place, which all at home were led to believe could and would be accomplished. Not to disappoint these expectations, the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and military were necessary, and therefore these considerations were pressed upon the attention of the naval Commander-in-Chief.

Whatever personal view Admiral Dundas may have held on the point submitted to him, his answer was prompt. He replied—"You may depend upon my using every exertion with my French colleagues to aid in your object.

"Sir Edmund Lyons I have recalled from his present post, where his services have been so valuable, and I have no doubt in his magnificent screw-ship he will be of the greatest use here.

"I will consult with Admiral Hamelin as to our joint operations, and will thank your Lordship to let me know the time when you intend to attack."

The next day a consultation of all the Admirals took place on board the *Mogador*, when it was resolved to support the attack of the allied armies by a general attack of the combined squadrons against the sea-forts and Russian vessels in the harbour. As the ships could only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun, they asked the Generals to say whether these projectiles should be all fired when the siege batteries commenced, or on the day of assault, or divided between the two days.

This being communicated to the allied Generals, they replied on October 16—"The Generals commanding in chief the allied armies have received with a lively satisfaction the communication made to them by the Admirals. They admire the great resolution which they have taken,

and they thank them for it. They have resolved on the following arrangements, and they propose them for their adoption.

"The fire will commence from the whole line to-morrow, October 17, towards 6.30 a.m. They consider it necessary that the ships-of-war should use in the first attack half their ammunition, keeping the other half for future events, particularly for the day of the assault.

"If when the seventy rounds are exhausted the Admirals should observe that the fire of the batteries of the two armies has ceased entirely, it may be taken for granted that the Generals have judged that the assault is possible, and have ordered it. In this case the fire of the ships-of-war must be directed exclusively against so much of the port and of the batteries as line its north side."

From this it is evident that the Generals were uncertain whether the assault would be feasible on the first day, or whether the final attack would be delayed until twenty-four hours after the commencement of the bombardment.

This plan of operations reached Admiral Dundas the same morning, when off the Katscha, where he had assembled his squadron to prepare for the attack, while Admiral Hamelin with his ships was in Kamiesh Bay making like preparations.

The *Agamemnon* left Balaclava on the 15th, and joined the Fleet off the Katscha the next morning. Considerable discussion now took place in the Fleet as to when and how the naval attack should be made. The general opinion was that the ships should reserve their fire for the final assault. Sir Edmund writes to Lord Raglan on the 16th—"I find a strong and universal opinion among the captains here in favour of attack by the Fleet being simultaneous with your *assault* rather than attacking when you commence firing; and the more I think of it, the more I am convinced that the first is the best mode; for if we

should attack when you first open your fire, and then retire without the means of renewing the attack from day to day, the enemy will think naturally and truly that we are *hors de combat*, and thus be encouraged." But he was prepared to carry out loyally the wish of the Generals, and on hearing their views wrote to Lord Raglan at 10 P.M.—“Admiral Dundas has just sent me for my information, your communication to him of to-day. We shall *hear* each other then at half-past six, and I am not without hopes of our *seeing* each other in Sebastopol in the course of the day.”

The plan of opening fire early from the ships was, however, frustrated by the French Admiral, who informed Admiral Dundas he should not commence his fire before ten or eleven o'clock, as his shot would not last long, and if expended early the enemy might think he was beaten off. Admiral Dundas at once acquiesced in this alteration. In this request of the Generals that the Fleets should co-operate in the attack, and the acquiescence therein of the Admirals, Sir Edward Hamley, with strange pertinacity and a distorted view, can only discern the malignant influence of Sir Edmund Lyons urging what a better judgment would decline. In his account of the war he says—“Sir Edmund Lyons, the second in command of the Fleet, was in constant communication with the General. It was very unfortunate that he enjoyed such credit with Lord Raglan as to be listened to even when giving opinions concerning which Lord Raglan had legitimate advisers at hand: it was owing to his counsel that we took Balaclava as a base, and now it was he who urged that the Fleets should join in the attack. In these earlier stages of the war his rash desire to do something effective rendered him Lord Raglan's evil genius, and how rash his impulses could be was shown a little later, when he succeeded Dundas in command of the Fleet, for he who now so hotly urged

a naval attack, never made the slightest attempt on Sebastopol when he became responsible for such an action, and had found by experience how fruitless it would be."

I have dealt with former indictments by this officer against Sir Edmund as regards an attack on the north side and the selection of Balaclava; this last one is not only contradictory, but is more serious and demands refutation. It is perfectly true that Sir Edmund was in constant communication with Lord Raglan and the other chiefs of the expedition. His energy and activity enabled him to overcome what many younger men could not have accomplished. A journey from the Fleet to Lord Raglan's head-quarters involved a long ride to and fro, and later on when off Sebastopol a sea trip of some miles in the depth of a Crimean winter. Owing to his state of health, Admiral Dundas could not do this, and hence he was glad to have the assistance of his Rear-Admiral in such missions. By a former letter we have seen that Sir Edmund anticipated the Fleet would join in the attack, and no doubt he so expressed himself to Lord Raglan. Nor can I see that such action was undesirable. Its efficacy in affording support to the army in an assault by land would depend upon the method in which the naval attack was conducted. On former occasions, as at Algiers and Acre, it had been seen that a heavy fire from wooden ships having a large number of guns on the broadside, and engaging at close range, could be very effective against sea-forts. The natural disadvantage of a wooden structure exchanging fire with one of solid stone—or earth emplacements—could be compensated for by a superiority in gun power if judiciously concentrated. If defective in this respect the general result might be disappointing. To estimate whether an opinion in favour of a sea attack was wrong, one must wait to observe whether the foregoing conditions were fulfilled.

The statement that Sir Edmund never afterwards made

the slightest attempt on Sebastopol is unjust, ungenerous, and untrue. Though no general bombardment took place again from the sea, there were frequent attacks by ships on the harbour and town which will be described later on. It was moreover only the state of the weather (a gale of wind on a lee shore) which prevented the allied Fleets from taking part in the bombardment on September 8, 1855. Of course Admiral Dundas was responsible for the safety of his Fleet, and could refuse to take part in an operation if he considered it would seriously endanger the ships, in view of the fact that the enemy still had afloat in harbour several powerful vessels. The French Admiral was under the orders of General Canrobert, and to decline to carry out any such request was in this case a more serious matter. Admiral Dundas finding his French colleague intended to acquiesce, decided—whatever his own opinion might be—that he had no option but to co-operate. But in his loyal desire to work with our allies he went further, and accepted a plan which he could not approve, which placed most of his ships at such a range from the forts that their fire must be ineffective, while it did not preclude their receiving serious damage. It was I think carrying loyalty to an extreme. The plan submitted to him was for the French Fleet to form a line on the south side of the harbour, extending from Streletska Bay towards the centre of the entrance, and for our ships to prolong the line to the north in such a direction that the distance from the bulk of the British Fleet to the forts would not be less than 1800 yards, while portions of the line would be even at a greater distance. With the smooth-bore guns of that day this simply meant a distant bombardment in which the guns were discharged into the air at a high elevation.

Admiral Dundas was far from pleased with the proposed plan. How little he desired an ineffective bombard-

ment can be gathered from what Captain Spratt says in his diary on the morning of the 17th—"On going on board the *Britannia* all was clear for action, and the men in high spirits. Not so the Admiral and his friend Colonel Brereton, who were sitting with very long faces. The Admiral immediately touched upon his grievance, which was the position that had been assigned him, viz. off the mouth of the harbour next to the left of the French ships which were to form the entire right wing, while ours were to be the left, which involved a difficulty in anchoring in as favourable a berth as desired in consequence of the shoal extending from Point Constantine. The Admiral said he had had some dispute about the side he was to take, but the French were so positive, and seemed to resolve upon declining to co-operate unless they had the extreme right, so as to support their army, that rather than risk their non-co-operation he gave way. 'But look at my position,' said the Admiral, showing me the chart. 'I shall be exposed to the fire of the batteries which can reach me, and my guns will be all out of range, but the lower-deck guns.' The disadvantage of his position seemed to trouble him very much."

I quote this in justice to Admiral Dundas, who might otherwise be held to have deliberately placed his ships where their fire could not have produced the greatest possible effect. His plan in other respects was as follows—The sailing-ships were to be towed into position by the steamers lashed alongside. It being intended to bring their starboard broadsides to bear, these steamers would be placed on the off—or port—side and remain in this position during the action. A division of the Fleet, consisting of the *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *London*, *Albion*, and *Arethusa*, was to engage the forts on the north side of the harbour specially, and to take up such a position as would enable it to do this most effectually. The following memoran-

dum was issued by Admiral Dundas the day previously—
“The object of the attack by this squadron is to destroy the batteries of the enemy on the north side of Sebastopol, and by that means assist the attack of our troops.

“Keeping our ships in an efficient state is a very great point, as the army depends so much on our assistance. I therefore wish every captain to consider his own position after he gets into action, and if he finds he is in very particular danger of being dismasted, getting on shore, or otherwise, to haul off without delay.

“It will be impossible in the smoke for the Vice-Admiral to see the different ships, and he is well aware that the responsibility on this point cannot be better placed than in the hands of the captains of the ships under his command.

“The steam vessels are to be lashed on the off side of the ship, and the Vice-Admiral recommends that they should not be cast off, unless it is found necessary for the safety of either the one or the other. Should a swell render it necessary for the steamers to tow ahead with hawsers, they are, as soon as their respective ships are in position, to shelter themselves under them as much as possible in readiness to tow them off again.

“So much must depend on weather, currents, etc., that it is not possible to direct whether an anchor is to be let go from forward or aft, or even at all. The Vice-Admiral thinks it will take an hour to get all the ships under fire. If light winds the steamers had better be taken alongside, and the squadron go down in line, and as a general rule he does not wish more than fifty rounds from each gun to be fired.

“When hauling off, the squadron must keep well to the south-west so as not to be raked by the north side batteries; those on the south will be either taken by the army or engaged by the French.

“In an attack of this kind ships may not be able to keep or get into their exact stations, but no one can do wrong who keeps up a well-directed fire upon the enemy. A ‘whelf’ hoisted on one or more parts of a ship will denote, ‘Want assistance.’ The general recall will denote, ‘Haul off and return to the anchorage!’

“Proposed order in which the ships are to advance—

<i>Agamemnon</i>		<i>London</i>	towed by <i>Niger</i> .
<i>Sanspareil</i>		<i>Vengeance</i>	„ „ <i>Highflyer</i> .
<i>Albion</i>	towed by <i>Firebrand</i> .	<i>Rodney</i>	„ „ <i>Spiteful</i> .
<i>Queen</i>	„ „ <i>Vesuvius</i> .	<i>Bellerophon</i>	„ „ <i>Vulcan</i> .
<i>Britannia</i>	„ „ <i>Furious</i> .	<i>Arethusa</i>	„ „ <i>Triton</i> .”
<i>Trafalgar</i>	„ „ <i>Retribution</i> .		

Strictures have been cast upon this memorandum as laying too great a stress upon caution and risk to the ships. It does not strike me in this light, but as containing a judicious indication of what should be avoided if possible, without laying down hard and fast rules which circumstances might render impossible to carry out. Such was the plan for the naval bombardment, and its execution did not differ materially from these orders as issued.

Before proceeding we may briefly describe these sea defences the Fleets were to attack.

There are few finer harbours in the world than that of Sebastopol, and hence its selection as the principal naval arsenal of Russia in the south. As a base for a fleet seeking to control the Black Sea it would be difficult to find a more advantageous position. The main harbour is a long and somewhat narrow inlet of the sea, extending in an easterly direction about four miles inland, but having deep water for nearly its whole area. On the southern side, a short distance within the entrance, there is an inner harbour a mile long, and about 400 yards broad, which affords still greater protection from wind and sea. This inlet, running due south, had on its east side the dockyard and arsenal

while the town of Sebastopol is on the west side. Against a westerly gale which would blow straight into the port this inner harbour gave complete shelter.

The main entrance from the sea is barely 1000 yards wide, a limitation which facilitates defence against a hostile fleet, and enabled the enemy to bar the passage by sinking a few ships in mid-channel, where the depth of water was only 60 ft. Thus resting on the ground the lofty hulls of those days left little water over them for other ships to pass in. It was a simple but effectual obstruction. This form of defence alone would not prevent ships shelling the town and dockyard from just outside the barrier, unless met by similar weapons. Strong forts existed on both sides of the harbour. Just at the entrance on the north side a spit of land projects into the sea, and on the extremity of this had been constructed a massive stone fort about 30 ft. in height. Its shape conformed to that of the ground it rested upon, viz. a horse-shoe, having one side facing seawards; another up the harbour, while the rounded portion commanded mid-channel. Mounted in this fort, having sides 6 ft. thick, were two tiers of guns in casemates, while on top were additional guns *en barbette*. In all 97 pieces of ordnance, of which about 50 would command the approach and channel, while the remainder would bear upon a fleet that had passed into the harbour. Such was Fort Constantine, and a formidable object of attack under any conditions for ships and guns of that time. There were other batteries on the northern shore of the harbour, but they were more directed against a fleet which had penetrated within the harbour, and it is therefore unnecessary to describe them.

On the south side opposite Constantine was Fort Alexander, a somewhat similar though smaller construction containing 56 guns, of which 28 were in casemates. Further in, and at the entrance of the inner harbour, was Fort

Nicolas, also mounting numerous guns, which to some extent commanded the approach, and which would be a serious obstacle to a ship passing the other two forts with impunity.

This did not comprise the whole of the sea defence. Just outside the harbour on the southern shore was a small inlet called Quarantine Bay, from which an enemy could effect considerable damage unless this harbour was denied him. For this purpose a large battery had been made at the entrance to the bay, mounting 56 guns all *en barbette*. This we named the Quarantine Fort. These forts are all on low ground, but at the back of Constantine on the north side there rises a ridge, terminating in a cliff 150 ft. above the sea. Inland on this plateau is situated the North or Star Fort. It is not seen from a ship when within range of Constantine from the northward, and therefore does not afford any support to that fort. This was early discovered by the Russians when our cruisers used to look into Sebastopol; so they constructed a square fort on the cliff, and just within its crest, mounting eight guns *en barbette*, so as to command the approach on the north side. Our steamers had occasionally tried to destroy this fort by fire at long range without avail, owing to its position on the cliff, and its stinging properties caused it to be christened the Wasp Fort. Further along the cliff towards the harbour's mouth was a telegraph station, and here the Russians had been observed throwing up earthwork batteries, which from their elevated position were to prove, in conjunction with the Wasp Fort, the most formidable defences we had to contend against.

The morning of the 17th was calm and almost sultry. As the day advanced it became hot and oppressive. Soon after daylight our land batteries opened fire as arranged, and this being returned with spirit by the enemy, so dense a smoke was produced over the town and harbour that the

sea-forts were hardly discernible as the Fleet approached. From an early hour the ships had been preparing for action, taking down the bulkheads, and removing below what might cause splinters; getting light spars on deck and sending them, with other articles, to the *Vulcan*; sanding the decks to prevent them getting slippery, and the many little things that are a prelude to a fight at sea. By noon all was in readiness, and the Fleet under way with the steamers secured alongside the sailing-ships. Sir Edmund Lyons had visited the *Britannia* with his flag-captain and master¹ for final instructions, going afterwards on board the *London* and *Albion*, which formed part of his division. The crews then went to dinner. Soon afterwards the *Sphinx*, commanded by Captain A. P. Eardley-Wilmot, arrived from Constantinople with stores and ammunition. On board her was the senior lieutenant of the *Agamemnon*, Lieutenant W. R. Rolland, who had been in hospital at Therapia, but hearing what was contemplated took advantage of the *Sphinx* joining the Fleet to obtain a passage. Captain Eardley-Wilmot, knowing that Lieutenant Rolland might miss promotion if not on board his ship during the action just about to commence, lowered his boat and sent that officer to the *Agamemnon*. By this chivalrous act² Lieutenant Rolland secured his promotion with the other senior lieutenants who were present. At half-past twelve the Fleet moved down towards Sebastopol, standing out somewhat from the land. The towing steamers were now on the near side, and therefore would be exposed to damage if passing close to the batteries, as eventually the ships would turn into position and engage with the present off or starboard broadside. This caused the main body to make a detour and increased the distance they had to go.

¹ Mr. Bower.

² Many captains would have declined to send a boat to the flagship at such a time.

REFERENCE TO BATTERIES


A	17 GUNS
B	104 "
C	80 "
D	34 "
E	HEAVY GUNS & MORTARS
F	80 GUNS
G	192 "
H	50 "
I	50 "
K	64 "
L	51 "
M	12 "
N	MUD BATTERIES MOUNTING ABOUT 20 HEAVY GUNS

REFERENCE TO ENGLISH FRENCH & TURKISH SHIPS

FRENCH & TURKISH SHIPS	ENGLISH SHIPS
1 NAPOLEON	1 AGAMEMNON
2 HENRY II	2 SANS PAREIL
3 MAHMOUDIE	3 ALBION
4 VALMY	4 QUEEN
5 VILLE DE PARIS	5 BRITANNIA
6 JUPITER	6 TRAFALGAR
7 TURKISH 2 DECKER	7 LONDON
8 FRIEDLAND	8 VENGEANCE
9 MARENGO	9 RODNEY
10 MONTEBELLO	10 BELLEROPHON
11 SUFFREN	11 ARETHUSA
12 JEAN BART	12 SAMPSON
13 CHARLEMAGNE	13 TRIBUNE
	14 TERRIBLE
	15 SPHYNX
	16 LYNX
	17 SPITFIRE

H.M.S. AGAMEMNON WAS

DISTANT FROM	YDS
FORT CONSTANTINE	770
TELEGRAPH FORT	750
WASP FORT	1200
FORT ALEXANDER	1800



PLAN OF THE ATTACK OF THE ALLIED FLEETS ON THE FORTS OF SEVASTOPOL OCT 17TH 1854.

From original sketch by LIEUTENANT COWPER COLES, R.N.

[To face page 246.

The French Fleet had but a short distance to traverse before arriving in their position, and shortly after one o'clock their ships were seen to be engaged with the forts. Admiral Dundas then made the signal to Sir Edmund Lyons to proceed and engage batteries. The helm of the *Agamemnon* was at once put to starboard, and followed by the rest of her division she proceeded towards Fort Constantine. Off this fort an extensive shoal runs out preventing ships of deep draught approaching it close from seawards; but previous soundings had shown there was a bend or bight on the north side of the shoal with fairly deep water, by means of which a line-of-battle ship could place herself within 800 yards of the outer face of the fort. Getting into such a position was a matter of careful pilotage and cautious approach. Sir Edmund had therefore arranged with Mr. Edward Codrington Ball, second master, R.N., in command of the steam-tug *Circassia*, that she should go ahead of the *Agamemnon* and sound the way in. It was a service of considerable danger to such a craft, but Mr. Ball gallantly undertook the risk, and Sir Edmund had complete confidence in the skill of his pilot.

As this squadron—which hereafter came to be known as the inshore squadron—proceeded down towards Constantine, the batteries on the cliff opened fire, but their shot mostly fell short. This fire was returned by the ships, also without effect. As they got nearer, however, the guns of the enemy appeared to be getting the range, and at 1.50 the *Agamemnon* was hulled by a shot, and others struck her aloft. In the meantime the little *Circassia* steamed ahead, sounding as she went—though her first lead-line was shot away—until the edge of the shoal was reached. The *Agamemnon* had now only 2 ft. of water under her keel, so she first dropped an anchor at the stern, and then another forward, so as to maintain her broadside to Fort Constantine. The centre of this now bore S.E. 800 yards distant.

This was the spot in which Sir Edmund intended from the beginning to place his ship. It might be thought that at such close quarters the fire from the shore would prove overwhelming, as she had guns directed on her from several directions, and indeed the *Agamemnon* was repeatedly struck, especially aloft. But it was the very closeness at which he had resolved to engage that constituted the ship's principal protection, for the guns on the cliff being so high above the sea could not at first be sufficiently depressed to sweep the water just beneath them. The gunners could be observed strenuously working to effect this, and when they succeeded the ships to the northward of the *Agamemnon* suffered severely. These had in succession taken up their positions to silence if possible the cliff batteries. The *Sanspareil* anchored on the starboard quarter of the *Agamemnon*, there being just room for her; then came the *London*, *Albion*, and *Arethusa*. From 2 to 2.30 this squadron was alone engaged as regards the English Fleet, but then the main body having got into position, the other ships opened fire and the action became general.

The smoke made it difficult to ascertain the effect of the stream of projectiles discharged by the *Agamemnon* and *Sanspareil* against the northern face of Fort Constantine. Shortly after two a heavy explosion was observed in the fort, causing a temporary cessation of its fire, but this soon re-commenced, and the hull, masts, and yards of the ships were frequently struck. At 3.30 a shell set the *Albion* on fire, and she had to be towed out of action. An hour later the *London* and *Arethusa* had to follow her example. In the meantime the *Sanspareil*, having forged ahead dangerously near her leader, found some of her guns masked by the *Agamemnon*, so she weighed to alter her position. Thus for a time the *Agamemnon* was almost unsupported, and the fire on her became very heavy. One

Wasp Fort Earthworks on Cliff. Telegraph Battery. Position of Forts and Batteries obscured by smoke—
Fort Constantine (north side), Fort Alexander (south side).



*Trafalgar &
Retribution.
Brilliantia &
Furious.
On the right,
not shown.)*

Terrible. Albion Firebrand. Avetusa & Triton. London & Niger. Sampson. Sanspareil & Agamemnon. Circassia. Spilfire. Bellerophon & Cyclops. Sphinx. Lynx. Queen & Vestal. Rodney & Spiteful. Vengeance & Highflyer. Tribune.

British Attack on the North Forts, taken from a picture by Flag Lieutenant COWPER P. COLES, of the Bombardment of the Sea Defences of Sebastopol by the Allied Fleets of England, France, and Turkey on the 17th October, 1854. (For full Plan of Attack, see page 246.) [To face page 248.]

shell burst in the side of the ship, setting her on fire, but it was soon extinguished. The day being calm the smoke hung about the ships in dense masses, making it most difficult to distinguish signals. Further support being necessary at this time, the Admiral's flag-lieutenant, Mr. Cowper Coles, volunteered to go in a boat to the *Bellerophon* and *Sanspareil* and request their captains to close the *Agamemnon* again. It was a service of great danger, for the water all round outside the ship appeared a mass of foam from the projectiles which were passing over her in all directions. Nevertheless Lieutenant Coles accomplished his mission and returned in safety.

The critical position of the *Agamemnon* could not well be observed by the main body, owing to the smoke and distance which intervened between that ship and the *Britannia*. But Captain Jones, of the *Sampson*, who was engaging the cliff batteries, saw her danger and proceeded to Admiral Dundas to urge that assistance should be sent to Sir Edmund. The Vice-Admiral accordingly directed the *Queen* and *Rodney* to support the *Agamemnon*. They did so, but the *Queen* on arrival was almost immediately set on fire and had to haul out of action. Captain Graham in the *Rodney* gallantly brought his ship as close as possible to the *Agamemnon* and anchored on her starboard bow ; in fact, the two ships were in contact, and the *Agamemnon* had to haul astern to clear. The other ships of the northern division also coming in again, the cannonade was continued.

It was now five o'clock, and though the *Agamemnon* had been nearly four hours under fire she must be considered to have escaped heavy loss in a marvellous manner. In addition to projectiles from the north she lay end on to Fort Alexander on the south side, and exposed to a raking fire from that work, the shot coming in at the bow and passing out over the quarter. Nevertheless only 4 men had been killed and 23 wounded. Among

the latter was James Jope, the Admiral's valet. Whilst walking on the poop Sir Edmund saw Jope up there, and sent his secretary to tell him he had better go below. Jope was much disconcerted and pleaded to remain, saying if anything happened to the Admiral he would never forgive himself if not at hand. However, he was at last persuaded, and left the poop. He had only just got to the bottom of the ladder when a round-shot took off his arm! He recovered, but was invalided, and the following year Sir Edmund obtained for him an appointment as messenger at Somerset House, in which the various departments of the Admiralty were then located.

The day was now closing in, and there seemed no object in continuing the action. All hope of assaulting Sebastopol that day had been frustrated at an early period. No success attended the bombardment on land, for owing to misfortunes the French siege batteries ceased their fire before noon, though our guns kept up a cannonade throughout the day. The failure on shore did not become known to our Fleet until after the action, or their efforts might have been reserved for a later occasion. But communication after ten o'clock between generals and admirals being impracticable, our ships once in action could not well haul off till the end of the day. Though knocked about none had been sunk, and they had maintained their position before forts of immense strength. Only a portion were placed so as to bring their broadsides to bear with the greatest effect, and hence the result as regards damage they effected to the forts is hardly a criterion of what a dozen or more of line-of-battle ships could do under other circumstances. Besides shell, red-hot shot were dangerous projectiles to wooden ships, and much used at that time. When approaching fortified places in the Black Sea the first intimation our ships received of an intended warm reception was the smoke of the furnace for heating the

shot. Such a projectile lodging in a thick wooden side, mast, or yard, soon set it on fire, a result more dreaded in old naval warfare than any other effect of round-shot. Taking all things into consideration it is wonderful the *Agamemnon* did not suffer more. For one thing she did not use her upper-deck guns, except the bow pivot, owing to a number of her men being on shore with the Naval Brigade. This probably saved her many casualties, for owing to the ship being so close and the enemy's guns laid for a greater range, most of the shot and shell passed or exploded over the hull, fragments cutting up the poop and quarter-deck in many places. Masts and yards were severely damaged and rigging much cut about.

At a quarter past five the *Agamemnon* slipped her cable and backed astern, the *Rodney* being aground just ahead of her. That ship got off, however, shortly afterwards, and then the main body of the Fleet was observed steaming to the northward, a proceeding which was soon followed by the inshore squadron, and all anchored again about eight o'clock off the Katscha. Thus came to an end the day on which Sebastopol, first bombarded by land and sea, successfully resisted our efforts, and it may be considered the beginning of that prolonged siege which taxed to the utmost the resources of all engaged in the struggle.

CHAPTER XIII

1854—NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER

Dispatch of Admiral Dundas—List of killed and wounded—No special mention of Sir Edmund—Letter to Captain Graham of *Rodney*—Effect on the forts by the bombardment and on shore—The Naval Brigade—Battle of Inkerman—Effect on the siege—Gale on November 14—Losses at Balaclava—Damage to squadron at the Katscha—Effect at Eupatoria—Lord Raglan's calmness—*Miranda*, Captain E. M. Lyons, joins Fleet—Admiral Dundas's time in command expires—To come home if no important operation at hand—Sir Edmund designated as successor—Becomes Commander-in-Chief—Relation between the two Admirals—Sir Edmund's peculiar position as Second in Command—His feelings towards Admiral Dundas—Correspondence with First Lord.

CONCERNING this bombardment Admiral Dundas sent the following dispatch next day to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

“*‘Britannia,’ off the Katscha.*

“SIR,—1. I beg you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the siege batteries of the allied armies opened fire upon the Russian works, south of Sebastopol, about half-past six o'clock yesterday morning with great effect and small loss.

“2. In consequence of the most urgent request of Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, it was agreed by the Admirals of the allied Fleets that the whole of the ships should assist the land attack, by engaging the sea batteries north and south of the harbour, on a line across the port as shown in the accompanying plan ; but various circumstances rendered a change in the position of the ships necessary and unavoidable.

“3. The *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Sampson*, *Tribune*,

Terrible, *Sphinx*, and *Lynx*; with *Albion*, *London*, and *Arethusa*, towed by *Firebrand*, *Niger*, and *Triton*, engaged Fort Constantine and the batteries to the northward; while the *Queen*, *Britannia*, *Trafalgar*, *Vengeance*, *Rodney*, *Bellerophon*, with *Vesuvius*, *Furious*, *Retribution*, *Highflyer*, and *Spitfire* lashed on the port side of the several ships, gradually took up their positions nearly as possible as marked on the plan.

"4. The action lasted from about half-past one until half-past six p.m., when being quite dark the ships hauled off.

"5. The loss sustained by the Russians and the damage done to Fort Constantine and batteries cannot of course as yet be correctly ascertained.

"6. An action of this duration against such formidable and well-armed works could not be maintained without serious injury; and I have to regret the loss of 44 killed and 266 wounded, as detailed in the accompanying lists. The ships' masts, yards, and rigging are more or less damaged, principally by shells and hot shot. The *Albion* has suffered much in hull and masts; the *Rodney* in her masts, she having tailed on the reef, from which she was got off by the great exertions of Commander Kynaston of the *Spiteful*, whose crew were necessarily exposed in performing this service; but with the exception of the *Albion* and *Arethusa*, which ships I sent to Constantinople to be repaired, I hope to make my squadron serviceable in twenty-four hours.

"7. Foreseeing from the nature of the attack that we should be likely to lose spars, I left the spare topmasts and yards on board her Majesty's ship *Vulcan* at this anchorage, where I had placed her with all the sick and prisoners.

"8. I have now the pleasure of recording my very great satisfaction with the ability and zeal displayed by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, the Honourable Montagu Stopford, and all the captains under my orders, as well as my sincere thanks to them and to the officers, seamen, and

marines employed, for their unremitting exertions and the rapidity of their fire, in the absence of a large number of the crew of each ship that were landed to assist in working the siege batteries, etc., on shore, and to this circumstance I attribute the small loss of killed and wounded.

"9. The gallant and skilful conduct of our French allies in this action was witnessed by me with admiration, and I hear with regret they have also suffered considerable loss.

"10. I beg to express my gratification with the manner in which Ahmed Pacha, the Turkish Admiral, did his duty.

"I have, etc.,
"J. W. D. DUNDAS."

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE BRITISH SQUADRON
OCTOBER 17, 1854.

Ships	Killed		Wounded	
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men
<i>Britannia</i>	1	8
<i>Agamemnon</i>	4	2	24
<i>Queen</i>	1	. . .	7
<i>Sanspareil</i>	Mr. Madden (Mid.)	10	3	56
<i>Sampson</i>	1	. . .	2
<i>Terrible</i>	1	. . .	8
<i>Retribution</i>	2
<i>Firebrand</i>	Cap. Stewart ¹	4
<i>Sphinx</i>	1
<i>Spiteful</i>	2	3	5
<i>Cyclops</i>	1
<i>Triton</i>	1	4
<i>Albion</i>	Lieut. Chase	10	3	67
<i>Bellerophon</i>	4	1	14
<i>Rodney</i>	2
<i>Vengeance</i>	2
<i>Arethusa</i>	4	. . .	14
<i>London</i>	4	1	17
<i>Niger</i>	1	. . .	4
<i>Furious</i>	6
<i>Trafalgar</i>	2
	2	42	16	250

Total, 44 killed, 266 wounded.

¹ Now Admiral Sir William Houston Stewart, G.C.B.

There is no denying the fact that Sir Edmund felt hurt that in this dispatch no special mention occurred of the inshore division which had borne the brunt of the fighting ; no allusion to the position taken and held by the *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, and others in close proximity to powerful forts. As second in command, moreover, he might well have received individual notice instead of being coupled with Admiral Stopford, who, as Captain of the Fleet, no doubt performed useful service, but who from the poop of the *Britannia* had no influence on the result of the operations. As one himself always prone to acknowledge support by officers under him, Sir Edmund was keenly touched by the absence of all allusion to the part played by Captain Dacres (his former lieutenant in the *Blonde*) and the *Sanspareil*, in sticking to the *Agamemnon* under the heaviest fire. He had told the officers and ship's company of that ship the next day—"that not even in the glorious annals of the British Navy had an admiral ever been better supported than he had been by the *Sanspareil*." Her gallant captain in a letter of thanks replied—"My duty was a very light one, as I had only to follow your flagship as close as possible, and to be sure that your next astern would be in a position that would be envied by every ship in the Fleet." By the interchange of similar sentiments, and recognition of services, did Nelson attach to himself all who came in contact with him, and produce in others a zeal only second to his own.

Of course all the ships had done what was required of them on October 17, and many had been exposed to a galling fire, but an analysis of the casualties will show that the risks were unequally distributed. The rest of the Fleet would have felt no jealousy if Admiral Dundas had made some special allusion to the services of his second in command, and the ships with him on this occasion. As the Vice-Admiral did not desire any report from captains of the

doings of individual ships on this occasion, his dispatch was the only official published record, and my account of the *Agamemnon's* proceedings is taken from her log and accounts given by eye-witnesses. The plan, moreover, giving the position of each ship speaks for itself, and if official accounts said little, correspondents of the Press at the seat of war did not fail to give a vivid description of the performances of the inshore squadron. Personal eulogy from such a source Sir Edmund did not seek. Indeed he deprecated it, and in a letter to Sir James Graham at the end of the month says—"I am pained at seeing the language of the Press. To be over-praised as I am is as disagreeable as it is disadvantageous, and it quite distresses me to see letters said to be written from this ship in abuse of my Commander-in-Chief. These things vex me, but they do not divert my attention from the one great object of taking Sebastopol."

It was for those associated with him in any service that Sir Edmund desired recognition of good work. I have alluded to his invariably acknowledging support from others; he was equally ready to help an officer in any difficulty if not the result of negligence or want of zeal. I am tempted to give an example of this. There was a rule that if a ship got on shore a court of inquiry should determine whether blame attached to the officer in command. On October 17 the *Rodney* had grounded in coming to the assistance of the *Agamemnon*. On the 19th Sir Edmund wrote to Captain Graham as follows—

"MY DEAR GRAHAM,—The more I think of the noble bearing of the *Rodney* when she came down to the succour of the *Agamemnon* and the *Sanspareil* the evening before last, the more I admire it, and the more I feel obliged to you and the fine fellows under your command; and I am very anxious you should do yourself and them justice in

the letter you write to report that the ship touched the ground. That you will give a plain statement of facts, and that that statement of facts will reflect honour upon all of you, are two things quite certain, but you must take care that you do not write as if you were defending yourself against a presumed mistake, or error of judgment, when in truth all was honourable to your professional knowledge and pluck.

“Lookers-on generally see things in the *ensemble* better than those actually engaged, and what appears to me to have been the case was simply as follows.

“You came down to the succour of the *Agamemnon* and *Sanspareil*, which ships were sorely pressed by the four batteries with which they had been engaged for more than three hours. You gallantly steered so as to be between both, and take off the fire from them: but at the critical moment the *Sanspareil* forged ahead and you, in order not to get on board of her, and at the same time determined not to swerve from your resolution of supporting us by getting as near to the large battery as possible, backed astern and ranged past outside of the *Agamemnon* obliquely, and when the *Rodney's* bow was parallel with the *Agamemnon's* bow you very judiciously, both as to time and place, let go your anchor; but as the ship swung with her stern a few yards nearer the forts than the *Agamemnon* she tailed on the ground.

“The *Agamemnon*, quite unaware of your being aground, but finding you close athwart her hawse, the jib-guys touching and hampered with the steamer alongside of you—a steamer, the *Spiteful* I believe, that seemed to be doing her work admirably—apprehending the two ships might fall on board of each other and get on shore together (for the *Agamemnon* had only 2 ft. of water under her keel all day), slipped her bower and steamed astern out of your way. It was then getting dusk, and

I made a sweep to get another lick at two batteries that had been cutting me up all day. I saw no more than a signal from you that you wanted a steamer, which I repeated to two or three close to me.

"But though I did not *see* what occurred on board the *Rodney* after I hauled astern from her, I know that nothing could be more honourable and creditable to all on board than the measures taken to extricate her from the perilous position in which she was. Nothing could be finer than the way in which the men at the after quarters kept up a strong fire upon the large battery within 800 yards of you while those at the foremost quarters weighed the anchor; and all this under a tremendous fire from three or four forts.

"Those things should be known, for they reflect honour, not only on those immediately concerned, but upon our glorious profession generally. And it is my fear that your modésty may stand in the way of their being known that induces me to write my views of the matter.

"Yours sincerely,

"EDMUND LYONS."

This letter explains also why the *Agamemnon* moved away from the *Rodney*, upon which action of the former Kinglake—who in 1873 endeavoured without success to get access to Sir Edmund's papers through the second Lord Lyons—in his *History* makes some ill-natured remarks. The *Agamemnon* was obliged to haul out because the *Rodney* lay over her anchor, and she had to shift her position to prevent being pushed on to the shoal. It is marvellous that the *Rodney* escaped with only two men wounded, but it was due to her being so close, for the Russians could not depress their guns sufficiently to hull her frequently. In the case of the *Sanspareil* the casualties to the crew were greatest when she first hauled out and

came into the zone of fire from the cliff batteries, which ploughed the water up continuously a short distance beyond the *Agamemnon*.¹

As regards the effect produced by this bombardment upon the forts, it was difficult at the time to ascertain how they had suffered. The upper guns in Constantine were no doubt all more or less disabled. The sides of the fort being very thick had withstood the fire and were described by Sir Edmund as pitted all over, but many projectiles must have found their way into the casemates. In fact months afterwards a deserter stated he had been stationed in Fort Constantine on October 17, and that it had been seriously injured by the attack; that 155 men were killed in the fort and that 650 shot were picked up inside after the action.

Another Russian account, dated October 22, stated that—"The batteries of the Quarantine Fort were silenced; the crowns of two towers knocked off; the batteries 3 and 10 partly destroyed, and the forts of Paul and Constantine severely injured. The suburb of the dockyard was on fire for three days, but the stores were all saved. Even the Fleet was damaged, which is a proof that the projectiles of the Allies reached the inner part of the city." For many weeks after the bombardment Fort Constantine was observed to be supported by heavy scaffolding.

This bombardment did not solve the problem whether ships could attack forts with success, but it did tend to show that if such an operation was undertaken, little advantage would result unless such ships were placed at close quarters, while the risk to them was not thereby increased to the extent that might be expected.

The Fleet remained off the mouth of Katscha river for some days repairing damages, and on the 23rd arrived

¹ The *Albion* was the ship most exposed to the fire of the batteries on the cliff, and hence the number of her casualties.

the *Algiers*, another screw line-of-battle ship of 90 guns commanded by Captain Charles Talbot.

Sir Edmund Lyons now frequently visited head-quarters, and on the 25th witnessed the battle of Balaclava. In this the marines performed useful service, as the dispatches state—"that a fire was opened from the batteries on the heights with good effect upon the Russians as they followed up the Turks, who were running across the open after having been driven out of the advanced redoubts."

The Naval Brigade had also won golden opinions from all who witnessed their exertions in getting guns to the front and keeping up a continued fire on October 17. A military officer¹ writing home at the time said—"During the day I was sent into the different batteries of our two attacks. It was amusing to see the sailors. There were two reliefs of them, and as soon as one had done its turn of duty, you heard the officer in command say—'Now then, second relief, fall in; you others can go and skylark.' A nice place in which to skylark with 68-pound shot and 13-inch shell dropping in amongst you every minute. However the bluejackets did not mind and took the permission given them quite literally. I never saw a finer body of men, and the way they tossed about the heaviest guns was the best proof of the strength and power they possessed. I believe there was not a man among them who did not think that the Naval Brigade would have taken the town with ease." It was such a spirit which animated them throughout the siege. Notwithstanding severe losses they never flinched, and were commanded by officers who gave them an example of courage, self-denial, and zeal that our seamen have been ever ready to follow. At this time the English Fleet had on shore 1786 officers and seamen; 1530 officers and men

¹ Lieut.-General the Hon. Somerset Calthorpe in *Letters from Head-quarters*.

of the Royal Marines ; and 400 marines at Eupatoria. We had landed from the ships 6 68-pounders, 50 32-pounders, 9 24-pounders, 9 12-pounder howitzers, and 608 24-pounder rockets, with an immense quantity of ammunition of all sorts. It is doubtful if the siege could have been undertaken without this help from the Fleet.

On October 27 the *Agamemnon* left the Katscha and proceeded to an anchorage off Cape Khersonese. Here Sir Edmund could communicate more easily with Lord Raglan. This Admiral Dundas desired, being himself unable to undertake such a fatiguing journey. From the ships on the morning of November 5 could be heard the heavy firing which indicated a serious conflict. It was the battle of Inkerman. After breakfast Sir Edmund landed and rode up to the battle-field. General Sir John Adye in a letter to me says—"About midday Lord Raglan had sent me with an order, and having carried it out I was returning to him on the ridge, when I met Sir Edmund Lyons, Captain Drummond, and I think one or two other naval officers. On seeing me Sir Edmund requested me to take him at once to Lord Raglan, which I proceeded to do. I remember that Captain Drummond took me aside and quietly begged me not to take the Admiral into great danger. He added that the Admiral's life was of such importance to the navy that it would be a great misfortune were anything to happen to him. My reply was that a very severe battle was going on, the English and Russians being at close quarters, and that it was impossible to escape danger. We rode on, and in a few minutes the Admiral joined Lord Raglan in the midst of the battle." In this hard-fought battle our losses in killed and wounded were very severe. Among the latter was Sir Edmund's great friend Sir George Brown, who had been shot in the arm. He was brought on board the *Agamemnon* during the afternoon, accompanied by his A.D.C., Lieutenant Richard

Lyons Otway Pearson, of the 7th Fusiliers. This officer was a nephew of Sir Edmund's, whose sister, Miss Caroline Lyons, had married Mr. Henry Shepherd Pearson, of the India Civil Service. The Admiral was much attached to his nephew, who had behaved with great gallantry at the battle of the Alma, and was afterwards transferred to the Grenadier Guards. He served throughout the war, and retired as Lieut.-Colonel from the army in 1864. Obtaining an appointment in the Metropolitan Police, he became an Assistant-Commissioner in 1881, was made a C.B., and died universally regretted in 1890.

Our position for a time in the Crimea, after the battle of Inkerman, seemed critical owing to losses in officers and men, and the question of raising the siege was mooted. Sir Edmund recommended, however, that our batteries should re-open fire the next day as if nothing unusual had occurred, and this view prevailed. There became then no question of abandoning the siege. But this sanguinary battle did cause a postponement of the next great bombardment, for which the preparations were practically complete.

All felt we were not then strong enough to attempt an assault against such a force as Sebastopol now contained within its walls. A Council of War held two days after decided to wait for reinforcements, and thus a winter outside the fortress became inevitable.

Indeed it was fast approaching. During the next few days the weather, which had hitherto been generally fine, broke up. On November 12 a gale of wind gave indication of coming troubles. Several vessels had been sent outside the harbour of Balaclava for safety, as since October 27 a large Russian force lay encamped in its neighbourhood, and we did not consider the port entirely secure from capture. The *Sanspareil* lay inside ; the duties previously carried out there by Sir Edmund in the *Agamemnon* now devolving on Captain Dacres. Captain Christie

had charge of the transports, and it proved most unfortunate that so many were at anchor outside, for on November 14 a terrific gale of wind came on, causing great destruction and loss of life as well as most valuable stores.

It began about 9 a.m. by a heavy squall from the south-west, and then the wind increased with great violence during the next four hours, until it was blowing nearly a hurricane. This continued all day and that night, moderating on the morning of the 15th. Being a southerly gale the ships were exposed to its full force, with no alternative if their cables parted but to be driven on to the rocks. In that event little hope existed of saving the crews. Many suffered this terrible fate. Outside Balaclava the transports *Prince*, *Resolute*, *Kenilworth*, *Wildwave*, *Progress*, *Wanderer*, and *Malta* were dashed to pieces on the rocks. The *Prince* had not long arrived and still had on board stores of all kinds, including an immense quantity of ammunition, then much wanted. Great loss of life occurred among the crews of these vessels, it being impossible to afford them much assistance. A certain number—about thirty—were, however, saved by being hauled up the cliff, in which service Mr. Newby, boatswain of the *Sanspareil*, was most active. The *Retribution* and *Vulcan* lay at anchor outside and weathered the gale. On board the former was the Duke of Cambridge, who had gone off a few days previously, at the invitation of Captain Drummond, to recruit his health, impaired by his great exertions at the battle of Inkerman, and with sorrow at the loss of so many friends in that fierce struggle when the Guards bore so distinguished a part. Here the elements were causing as awful a scene as any battle-field. Ships going to pieces before men's eyes, a fate which might be theirs at any moment. None except those present can realize the horrors and anxieties of that day and night. Even inside the harbour many ships suffered damage, and nearly every

steamer was crippled. All the fury of the elements seemed to be directed against us. The bulk of our Fleet was off the Katscha, and though several of them suffered injury none went ashore. Five transports were driven on the beach, but our boats saved the crews. A seaman of the *Queen* and the captain of the *Sardinian* brig were shot by the Cossacks whilst so employed. Some of our ships had narrow escapes. The *Marengo* dragged till within a few yards of the *Britannia*. A Turkish ship-of-the-line cut her masts away, and then nearly fell on board the *Rodney*. The *Sampson* was dismasted by two transports fouling her. Three French ships carried away their rudders, among them Admiral Hamelin's flagship, *Ville de Paris*. They had to go to Constantinople. No wonder the French Admiral wrote to his British colleague next day—"This anchorage is detestable, and quite unfit for shelter during the winter. I am hoisting my flag in a steam frigate, and going into Kamiesh Bay." At Eupatoria this storm also produced disastrous effects. The *Bellerophon* was there at the time, and her captain, Lord George Paulet, reported—"Although the men-of-war here under my immediate orders are all safe, I deeply regret to say that the loss amongst the other men-of-war and shipping, including our own transports, has been painfully great.

"The gale commenced at about 6 a.m. yesterday. During the forenoon it was blowing terrifically with a heavy sea from the southward. A strong outset from the bay brought the sea abeam, and caused it to break over our waist. The ships rolled heavily with three anchors down; the lower yards which were struck dipping their yard-arms in the water.

"The *Henri IV.*, French line-of-battle ship, parted from her anchors just after dark, and lies broadside on to the beach to the southward of the town. The sea is constantly breaking over her. Her crew are all on board, but not in

danger. A French man-of-war steamer lies broadside on to the beach, with the sea breaking clean over her; crew apparently landed. Six French transports have gone aground off the town. One off Eupatoria Point is in flames from Russian shell. Her crew escaped in their boat, and are now on board my vessel.

"During the night the Turkish two-decker parted from her anchors, and is now lying on her starboard bilge on shore, south-east of the *Henri IV*. English transports on shore to the south-east of the town, some with their masts gone, viz. Nos. 3, 53, 55, 61, and 81. Crews appear to be still on board."

The losses caused by this terrible gale, coming a few days after the hard fight at Inkerman, were a great blow to both armies. They did not, however, cause any alteration in the decision of the commanders to prosecute the siege with undiminished energy. The attitude of Lord Raglan under these trying circumstances is thus described by Sir Edmund in a letter to Sir James Graham—"Nothing could be more edifying than Lord Raglan's bearing on learning the disastrous effects of the very *extraordinary* gale with which this coast has been visited. To hear at such a moment of the loss of four millions of Minie ball cartridges and other field ammunition in one ship—the *Resolute*—and of still more ammunition and a large proportion of winter clothing in another ship—the *Prince*—was enough to try the nerves of the Commander of the Forces.

"His first step was to ascertain whether there remained a sufficient quantity of ammunition to carry on operations, and it was certainly a painful suspense to him—in which I fully participated—until we had an affirmative answer from the proper departments. He then turned his thoughts towards supplying the loss of the winter clothing which had been so liberally and considerably furnished by the Government at home, and on my return to my ship I had

the satisfaction of informing him of the arrival of the *Jura* with a large supply of blankets and clothing. A few hours later I announced to him the arrival of further reinforcements, making 9000 for the French and 3000 for the English since the battle of the 5th. I find a hopeful as well as a determined spirit prevailing in both armies. They all feel, and with reason, that hitherto everything has been honourable and glorious for the arms of England and France. They have confidence in the support of the two Governments and the two countries, and are resolved to deserve that support, and through the blessing of God and a good cause to conquer." To Admiral Dundas the day after the gale Sir Edmund writes—"I conclude you must have had a most anxious time. Command me in all matters, great or small, night or day, in which the *Agamemnon* or I can be useful. Wherever you think I can be of most assistance to you, there send me by signal or otherwise. All must put their shoulders to the wheel in such emergencies as we have to deal with now."

Amidst so many trying circumstances Sir Edmund was cheered by the arrival of the *Miranda*, commanded by his son, Captain E. M. Lyons. After her return from the White Sea she had been refitted and dispatched to the Black Sea. The other ships which had joined just previous to or after the bombardment were the *Valorous*, *Gladiator*, *Stromboli*, *Lynx*, and *Viper*.

The time also approached when the position of second in command was to be given up by Sir Edmund. On November 29, Sir James Graham wrote to him—"We have sent orders to Admiral Dundas, empowering him to transfer the command of the Fleet to you, and himself to return to England, unless some active operation be impending which it would not be consistent with his feelings and honour to leave unaccomplished to other hands. The commission appointing you the successor to the naval

command has been forwarded to Admiral Dundas to be delivered by him to you when he decides on returning to England.

"The *Royal Albert* is destined for your flag, and Sir Thomas Pasley will succeed your flag-captain in *Agamemnon*.

"I have offered to Admiral Stewart at Malta the post of second in command under you. I know not whether he will accept, but I was quite certain that his appointment, if it take effect, will be agreeable to you.

"In this case Admiral Stopford will go to Malta, and I wish to know with as little delay as possible if Captain Grey—now next for promotion as a rear-admiral—would be acceptable to you as Captain of the Fleet. When the command of *Hannibal* is vacant this ship would be excellent for the flag of the second in command, though I have told Admiral Stewart that I cannot promise *Hannibal*.

"We must have some of the sailing-ships long in commission brought home without delay. We have sent you some screw line-of-battle ships, and will send one or two more.

"We have just heard of the fatal effects of the hurricane of the 14th, and have written to Admiral Dundas on the subject of a station for ships-of-war and transports during winter. I know not whether Sinope can in present circumstances be made available, but I suspect communication with the army for stores, ammunition, provisions, and its daily wants, must be kept up by a constant stream of steamers between Balaclava and the Bosphorus. This winter will tax all your skill and energies, but the prize at stake is worthy of more than ordinary efforts."

Before this letter reached the Black Sea the *Britannia*, *Trafalgar*, *Queen*, and *London* sailed for the Bosphorus, and Admiral Dundas transferred his flag to the steam frigate *Furious*. As no active operations were impending,

nor prospect of an immediate attack upon Sebastopol, he determined to return home, having completed three years in command of the Mediterranean station. On December 20, therefore, Admiral Dundas proceeded to Constantinople, leaving Sir Edmund in command off Sebastopol. At the end of the month the Vice-Admiral left the Bosphorus on his way to England, and transmitted to Sir Edmund his commission as Commander-in-Chief of the station.

The position of Sir Edmund since he came out to the Mediterranean can hardly be viewed as that ordinarily attached to a second in command. Having been an Envoy-Extraordinary and Minister-Plenipotentiary for nineteen years; personally acquainted with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and most of the corps diplomatique at Constantinople, and with a good knowledge of the French language, his previous experience gave him a position of great importance in a combined naval and military expedition, where every point had to be discussed with our allies, while his undeniable ability as a seaman enabled him to assume a leading part in all naval affairs. This position had been tacitly conceded, and enabled him to take much labour from the shoulders of his senior officer.


Though it cannot be said that the two Admirals had been in complete accord during the time they were associated together, I have endeavoured in rendering justice to the efforts of Sir Edmund to avoid uttering any disparaging remarks of Admiral Dundas. As one who had no personal knowledge of, or connection with, either officer, I could hold the scales impartially and record the facts without bias. Hence in certain instances my testimony to the Vice-Admiral's judgment and promptness in carrying out Lord Raglan's wishes has been freely given. But it was quite evident from the beginning that with two men of such dissimilar temperament jars would occasionally arise, and one can equally understand that to an officer of

Sir Edmund's character the position of second in command was difficult in the extreme. I have heard it said that he occasionally and openly gave vent to impatient expressions concerning his senior officer. Whether this was the case or not I do not know, but this I can say, that having had the whole of Sir Edmund's correspondence unreservedly placed in my hands, with letters evidently indited on the spur of the moment, and with the same impulsiveness which characterized his speech, I can find no corroboration that his feelings prompted him to speak otherwise than kindly of one with whom he often differed as to the action to be pursued in carrying out the service upon which they were engaged. As to any allegation that he strove to supplant Admiral Dundas in the chief command, that is equally without foundation, for, as we have seen, the succession was practically promised to him on leaving England.

His own feelings are expressed in a letter to Sir James Graham on December 23 in answer to one in which some allusion was made to the subject—"Looking back upon a life of responsibilities not always courted but never shrunk from, there is nothing in the retrospect in which I conscientiously believe I have less to reproach myself with than in the whole of my conduct towards Admiral Dundas from first to last. I always did as I would be done by, and though I often urged him to pursue a course which was quite as much for his own honour and advantage as for that of the public service, not an angry word ever passed between us, and after shaking hands with him on parting I was glad to answer his general signal, 'Success attend you,' by the signal from the *Agamemnon's* masthead, 'Happiness attend you.'"

Finally adverse comment may be made on the fact of a correspondence maintained between a First Lord and a second in command; a correspondence, however, which I

consider has imparted great interest to this biography. To any such comment here is Sir James Graham's answer in a letter to Sir Edmund on December 3—"In very critical circumstances I have corresponded with you, as well as with the Commander-in-Chief, because you were designated as his successor, and because I was anxious that when he vacated his command the thread of the communication with the principal naval authorities in the Black Sea might not be broken ; but with the exception of one or two casual expressions I do not think that my letters to you are inconsistent with the respect and confidence due to the Commander-in-Chief. It has been my wish to act fairly between you, and the public good has been my sole object ; come what may, this is my consolation and some defence." If any defence be needed it appears to me complete in these eloquent words.



BLOCKADE OF SEBASTOPOL. LOOK-OUT FRIGATE IN ADVANCE OF THE FLEET.
(From a picture by W. Simpson, Esq. Messrs. Colnaghi.)

[To face page 270.]

CHAPTER XIV

1855—JANUARY TO MARCH

Question of Captain of the Fleet—Not appointed—Extensive work of the squadron—Visits to the camp—Testimony by military officers to Sir Edmund's kindness—Encouragement to young officers at his table—State of Balaclava—Arrangements by the Navy described by Sir Edmund—Anger at home—Lord John Russell resigns—Sir James Graham leaves the Admiralty—Farewell letter to Sir Edmund—Changes in the squadron—Arrival of *Royal Albert*, new flagship—Attack on Eupatoria—Turkish army conveyed to Eupatoria—Efficiency of British Transport Service—Last attack on Eupatoria—Arrival of Sardinian army in the Crimea—Slow progress of the siege—Work of the Naval Brigade—Laying an electric cable between Varna and Balaclava—Difficulties of the operation—Successfully accomplished—Its last message.

ON assuming the command Sir Edmund Lyons wrote to Lord Raglan acquainting him with the fact, and in replying the Field-Marshal said—"It is a matter of the highest satisfaction to me to know that you are installed in the elevated appointment which has been conferred upon you, and whilst I beg your Excellency to believe that I shall never hesitate to apply for your assistance when I have need of it, I need hardly add that I shall do so in the full confidence that your Excellency will always be anxious to render this army and myself personally, every aid and support that you can command, as, I may be permitted to say, has already been the case in numberless instances which are warmly appreciated by me, as well as by her Majesty's troops." It has been seen that the First Lord

of the Admiralty asked Sir Edmund if Captain the Hon. F. Grey would be acceptable to him as Captain of the Fleet. But before receiving the letter Sir Edmund had in one to Sir James Graham quoted what he had said to Admiral Stopford when that officer asked him his opinion on this office—"I told him that I thought the position so undefined a one, not to say so false a one, that few men capable of fulfilling what was expected would remain long in it. Circumstances might, however, sometimes render it desirable." When therefore the question came direct, Sir Edmund replied as follows to the First Lord—"My previous letter will have shown you soon after you wrote what my feelings and opinions are on the *principle* of the measure, which are founded in some degree upon my recollection of Lord Nelson's having found it very inconvenient, even when he had his chosen friend Admiral George Murray with him off Toulon, and of his having afterwards declined having one when his Fleet was increased to nearly forty sail-of-the-line.

"As to the person, none more agreeable to me, or fitted for the post, I should think, than Captain Grey. I have not breathed a syllable on the subject to him, but if you write to him and he should accept the offer, or if you are in favour of the measure and name any other officer, I shall cheerfully acquiesce." After the receipt of this letter Sir James Graham wisely refrained from pressing the matter, and no Captain of the Fleet was appointed. Of course not having this additional officer increased the work devolving on the Commander-in-Chief and his staff. This was already very great and soon became enormous, as demands by the land forces on the assistance of the navy multiplied daily, in addition to the requirements of what had now grown into a large Fleet. Far from being concentrated off Sebastopol, there were detachments in the vicinity of Kertch and Odessa, at Eupatoria and off the Danube,

with all of which frequent communications passed. We had a very large establishment at Constantinople, involving a mass of correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief, in addition to much work going on at Malta and Gibraltar. Nor could other parts of the Mediterranean be entirely neglected nor deprived of occasional visits from ships-of-war. We had to watch Greece and keep in touch with our Commissioner in the Ionian Islands; added to all this Sir Edmund maintained a semi-official and private correspondence which, as he apparently never destroyed a letter, I can vouch to having been of a most extended nature. Yet his energy never flagged, nor did these demands on his time prevent him paying frequent visits to the camp and being in constant personal communication with Lord Raglan. There he was ever welcome to young and old, giving encouragement to the one and imparting his own hopeful views to the other. Among his letters I find one from General Sir John Burgoyne, chief of the engineers, dated from the camp, December 1854, when affairs looked very gloomy. The Admiral had been detained on board for a day or two. Sir John writes—"I am very much obliged to you for your note, but I would much rather that you could be here in person, and I regret *exceedingly* that your naval arrangements keep you from affording us by word of mouth the *cheering* counsels that you are always inclined to promote." This distinguished officer does not apparently share Sir Edward Hamley's view that "it was very unfortunate he (the Admiral) enjoyed such credit with Lord Raglan as to be listened to even when giving opinions concerning which Lord Raglan had legitimate advisers at hand."

As regards young officers, one who was then A.D.C. to Lord Raglan¹ writes to me in reference to Sir Edmund—"I saw him very frequently during the war with Russia, for

¹ Lieutenant-General the Hon. Somerset Calthorpe.

he was always in communication with our head-quarters. He had—I remember well—a cheery word to say to every officer on the personal staff, and though I was only a subaltern A.D.C., on many occasions showed me kindness and consideration, and more than once came and chatted in my tent or hut until the Commander of the Forces had concluded his daily *levée* of heads of departments. The Admiral in the Crimea used to ride up on his pony at least twice a week during the greater part of the siege, and not unfrequently accompanied Lord Raglan when he visited the camps of our various divisions before Sebastopol. All who knew him could not fail to admire his grand character and ability.” Another officer¹ says—“ I can well remember how much we, the personal staff of Lord Raglan, thought of his ability to command, to say nothing of his pluck, and how greatly we appreciated his kind manner to us, together with his particularly open and gentlemanlike bearing.” What seems to me one of the principal traits in Sir Edmund’s character was this kindness to young officers. I have heard and read of numberless instances, and it was certainly as conspicuous in the case of his own profession as in that of the sister service. A General of Marine Artillery² thus recalls his recollections of Sir Edmund—“ I had not the pleasure of seeing him often, but each time I did so I was more and more impressed, not only with his courtesy, but with the frank cordiality with which it was accompanied. I do not think I had ever been received by a naval officer of his high rank in the same kind and friendly way, and I greatly appreciated it. I dined with him twice, and was greatly struck with the way he led the conversation at his table. He seemed to think that his guests—no matter what their rank—could not fail to take an interest in the great operations which were being carried on around

¹ Colonel Sir Nigel Kingscote.

² The late General G. G. Alexander, R.M.A.

them, and he evidently took a pleasure in telling them all that he might tell about what was being done and what the future might produce : all this without any condescension or unnecessary reticence."

In the matter of entertaining Sir Edmund was extremely hospitable and kept a most excellent table, to which all officers were freely invited. This he had carried out even when second in command, though it is not expected of an officer in this position. On this being remarked to him by a friend, Sir Edmund replied—"I do it for two reasons. First, because it gives me pleasure to have officers at my table. Secondly, because by thus seeing them at their ease, and encouraging them to talk, I get to know their character and form an opinion of their capacity. This will enable me in the future, when any particular piece of work has to be done, to select the officer whom I think best qualified to perform it."

One of the first things to engage his attention were the arrangements at Balaclava. In every history which has been written of the Crimean expedition, a vivid description is given of the sufferings of our army during the months of December 1854 and January 1855. These sufferings are attributed to many causes, into which it is unnecessary to enter here, but as numerous complaints reached England as to defective arrangements of the transport department at Constantinople, and of serious delays in much-needed stores reaching the army after arrival at Balaclava, the Admiralty called the attention of Admiral Dundas to these points just before he gave up the command. Owing to further representation of mismanagement at both places, another letter was sent to Sir Edmund Lyons on January 2, 1855, in which he was directed to inquire into the matter, and remove any of the officers concerned should he see fit. Rear-Admiral Boxer had previously been directed to proceed to Balaclava to take charge of the harbour, while on January 5 Captain

the Hon. F. W. Grey was ordered to hoist his flag as commodore of the first class for service in the Bosphorus, and to carry out the duties hitherto performed by Admiral Boxer. Of course Sir Edmund could not express any opinion as to the conduct of business at Constantinople whilst he had been second in command, but he could assure the Admiralty there had been no failure on the part of the navy inside the port of Balaclava. Writing on January 13, 1855, he says—"Their Lordships are no doubt aware that most of what is regrettable inside the harbour arises from the want of means for transporting cargoes from the ships to the camp. What happened outside the harbour on November 14 is another matter, and their Lordships may rely upon my doing all in my power to give effect to their order for inquiry with regard to these melancholy events.

"But to revert to the inside of the harbour, the responsibility for the first three weeks rests with me, for I had the superintendence, and all I will say of myself is, that I naturally did my best to promote the success of an object that I had much at heart; but of my assistants I may say that no man ever had a more able one than I had in Captain Mends for the details of landing the cargoes, or a more efficient one than I had in Captain Leopold Heath for all the duties relating to the ingress, berthing, and egress of the shipping. The roads were then in good order, and the horses and mules, though never sufficient in number, in fair condition, and although we had the heaviest part of the work to perform in landing the siege train, all went on smoothly and expeditiously. I do not say this with any view of claiming credit for it, but simply to show that so long as the roads were in good order, and the means of transporting forthcoming, it was plain sailing. But it was far otherwise with those who succeeded me, for they had to contend with the difficulties occasioned by the roads being

quagmires, and by the failure of the means of transport, to say nothing of the sad effects of the hurricane of November 14. Still the navy have always been able to land provisions, clothing, ammunition, indeed, all the requirements of the army, faster than they could be carried off to the camp; and often when the officers of the commissariat department in their laudable desire to get things forward have overrated their means of conveyance, things have been reshipped for the double purpose of security, and of making room on the quays.

“That mistakes may have been made on all sides I am far from denying; but Rear-Admiral Boxer will find on his arrival to take the direction of affairs in the harbour, that all are now doing their best to profit by the experience of the past, and he will certainly have all the support that Lord Raglan and I can give him, and he will have delivered to him by Captain Heath the harbour regulations which have been made from time to time by that officer with my concurrence. The admirable way in which they are carried out under the supervision of Captain Heath, and with the assistance of Commander Ashmore Powell, is universally remarked and acknowledged.”

These regulations were very complete, and dealt with the piloting and berthing of vessels, allotting wharves for different purposes, unloading ships, embarking sick and wounded, etc., so that shortly after taking possession of the harbour a system was established which enabled an immense mass of stores of all kinds to be expeditiously landed. It was not the fault of the navy if they could not be transferred with equal expedition to the camp.

As we have seen, the *Agamemnon* was in the harbour until October 15. After the battle of Balaclava there were fears for the safety of the place, and the *Sanspareil* went inside on October 28. Captain Dacres thus became senior naval officer there, and supervised the work with great

energy. In a memorandum by him on what had been done by the Fleet he states—"It was with great difficulty and great exertion that we kept the army supplied, but it was done, and while I was there I never heard a complaint of any want of provisions or forage being in Balaclava and ready for conveyance to the front. This was chiefly attributable to the extreme usefulness of the tug steamers, which were constantly employed towing in the vessels named by the commissariat, which were cleared by working parties of seamen.

"On November 5 the battle of Inkerman took place, and for several days after our only thought was embarking the wounded and getting the ships laden with them away. I have seen reports that there was a scarcity of boats on that sad occasion. I can declare such was not the case, nor were the poor fellows kept waiting a moment. The boats were platformed over, the wounded laid on them and towed off to the ships as fast as they came down. I say this, for I never left the small wharf to which the bows of the boats were hauled in."

Captain Dacres's health then broke down, and he had to give up the *Sanspareil* on November 17. Captain Heath remained in charge of the harbour until Rear-Admiral Boxer assumed command. The latter was not a judicious appointment, as experience at Constantinople had demonstrated, for though Admiral Boxer was a zealous and hard-working officer, he had not the special qualities pre-eminently necessary for such duties. Fortunately, and owing to the ability of Captain Heath, a thoroughly good system was already established at Balaclava which his successor had only to continue, and no further complaints are heard, as long as the war lasted, which can be applied to the navy.

At home the nation, raging against a condition which had been brought about by defective organization and a

combination of causes rather than the ineptitude of particular individuals, directed its wrath indiscriminately, but selected the Government as the special object of its anger. Lord John Russell resigned rather than meet a motion which involved censure on the Government with a direct negative. Sir James Graham, writing to Sir Edmund on January 28, says—"This is perhaps the last occasion on which I shall address you with any official authority. I have not been negligent in my endeavour to provide the naval means for the success of the bold undertaking in which you are now engaged. I always advocated the attack, and its failure will not make me ashamed of having advised it. Fortune has not favoured us, but you have done all in your power, and will continue to do your duty nobly and faithfully to the last, and I shall never have cause to regret that I placed you in an eminent station, and in a great command, at a moment of difficulty and danger."

Lord Aberdeen's Government fell, but Sir James Graham, at Lord Palmerston's request, retained his office for a short time longer. As, however, the new Cabinet were disposed to agree to a committee of inquiry into the war, he resigned with Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Sir James gives his reason for this step in a letter to Sir Edmund of February 26—"I have been going from hence for some time past, but I am now irrevocably gone. The newspapers and the reports of the debates in the House of Commons will give you the fullest and most accurate information of what has occurred. I have acted from a strong sense of duty, and have left a noble post at a trying moment with great reluctance; but I could not hand over to an irresponsible committee of the House of Commons the character of the commanders by sea and land on a distant station of whom the Queen's Ministers are the guardians and protectors as well as the rulers.

"Sir Charles Wood is to be my successor here. I shall

give him all the information in my power ; and it will be of great advantage to the public service that confidential and easy private communications should be established between you. Perhaps you will sometimes do me the favour of writing me a letter as to a friend whom you can trust.

“ Let me entreat you to have an eye on my son, who is a midshipman on board the *St. Jean d'Acre*. He is the object of my tenderest affection and fondest hopes. I venture sometimes to believe that he has noble qualities, which, if his life be spared, will not be unworthy of the profession of his choice. He is the pledge which I have given to the navy of my devoted attachment to its honour and interests, and any encouragement which you can give him, if he be worthy of it, will be a solace to a father's heart.


“ Always with sincere regard,

“ Yours very truly,

“ JAMES GRAHAM.”

Thus terminated the official connection between Sir James Graham and Sir Edmund Lyons, for that able statesman did not take office again, and died in 1861. His letters already quoted speak for themselves, and give an indication of character such as no words of mine could express. I can only lament that at such a juncture the country, as well as the navy, were deprived of his services.

Since the bombardment of October 17, certain other changes, not yet mentioned, had taken place in the squadron, and among the officers in command. The *Royal Albert*, a fine screw three-decker of 121 guns, under the command of Captain Sir Thomas Pasley, arrived on December 18. Certain alterations in her accommodation were necessary to provide for the Admiral's staff, and efficient execution of the immense amount of work which now devolved on the office of the Commander-in-Chief. The *Royal Albert* also soon after her arrival sprung her



H.M.S. ROYAL ALBERT IN A SNOW STORM, BLOCKADING SEBASTOPOL.
By permission of and from "The Illustrated London News," February 10th, 1855.

rudder in a gale, necessitating its being unshipped and repaired on board. Consequently Sir Edmund did not transfer his flag to her till February 14, when Sir Thomas Pasley succeeded Captain Mends in the *Agamemnon*. The *Hannibal*, 91, screw two-decker, commanded by Captain the Hon. Frederick Grey reached the Crimea the last week in December, and Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart, who had been succeeded at Malta by Rear-Admiral the Hon. M. Stopford, arrived on February 10 in the *Spiteful*, and hoisted his flag in the *Hannibal* the next day.

Captain John Dalrymple Hay was his flag-captain, while Captain Grey, as we have seen, went to Constantinople. Captains Eden and Graham of the *London* and *Rodney* had been invalided, being succeeded in their commands by Captains L. T. Jones and George St. Vincent King. Captains Peel and Drummond had been transferred to the *Leander* and *Tribune*. The squadron had been further strengthened by the arrivals of the *St. Jean d'Acre*, 101, screw line-of-battle ship, Captain the Hon. H. Keppel, on January 30, and the *Princess Royal*, 91, screw line-of-battle ship, Captain Lord Clarence Paget, on February 6. Several other small vessels had also joined Sir Edmund's command, so that he now had a fine Fleet—containing a considerable proportion of steamers—to undertake any service that might assist in the object upon which all hopes were centred, the capture of Sebastopol.

The effect of the disastrous gale on November 14 in the roadstead of Eupatoria has been described. On shore the newly-erected defences were damaged, and ditches filled up with sand. Seeing all this and supposing the garrison, having their hands full, would be unable to resist, a Russian force outside made an attack on the place that afternoon. This force, about 10,000 strong, was chiefly composed of cavalry and horse-artillery. Advancing to within 800 yards of the defensive works, the artillery

brought 14 guns into action and opened a brisk fire. This was returned with spirit and maintained for about an hour. Our rockets did good execution, while on our side only two men were wounded, though sixteen of the enemy's shot were dug out of the parapet next day, and several fell inside the battery. Seeing they could make no impression on our defences the Russians retired, having, it was reported, lost considerably.

Towards the end of the month Turkish troops began to arrive at Eupatoria, and these on December 10 were augmented by a division of Omer Pacha's army. The garrison now consisted of 9000 men, and consequently the seamen were gradually withdrawn. General Cannon took charge of the place, and Captain Brock left to join the *Sampson*, Captain Jones having succeeded Captain Eden in the *London* on that officer being invalided.

It now seemed desirable to utilize in the Crimea the Turkish army, which had hitherto been maintained in Bulgaria, and it was decided by the allied Generals that it should be stationed at Eupatoria. Omer Pacha having visited the place, found it well adapted for winter quarters, but as the Turkish Government had no means of transporting such a force by sea, or of keeping it supplied with provisions, the English and French naval commanders were appealed to. Admiral Bruat, who had succeeded Admiral Hamelin, agreed to appropriate two steam frigates for conveying troops, but in view of the large French army now before Sebastopol, could not undertake to keep them supplied with provisions. Sir Edmund therefore agreed—with the assistance of the two French steamers—to provide transport for the army, between 30,000 and 40,000 men, and keep up a supply of rations for the whole force at Eupatoria. This was carried out during January and February without a hitch, and the best tribute to what it entailed is contained in the following extract from a letter

of Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons on March 8. "Colonel Simmons¹ has drawn up a return of the arrival and sailing of transports engaged in transporting troops from the coast of Bulgaria to Eupatoria between the 31st of December last and the 3rd instant. By this return it appears that in that space of time 41,117 men had been brought over, 2946 horses, 97 guns, and no end of stores, provisions, and powder; and all this has been effected in British transports with three exceptions. This great undertaking has been accomplished by you; and I hope that you will not consider that I am taking a liberty in expressing my sense of the important services you rendered the cause, and my admiration of the arrangements which you made for effecting it." In forwarding this letter to the Admiralty Sir Edmund says—"Omer Pacha too, who has been an eye-witness of this creditable performance, has requested Colonel Simmons to tell me that he is lost in admiration at the manner in which all this has been executed in so short a space of time under the directions of Captain Hastings of the *Curacoa* at Eupatoria, of Captain Wilmot of the *Sphinx* at Baltchik, and of Commander Popplewell of the *Inflexible* at Varna, ably and zealously assisted by Commanders Rawstorne and Hoseason, R.N., acting in the transport service, as well as by the commanders of the transports, to all of whom, and not to me, as might be inferred from Lord Raglan's letter, the credit is due."

In the meantime the enemy had doubtless become aware that a Turkish garrison defended Eupatoria, and an attack in force was determined upon. At daylight on February 17 a Russian army was observed advancing on the place. It carried a great number of guns—some of large size—with which a heavy fire was opened upon the town. About nine o'clock the enemy's infantry came on to the attack,

¹ The present Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn Simmons, G.C.B.

but were repulsed with considerable loss. Captain Hastings of the *Curacoa* was the senior naval officer, and the other ships present were the *Valorous*, *Furious*, and *Viper*. These steamed close in to support the Turkish flanks, and were able to effect good service in this way. About ten o'clock the enemy retired, leaving most of their killed on the ground, and encamped about five miles from Eupatoria. After the battle we buried 450 Russians. Our loss was 104 killed, of whom 87 were Turks. The wounded numbered 370. In this affair the behaviour of the Turks was excellent, and Selim Pacha—an Egyptian—who was killed, behaved with great gallantry. After this the defences of Eupatoria were much strengthened, and additional guns mounted. From henceforward to the end of the war the Russians made no further effort to recapture the place.

Hardly had the work of moving the Turkish army to Eupatoria commenced, when the Admiral received intimation from home that a Sardinian contingent would join the allied armies, and that we were to provide transport for 15,500 men of all arms, 2000 horses, and 36 guns, with other stores. These had to be brought from Northern Italy to the Crimea. We had now sixty steamers engaged in transport duty in addition to sailing-vessels and men-of-war assisting this service, for a large portion of the reinforcements to the French army had been brought in our vessels, but the means were forthcoming, and a contingent of the Sardinian army arrived during the first week in May, with General La Marmora in command. If ever an official history of the Russian war should be written in this country, the transport work would, I am sure, be a special feature, and afford a striking proof of our resources for over-sea expeditions.

While these events were taking place, the siege was progressing slowly. One cause after another had delayed since the first attack, the next great bombardment.

Although a continuous fire was kept up upon the works the Russians were now continually adding to their defences. We also were augmenting our means of attack, and it was chiefly by further calls upon the navy. These were cheerfully responded to. At the beginning of March 1855, Captain Lushington writes to Sir Edmund Lyons—"Calculating on your promised reinforcement of 200 men from the *Leander* previous to opening fire, I have undertaken, to fight 37 guns as follows.—Right attack 14 guns, of which there are 9 32-pounders; 3 68-pounders; and 2 Lancasters. On left attack 23 guns: 14 32-pounders; 1 68-pounder; 2 8-in. 65-cwt., 2 8-in. 50-cwt. Lancasters; 2 24-pounder Lancasters, and 2 10-in. Lancasters." On April 9 all the English and French guns opened fire together, and this was continued throughout the day. In the opinion of General Canrobert a sufficient impression had not been made upon the works to justify an assault, and hence the bombardment was continued for some days. From the Russian return fire we suffered some loss, among the killed being Lieutenant Twyford of the Naval Brigade, while Commander Lord John Hay¹ was wounded. At a council of war on the 14th it was decided not to assault, and thus the capture of Sebastopol seemed as far off as ever.

In other parts of the Black Sea our ships continued to harass the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred. Captain Geo. Giffard, in command of the *Leopard*, while cruising off the Circassian coast ascertained that the Russians had sent away guns from the fort at Soujak Kaleh to strengthen Anapa, and would probably leave the former on the appearance of any considerable hostile force. Being joined by the *Highflyer*, *Swallow*, and *Viper*, and French steamer *Fulton*, Captain Giffard anchored his squadron on March 12, within 1000 yards of the fort. The Circassians in the neighbourhood had informed him that they

¹ Now Admiral of the Fleet Lord John Hay, G.C.B.

would attack the fort by land if he would do so by sea. Accordingly directly after anchoring the squadron opened a heavy fire upon this stronghold, and though from their position the fort could only bring ten guns to bear upon the ships, the Russians returned the fire with spirit. They were, however, soon driven out of the place, but Captain Giffard was much disappointed to find that the Circassians did not advance to attack the enemy's troops, and the garrison being large he could not land sufficient men to complete the work. He therefore withdrew, his ships having only sustained slight injury to their hulls and masts.

A few days previous to this, March 8, the *Viper*, Lieutenant Armytage, attacked the Martello tower at Djimiteia, and having with her fire dispersed the Cossacks, a landing party was sent on shore under Mr. James Roche, second master, which spiked the guns and destroyed the fort as well as the barracks and ammunition; all this effected without any casualty on board the *Viper*. This Martello tower had recently been erected for the defence of the direct communication between Anapa and Kertch.

In these days of regular postal and telegraphic communication with nearly every part of the world, it is perhaps difficult to realize how imperfect these were in 1854. An electric cable had been laid across the English Channel, and land wires established on the Continent which were gradually extended to the East, though Turkey apparently had not yet adopted to any extent the new invention. Communication, therefore, between Western Europe and the seat of war had been hitherto carried on by sea through the Mediterranean and to Constantinople, from whence dispatches were conveyed to Balaclava by a regular service of steamers instituted by the allied Admirals. News from either extremity took from two to three weeks to reach its destination.

It being now desirable to utilize the electric cable to

a further extent, in December 1854 Messrs Newall offered to lay one down between Varna and Balaclava for £22,000. They proposed a gutta-percha covered wire, the greater portion quite unprotected; that is to say, not sheathed with the iron wire now invariably used under water to give strength to the cable. The cable was to be laid by a steamer of about 700 tons, and the firm asked for a powerful Government steamer to aid the operation by towing their vessel or giving any assistance necessary. This offer was accepted, and the Admiral informed. Captain Spratt in the *Spitfire* was accordingly directed to proceed to Constantinople to meet the cable steamer, while the *Terrible* with Captain McCleverty went to Varna to assist in the operation.

Various causes delayed the arrival of the *Argus*—the cable steamer—at Constantinople, so that it was not until March 31 that she and the *Spitfire* reached Varna. To avoid injury to the cable from vessels anchoring in the bay, Cape Kaliakra was selected as the point from which to start, and here they erected a suitable telegraph station. Bad weather and fogs prevented their starting till April 7, when the flotilla weighed and commenced paying out the cable. Considering its frail nature this was a most delicate operation, even carried out at so low a speed as three knots, and on one occasion they had to anchor; but on the 12th they sighted the Crimea, and soon afterwards observed the smoke of the guns at Sebastopol. The next morning they safely reached and anchored in the little bay of St. George near Balaclava, on the heights above which is the monastery of that name. It had been a time of great anxiety, but they had kept up a communication with the small party left at Cape Kaliakra, showing the cable had remained intact, and now their efforts were rewarded. The Crimean end was soon landed, and then this part connected with Europe by what for nearly 300 miles was a mere thread.

We had already communication by wire from England to Bucharest, and when completed to Varna we could receive and transmit important news without delay.

Captain Biddulph—now Sir Michael Biddulph—who accompanied the cable flotilla across the Black Sea, was placed in charge at the monastery, where he remained till the fall of Sebastopol. That piece of news was about the last—so he informs me—which passed through this cable, for it then broke down and the fault could not be discovered. Too weak to lift in any depth of water, it probably remains at the bottom of the Black Sea to this day, with other hidden records of a great enterprise.



H.M. SHIPS ROYAL ALBERT AND WAANGIER OFF ALOUFKA, CRIMEA.
(From a picture by W. Simpson, Esq. Messrs. Colnaghi.)

CHAPTER XV

1855—MARCH TO JUNE

Roads into the Crimea—Perekop—Eastern road crossing Putrid Sea—Desire to command the Sea of Azoff—Army too weak at first—An expedition organized—Starts—The French recalled—Disappointment of Sir Edmund—General Pelissier succeeds General Canrobert—Indecision of the latter—The expedition organized again and starts—Landing at Kamish Bourru—Occupy Kertch—Plucky action of the *Snake*—Light squadron under Captain Lyons enters Sea of Azoff—Evacuation of Soujak Kaleh and Anapa—Operations of the Azoff squadron at Berdiansk, Arabat, Genitchi, and Taganrog—Commander Cowper Coles's raft—Destruction of stores and grain by the squadron—*Miranda* returns to Sebastopol—Kind message of the Queen.

FROM an early period of the war, and especially when a siege of Sebastopol became necessary, the importance of cutting off supplies as far as possible to that town from the interior had been recognized at home and by the chiefs of the expedition. It was known that one of the main roads into the Crimea was by the Isthmus of Perekop, a narrow neck of land connecting the promontory with Russia and enabling reinforcements from other parts to reach the besieged. It was therefore desirable to ascertain how close ships could approach the shores of the isthmus with a view to impeding troops marching from Odessa and elsewhere to the Crimea. At the end of November 1854 Captain Spratt in the *Spitfire* was therefore dispatched to survey that part of the coast. He found that the head of the gulf leading up to the Isthmus of Perekop was so shallow

as not to be navigable by boats, much less by large vessels, and that none of our gunboats could get within fourteen miles of the road. It was therefore unassailable from the sea.

Whilst on this service, however, he ascertained another point of great importance which does not appear to have been previously known to the Allies. This was the existence of a second military road into the Crimea at the eastern side, which crossed a portion of the Sivash Lake—or Putrid Sea—by means of a stout wooden bridge and then continued to Simpheropol. Troops coming from the east and centre of Russia utilized this road, along which also were conveyed grain and stores to the Crimea. The great highway then from Central Russia to the south was by the river Wolga as far as Dubovka. At this point it is about thirty miles from the Don—another large river 1000 miles long emptying into the Sea of Azoff. Merchandise was transhipped from one river to the other and carried by barges to Taganrog, from whence its distribution proceeded. Extensive grain depôts were formed on the shores of the Sea of Azoff to be forwarded by water when required, or along the peninsula of Tchongar and across the bridge alluded to and named after the peninsula. There was thus an extensive traffic in the Sea of Azoff and along its shores. To enter and control that sea and thus prevent supplies of grain, etc. reaching Sebastopol from the rich granaries of the south and by the Don, on which the Russian army in the Crimea depended to a great extent, had from the first been urged upon those commanding the expedition. On October 13, 1854, the Admiralty wrote to Admiral Dundas, they were of an opinion “that whenever the means at your disposal will admit, proper measures should be concerted with your colleagues in command of the allied forces for obtaining an entrance by the Gulf of Kertch into the Sea of

Azoff with a view to interrupt the communication of the enemy with the eastern shores of the Crimea, to which their Lordships have always attached the greatest importance." To this the Admiral replied on November 8—"Some time since it was proposed to send a combined force to effect a diversion at Kaffa and Kertch, but as no troops could be spared to assist in the operation the proposal was not entertained." The battle of Inkerman and sickness had so reduced the strength of the army that we could not then afford to further weaken—even for a few days—our position before Sebastopol. Winter soon intervened, and then ice became an effective barrier to naval operations in that part.

Soon after Sir Edmund Lyons became Commander-in-Chief of our Fleet, the Admiralty again called attention to the necessity of occupying the Sea of Azoff when an entrance could be effected. He was informed that the shallowness of the water both at the entrance and within the sea itself presented the most serious obstruction, but the small craft of the squadron would be augmented by two gun-vessels, the *Weser* and *Recruit*, drawing under 7 ft. of water, while further vessels of this nature were if necessary to be obtained at Malta and Constantinople.

In the meantime Sir Edmund was eagerly anticipating the time when he could effectively utilize the Fleet under his command in this direction. A blockade of the Russian coast had been established on February 1, and Captain Giffard in the *Leopard* was off Kertch. That officer on February 13 reported that the ice had left the straits, and a few days later he observed additions being made to the defences. On March 4 the Admiral wrote home—"The season is approaching when operations in the Sea of Azoff may be undertaken. Vice-Admiral Bruat and I give earnest attention to this matter, on which, as it appears to us, the complete success of the Crimean

expedition depends in no small degree. We are happy to find that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert attach no less importance to these operations than we do, and that they agree with us in thinking prompt measures and the operations of a land force necessary. In addition to the eight steam-vessels of light draught of water already under my orders, a few of lighter draught might be extremely useful. Such a flotilla co-operating with a similar force expected by Admiral Bruat, and supported by the *Miranda*, whose draught of water will I hope admit of her passing through the straits, can hardly fail to render good service in the Sea of Azoff." At more than one conference held by the allied heads of the expedition Sir Edmund urged making preparation for this diversion, and stated that to effect it military co-operation to the extent of 12,000 men would be necessary for a limited time—perhaps ten days or a fortnight. As the French army had received considerable reinforcements during the past few months, and now greatly exceeded our own in numbers, it was evident that in any detached force the larger proportion of the men employed would be French. On their General therefore depended very much whether an expedition would be dispatched. Now Canrobert, though desirous of falling in with Lord Raglan's views, was not, when the time came for furnishing the troops, in favour of the project. He considered it to be hazardous, and having received an intimation from France that 40,000 more men were on the way to him, he thought it was at Sebastopol and not at Kertch that the fate of the campaign would be settled. If successful with the principal fortress, Kertch and everything else should fall as a matter of course; but if we were unfortunate before Sebastopol another expedition elsewhere would not save us. Such were his views as I find in a memorandum of a conversation with him by Sir George Brown, who was to command the English land force employed. The French

General, however, consented to send an engineer officer to examine the neighbourhood of Kertch. His report being favourable and an assault on Sebastopol being deferred until after the arrival of the reinforcements, Canrobert consented to provide his contingent for Kertch.

Preparations for the expedition were made on May 1 and 2. It included 8500 French and 2500 English troops, with four batteries of artillery, conveyed by a large squadron of the two Fleets with both Admirals. Full details of the force are unnecessary because it did not reach its destination. Sailing at sunset on May 3, the flotilla first shaped a course as if about to proceed to Odessa as a feint, but at midnight turned back and proceeded towards Kertch. The next evening, however, Admiral Bruat received a letter from General Canrobert, saying that in consequence of a dispatch from the Emperor he must ask him to return at once. A consultation was held by the leaders of the combined force, when Sir Edmund urged that the expedition should not be abandoned when all seemed so favourable for success. Admiral Bruat consented to go on as far as the rendezvous off the Straits of Kertch, but early the next morning he went on board the *Royal Albert* with General D'Autemarre and told Sir Edmund that a night's reflection had convinced them that it was their duty to obey the order and return. He therefore proceeded to retrace his steps at once. Finding no arguments of any avail, and feeling that his own force was insufficient to carry out the intended objects of the expedition, Sir Edmund reluctantly followed his French colleague and arrived off Balaclava again on May 6. On seeing the telegraphic message from France upon which General Canrobert acted, Sir Edmund did not think it necessarily compelled the return of the French troops, and his disappointment was great. The peculiar relation of the French Admiral to the General in command is

brought out in the telegram Sir Edmund sent to the Admiralty on May 7—"I think it right that their Lordships should know that not only combined naval and military operations, but also the operations of the combined Fleets alone, are dependent upon the pleasure of General Canrobert (whose indecision is proverbial), and consequently upon his interpretation of telegraphic messages, for Admiral Bruat is bound to obey his orders implicitly in all matters that do not concern the safety of the ships and their crews nautically considered." This is also alluded to by the Admiral in a letter to Lord Raglan on the day the expedition turned back. He says—

"MY DEAR LORD,—You will readily believe that I am grieved and disappointed beyond measure at having the cup dashed from my lips by General Canrobert; but when I reflect upon poor Admiral Bruat's relations with him, and contrast them with those which I have the honour, advantage, and happiness of enjoying with your Lordship, I feel that I have reason to be very grateful. Your confidence-inspiring letter of yesterday brought by the *Spiteful* is highly appreciated by both Brown and myself."

Lest it might be thought by those not well acquainted with the history of the Crimean War that the Admiral's judgment of Canrobert was somewhat harsh, and as Lord Raglan's opinion on the subject has never been made public, I find in a letter from Sir John Burgoyne to Sir Edmund, in December 1854—"Canrobert appears to me to be in an excited state of uncertainty, between over-alarm and over-caution on one hand, and a belief that to get out of his apprehended dangerous position he must adopt a proposition that is urged upon him of extreme rashness. While I can perceive nothing but great caution and *defensive* arrangements by the Russian armies outside, and while we are become by art and the weather exceedingly

strong, *he* can see nothing but symptoms of a tremendous attack upon us. If he would have abandoned his excess of caution, and allowed us to employ the means in *offensive* operations against the place which he had insisted upon being applied *defensively* against the country, we would have been prepared to act with more chance of success for our great object, which is to get possession of the place." It seems to me that an answer to the question, "Why was not Sebastopol taken sooner?" may be found in the foregoing letter.

Under these circumstances it was a relief, at any rate to the Admiral, when, on May 19, General Canrobert turned over the chief command of the French army to General Pelissier, who at once concurred in another expedition being sent to capture Kertch. The details of this were settled at a council of war on May 20; the French agreed to provide 7000 infantry and three batteries of artillery, the English 3000 infantry and a battery of artillery, and the Turks 5000 infantry and a battery of artillery. The whole force was to be under the command of Sir George Brown, which General Pelissier himself proposed. In the meantime Sir Edmund continued receiving favourable reports of the prospects of such a diversion. Captain John Moore of the *Highflyer*, a most capable officer, of whom the Admiral had the highest opinion, had kept him informed of all movements of the enemy in the Straits of Kertch, while Captain Spratt in the *Spitfire* surveyed the coast to ascertain the best place for a landing. Such was the alacrity with which all entered into the project, that the arrangements were completed and troops embarked on board the ships of the combined Fleets by the afternoon of the 22nd.

The following ships composed our squadron—

Name of Ship.	Guns.	Commander.	Description.
<i>Royal Albert</i> (bearing the flag of Rr.-Adml. Sir Edmund Lyons)	121	Cap. W. R. Mends .	Screw 3-decker.
<i>Hannibal</i> (bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart)	90	„ J. C. D. Hay .	Screw 2-decker.
<i>Algiers</i>	90	„ Chas. Talbot .	Screw 2-decker.
<i>Agamemnon</i> . . .	91	„ Sir T. S. Pasley	„ „
<i>St. Jean d'Acre</i> . .	101	„ Hon. H. Keppel	„ „
<i>Princess Royal</i> . .	91	„ Lord Clarence Paget	„ „
<i>Sidon</i>	22	„ Geo. Goldsmith	Paddle-wheel steam frigate.
<i>Valorous</i>	16	„ C. H. M. Buckle	„ „
<i>Leopard</i>	18	„ Geo. Giffard . .	„ „
<i>Tribune</i>	31	„ Hon. J. R. Drum- mond	Screw steam frigate.
<i>Simoom</i>	8	„ T. R. Sullivan .	Screw troop-ship.
<i>Furious</i>	16	„ Wm. Loring . .	Paddle-wheel steam frigate.
<i>Highflyer</i>	21	„ John Moore . .	Screw corvette.
<i>Terrible</i>	21	„ J. J. McCleverty	Paddle-wheel steam frigate.
<i>Miranda</i>	14	„ E. M. Lyons .	Screw corvette.
<i>Sphinx</i>	6	„ A. P. E. Wilmot	Paddle-wheel corvette.
<i>Spitfire</i>	5	„ T. A. B. Spratt .	Paddle-wheel survey- ing vessel.
<i>Gladiator</i>	6	„ Robt. Hall (actg.)	Paddle-wheel corvette.
<i>Vesuvius</i>	6	Com. Sherard Osborn	Paddle-wheel sloop.
<i>Curlew</i>	9	„ Rowley Lambert	Screw sloop.
<i>Swallow</i>	9	„ F. A. B. Craufurd	„ „
<i>Caradoc</i>	2	„ S. H. Derriman	Paddle-wheel dispatch vessel.
<i>Stromboli</i>	6	„ Cowper P. Coles	Paddle-wheel sloop.
<i>Ardent</i>	5	Lt. Wm. Horton . .	„ „
<i>Medina</i>	4	„ H. B. Beresford .	„ „
<i>Wrangler</i>	4	„ R. H. Risk . . .	Screw gun-vessel.
<i>Viper</i>	4	„ Wm. Armytage .	„ „
<i>Lynx</i>	4	„ C. M. Aynsley .	„ „
<i>Recruit</i>	6	„ G. F. Day . . .	Iron gun-vessel.
<i>Arrow</i>	4	„ W. K. Jolliffe . .	Screw gun-vessel.
<i>Banshee</i>	2	„ L. R. Reynolds .	Paddle-wheel dispatch vessel.
<i>Snake</i>	4	„ H. F. McKillop .	Screw gun-vessel.
<i>Beagle</i>	4	„ W. N. W. Hewett	„ „

Sir Edmund Lyons and Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart were on board their respective flagships, while Vice-Admiral Bruat was in command of a nearly equal French squadron.

The expedition, comprising 15,000 men of all arms and five batteries of artillery, started on the evening of May 22, and steered towards Kaffa Bay, where it arrived the next morning. This was not the intended point of disembarkation; but to induce such a belief in the enemy the flotilla remained there most of the day. The selected landing-place recommended by Captain Spratt was in the Bay of Kamish Bourru, further on, and not more than five miles from Kertch. Thither the squadron proceeded, arriving early on May 24. Owing to the shallowness of the water in this part of the straits, the line-of-battle ships could not approach close to the shore, but the steam frigates were able to take up a position and cover the landing, which proceeded without opposition on the part of the enemy. Some of his troops appeared, but evidently awed by the size of the expedition, they retired, and blew up the magazines of their batteries in the immediate neighbourhood, thus acknowledging the futility of resistance. Whilst the disembarkation was proceeding, a gallant piece of service was performed by the *Snake*, commanded by Lieutenant H. F. McKillop. She had been ordered to reconnoitre the batteries beyond, when observing a Russian war-steamer crossing the straits, McKillop obtained permission to try and intercept her. This he succeeded in doing, and opened fire upon her, driving his opponent under the guns of Yenikali. Undeterred by the fire of this fort, the little *Snake* continued her attack, and soon with her shells set fire to the vessel. This caused her to be abandoned by her crew, and she shortly blew up. While thus engaged, three other Russian steamers came down and opened fire on the *Snake*, in addition to the fort, which

had already sent one shot through her hull at the water-line, and another through the rigging, but her gallant commander did not cease his exertions until he had completed his mission; and, being recalled, returned to the squadron.

As soon as the troops had landed they marched on Kertch, which was occupied the same day. As they advanced, the Russians continued to explode their magazines and retire.

A flotilla of light-draught vessels, consisting of the *Miranda*, *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Swallow*, *Stromboli*, *Medina*, *Wrangler*, *Viper*, *Lynx*, *Recruit*, *Arrow*, *Snake*, and *Beagle*, had been placed under the command of Captain Lyons, to act in the Sea of Azoff with five French steamers. This force now pushed on to Yenikali at the entrance, and remained there out of range till our army should come up. But early in the morning of the 25th, the Russians evacuated this place also, and a tremendous explosion then announced that the last impediment to entering the Sea of Azoff was removed. At two o'clock in the afternoon Sir Edmund arrived in the *Banshee*, and hoisting his flag on board the *Miranda*, the whole flotilla passed through the straits. Then for the first time in history the flag of a British admiral floated on the waters of Azoff, and an object was achieved upon which the heart of Sir Edmund had long been set. He did not intend, however, to deprive his son of any honour that might come to the share of the light squadron, so bidding him good-bye, the Admiral returned to the *Royal Albert* in the *Banshee*. Everything had gone off admirably. Though the enemy had been aware previously that some such stroke was intended, the rapidity of our movements seems to have taken him by surprise, hence his destruction of the fortifications on each side of the strait, and rapid retreat. Thus nearly a hundred guns came into our possession, as well as large



LANDING OF ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY ARMY AT KAMISH BOURRU, NEAR KERTCH.
(From a picture by W. Simpson, Esq. Messrs. Colnaghi.)

quantities of ammunition and stores, though the Russians, before leaving, destroyed nearly 2000 tons of grain. The utmost cordiality and good-will prevailed between the allied forces throughout the operations, and it was decided to occupy Yenikali for the present, putting it in a state of defence again, that the place might be left in charge of a Turkish garrison. When accomplished, the English and French troops would be available for attacks on Soujak Kaleh and Anapa, two strongly fortified places on the Circassian coast. The Fleet therefore remained in the Straits of Kertch for this purpose. But as we thus had cut off the communication by sea of these places with Russia, they were evacuated by their garrisons in succession on May 28 and June 2. Admiral Stewart, in the *Hannibal*, with Admiral Charner in the *Napoleon*, then went to Anapa to ensure all the guns and ammunition being destroyed, in case the enemy should return after our departure. They found this had been done by the Russians, who, previous to leaving, also burnt the buildings and destroyed the stores. As no further work remained for a land force in that part, the expedition re-embarked, and, having left a garrison in the straits, the Fleet returned to Sebastopol.

The proceedings of the Azoff squadron now demand attention. In this some of our best and most dashing officers held command. Commander Sherard Osborn, the next in seniority to Lyons, had already given indication of the ability which henceforward distinguished his career—alas! too short. Rowley Lambert, Murray Aynsley, Day, McKillop, Risk, and others could be relied on for any service allotted to them. Cowper Coles was promoted to commander after the bombardment of October 17, and went home. He came out again in January 1855, to be commander of the *Rodney*, and in May received command of the *Stromboli*. In addition to professional qualifications

of no mean order, he possessed much artistic talent, as can be observed by his illustration of scenes in this war given here, especially that of the sea attack on October 17. He was succeeded as flag-lieutenant by Algernon Lyons,¹ then in the *Firebrand*, and who in that vessel had taken part in the attack on the sea defences of Sebastopol on October 17, 1854. He continued acting in this capacity to his uncle until the flag was hauled down. As a signal officer in those days few excelled him. He seemed to divine the meaning of a signal even before the flags were broken.

The orders to Captain Lyons were to cut off the enemy's supplies and harass him at every point. These he proceeded to execute with great vigour. Pushing across the Sea of Azoff with his flotilla and the French steamers *Lucifer*, *Megère*, *Brandon*, and *Fulton*, he arrived on the 26th off Berdiansk. Anchoring so as to command the beach and harbour, the boats of the ships were sent in under Commander Osborn to destroy a large number of vessels lying at anchor, while one or two gunboats pursued those endeavouring to make their escape. On the beach in the bay, burnt to the water's edge and abandoned, were found four steamers-of-war which had escaped from Kertch under Rear-Admiral Wolff.

On the next day men were landed to destroy Government stores and grain, of which they found a considerable stock in the place, but private property was respected. This work being completed the squadron sailed for Arabat, and on the 28th bombarded the fort which guards the narrow strip called the Spit of Arabat. After an hour and a half's engagement the magazine of the fort blew up, but its large garrison prevented a landing by such a small force as our squadron could furnish. Rapidity of operation being essential, it was necessary to sink and burn rather than capture prizes, which would have involved delay. Thus

¹ Now Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. Lyons, G.C.B.

in two days over 100 vessels were destroyed. The next place to be visited was Genitchi. A glance at a map of the Sea of Azoff will show that its western side washes that narrow strip already mentioned as the Spit of Arabat. This is only just above the level of the sea, and forms a convenient route to the peninsula of Kertch, which it joins at Arabat. From thence there is easy communication to Circassia across the straits. The northern extremity of this spit does not join the mainland, being separated from it by a narrow channel leading into the Sivash, or what is more generally known as the Putrid Sea. This has really more of the attributes of an extensive marsh than an inland sea, for in many places the water was only a few inches deep, though this varied according to the direction of the wind in the Sea of Azoff. Nor was it so offensive as the name implies, for beyond being extremely salt and muddy where shallow, our officers did not afterwards find it objectionable on that score. Genitchi was a town on the Russian side of the channel leading into this sea, and from which at one time a bridge of boats connected it with the spit. This had, however, been destroyed some time before and a ferry substituted as a means of communication. The proceedings of Captain Lyons are given in the following extracts from his dispatch—

“ ‘*Miranda*,’ off *Genitchi*, May 29, 1855.

“I have the honour to inform you that I arrived here shortly after dark last night with her Majesty’s ships under my orders, and joined the *Swallow* and *Wrangler*, which ships had already destroyed or captured all the vessels in this neighbourhood outside the Straits of Genitchi; but a very great number had passed the straits, which are only 50 yards wide and are commanded by the low cliffs on which the town is built, and were moored inside under these cliffs.

"At six o'clock this morning I sent Commander Craufurd with a flag of truce to demand the immediate surrender of all these vessels, and of the immense corn stores for the supply of the army in the Crimea, stating that if these terms were complied with I would spare the town and respect private property. The enemy at this time had six field-pieces in position, with about 200 men with them, and a battalion of infantry, besides Cossacks, drawn up behind the town.

"Commander Craufurd was met by an officer of apparently high rank who refused to accede to these terms, saying that any attempt to land or destroy the vessels would be resisted. Having allowed till 9 a.m. for reconsideration of the refusal and receiving no answer, and seeing that the enemy could place his guns and infantry in the town to command the channel and prevent the boats passing to destroy the vessels and stores, I directed the ships to shell the town, which they did so effectually that the boats under the command of Lieutenant J. F. C. Mackenzie¹ got safely through the passage and set fire to the shipping (73 in number) and the corn stores. This service was ably performed, and the boats returned without accident.

"The wind having shifted about two hours after the boats came off, some of the corn stores did not catch fire. Considering the destruction of these, as well as some of the more distant vessels, to be of the utmost importance, I sent the boats in again, though aware that the enemy having had time to make preparations it would be a hazardous enterprise.

"The ships accordingly resumed their fire upon the town, and the boats proceeded. Lieutenant Cecil W. Buckley of this ship, Lieutenant Hugh T. Burgoyne of the *Swallow*, and Mr. John Roberts, gunner of the *Ardent*, volunteered to land alone and fire the stores, as there would

¹ Senior Lieutenant of H.M.S. *Miranda*.



DESTRUCTION OF GRAIN AND STORES AT GENITCHIL.
(From a picture by Staff Commander Bedwell, R.N.)

be imminent risk in landing a party in presence of such a superior force and out of gun-shot of the ships. This very dangerous service they most gallantly performed, narrowly escaping the Cossacks, who all but cut them off. At the same time Lieutenant Mackenzie pushed on and burnt the remaining vessels, the enemy opening fire from four field-guns and musketry almost within point-blank range of the boats. Everything being now effectually accomplished the boats returned. Although several of them were struck by grape and case-shot, most fortunately only one man was slightly wounded. Since the squadron entered the Sea of Azoff four days ago the enemy has lost four steamers-of-war, 246 merchant vessels, also corn and flour magazines to the value of at least £150,000."

In a letter to his father at the same time Captain Lyons says—"I think that the destruction of the immense corn depôts and vessels at Genitchi cannot fail to be very detrimental to the Russian armies in the Crimea. The vessels in this sea were evidently almost exclusively employed in the carrying trade of the troops. We have expended a good deal of ammunition, but it was necessary to make the town too hot to hold the Russian infantry and guns, or our boats would have suffered most severely and been unable to effect their purpose. This boat affair I have not managed to do justice to in my official letter. It was a very gallant little affair, extremely well managed by Mackenzie, and our small, or rather no loss, seemed miraculous to us who were watching the grape and canister pitching among them with our glasses from the ships. Lieutenants Buckley and Burgoyne's little exploit was a very hazardous one, but attended with complete success. I need not say that I am delighted with my command, and much pleased with the commanders of the vessels under my orders. Although I fear we can do nothing brilliant, I am sure we are useful. I shall be very anxious

to hear from you, and to know where you went after Kertch ; indeed my thoughts are very constantly with you."

Though the vessels employed on this service were small, it was found that craft of even lighter draught were essential in many parts of the Sea of Azoff, which we now desired to approach. The two Admirals therefore dispatched from their squadrons twenty of the line-of-battle ships' launches armed with 24-pounder howitzers and rockets, to join the Azoff flotilla.

After leaving Genitchi Captain Lyons proceeded to the other side of the Sea of Azoff to carry out the same work at Taganrog, an important town in that part. At one time all Russian vessels in the Black Sea were built there, and even frigates, these being floated down to Kertch by buoyant structures called "camels." Then the development of Nicolaieff and Sebastopol as naval arsenals reduced the importance of Taganrog except for small craft, but it has the natural advantages of good coal and iron in the vicinity. Its chief defect as a coast town is the shallowness of the water for a considerable distance seawards, so that Captain Lyons had to anchor his squadron on arrival on June 1 eight miles from Taganrog, and therefore beyond gun-shot.

To effect his object here special preparations became necessary, and this led to Commander Cowper Coles suggesting and preparing on board the *Stromboli* a raft to carry a 32-pounder, which was christened the *Lady Nancy*, and is now famous as the beginning of those improved methods of mounting and working guns, especially the ship-turret, with which the name of Captain Cowper Coles has since been associated. While thus making arrangements to attack with the squadron's boats and the raft, a reinforcement arrived in the shape of three tugs and twelve of the armed launches. These were supplemented shortly afterwards by a similar force of French boats. Then Captain Lyons in the *Recruit* proceeded to Taganrog with



ATTACK ON TACANON, JUNE, 1883.
(From a picture by Staff Commander Leavelle, R.N.)

his flotilla and anchored 1400 yards from the Mole. Under a flag of truce he sent in a demand for the surrender of all Government property; the troops and inhabitants to withdraw while we destroyed it; any infraction to be punished by instant bombardment. The Governor of the place refused these terms, stating that having troops at his disposal he intended to resist.

After the lapse of an hour the *Recruit*, as well as the boats which took up a position in line for this purpose under the command of Commander Cowper Coles, opened fire upon the stores. This proved so effective that although the enemy made repeated attempts to get down to the houses lining the beach, so as to save the long range of store-houses from destruction, they never succeeded in doing so in sufficient numbers. Lieutenant Buckley landed and set fire to several stores and Government buildings, a dangerous service in the presence of 3000 troops who were only kept in check by the fire of the boats' guns. By 3 p.m. the long ranges of stores of grain and timber and all the vessels on the stocks were in a blaze, and the boats hauled off. The loss of the enemy in men must have been severe, and the destruction of grain enormous. Our only casualty was one man wounded by a musket-ball. The French co-operated most ably and cordially on this occasion, their senior officer being Captain de Sedaiges, and their boats led by Commander Le Jeune, *aide-de-camp* to Admiral Bruat.

Captain Lyons then proceeded to Marianpoul and sent on shore a similar requisition, to which no answer was received. On a small force from the squadron being landed, a large body of Cossacks was observed to retire from the town. Our men then destroyed an extensive store of grain without disturbance from the enemy. At Gheisk, another town, the Governor acceded to the terms demanded, having no force to defend the place, and we burnt a quantity of

hay just about to be sent off to Sebastopol, with several thousand quarters of wheat. Thus, as Sir Edmund reported to the Admiralty—"In the space of a fortnight the Sea of Azoff has been swept by the allied squadron under Captain Lyons's orders, and the enemy deprived, not only of the supplies which already existed in the different depôts, but also of the means of transporting the incoming crops."

Shortly after this Captain Lyons, with the *Miranda* and a portion of the flotilla, left the Sea of Azoff and rejoined the Admiral. The day for another great bombardment of Sebastopol approached, to be followed, we hoped, by an assault, and Sir Edmund naturally did not wish his son to miss such an event. Commander Sherard Osborn, upon whom now, as next in seniority, the conduct of further operations devolved, would, he knew, prosecute them with vigour. There was every reason to be satisfied with what had been accomplished. The Admiralty expressed to Sir Edmund "their great satisfaction at receiving his report of the gallant and judicious conduct of Captain Lyons and of the officers and men under his orders in conducting these highly important operations." But what gave more satisfaction still to all concerned, the First Lord telegraphed to the Admiral—"The Queen desires me to convey to you her Majesty's extreme satisfaction at the successful operations in the Sea of Azoff, and her high sense of the admirable manner in which your son has conducted them."

CHAPTER XVI

1855—JUNE

Suggestion of Lord Clarence Paget for night attacks on Sebastopol—His arrangement with lights for leading marks—The *Valorous* commences—General Todleben's reminiscences by Sir John Hay—*Royal Albert* and *Montebello*—The Naval Brigade—Admiralty objections—Difficulties of withdrawing seamen—Casualties in Brigade—Attack on June 18—Gallantry of the seamen—Night attacks renewed—Captain Lyons wounded—Dies of wound—His calmness in death—Tribute to his noble qualities—Letter from the Queen—Sir Edmund's reply—Death of Lord Raglan—Grief of Sir Edmund—Death of Captain Christie and Admiral Boxer—Captain Peel and Lord Clarence Paget invalided—Rewards to the Naval Brigade—Changes—Sir Edmund receives military G.C.B.

WHILE the Fleet thus afforded valuable assistance afloat and ashore, Sir Edmund was ever ready to consider any suggestion which would enable his ships to still further co-operate with the army. All under his command desired to share the risks as well as the hard work which since the first bombardment had fallen principally on those who had borne the brunt of Inkerman and were exposed day by day in the trenches. He therefore adopted with alacrity a suggestion of Lord Clarence Paget, that ships should go in at night within range of the batteries at the entrance to Sebastopol, and subject the place on that side to a fire which would not only harass the besieged but compel the enemy to keep those forts manned. The gunners allotted to these works would not therefore be able to assist in the

land defence. To enable this to be done efficiently, and to prevent ships running aground on the shoals outside in the eagerness of their commanders to attain a favourable position, it was necessary to have some clearly defined marks on which to steer. At night these could only be lights, and Lord Clarence was deputed with his master, Mr. Hall,¹ to arrange their position. This he carried out during the day, placing red and green lights at suitable points on each side of Streletska Bay, so that when each pair was in one the ship would be in deep water, but within about 1200 yards of the nearest battery. At such a point the Russian ships in harbour as well as the town would be within range. Of course the fire could be returned, but except from the blaze of her broadside there was nothing to indicate the position of a ship, and her range being unknown the chance of hitting her became very uncertain.

When the lights were placed and verified by sending in a boat to sound on their line of bearing, it was decided to send a ship to try the effect the following night. The *Valorous*, Captain Buckle, was selected for the first attack, and one or two other captains asked permission to accompany him. It was calm and dark, therefore favourable to the purpose. About midnight the *Valorous* steamed quietly out and had no difficulty in steering by the lights, having her guns ready. On reaching the prescribed position she fired a broadside of shell. These projectiles at this period were exploded by a fuse, which projected outside. On being ignited by the charge of the gun it continued to burn until a certain time—regulated by the distance—had elapsed, when the flame reached the bursting charge and exploded the shell. Thus its flight through the air could be observed, and a broadside of them at night was a fine sight. Loading again quickly the *Valorous* was about to repeat the dose, when the batteries, recovering from their

¹ J. W. McL. Hall, afterwards master of the *Royal Albert*.

surprise, opened fire upon their unseen enemy. Shell flew all round the ship, affording no doubt an equally attractive spectacle to the other side. Either the position of the *Valorous* was well estimated or chance directed it, but one shot struck her paddle-wheel and distorted it so that it revolved in a curious fashion, with a sound as if—as Lord Clarence Paget says in his Memoirs—it had the asthma. The ship then returned to her anchorage.

That the attack was quite unexpected and took the garrison by surprise is confirmed by high authority. Admiral Sir John Hay, then flag-captain to Sir Houston Stewart, accompanied Captain Buckle on this occasion. Writing to me of the incident he says—"Six years after, when staying at a house where General Todleben was also a guest, he happened to mention that during the war he was only once caught unprepared. He said, 'A steamer of yours came in unexpectedly and disturbed the whole garrison. One shell passed through the room in which I was sleeping. We fired in return, but she escaped.' I said, 'My dear General, I had the happiness to be a passenger in that steamer; it was the *Valorous*.'"

Sir Edmund was much pleased with the result of this new method of attack, and his colleague Admiral Bruat also entered into it heartily. They arranged that an English and a French ship should join on each night when the weather permitted, and this was kept up until preparations for the Kertch expedition absorbed all their attention.

Captain Spratt, on completion of his work in laying the electric cable, devised a method for carrying out the same operation during a fog, using a patent log and sounding machine. This he tested by taking the *Wrangler* in during a dense fog and firing thirty rounds with considerable effect. The Admirals then determined to go in themselves—Sir Edmund in the *Royal Albert* and Bruat in the *Montebello*. To decide who should lead lots were drawn,

and it fell to Admiral Bruat. On April 23, shortly after midnight, the *Montebello* got under way and proceeded out. The *Royal Albert* followed suit. Soon, however, the French ship was observed to be at a standstill, and a message came from Admiral Bruat that the steam had blown out of the boilers. After some further delay the French Admiral said his ship could not go on. He also asked Sir Edmund not to proceed without him. Both ships therefore returned to the anchorage, the *Montebello* being assisted by the *Spitfire*.

Though the Admiralty had approved of the landing of a Naval Brigade the previous October, and utilizing ships' guns in the siege, they had, as time went on and the demands on the Fleet for men and stores continued, viewed with some apprehension so many vessels crippled to a large extent, and the best seamen of the country employed on work for which they were not intended. This had been referred to on several occasions in communications to Admiral Dundas, and suggestions were made, though they did not go to the extent of advocating non-compliance with the urgent demands of the General. At the same time, on December 6, the Admiralty hoped the seamen might be re-embarked as soon as possible, and expressed an opinion that the screw ships-of-the-line about to be sent out should not be called upon to furnish seamen or marines for land service. And they continued to urge that these vessels should be kept fully manned ready for any service. When the condition of the army at the beginning of the winter became known at home the alarm for our seamen increased, and the Admiral was ordered to re-embark a portion of the force on shore. It must be remembered that we had manned the Fleet with difficulty when the war broke out; that we had no reserve of seamen, and that any great loss in those afloat could not be immediately replenished. But circumstances absolutely forbade any such action. The

army was weak enough already, and the Admiral could not harass Lord Raglan with a proposal of this nature. So that although the same views were pressed upon Sir Edmund when he assumed the command, he continued to keep the Naval Brigade up to its full strength and land additional guns as required. In a dispatch of January 12, 1855, he replies—"The re-embarkation of the seamen belonging to the ships remaining on the station would in fact be the breaking up of the Naval Brigade engaged in the siege of Sebastopol, and I fear it would considerably increase Lord Raglan's difficulties and dishearten the troops—French as well as British—by leading them to apprehend an indefinite postponement of the assault on the place, and consequently a prolongation of their exposure and privation on the heights. I fear also that it would be very difficult to explain the matter satisfactorily to our allies, particularly at this moment, when Lord Raglan is asking General Canrobert for a division of his army to assist in the defence of our position, and when their Naval Brigade is still aiding them in the siege, though their forces are at least three times more numerous than ours. When their Lordships are apprised of these circumstances, I trust they will not consider that I am exercising an unsound discretion in suspending the embarkation, and I trust they will believe that in treating this question I do not lose sight of the important consideration that the loss of a seaman is not by any means so easily replaced as that of a soldier."

After receiving this dispatch the remonstrances of the Admiralty on this head became feeble and the Naval Brigade continued undisturbed. Their fire was vigorous when we renewed the bombardment on April 9, for being reinforced by Captain G. St. V. King and 200 men, the Brigade now manned 47 guns in the right and left attacks. The cannonade continued for some days, but, as we have

seen, the assault was again postponed. Nothing discouraged the sailors. On April 14 Captain Lushington reported—"Our platforms are wearing away very fast and most of the guns are beginning to run at the vents. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the whole Brigade under my command, who continue to work night and day with the same steady cheerfulness and untiring courage, despite the increased labour of working the guns on the worn-out platforms."

As at times the enemy was equally active with his batteries, the Naval Brigade did not escape loss. Lieutenant W.H. Douglas of the *Queen* was killed in the right attack, and Lieutenant Steele, R.M.A., wounded. Our fire after April 16 was reduced to 30 rounds per gun a day, and for the next six weeks we mainly directed our energies to replacing disabled guns and preparing fresh batteries for a renewal of the attack. With equal tenacity and perseverance the Russians, under the able guidance of Todleben, took advantage of every delay to repair their defences and add new works to those which had already foiled our advance.

So matters progressed until General Pelissier's assumption of the command infused new life into the operations. It was decided at the beginning of June that the Mamelon and the quarries should be taken by assault after a heavy cannonade. Fire from the whole line was accordingly opened at 3 p.m. on the 6th, and the next day these strongholds of the enemy were occupied by the Allies. From these points we proceeded to sap towards the Malakoff and the Redan, which for some time had been our principal objective. These it was decided to assault on June 18, the French attacking the Malakoff, while the English were to endeavour to capture the Redan. The latter was a much more arduous task on account of the greater distance our men would have to traverse before

arriving at the work, and over ground which would be swept by a storm of projectiles. In both places the attempts of the Allies were unsuccessful, and the Naval Brigade which took part suffered severely. Of this Captain Lushington reported—"June 18.—On Sunday at 3 a.m. we opened fire, which was very soon returned, but not with the spirit or skill which usually characterizes the enemy's fire. Towards 2 p.m. the fire became slack, and their batteries appeared much shaken.

"The fire continued all day, and the Commander of the Forces having intimated to me his acceptance of my proposal to carry the ladders in case of an assault being made on the town and batteries, I told off four parties of sixty each to accompany the four columns ordered for this service, and Captain Peel having volunteered his services I placed them under his command. I regret to say that the assault which took place at 3 a.m. was not successful; but our severe loss shows too plainly that the officers and seamen of the Naval Brigade did their duty most gallantly, and the ladders were at their places in spite of the most murderous fire I have witnessed. Captain Peel led one party in the most gallant style, and Lieutenant Cave led the other. The other two columns did not advance, and consequently the ladder parties, although exposed to a severe fire, as indeed was every one, did not suffer much. Captain Peel was shot through the arm, but was enabled to continue his duty till the affair was over. I have to regret as well that Lieutenants Urmston, Cave,¹ and Dalyell, Messrs. Parsons (mate) and Wood² (midshipman) were all wounded. Lieutenant T. O. Kidd and 9 seamen were killed, 41 seamen were wounded, and 1 missing. The party under Lieutenant Cave, with the loss of Lieutenant Kidd and 5 seamen killed, Lieutenant Cave and 7 seamen

¹ Now Admiral John Halliday Cave, C.B.

² Now General Sir Evelyn Wood, G.C.B., V.C.

wounded, equally performed the duty assigned to them. Every officer and man engaged in this arduous service has performed his duty most gallantly, and I only await your permission to recommend those whose conduct I particularly noticed." The losses of the Allies on this unfortunate day were very great ; but though we had failed for the moment we did not relax our grip on the place, and fresh saps were soon commenced by which the interval between the opposing forces became still further diminished.

As we have seen, Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat returned from Kertch just before this attack, and having been informed by the Generals that the previous night attacks by the ships had produced considerable effect, it was determined to continue them on the two nights previous to the assault, and so divert the enemy's attention as much as possible. On the night of the 16th the *Tribune*, *Highflyer*, *Terrible*, *Miranda*, *Niger*, *Arrow*, *Viper*, *Snake*, and *Weser*, with some French steamers, went in and discharged a heavy fire upon the sea defences, town, and shipping. Ships' launches also poured in a shower of rockets, and on this occasion we suffered no casualties. A strong desire prevailed throughout all the ships that this service should not be limited to the frigates and sloops, and the next night Lord Clarence Paget obtained permission, he being best acquainted with the marks, to take the *Princess Royal* in. The enemy was now prepared, and returned such a well-directed fire that this ship had 1 man killed and 2 wounded ; the *Sidon* 2 men killed and 11 wounded, while the *Miranda*, which had gone in again that night, was struck by a shell, a piece of which wounded Captain Lyons in the leg. Though the limb was considerably lacerated, no evil results were feared, but it was considered advisable to send him to the hospital at Therapia in the Bosphorus. A terrible blow was, how-

ever, now to fall upon Sir Edmund and his family, for in a few days mortification set in, and Captain Lyons succumbed on June 23. Thus died at the early age of thirty-five an officer who had already made a distinguished name, and gained the affections of all with whom he came in contact. He met his death with calmness and resignation. Dr. Corbett, surgeon of the *Miranda*, writing to Sir Edmund a few days afterwards, says—"Captain Lyons had a very easy passage to Therapia, and was removed to hospital without any pain . . . he was in comparative comfort till the last twenty-four hours. I acquainted him with his approaching fate about twelve hours before his decease, and he received it with a smile, and spoke of the circumstance as if it was an ordinary subject. Throughout the whole time to the last Captain Lyons showed the same courage, calmness, and kindness that distinguished him through life, and he never for a moment forgot his extraordinary consideration for those around him. He met his fate with a smile on his face and duty on his lips." His last message to his father was—"Tell him there never was a son who was fonder or prouder of a father than he was," and he was principally concerned at the thought that his death might unman Sir Edmund, and prevent him carrying out his public duties. "That," he said shortly before his death, "would be a national loss." He added, "I may speak out now and confess that I believe my father to be our greatest Admiral, and a man fitted for the times."

Captain Lyons was buried on the 25th, his funeral being attended by a large number of people. Mrs. Houston Stewart, who was then at Therapia, wrote to her husband—"At the funeral all combined to testify the deep sense entertained by the navy and our country at their loss and the cause of the Allies at the death of such a man at such a time. Steamers full of Turkish officers

and dignitaries and French officers without number attended. The *Miranda* was anchored close off, and Lord Stratford and all his suite came in state. Not a breath was heard when Mr. Mackenzie read the prayers of the funeral service, but an audible sob burst from the sailors as well as officers when the remains of their brave and beloved commander were consigned to their last home in the picturesque burial-place in the garden of the Palace Hospital." Mr. Mackenzie was the chaplain at the hospital, and writing to his brother,¹ who was captain of the Manilla transport, that evening, he says—"We are in deep sorrow here, as you may well believe, at the death of Captain Lyons of the *Miranda*. We have just buried him, and a more impressive scene than the funeral I have seldom witnessed. I had the mournful gratification of reading the burial service over him and attending him on his death-bed. I have seldom been so overcome as I was after bidding him farewell. A more attractive and lovable being I scarce ever met, and such was his look and manner when I spoke to him about his spiritual state, that I felt as if speaking not to a stranger but to a bosom friend. It would have been gratifying to Sir Edmund to have witnessed the unfeigned tribute of respect paid by such multitudes of sincere mourners this day to his noble son."

Such tributes from all quarters did indeed to some extent assuage the grief of Sir Edmund at this unexpected blow, if not at the moment, at any rate when the first pangs had subsided. He was most deeply touched, however, by receiving from the sovereign whom he served with his whole heart the following gracious letter—

"Buckingham Palace, June 29, 1855.

"The Queen cannot let any one but herself express to Sir Edmund Lyons the Prince's and her feelings of

¹ Afterwards Sir William Mackenzie, Bart., of Coul.

deep and heartfelt sympathy on the most melancholy occasion of the loss of his gallant and beloved son, Captain Lyons. We grieve deeply to think of the heavy affliction into which Sir Edmund Lyons is plunged at this anxious moment, and we mourn over the loss of an officer who proved himself so worthy of his father, and was so bright an ornament to the Service he belonged to.

“To lose him just when he returned triumphant, having accomplished so admirably all that was desired and wished, must be an additional pang to his father. If sympathy can afford consolation, he possesses that of the whole nation.”

To this the Admiral replied as follows—

“*H.M.S. ‘Royal Albert,’ off Sebastopol, July 14, 1855.*”

“Sir Edmund Lyons presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge with every sentiment of devotion and thankfulness your Majesty’s most gracious letter of June 29. Sir Edmund regrets that it is wholly out of his power to express how highly he feels himself honoured, and how very much he is consoled and comforted, by your Majesty’s and the Prince’s sympathy in the sore affliction with which it has pleased God to visit him. Sympathy so graciously, so tenderly, and so touchingly conveyed that it comes straight to his heart and fills it with gratitude, and increases, if possible, the sentiments of loyalty and attachment to the Throne in which he was brought up, and which he has cherished from his childhood, and are now become more than ever a part of his nature.”

In the midst of the great grief occasioned by the loss of his son, Sir Edmund received another blow in the death of Lord Raglan, one to whom he had become deeply attached, and for whose noble qualities he had the greatest admiration. Though the General had witnessed our failure

on June 18 with that calmness which never deserted him, and continued cheerful under heavy responsibilities, those around him saw with anxiety that the late events had undoubtedly affected his health. He was much grieved at our heavy losses both on the field and from sickness. Then came the death of General Estcourt, Adjutant-General, an old and valued friend, on June 24. Though suffering from dysentery, Lord Raglan went to take leave of him, but felt unequal to attending his funeral. Lord Raglan then became rapidly worse, and passed quietly away himself on the evening of the 28th, to the great grief of all.

Of Lord Raglan's professional qualities as a soldier it is not for me to speak. They are sometimes decried by men who have never been placed in the same position, and do not perhaps realize what a difficult one it was. It may be that Kinglake's estimate of his merits is exaggerated, and that in placing the man on too lofty a pedestal a reaction was caused which went beyond the mark. It is possible to increase this by undue depreciation of others, and there seems no proof that Napoleon III. or any of his Generals desired to act otherwise than loyally with us. Be that as it may, Lord Raglan's name will always stand high in British minds. His loss to our army was at once felt, for not only was it difficult to find a successor, but from that time our force in the Crimea, though doubled in numbers, had not the position in the allied councils that it held when but the remnant of an army during the dark winter days under Lord Raglan.

On July 3 the body of the late Field-Marshal was transferred to the *Caradoc* for conveyance to England with imposing ceremony. The mournful procession from headquarters included the Commanders-in-Chief of the allied armies, and an immense number of officers. Sir Edmund was not present, but wrote that evening to Lord Burghersh

—"I am forbidden to follow my own wishes, and I confess that I believe the medical men and my friends are right, for I do not know how, superadded to my own unutterable woe for the loss of the best of sons, I could bear the sad, sad contrast between our landing at Old Fort and the embarkation of this evening, which severs me for ever in this world from the friend whose like I shall never see again; who inspired in all who were honoured by his friendship sentiments of the most exalted kind. Pray say to all around you, whose society I have so much enjoyed at head-quarters, that I shall ever in reviewing a rather eventful life consider my relations with them as one of the most pleasing and cherished features in the retrospect."

When the *Caradoc* steamed out of Kazatch Bay she stopped under the stern of the *Royal Albert*, and the Admiral came out of his cabin to pay a last salute to the remains of his revered colleague. The vessel then proceeded on her homeward journey. Death had indeed been busy with those associated with this expedition from the beginning. Great changes had taken place in the army from this cause. The navy had also suffered considerably. Captain Christie, who had been superseded as principal agent for transports, died of low fever in Kazatch Bay on May 1. Rear-Admiral Boxer died at Balaclava on June 5. Writing to Miss Lyons the next day Sir Edmund says—"I am considerably affected by poor Admiral Boxer's sudden death, but it is a pleasing reflection for me that I cheered up the last days of his life very much by promoting his son." Admiral Boxer was succeeded at Balaclava by Rear-Admiral Charles Howe Fremantle. Captain Peel, who was wounded on June 18, went home at the end of July. Writing on July 28 from the hospital at Therapia to Sir Edmund, he says—"I was invalided home this morning. My wound will not heal inside, there being still a passage through the arm though so long a period has elapsed. It

is with deep regret I cease to serve under your command and leave the gallant *Leanders* and the service of the trenches. I shall ever gratefully remember your personal kindness to me, and particularly, when I commanded the *Diamond*, the determination you showed that I should not be left behind.

"I know, Admiral, that the prosecution of this war must now be to you a painful but necessary duty. It must come to a triumphant conclusion, and I trust that in the joy of England you will find some consolation for your bereavement."

Captain Peel gained even greater distinction later in the Indian Mutiny when he commanded the Naval Brigade. Death from small-pox out there prematurely closed a brilliant career. Lord Clarence Paget was also invalided on July 30, suffering from a painful affection of the eyes. Amidst so much sorrow and gloom the hearts of the survivors were cheered by the rewards a grateful country bestowed on them. Stephen Lushington, who had been in command of the Naval Brigade from the day it landed, was promoted to Rear-Admiral, and made a K.C.B., the captains under him receiving a C.B. Several other promotions were made. Captain the Hon. H. Keppel¹ succeeded to the command of the Brigade. Sir Edmund Lyons, who eleven years previously had received a civil G.C.B., was now given a military Grand Cross of the same order, it being the first occasion I believe that one person had held these two orders at the same time, nor do I know of any other instance since.

¹ The present Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Henry Keppel, G.C.B.

CHAPTER XVII

1855—JULY TO SEPTEMBER

Further operations in the Sea of Azoff—Squadron reinforced with light vessels—Destruction of Genitchi Ferry by the *Beagle*—Gallantry of Joseph Trewavas — Attack on Fort Petrovskoi — Destruction of forage and fishing-tackle—Attempts on the Tchongar Bridge by Commander Osborn—Difficulty of the proceeding—Attempt unsuccessful—Operations in the Gulf of Oukliouk—Destruction of forage—Exploit of Lieutenant Commerell at the Salghir River—Narrow escape of the party—Lieutenant G. F. Day's exploring expedition—Approach of winter—Visit of squadron to Gheisk—Accumulation of corn—Preparations of the enemy—Place attacked by squadron—Success of landing-parties—Loss of the *Jasper* gunboat—Solitary triumph of the enemy—Cessation of the operations owing to winter—Importance of the work done—Tribute by Sir Edmund.

THE light squadrons of the Allies were now in complete dominion of the Sea of Azoff, but it was necessary to prevent any fresh accumulation of supplies on its shores, and this Commander Sherard Osborn proceeded to do with the *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Swallow*, *Ardent*, and *Beagle*. Effectual co-operation was given by Captain de Sedaiges in command of the French squadron. But though Commander Osborn reported on June 15 that "not a Russian boat is to be seen in the Sea of Azoff," any attempt at landing speedily brought Russian troops to the scene, and their numbers precluded any occupation of the towns by the small force our squadron could detach for the purpose. At other points the enemy had defended works which opened fire on our ships when opportunity occurred. Such

a place was Petrovskoi, at the mouth of the river Brenda, between Berdiansk and Marianpoul. On June 24 the *Vesuvius* stood in to reconnoitre this work, and had anchored within 600 yards, when a masked battery of four light guns opened fire, hulling the ship several times. This was, however, soon silenced by the ship's heavy artillery, the enemy's guns being disabled and their gunners forced to retreat. Our squadron then observed a large field-work within which infantry and cavalry had collected in anticipation of an attempt to land. Commander Osborn, therefore, contented himself with a bombardment of the work, intending to come again with a stronger force to render Petrovskoi untenable as a military position. His little squadron was now considerably augmented by the successive arrivals of the *Weser*, Lieutenant J. E. Commerell¹; *Wrangler*, Lieutenant H. T. Burgoyne; *Jasper*, Lieutenant J. S. Hudson; *Cracker*, Lieutenant J. H. Marryat; *Clinker*, Lieutenant M. E. Smithett; *Grinder*, Lieutenant F. T. Hamilton; *Fancy*, Lieutenant C. G. Grylls; and *Boxer*, Lieutenant S. P. Townsend; small craft, armed with a heavy pivot gun. With such energetic officers under his orders Commander Osborn effectually harassed the Russians in all directions, and many gallant feats were performed. The destruction of the ferry between Genitchi and the Arabat Spit by Lieutenant Hewett in the *Beagle* is detailed by that officer as follows—"July 4, 1855.—On my arrival at this place—off Genitchi—I immediately proceeded to examine the communication between the town and Arabat Spit, and found it to be by means of two large flats and hawsers which I determined to destroy if possible. I accordingly yesterday dispatched my gig under Mr. John Hayles, acting gunner of this ship, and paddle-box boat under Mr. Martin Tracey, midshipman. They succeeded entirely in

¹ Now Admiral of the Fleet Sir J. E. Commerell, G.C.B., V.C.

destroying it by cutting the hawsers and casting the boats adrift, which was done under a very heavy fire of musketry from about eighty yards: the troops completely lined the beach, the adjacent houses being filled with riflemen. Great credit is due to Mr. Hayles for his activity and zeal in destroying the same, and to Mr. Tracey for the effective fire he kept up in covering his retreat; the firing from the ship and paddle-box boat at the same causing great confusion and loss among the enemy. Mr. Hayles speaks in the highest terms of the boat's crew, especially of Joseph Trewavas, ordinary seaman—lent from the *Agamemnon*—who cut the hawsers.¹ The list of casualties is, I am happy to say, very small, although the gig and paddle-box boat were riddled with musket bullets."

On July 15 Commander Osborn arrived off Berdiansk with the *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Swallow*, *Wrangler*, *Fancy*, *Grinder*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, *Jasper*, and *Beagle*, accompanied by the French sloops *Milan*, Captain de Cintrè, and *Mouette*, Captain de l'Allemand. Large stacks of hay and grain being observed outside the town they were shelled and set on fire. The squadron then proceeded to Fort Petrovskoi, which, as they approached, gave evident indications that its defences had been increased since the previous visit of the *Vesuvius*. The squadron having taken up a pre-arranged position—about 1000 yards from the fort—fire was opened, and soon forced not only the garrison to retire from the trenches, but also kept at a respectable distance the reserve force, consisting of three battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. The boats under Lieutenant Hubert Campion² were then sent in to complete the destruction of the work, which they effectually did by burning everything within it though under fire

¹ Joseph Trewavas received the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on this occasion.

² Now Rear-Admiral Campion, C.B.

from the enemy in rear during the operation. The fort proved on inspection to be a very formidable one, consisting of a double parapet with three trenches, the outer one having numerous rifle-pits. There were platforms for sixteen guns; but these had either been removed, or had not yet arrived.

Leaving the *Swallow*, Commander Craufurd, to check any attempt of the enemy to re-occupy the fort and extinguish the fire until its destruction was complete, the rest of the squadron proceeded to destroy great quantities of forage, and some most extensive fisheries situated upon the White House Spit and about the mouth of the river Berda. By dark the work was done, and thirty fisheries, numbers of heavy launches, and great stores of nets and forage had fallen into our hands in spite of a large force of Cossacks in the neighbourhood. The same action was carried out in other places, and the extraordinary quantity of nets, stores of fish, and the scale of the works destroyed confirmed the statements made by the workpeople, that their occupation consisted in supplying food to the army in the Crimea, everything going to Simpheropol by the great northern road along the steppe.

Being now fully cognizant of the importance of the Tchongar route as a military road into the Crimea the authorities were desirous it should be interrupted. Instructions were accordingly given to the Azoff flotilla that the Tchongar bridge should, if possible, be destroyed. Of course this could be effected by landing an expedition in its vicinity, and marching on the object aimed at, as we had done in the case of Kertch. But presumably the Generals were not prepared to concede such a force. From the Sea of Azoff the project presented serious difficulty. There was first the Spit of Arabat to cross, then a passage through the Putrid Sea, where the water in some places was only a few inches deep. It could not, therefore, be navigated by heavily-armed boats. The

destruction of this bridge could only be accomplished by a small party evading notice and by stealth. It was a hazardous service, exceedingly difficult to carry out under these conditions. Captain Lyons had thought deeply on this subject during his time in the Sea of Azoff, and before leaving desired Commander Osborn to ascertain whether a light, fast-pulling boat could not be carried across the Spit and effect the object by surprise. When that officer, therefore, became senior officer, he determined to follow out his predecessor's idea. On July 3 he made the first attempt. On that evening two gigs—one containing Commander Osborn and four seamen, and the other carrying Lieutenants Commerell and Horton with five seamen—started to try and destroy the bridge. They hauled the boats over the Spit of Arabat, and having launched them in the Putrid Sea, proceeded to pull for the bridge, between twenty and thirty miles distant. About half-way they grounded, and their efforts having alarmed the country they were forced to return. Hiding the boats on the Spit they started again the following night, taking a Moldavian, who lived on the Spit, as guide. After a laborious pull of ten hours through a sea averaging from two to four feet deep, and full of shoals, they found daylight upon them while still about six miles from the bridge. They therefore secreted themselves and the boats in the salt marshes until night came on again. From their position they had an excellent opportunity of observing the vast convoy of camels, wagons, and stores which continued incessantly to pour down the peninsula of Tchongar; but the heat—thus exposed to the sun in the middle of a salt marsh—was almost insupportable.

Thus the little band gladly welcomed the setting sun, and at nine o'clock they started pulling again towards the bridge. They were soon, however, brought up by shoal water, and notwithstanding a keen search nothing like a

channel for the gigs that would take them nearer than three miles from the bridge could be found. The lowness of the water their guide attributed to the prevalence of the late easterly winds, and until they changed he did not believe even a flat boat could reach the bridge. There seemed no probability of the gigs getting further, the water being in this part only from four to six inches deep. The bottom being soft mud, into which the men when wading sank to the knees, it was impracticable to attempt reaching the bridge in this way, carrying at the same time materials for its destruction and their own arms. With reluctance, therefore, the little expedition gave up the attempt and returned, reaching their ships, much exhausted, on the morning of the 7th, hoping on a future occasion to be more successful. After their return the Moldavian guide volunteered to go in a small boat to endeavour to find a channel to the bridge. As an earnest of his good faith he lodged in Commander Osborn's hands sovereigns, napoleons, and other coins, amounting to about £103. He set out but never returned, nor could anything be heard of him. It was supposed he had been suspected by the Russians, and taken prisoner.

The money was eventually sent to our Embassy at Constantinople by order of the Admiralty; but I cannot say whether any claimant to it ever turned up. Operations in other parts, and a succession of gales during the first half of August prevented for some time a renewal of this attempt, but Commander Osborn and his active subordinates continued to harass the enemy wherever he could be reached. Another visit was paid to Genitchi, where the enemy had formed an entrenched camp. This was shelled, and the troops forced to retire. The squadron then coasted northward, inside the Berutch Peninsula, and entering the Gulf of Oukliouk Liman proceeded up the rivers Ukliaka and Kasuda as far as the depth of water would permit the

ships to go. This was in the neighbourhood of the great Sebastopol road, which passed to the north of Genitchi, and which could be seen lined with convoys on their way to the Crimea. Immense quantities of forage were observed collected and stacked near the lines of their communications, evidently for the use of the draught animals employed in these convoys and for the cavalry protecting them. Landing a party from the squadron a number of large stacks of hay and corn were destroyed, notwithstanding the presence of a troop of cavalry. These charged two or three times to within a hundred yards of our forty-five small-arm men and marines, but retired before the steady fire with which they were met. An intelligent prisoner, taken by us, estimated what we destroyed on this occasion as equivalent to two months' food for 1000 horses.

It would be wearisome to detail all the work of this nature performed by the Azoff squadron, or by individual ships detached on special service. Nothing was too arduous for men like Hugh Burgoyne of the *Wrangler*, George Day of the *Recruit*, or William Hewett of the *Beagle*. Nor are these names given as more meritorious than the others. Lieutenant Commerell, in the *Weser*, had already performed good service, and this active officer now obtained permission from Captain Osborn—lately deservedly promoted—to attempt to burn the stores collected at the mouth of the Salghir River. This runs into the lower part of the Putrid Sea, nearly opposite to the middle of the Arabat Spit. A reconnoissance of this part some time previously had shown that a considerable amount of forage and grain was stored there. Accordingly Lieutenant Commerell, Mr. N. D. Lillingston, mate, and three seamen—Rickard, Milestone, and Hoskins—left their ship in a small boat at half-past two in the morning of October 11. Hauling their skiff across the Spit they pulled through the Putrid Sea. About four o'clock they reached the other

side, and as the water was too shallow for the boat to get close in, Commerell, with two of the men, Rickard and Milestone, waded on shore, leaving Mr. Lillingston and Hoskins in the boat. Striking a course by aid of a pocket compass, in the direction they thought the stores were situated, they walked for about two miles, and then waited till it was lighter to discover the object of their search. After lying hid for half-an-hour day began to break, and then they observed the stores about a mile off, with a large red building close to a Cossack station and signal-post. The small party at once made for this point, having to wade across two canals up to their necks. On arrival they soon set fire to the stores ; but as regards the red house, Commerell came to the conclusion it would take too long to ignite, and give no chance for escape. As it was the Cossacks were fully aroused before the three men had finished their incendiary work with the forage ; but some time elapsed before the enemy realized the cause of the blaze and who had effected it. So Commerell and his companions managed to get the start of a mile before they were discovered. But double that distance had to be traversed before they reached the boat, and one of them—Milestone—was almost done up. He had to be helped along by the other two, and though he begged them to leave him, this they were determined not to do. The sight of their boat about a mile off on the right, cheered their spirits, but at the same time they observed a party of Cossacks in their front. It was a question which would get to the boat first. Milestone was now so exhausted they had to take his boots off. This delay lessened the distance of their pursuers, and the Cossacks began to get unpleasantly close. When the three men got within 200 yards of the boat the enemy were only sixty yards behind. Milestone then became almost helpless, and fell several times. The Russians, who had already opened fire, think-

ing he was wounded, raised a shout of delight. The position of the party at this moment seemed most perilous ; but the Cossacks were checked by the fire of Lillingston and Hoskins from the boat, and Commerell with his revolver stopped the leading horseman. At last, by dint of half carrying, half dragging Milestone they got him to the boat, and pushing her off got clear of their pursuers. They reached the ship without further incident, and had the satisfaction of observing from her masthead that the fire consumed everything. For their gallant conduct on this occasion Lieutenant Commerell and William Rickard were awarded the Victoria Cross.

This distinction was also conferred on Lieutenant George F. Day of the *Recruit* for carrying out unaided a reconnaissance of the vessels within the Straits of Genitchi. In the middle of September, being under an impression from reports received that the enemy's numbers in that neighbourhood were reduced, he desired to ascertain whether it was practicable to get at their ships from the Arabat side. Landing in the evening of the 17th and guided by a pocket compass, Lieutenant Day walked for four or five miles over low swampy ground, intersected with pools of water from knee to waist deep, until he got within about 200 yards of the vessels. From the perfect silence on board he came to the conclusion that their destruction on a future occasion would be feasible, and he then returned to the ship. This opinion was however modified a day or two after on observing from his ship considerable activity in the locality of these craft, so he determined to pay them another visit. On September 21 he set out as before, and after a longer and more difficult journey reached the place from which his former observations were made. What he now saw altered his opinion as to the feasibility of getting at these ships. They had increased in number, were fully manned, and seemed quite on the alert. To

reach them a boat would have to be launched across the Spit. Such a step would place surprise out of the question, for the whole route was within rifle-shot of the entrenchments of Genitchi. Lieutenant Day got safely back to the ship, but had a severe illness resulting from exposure and his gallant exertions. So important was the fishery industry in the Sea of Azoff to the population of the Crimea, that as fast as we destroyed this material in one place it was started in another, with new boats and nets. Though not glorious service it was essential to prevent this as much as possible, and our vessels continued their work of destruction with unremitting diligence, often under fire from the troops who vainly endeavoured to guard these sources of food and the grain upon which they would have to rely during the ensuing winter should the siege of Sebastopol be prolonged. In this lay the importance of the operations of the Sea of Azoff. Not felt for the moment they must later have seriously affected the victualling of Sebastopol, and hence Sir Edmund had from the first urged obtaining command of this sea at the earliest opportunity. Not much time remained now before the advent of winter to complete the work upon which the Azoff squadron had been engaged for five months, but hearing that the enemy had collected supplies at Gheisk, it was determined to attempt their destruction, though as in other places the shallowness of the sea approach rendered such an operation difficult.

Gheisk is situated at the head of a small bay on the southern shore of the Gulf of the Don, and nearly opposite Taganrog. It was therefore conveniently situated as a depôt for stores to be transported during the winter to the Russian army over the frozen Gulf of Azoff, or to the army in the Caucasus by land. As the harvest had lately been gathered grain abounded, and Captain Osborn determined to prevent it being utilized by the enemy.

On the evening of November 3 his squadron assembled outside the bay. As the larger vessels could not pass the entrance the crews of the *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Weser*, and *Ardent* embarked in their boats at daylight the next morning and proceeded in tow of the *Recruit*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, and *Clinker*. Observing large stacks of corn on the shore a detachment of boats were sent to destroy them, which they did before the Cossacks could put in an appearance.

At the entrance to the bay on its northern side—from which a spit runs out—is the small town of Glofira. Here corn-stacks extending for some distance could be seen, placed close to the water's edge ready for transport. Evidently anticipating a visit, an entrenchment had been cut along the edge of the cliff commanding the spit, and this was lined by dismounted Cossacks, while large bodies of men held other positions guarding the town.

While the gunboats opened fire upon the entrenchment with shrapnel shell, and directed "carcasses"—an incendiary shell—against the corn-ricks, a detachment of boats under Commander John J. Kennedy¹ went in to attack the spit. Finding the carcasses did not effect their object, and the shells from the ship could not reach the western extreme of the enemy, a party of marines landed under Lieutenant Campion, covered by a howitzer and two rocket-boats. Headed by the above officer this party charged the entrenchment and drove the enemy out of it, then forced the Cossacks back from store to store, to each of which they set fire. In the meantime Commander Kennedy had occupied the spit, and fired the stores on that side of the town. The party then returned to their ships as it was too late to proceed to Gheisk. Throughout the night the stores burnt fiercely, giving forth a vivid sheet of flame that appeared to extend about two miles.

¹ In command of *Curlew* on promotion of Commander Rowley Lambert. He afterwards became a flag-officer.

On the morning of November 6, the expedition proceeded up the bay and found that the gunboats could anchor within gun-shot of Gheisk, where enormous quantities of hay and corn were observed to be stacked. As the enemy had had time to make preparations it was decided to attack as many points as possible. Three landing-parties were therefore organized, keeping another small force in reserve ready to support any portion of the attack should it be hard pressed.

The different parties effected a landing at the appointed places fully a mile apart. The Russian troops within light breast-works tried to prevent this but failed, and soon heavy smoke from the burning ricks prevented them seeing how to manœuvre to cut off our detachments. The enemy mustered strongest on the right and centre, and at one time a body of about 1500 Cossacks was observed approaching. These arrived too late to stop our proceedings, and were indeed kept in check by a body of marines who covered with their fire the men engaged setting fire to the stores.

When everything but the town was destroyed our parties re-embarked, their casualties only amounting to six men wounded. We had 200 men engaged, while the force of the enemy in and about Gheisk was computed by our officers to be about 3000.

Captain Osborn, in his dispatch to the Admiral from which this short account is taken, says—"I despair of being able to convey to you any idea of the extraordinary quantity of corn, rye, hay, wood, and other supplies, so necessary for the existence of Russian armies both in the Caucasus and in the Crimea, which it has been our good fortune to destroy. That these vast stores should have been collected here so close to the sea while we were still in the neighbourhood is only to be accounted for by their supposing that they could not be reached by us." But with such enterprising officers as those employed in

the Sea of Azoff no obstacles deterred them from attempting operations likely to be of benefit to their country's cause. And considering how little known these waters were to our Fleet it is remarkable with what slight loss we obtained these important results. The only serious casualty was the loss of the *Jasper* gunboat, commanded by Lieutenant J. S. Hudson. Towards the end of July, after cruising in the Gulf of the Don and off Taganrog, she was relieved by the *Grinder* and proceeded on the 23rd to join the *Swallow* off the Crooked Spit. At half-past eleven that night, Lieutenant Hudson having, owing to the ship being short of officers, been obliged to keep the deck day and night for the past three days, lay down by the helmsman, telling the quartermaster to call him on sighting the *Swallow's* lights. At a quarter to one he woke up to find the *Jasper* on shore on the Crooked Spit with the surf breaking over her. Measures were immediately taken to get her off but without success. When day broke the Russians, observing the plight of the vessel, opened fire upon her. This the *Jasper* returned without ceasing their efforts to get her off. Commander Craufurd of the *Swallow* then arrived on the scene and ordered the pivot gun and shot to be thrown overboard preparatory to abandoning the vessel. Lieutenant Hudson, though not concurring in this decision, proceeded to carry out the orders of his senior officer. The crew were then directed to leave the *Jasper*. Lieutenant Hudson was the last to leave, having himself set fire to the ship and ignited the fuse leading to the magazine. They left the ensign at the masthead so that the ship might go up with her colours flying, but for some unaccountable reason the magazine did not explode or the flames totally destroy the ship. The Russians were thus able to secure the colours as a solitary triumph in all these operations.

There is no doubt the *Jasper* was too hastily

abandoned. Her own fire and that of the *Swallow* could have kept off the enemy until more ships arrived, and then their united efforts would doubtless have got off the ship. When the squadron arrived a few days later the ship was too much injured to save her. They however recovered by diving the pivot gun as well as three small pieces captured by the *Jasper* at Taganrog. The conduct of Lieutenant Hudson throughout had been so gallant and zealous, that though admonished by a court-martial for the loss of his ship, Sir Edmund almost immediately afterwards appointed him to the command of the *Clinker* on her captain being invalided, an appointment which the Admiralty confirmed.

Soon after these operations at Gheisk autumnal gales and the formation of ice necessitated the withdrawal of our squadron in the Sea of Azoff. Well had it done its work, to which generous testimony was at all times given by the Commander-in-Chief. Writing to him on November 24 Captain Osborn says—"In surrendering into your hands the prominent position in which you have been pleased to employ me for the last five months—that of senior officer of a detached squadron—allow me, Sir, to express most respectfully my deep sense of the honour you conferred on me, and the grateful recollection of the unvarying kindness, confidence, and consideration I have experienced at your hands; without it I feel I never should, as I trust I have, succeeded in carrying out your views and instructions.

"Next to that let me again remind you that my anxiety to execute your plans has ever been an easy task, supported as I have been by the gallant and zealous exertions of every officer and man serving in this squadron. I know not how sufficiently to express my appreciation of their conduct, and it is not the less pleasing part of my duty to assure you of the kindly co-operation I have

received from the officers of the French Navy serving in the Sea of Azoff. Among those more especially known to me I feel justified in mentioning Lieutenant Cloué commanding the *Brandon*, Lieutenant La Suchette, *Fulton*, and Lieutenant Vida of the *Caton*." On the Admiral indeed and his staff depended chiefly the efficiency of the detached squadron. It was no easy task without any naval establishment nearer than the Bosphorus to keep ships in the Sea of Azoff supplied with provisions, coals, ammunition, and stores of all kinds when even an insufficient supply of oil might have brought them to a standstill. We have had proof that their movements were never impeded on this score, and it speaks volumes for an organization which fulfilled the wants of a station extending from Gibraltar to the eastern extremity of the Sea of Azoff.

I have dwelt upon this work of the British Navy because it appears to me that it has not hitherto been appreciated as it deserves. Unaccompanied by losses it is obscured perhaps by feats of arms which presented a "butcher's bill" even if they had little influence upon the campaign. But it brought out all the best points of our navy—devotion, discipline, resource, and professional skill—which, especially on such service, have ever characterized the British seaman. To the heart of a man like Sir Edmund Lyons, generous in recognition of the zeal in others with which he himself abounded, it was a pleasure to witness and bear tribute to such exertions. Writing to the Admiralty on November 24, he says—"As the ice is now forming on the shores of the Sea of Azoff, and the squadron is withdrawn, I feel it to be due to Captain Osborn to record that under circumstances of great difficulty, occasioned by unusually tempestuous weather, he has most ably continued through the summer and brought to a successful close in the autumn, operations

novel in their nature and extremely detrimental to the enemy, which commenced auspiciously in the spring under the direction of the late Captain Lyons of the *Miranda*, nor is it too much to say that both commanding officers were supported throughout by as dashing and as intelligent a band of young officers, seamen, and marines as ever shone in the British Navy."

CHAPTER XVIII

1855—SEPTEMBER

Construction of a railway between Balaclava and the camp—The navvies—Accident at the first trip of the train—General Pelissier's taciturnity and pertinacity—Battle of the Tchernaya—Casualties in the Naval Brigade—Work of the Marine Division—Mortar-boats—Preparations for final assault—Fleets to participate—Increase in number of guns employed by Allies in siege—Losses of the Russians—Bombardment on September 5, 6, and 7—Assault on the 8th—French take the Malakoff—We are repulsed from the Redan—Russians evacuate south side—Blow up forts and sink their ships—Tribute to the Naval Brigade—Reflections on the siege—Glory to combatants on both sides.

AFTER the failure of the Allies on June 18 to take the Malakoff and the Redan, their efforts were for some time directed towards advancing the trenches towards these works, and strengthening their batteries. In bringing up ammunition and stores to the front they were much assisted by the railway which had been constructed from Balaclava to the camp. When towards the end of 1854 it became evident that our army would have to winter in the Crimea, the Government requested the great contractors of that day, Messrs. Peto, Brassey, and Betts, to lay a line of railway from Balaclava to the Sebastopol plateau, with a civil engineering corps to be formed and sent out by that firm. A contract was made in November, and a large force of navvies engaged in the first week of December for this work. Such men originated in a class called navigators in the fen countries, where they were employed in great

drainage undertakings. But then the demand for canals and, later on, railways caused the creation of a distinctive class of navvies, or earth labourers, able from skill and strength to do twice as much as ordinary agricultural diggers. At this time there were considerable numbers of them who had been born and bred to the business; who had toiled at some kind of railroad work since they were boys, and in several countries. They were men picked for physical strength, and the success of a contractor was in no small degree due to his judgment in selecting his workmen.

There was no difficulty in getting them to go out to the Crimea under the inducements offered for a six months' engagement. These were a free passage out and home; five shillings a day pay—a very high rate forty years ago—and the rations of the troops. In addition to the navvies engaged, carpenters, smiths, and platelayers were sent out.

Seven steamers and two sailing-ships conveyed the materials and this corps—under Mr. James Beatty—to the East. The rails—amounting to about 1800 tons—the 6000 sleepers, and all the other stores—about 3600 tons—were distributed among the vessels, so that the loss of any one would not endanger or delay the whole undertaking. The men were similarly divided among the seven ships. The first of these arrived at Balaclava on January 28, 1855, and the others followed in rapid succession, until all had discharged their passengers and freight. A start was soon made with the line, a double one, and the incline up the plateau being too steep for ordinary steam locomotion, this portion was provided with stationary engines hauling the trucks up by wire-rope. It was a novel sight to see the British navy at work amidst an armed camp, but he plied his vocation with his usual placidness, which not even the report of an expected Russian attack could disturb. They and the troops were on good terms, though the latter saw with some jealousy the navy abstaining from work on

Sunday, a luxury which seldom fell to the lot of our soldiers. The railway was completed up to the top of the hill at the beginning of April, but an unfortunate accident marred the *éclat* of its first trip. Some men of the 71st regiment were returning to Kadikoi from the front by the railway. Descending the steep incline the pace of the train became so accelerated that the brakes lost control, and the foremost truck left the line. It upset, and was immediately smashed to pieces by the trucks behind. Two men were killed and several severely injured. Mr. Beatty was in the train at the time but escaped with some bruises. This unfortunate incident led to an improvement in the arrangements, and the line proved of inestimable use for the remainder of the siege.

After the death of Lord Raglan there occurred a temporary lull in the operations, which seemed to languish. General Simpson was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British army, but he did not secure the influence possessed by his predecessor. All hinged apparently on the humour of Pelissier, and he was not communicative. Writing to Sir Charles Wood on July 21, Sir Edmund says—"I was at the camp yesterday, and heard from Generals Simpson and Jones that they were living from day to day ignorant of any plan whatever; General Pelissier not choosing to impart his thoughts to any one, not even to his chief of the staff or chief engineer. I said to Jones as we took leave of him for the day, that all we could hope for was that Pelissier had some good plan in his head, and that the said head might not be carried off by a cannon-ball with the secret in it! He said to his Generals a day or two ago that he had a plan, and that they would know it at the moment of execution."

However galling this may have been to his colleagues, Pelissier had fortunately one fixed idea—namely, the fall of Sebastopol, and he continued to decrease the distance

between his forces and its defences. He would not entertain the suggestion of any diversion elsewhere now that Kertch had been taken, and General Simpson was unwilling to propose any fresh expedition. They would not even contemplate another winter in the Crimea. In a further letter to the First Lord on July 28, Sir Edmund says—"I spoke at considerable length to General Simpson of the advanced state of the fine season, and of nothing being in progress to maintain communication between Balaclava and the camp during winter. He admitted that the railroad would be carried away by the first heavy rain, and that the road now used, and which was made by the French, is already carried away in the ravines by the summer rains. I spoke too of the absolute necessity for making preparations at once for constructing hospitals, kitchens, etc. in the camp, as well as macadamized roads to connect the different divisions; and last but not least, I urged what you mention in your letter of the 14th as to cutting off the enemy's communication in the interior. General Airey backed me in all these things, and General Simpson acquiesced, but added that he had no men to put on roads, nor could he spare men from the siege to go into the country. All of which is true: but still the roads must be made or we shall have the sufferings of last winter over again. As for the interior, the enemy have most of their provisions in the Crimea stored at Batchi Serai, where most of the roads meet, and we do nothing to interrupt them, although we have at the present moment 35,000 more bayonets on these heights than are required for the siege, and 30,000 more are coming, to which the Turks could add 25,000 horse, foot, and artillery from Eupatoria, and the whole force could be landed at Katscha within twenty miles of Batchi Serai. But I have observed from the first that the French commanders have no spirit of enterprise nor any idea of undertaking more than one operation

at a time, though the immense steam Fleet affords means for diversions, great and small, and I am sure that Bruat and I are ready to do anything.

"On the south side of Sebastopol I do not think the allied troops could penetrate into the interior, for the enemy has occupied and fortified every pass and road ; but so much the better, for he is less prepared on the north side."

At this time we had about 50,000 men around Sebastopol, while the French had over double that number, so that if the Generals would not detach a force to act elsewhere, we were strong enough to successfully resist any further attempt of the enemy to make us raise the siege. One final effort to obtain this result took place on August 16, when a Russian army attacked the Sardinian position on the Tchernaya river and three divisions of French infantry occupying the Fediukine Heights. After a battle of some hours the Russians were driven back with considerable slaughter, and thus terminated the last hope they entertained of causing us to relax our grasp on the besieged fortress. They indeed saw the end at hand clearer than we did. On August 25 Sir Edmund reported to the Admiralty—"During the present week the Russians have been busily employed in constructing a floating bridge or raft, which is nearly completed—from the south to the north side of the harbour of Sebastopol. It appears to be from 15 to 20 ft. broad, and the component parts must have been in the course of construction for some time, as they have now only had to be placed together.

"Opinions are divided as to the enemy's reasons for constructing this bridge. Some think that it is solely for the purpose of saving the excessive labour of sending the reliefs and stores across the harbour in boats : others that they may have the means of throwing a large number of men across during the assault, and no doubt both opinions are valid ; but I am also inclined to believe that as they

now find themselves so closely hemmed in and pressed by the Allies, they intend, in the event of our success on the south side, to sink the remainder of their Fleet, retire across the bridge, and then destroy it." It will be seen that the Admiral foretold here in a remarkable manner the action of the enemy a fortnight later. On the 28th he reported that "the Russians completed the bridge across Sebastopol Harbour on the evening of the 26th, and carts and horses, as well as foot passengers, pass to and fro, although they are occasionally interrupted by shot from the guns of the Naval Brigade batteries." That Brigade still continued to maintain the position it held in the estimation of the army and its fire seldom slackened—a fire usually returned with spirit by the Russian batteries, and often with effect. On August 17 Commander L. Hammett was killed by a cannon-shot, and from time to time there were similar casualties among the seamen. Nor were the services of the Marine Brigade less meritorious. Two companies had been detached at an early period from the Balaclava position to the front for duty in the right attack under Captains Hopkins and March. These took part in the battle of Inkerman, when Captain March was seriously wounded. This detachment continued to do duty in the trenches for some months, and then rejoined the Brigade at Balaclava. The Royal Marine Artillery were represented in the Naval Brigade by two subalterns, Lieutenants Douglas and Steele, and a party of non-commissioned officers and gunners. Both officers were wounded and highly commended in dispatches. In May 1855 a strong division of the French army having taken up a position on the Tchernaya, the Marine Brigade was advanced in support of the French so as to cover their extreme right. This enabled a detachment of Marine Artillery from the Balaclava lines to be transferred to the siege train, the Royal Artillery then being greatly in want of officers and

men. This detachment under Brevet-Major Alexander joined the right attack on June 17 in time to take part in the bombardment which preceded the unsuccessful assault next day, and continued with it until July 11, when they were transferred to the left attack. They afforded valuable assistance in both positions. The value of high angle fire against an extensive fortified position had been amply demonstrated in the past, and mortar-vessels—French and English—had lately arrived to assist the bombardment. They were small, each containing a single mortar, and the difficulty was to find a position from whence their fire would be effective. Owing to the swell that constantly prevailed outside the harbour of Sebastopol, the motion of these vessels would place them at a disadvantage when pitted against the forts within the range of which they would have to lie. The only position therefore in which their fire could be utilized was within Streletska Bay, and here they were placed, directing their shells against the Quarantine Fort, which kept up a constant fire against the new French works on their left flank. The mortars, fitted on a plan devised by Captain Roberts,¹ of the Marine Artillery, answered admirably, and though their range was obtained by the enemy he did not succeed in putting any of the mortar-boats out of action. But it was on the power and number of guns we could place in position on land that the issue of this long struggle rested. Both sides had been unremitting in their efforts to render attack and defence as formidable as their resources permitted. Opening the siege on October 17 with—as far as the British were concerned—a fire from 83 guns, we had now in the first week of December 207 pieces of ordnance in position, a large proportion of which had been supplied by the Fleet. Of this total 50 were worked by sailors. A stage had been now reached in which further delay or procrastination

¹ Captain Julius Roberts.

became impossible. The French had pushed their sap up to the abattis round the Malakoff, and they were not more than 30 paces from its ditch. They could hear the Russian miners at work, and might soon expect to have these mines exploded against them. The English had advanced their trenches as far as practicable towards the Redan, being about 200 yards from its salient angle. They could not go closer or they would have come under enfilading fire from the Malakoff, and the rockiness of the ground made trench-work almost impossible. On September 3, therefore, a grand council of war decided on the plan of attack to take place in a few days. The arrangements were confirmed and completed on the 7th. Writing on that day to Sir Charles Wood, Sir Edmund says—"I have just returned from head-quarters, where it was determined to assault the Malakoff, Redan, and Central Bastion at noon to-morrow, and possibly the whole south side. As in the latter case the Fleets may be of some use, Admiral Bruat and I intend to weigh, and to be at hand if the weather should moderate, but it blows so hard now, and with so heavy a sea, that Stewart and I have had difficulty in getting from the boats to our ship.

"The day before yesterday a frigate in the harbour was set on fire by a shell from the allied camp, and she burned to the water's edge. To-day another frigate has shared the same fate, and shot and shell are falling all round the ships-of-the-line. Many no doubt strike home. We have indeed just seen a shell fall on the forecastle of a three-decked ship, and cause a fire which lasted some minutes before they got it under.

"We are naturally all anxiety for the result of to-morrow's attack, of which you will know by the wire long before this can reach you."

Although Sir Edmund Lyons had from the day he became Commander-in-Chief been willing and desirous that

the Fleet should take any action the Generals might think would conduce to the result they desired, there were difficulties which increased as the investment became closer. In a letter to the First Lord on September 1 Sir Edmund says—"On former occasions Admiral Bruat and I offered all the assistance the Fleets could afford, but Lord Raglan and General Canrobert proved to us that we could not fire upon the south side without running great risk of hitting the allied troops, nor without a certainty of alarming them, and probably causing them to halt or even turn back on seeing the ships' broadsides firing in that direction. There never was a place so provokingly situated to prevent a fleet acting against it." As we have seen, however, Sir Edmund intended to put his Fleet outside the harbour on the day of assault, and this was only frustrated by the weather. On that morning Sir Houston Stewart¹ wrote to him from the *Hannibal*—"The weather is against the Fleets, but not so for the troops, and the smoke from the fire in the town may possibly contribute towards the advance of the attacking columns.

"You will not look upon it as presumption if I venture to tell you what I think as to our proceedings, for, whatever may be its value, I think that under present circumstances you have a right to know my opinion.

"With wind so fresh and sea so heavy it will not be pleasant or profitable to manœuvre our ships in *conjunction*, and in close company with those of our allies; and the sea appears to be heavier closer in shore. I should therefore incline to remain at anchor.

"By agreement with the Generals we were only to fire on the extreme left of the south side, and that for a very limited period. Our fire in such a sea as we now have must necessarily be unsteady and might do mischief. The enemy cannot well fire on the town from the north side until their own people shall have retired from the south side.

¹ Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart, C.B., had been made a K.C.B.

"It therefore appears to me that the mortar-boats and bomb-vessels from the smooth shelter of Streletska Bay are the only portion of the allied Fleets which can do anything effective this day.

"When the Allies are in possession of the south side, and the weather moderates, it may be possible with the Fleets to take off a portion of the fire of the north side should it prove distressing to our troops."

Had the weather been favourable there is no doubt the allied Fleets would have taken part in the final attack which was about to take place; and what has been related disposes of Sir Edward Hamley's statement, that after the bombardment of October 17 "he who now so hotly urged a naval attack never made the slightest attempt on Sebastopol when he became responsible for such an action, and had found by experience how fruitless it would be."

I have alluded to the manner in which the English batteries had been strengthened from the beginning of the siege. The French on their part had made even greater efforts. Opening their first fire with less than 60 pieces of ordnance, they had now 330 pieces on the ground they originally took up, while on our right they had placed in position 260 guns, or 590 in all. Thus the grand total of the Allies was just upon 800 guns of all natures with which they hoped to overcome the opposing fire of the Russian defences and facilitate an assault. On the other hand all the resources of a great arsenal guided by a master-hand had been brought to bear in augmenting the resistance of those crucial points in the outlying defences of Sebastopol upon which its security hung. It was indeed a marvellous example of tenacity on both sides.

Thus strengthened the allied batteries opened a tremendous cannonade on the morning of September 5, which continued throughout the 6th and 7th. It appeared to paralyze the enemy, for his reply was not in proportion.

He was probably expecting an assault at any moment, and reserving his principal fire for such an occasion. This necessitated his keeping large numbers of troops well up to the batteries, and naturally these suffered severely. It is stated that on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of September the Russians lost 4000 men. The morning of the 8th broke gloomy. The weather had been boisterous all the previous night, and the wind increased if anything at daybreak. This, as we have seen, kept the Fleet at anchor. The events of this day on land have been often described, and it is not my mission to deal with the military side of this campaign. At noon General Pelissier gave the signal, and his gallant troops, emerging from their trenches, made a rush for the Malakoff. They had not far to go, and the hour was well timed. At this period of the day the Russians usually had their mid-day meal, and their vigilance was temporarily relaxed. In less than five minutes the head of the French column had penetrated the Malakoff, their comrades poured in, driving out the enemy, and we gained possession of the key of Sebastopol.

Success at this point was to be the signal for the English to advance against the Redan. It was given about ten minutes past twelve, and our troops advanced under a heavy fire of grape. But the distance—about 200 yards—was too great. Numbers were struck down, and the remainder became disorganized. A few got across the ditch and over the parapet, but were shot down by the large body of Russians now manning the parapet. Others following were driven back. The attempt on the Redan had failed. Retaining possession, however, of the Malakoff, the south side of Sebastopol now became untenable to the enemy, and the next day Sir Edmund Lyons telegraphed—“The enemy is blowing up his fortifications on the south side of the harbour of Sebastopol, and appears to be evacuating the south side.” His dispatch to the Admiralty on

September 10 was as follows :—“ Of the operations on shore which have produced the successful result of the singular and memorable siege of Sebastopol, her Majesty’s Government will be informed by General Simpson, but it is my duty to report what has taken place afloat and on the seaboard under my own observation.

“ It had been arranged by Generals Simpson and Pelissier, Admiral Bruat and myself, that precisely at noon on the 8th instant the allied Fleets should open fire upon the Quarantine batteries that enfiladed the approach of the assaulting columns, but unfortunately the weather, which had been fine for some days, changed on the morning of the attack, and a north-west gale and heavy sea rendered it impossible for any vessels to act upon batteries situated on the lee shore of this exposed roadstead. It will be seen, however, that the mortar-vessels attached to the Fleets kept up a very effective fire from their position in the Bay of Streletska. As the day closed things in the harbour seemed to be in the same state as they were in the morning ; but during the night several heavy explosions were heard, and at early dawn we observed that the fortifications on the south side were in flames, and that the six remaining ships-of-the-line had been sunk at their moorings, leaving afloat no more of the late Russian Black Sea Fleet than two dismasted corvettes and nine steamers, most of which are very small.

“ Soon afterwards the enemy were seen retreating across the newly-constructed bridge until the south side of the harbour, on which the naval and military arsenals, the public buildings, and the town of Sebastopol are situated, appeared to be completely evacuated, and then the southern portion of the bridge was hauled over to the north shore.

“ It is now my pleasing duty to render justice to the admirable conduct of all whom I have had the honour and happiness to command during the last nine months of this

arduous struggle, and whose duties I shared in before ; for although with the exception of the Naval Brigade in the camp, whose gallant bearing from the beginning under the command of Sir Stephen Lushington has been beyond all praise, and never more so than during the last two bombardments under the command of Captain the Hon. H. Keppel, it has not fallen to the lot of the navy on this occasion to perform distinguished deeds of arms, such as those of their gallant brethren in the army ; still, whilst straining every nerve night and day under very trying circumstances to supply the means for carrying on the siege, in the glory of which they could not share, the generous cheer of encouragement, unalloyed by envy, has always been heartily given in the day of triumph ; nor have sympathy and assistance ever been wanting in the hour of distress and suffering. The same sentiments have pervaded all ranks—captains, officers, seamen, and marines all agreeing with each other in following the excellent example set them by my able second in command and coadjutor, Rear-Admiral Sir Houston Stewart. Perhaps in closing this letter I may be permitted to indulge in the expression of the gratification I feel in reflecting that under all the circumstances to which it relates my gallant colleague, Vice-Admiral Bruat, and I have gone hand-in-hand together, and that the most perfect understanding and hearty co-operation in the great cause of humanity in which we are all engaged have invariably prevailed throughout both Fleets.” Four days later the Admiral telegraphed—“The enemy has destroyed all his steamers in the harbour. Thus the late Russian Black Sea Fleet is annihilated.” And in his own words—“The bottom of the splendid harbour is now encumbered with more than fifty sunken vessels, including eighteen sail-of-the-line and several frigates and steamers, whose menacing attitude, but a short time ago, materially contributed to bringing on the war in which we are now

engaged." If the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope deserved retribution it was now complete, though few of the principal actors in that episode had survived to witness it. Those that remained could find more genuine pride in the glorious part they had taken against a foe more worthy of their steel.

Thus fell the great arsenal of Sebastopol amidst the roar of cannon and the thunder of successive explosions, with which were mingled the groans of the wounded. Men's blood reddened the ground within and without, for near 20,000 human beings had shed it on that day in a cause each considered a just one. It was a melancholy reflection that so many had passed away without seeing the fruits of their labours. Where was that gallant band which crossed the Black Sea full of life and spirits a year previously? Where the chief who through good and ill report had so loyally from the first kept this end in view? Viewing the last steamer disappearing in flames, Sir Edmund's thoughts turned to him with whom he had been so closely connected in this enterprise. Writing to Colonel Steele on September 14, he says—"Well, my dear Steele, here we are at the anniversary of our landing in the Crimea. Oh, that Lord Raglan were here to participate in our feelings." To Sir Charles Wood, Sir Edmund writes—"Most heartily do I congratulate you and your colleagues in the Government on the successful result of the siege.

"For myself, although I have always felt confident of success, and have never flinched from saying so in the face of the croakers, still I confess that the last forty-eight hours have possessed a heartier interest for me, and, as success became evident, of internal exultation, which, however patriotic the feelings of others might be, could not be felt by them to the same degree as by me, who feel conscious of having incurred all the moral responsibility of originally and unceasingly, throughout all its phases, encouraging,

approving, and promoting the expedition to the utmost of my ability.

“ Like all worldly gratifications it has its alloy, and a great one it is to feel that Lord Raglan and a great many gallant hearts like his are no longer here to share in the honest exultation of this signal triumph.”

Thus terminated this great siege. The manner in which it was conducted evoked many criticisms at the time, principally by those who had no share in its responsibilities and were ignorant of the difficulties their leaders had to encounter. Condemnation has been passed since on many of the operations by expounders of military strategy as derived not on the field but in the study of war, and acquired in the library. Faults there may have been. Can history show a commander, naval or military, who did not commit them? What operation of war in the past is without flaw? But when all is said, who can withhold a tribute of admiration either to the side which on hostile territory 3000 miles distant from its own could accomplish such an object, or to the opponent which for nearly twelve months defied the combined efforts of two of the most powerful nations of Europe? Now after the lapse of over forty years all concerned can look back with genuine pride to events which linked glory with victory and defeat alike.

CHAPTER XIX

1855—SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER

Naval Brigade re-embark—Praise from the General and Admiralty—Inactivity of the army—Preparations to attack Kimburn—Equipment of the expedition—French floating batteries—Position of Kimburn—Its defences—Captain Spratt in *Spitfire* reconnoitres the approach—Expedition sails and arrives—The attack on Kimburn—Fort surrenders with garrison—Effectiveness of the floating batteries—Alarm at Nicolaieff—The Emperor's visit—Examines a prisoner—Reconnoissance up the river Bug—Expedition returns to Sebastopol—Pelissier's indisposition to further operations—The Admiral ordered home—Leaves the Crimea and arrives in Paris.

WITH the capture of the south side of Sebastopol, the work of the Naval Brigade came to an end, and it was ordered to re-embark. This led to the following general order being issued from head-quarters. "The service for which the Naval Brigade was attached to this army having been completed by the fall of Sebastopol, the force has been ordered to rejoin the Fleet.

"The Commander of the Forces heartily thanks the officers, petty officers, and seamen for the very efficient services they have rendered in the batteries, and on all occasions when their aid against the enemy was required ; and he has to notice the patience and courage with which, side by side with the soldiers of this army, they have endured the dangers and hardships of nearly a year's duty in the trenches.

"General Simpson acknowledges the obligations he is

under to Rear-Admiral Sir Stephen Lushington, K.C.B., who so ably commanded the Brigade from its formation until his removal by promotion to a higher rank, and to Captain the Hon. H. Keppel, who succeeded him and retained the command until the conclusion of this ever-memorable siege."

The Secretary to the Admiralty wrote as follows to the Admiral—"I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to acquaint you that they have received with the most lively satisfaction the account of the capture of the south side of Sebastopol, and of the destruction of the Russian ships of war in the harbour. My Lords feel that it is a very natural source of regret to yourself and to the gallant officers under your command, that they have been unable to take a more prominent part in the active operations which have more immediately led to this result; but my Lords feel strongly that this has arisen only from the want of opportunity for displaying that gallantry and skill which has never been wanting in every action in which any of her Majesty's ships have been engaged.

"I am commanded by their Lordships to signify to you, and through you to Rear-Admiral Sir Houston Stewart and the officers, seamen, and marines under your orders, their high approbation of the manner in which their duties have been performed from the commencement of the operations in conveying the army into the Crimea. My Lords have, on a former occasion, signified their approbation of the able and successful operations in the Sea of Azoff by which such large quantities of the enemy's resources have been cut off; and they are fully sensible of the constant zeal and activity with which assistance has been rendered on all occasions, both to her Majesty's forces and to those of her allies.

"They command me on the present occasion to desire you to convey their approval of the conduct of the officers

and men of the battalion of Royal Marines who have been serving on shore, and more especially of the officers and men of the Naval Brigade.

“That Brigade has shown the most cheerful endurance of the hardships and fatigue of trenches, as well as the greatest skill and gallantry in working the guns and bearing their part in the dangers of the advanced works in the assault on the enemy’s lines.

“My Lords have seen with great pleasure the complete concord which has existed between yourself and Vice-Admiral Bruat, the Commander-in-Chief of the French squadron, to which, and the hearty co-operation of the officers and crews of the ships of his Majesty the Emperor, the success of all the naval operations is so much owing, and they desire that you will convey their best thanks to the Vice-Admiral and to the officers and men under his orders.

“My Lords desire further to express to you the sense which they entertain of the unwearying energy, no less than of the sound judgment, with which you have conducted the service which has been entrusted to you, never allowing any circumstances, however trying, to interfere for a moment with your devotion to the interests of her Majesty’s service.”

Sir Charles Wood also wrote personally to the Admiral in the same sense, to which Sir Edmund replied on October 6—“Nothing could be more gratifying to me, as well as to the whole Fleet under my command, than the handsome letter of the Board, acknowledging our constant and earnest endeavours to contribute by all the means in our power to the success of the Crimean expedition. I confess too, that I am much gratified by your kind private letter, for it is true that I did exercise some influence in the councils at Varna which had to decide whether the expedition should be undertaken or not. Nor is it less true that I put my

shoulder to the wheel to overcome difficulties in the preparations and execution which were declared to be altogether insurmountable.

“The dispiriting effects of the cholera which raged in the Fleet and in the camp, had indisposed most men not in the prime of life from engaging in a bold enterprise at an advanced season of the year, and never can I forget the persevering efforts that were made to deter me from what they called the ‘awful responsibility’ of taking so decided a part as second in command: nor was I insensible to the taunts of those persons who—when things wore an unpromising aspect—reproached me with having promoted the expedition in the first instance, and with having been instrumental in preventing the abandonment of the enterprise while there was yet time before the winter came on in full force.

“As poor Lord Raglan is dead there is no one in the world but me who can ever know what we had to contend against, under the most disheartening and discouraging circumstances that could be imagined.” Privately also Sir Edmund wrote to Admiral Bruat.

“MY DEAR FRIEND,—The proofs I have had of your kind sympathy in my joys as well as in my sorrows, are too numerous and too touching to admit of my entertaining any doubt of my doing as you would wish in communicating to you privately, and *in extenso*, the letter I have received from the Board of Admiralty, which is indeed a faithful and beautiful record of the fruits which have resulted from the perfect harmony and understanding that has subsisted between us, from first to last during this memorable campaign.”

His official letter to the French Admiral was as follows—

“MY DEAR COLLEAGUE,—It has never been my good fortune to have to perform a duty more gratifying, or more

in consonance with my own feelings, as well as with the feelings of the officers and men which I have the honour to command, than in communicating to your Excellency that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have seen with great pleasure the complete concord which has existed between us, to which, and to the hearty co-operation of the officers and crews of the two Fleets, their Lordships attribute the success which has attended all the naval operations in the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff; and they desire me to convey to your Excellency, and the officers and men under your orders, the expression of their best thanks."

Admiral Bruat replied as follows—

"MON CHER COLLÈGUE,—C'est avec un vif sentiment de satisfaction et de gratitude que j'ai reçu et que j'ai transmis à l'escadre placée sous mon commandement, les remerciements que les Lords Commissaires de l'Amirauté Britannique ont bien voulu vous charger de me transmettre. Cette appréciation si flatteuse des services que nous avons pu rendre à la cause commune, devait acquérir pour nous tous, et pour moi personnellement encore, un nouveau prix par le choix de l'interprète au quel était confié le soin de nous l'exprimer. Je me plais à attribuer, comme vous, à la cordiale sympathie de nos relations, et à la confiance mutuelle qui anime les deux flottes, le succès constant qu'ont obtenu nos opérations dans la Mer Noire et dans la Mer d'Azoff. Ces sentiments feront encore, je l'espère, avec l'aide du Dieu tout puissant, le succès de la grand entreprise que nous allons tenter de concert.

"Les remerciements que vous me transmettez aujourd'hui sont d'un heureux augure et nous aurons tout à cœur d'en mériter de nouveaux."

The Naval Brigade re-embarked on September 19, in splendid order and perfect health. It had fully sustained the reputation of that profession whose records contain

continuous mention of services ashore in operations of this nature, but seldom so long prolonged or of so arduous a character. Though many had fallen and been invalided from wounds or sickness, their places were at once filled up from the Fleet, so that the efficiency of their batteries was never impaired by losses. Including the marines, 4469 officers and men were landed from the Fleet between October 1, 1854, and September 16, 1855. Five officers and 95 men were killed, and 38 officers and 437 men were wounded during this period. The services of the Naval Brigade and the assistance it afforded in overcoming the resistance of Sebastopol, have not hitherto been accorded adequate recognition in the histories of this memorable siege, though it is quite evident that without the support and resources of a powerful fleet, no such operation was feasible to the force which landed in the Crimea.

It might be thought that having achieved the great object upon which his mind was set from the beginning, Sir Edmund would acquiesce in the respite which our troops now found from their labours. But he saw in the fact only incentive for renewed exertions. Writing on September 13 to Sir Charles Wood, the Admiral says—“The thing uppermost in my mind is that the Marshal¹ seems to be reposing on his laurels instead of following up the blow; here at the end of eight days nothing is done, absolutely nothing. Bruat and I proposed at a conference the day before yesterday to transport and land any part of the army when and where the Generals pleased, and we spoke of Eupatoria, or any place between that and Sebastopol, but the Marshal said he could not divide his army into two corps. I then urged a small expedition to Kaffa and Arabat, but he saw no advantage in that. Bruat and I then talked of knocking down Fort Constantine when the floating batteries should arrive. But General Niel said,

¹ General Pelissier had been made a Marshal of France.

with some reason, that that would be *en pure perte*, for we could destroy the stone batteries on the north side by our heavy guns from the south side, but that the enemy would replace them with earth-works in better positions. Bruat then suggested that Kimburn Fort at the mouth of the Dnieper might be reduced and occupied; to that it was objected that as the Generals were not disposed to detach troops so far off for the occupation, the reduction of it would show the enemy that we attached importance to it, and prompt them to rebuild it with additional strength, and to place batteries on the salient points in the river that might militate against the success of any operations in that quarter that might possibly be undertaken next year.

"The only result of the conference that I am sensible of, is a firm conviction in my mind that Pelissier will do nothing unless he is ordered from Paris to act on the offensive.

"I have been all over the south side, and never was I more astonished than on seeing the ruinous effect of the fire of the besiegers. It entirely confirms the opinion I always entertained, and often expressed, that we ought not to have opened our fire in the spring until we were prepared to go on with it till the place was ours. It is evident that they could have done nothing towards strengthening the weak points, or repairing the damages done by our fire, if it had been continuous. The docks are really magnificent, and the public buildings fine, all proving that it was a pet place of Nicholas, and looked upon as a *dépôt* on the threshold of the Bosphorus.

"It would be impossible to imagine a finer harbour. It struck me so when I was here in the *Blonde* in 1829, but now in looking on it from the heights I am more than confirmed in that opinion. We have no idea where the Russian army is at this moment, nor shall we till we send some cavalry to Eupatoria."

Little, however, was done beyond destroying the "magnificent docks," and this not until after communicating with England. Writing on September 18 to the First Lord, Sir Edmund says—"It blew so hard for a day or two after the fall of the place that I could not get on shore, or I think I might have persuaded the Generals to destroy the docks at once before diplomacy could be mixed up in the matter, and without embarrassing the Government by asking any questions about it. I do not know whether I should have been right or wrong, but I confess that is what I should have done; but when I got on shore the question was already asked. If the Russians are ever to re-occupy Sebastopol, either with our consent or by force of arms, the whole naval establishment should be completely destroyed. Bruat is naturally in high spirits. Independent of the many important rewards with regard to rank and station, it is something to have 75,000 francs a year for life, instead of only 15,000 when on half-pay.¹ Well, he deserves it, for he is an enterprising, dashing fellow with moral courage enough withal to resist being persuaded or provoked into doing what he does not consider right and proper."

In the meantime the enemy was strengthening his position on the north side, occasionally showing that he had no intention of withdrawing further by sending shells across the harbour when our men appeared near the water's edge. Sir Edmund fretted much at the inaction of the allied armies. Having attended a council on September 24, to consider a dispatch from Lord Panmure, who had succeeded the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for War, the Admiral writes to the First Lord next day. "I was highly pleased with that part of Lord Panmure's message which deprecates dreams of negotiations, and enjoins vigorous action; but his Lordship must not suppose

¹ Vice-Admiral Bruat had been promoted to Admiral, ranking with a Marshal of France.

that Simpson and Pelissier are Radetzkis, who can mount their horses and conduct a campaign like men in the prime of life.

"Two such men as Pakenham, (the present Adjutant-General) in command of the armies would have driven the Russians in full retreat out of the Crimea by this time, but we have done nothing for seventeen days, while they (the Russians), as I foresaw and foretold, having taken advantage of our absolute inaction to do what they wanted, have now opened a heavy and harassing fire on the town from the north side."

Almost from the commencement of the war the Admiralty had been periodically urging an attack or bombardment of Odessa. As pertinaciously the Generals and the French Admiral had opposed this action. There was not indeed much to gain by it unless the Allies intended to occupy the place. Now, again, Sir Edmund was desired to consult Admiral Bruat on the subject, who replied that he did not consider himself authorized to bombard Odessa. Sir Edmund expressed his readiness to do it alone, but the Admiralty shrank from directing this, and eventually the idea was finally dropped on a telegram from the French Emperor forbidding his Admiral to act against Odessa.

But Napoleon III. seeing that something must be done, ordered his General to attack the Fort of Kimburn, and on September 26 his Minister for War sent a telegram to Pelissier, directing this to be undertaken if considered feasible. An occupation of Kimburn would, he considered, stop all communication by sea between Nicolaieff, Kherson, and Odessa; it would threaten the rear of the Russian army, and perhaps force it to evacuate the Crimea. He pressed the importance of taking immediate steps as winter approached.

On receipt of this dispatch on the 28th, a conference of the Generals and Admirals was convened for the next

day, when they arrived at a decision that 8000 troops should be embarked on board the ships-of-war and proceed on the expedition as soon as the light-draught vessels could be collected. Most of these were then employed in the Sea of Azoff, and it became necessary to withdraw as a temporary measure a portion for this new expedition. By the evening of October 6, all was in readiness. The *Royal Albert*, *Hannibal*, *Algiers*, *Princess Royal*, *St. Jean d'Acre*, *Sidon*, and *Leopard*, with two transports, carried 4000 British infantry, Colonel Hurdle's battalion of Royal Marines, comprising 950 officers, rank and file, and a battery of field artillery, all under the command of Brigadier-General the Hon. Augustus Spencer. A similar French force under General Bazaine,¹ who also was in chief command, embarked on Admiral Bruat's squadron. Attached to the two squadrons were a considerable number of steam frigates, sloops, gun and mortar-vessels.

With the French force moreover on this occasion were three vessels of entirely new design and construction, the efficiency of which was now to be tested and the result to exercise great influence upon the future of naval armaments.

If the overwhelming effect of shell-fire upon the Turkish squadron at Sinope had not attracted great attention in England, it was not lost upon the mind of a man in France, who seems to have made a special study of war material, though without the experience or capability for active command. Napoleon III. caused experiments to be made during 1854 with iron plates for resisting shot, the result of which, and the bombardment of the Sebastopol forts by the allied squadrons on October 17, led him to order the construction of some vessels armoured with iron. To develop and carry out what were no doubt crude ideas at

¹ Afterwards Marshal Bazaine who commanded in Mexico and capitulated at Metz in 1870.

first, he had in M. Dupuy de Lôme one of the most talented naval architects of the day. The idea was not entirely novel, for Sir Charles Napier had ten years previously advocated cutting down a line-of-battle ship and plating her with iron. But there was then little chance for new ideas on naval construction in England. Napoleon III., however, was not hampered by naval tradition, and his subordinates threw no difficulties in the way. Several floating batteries were therefore commenced in France of the following approximate dimensions. Length 164 ft., breadth 42 ft., and size 1400 tons. They were built of wood and their sides covered with iron plates 4 in. thick. On the main-deck was placed the armament, consisting of 18 50-pounders mounted on the broadside and firing through ports made narrow to allow as few projectiles as possible to enter. They had steam power and were screw ships but of slow speed. The crew comprised 280 officers and men. These batteries were low, heavy-looking structures, but they only drew 9 ft. of water, and had a dozen of them been available on October 17, 1854, a much greater effect would have been produced on the forts guarding the entrance to Sebastopol.

Details of the designs for these French floating batteries were sent to England, but our Admiralty viewed them with distrust, and it was not until after some delay that we ordered four: the *Glatton*, *Meteor*, *Thunderer*, and *Trusty*. They were not finished in time to get out to the Black Sea until all active operations practically ceased. Three of the French batteries, however, *Lave*, *Tonnante*, and *Devastation*, arrived in Kamiesh Bay at the end of September, and were thus in time to take part in the operations against Kimburn. They did not differ materially from those we constructed. They had a rudder on each quarter and narrower ports. One novel addition the French batteries had, a place of security for the captain. In a letter home

comparing the batteries, Sir Edmund says—"The last point of difference, the 'safe guard' (I do not know what else to call it), speaks for itself. It seems to me one of two things, either a safeguard or plurality of captains." The word conning-tower had not then been invented, but it is evident the French were also first with this modern device.

Of the southern coast of Russia, washed by the Black Sea, the western portion runs to the northward past Odessa, and then stretches to the eastward until the mouth of the Dnieper is reached. From here the coast turns west again forming a small gulf. This, which may be called the Dnieper Gulf, is made comparatively narrow at the entrance by a long spit of land on its southern shore which extends for some miles towards the opposite coast. This, known as the Kimburn Spit, guarded the entrance to the gulf, within which not only is situated the mouth of that important river the Dnieper, but it forms also an advance-guard to the mouth of the Bug river, on which some twenty miles up is situated the dockyard and arsenal of Nicolaieff. The mouth of the Bug river is well inside the gulf, while the mouth of the Dnieper is at its eastern extremity. Not far inland from the latter point is the important town of Kherson, through which troops were continually passing from Odessa and other parts of Russia to the Crimea by the Isthmus of Perekop. Thus favourably placed to command the approach to these rivers, the Kimburn Spit had naturally been fortified, the principal work being a large stone fort built some distance from the extremity of the Spit. The intervening ground was occupied by two other batteries—sunken earth-works—which offering a small mark to hostile fire were formidable defences. They had not long been constructed, and were intended to prevent the channel being forced while the principal fort was otherwise engaged. Each mounted ten guns.

Fort Kimburn was a solid stone structure of much older date with casemated embrasures. Surmounting the stone face was a parapet of earth about fifteen feet thick. Mounted principally *en barbette*, were about 55 guns, howitzers, and mortars, which commanded the principal approaches by sea, while a wet ditch guarded the north front. The garrison—under the command of General Kokonovitch—of these three works amounted to about 1500 men. On the opposite side of the channel leading into the gulf is Ochakoff Point, at the extremity of which Fort Nicolaieff, mounting 22 guns in addition to several earth-works, swept the approach should an advance be made along the north shore. The plan of the Allies was to disembark the troops on the Spit some way below Fort Kimburn so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison, and then to bombard the defences with the floating batteries and mortar-vessels until they surrendered.

By this method, if successful, the whole of the garrison must be captured. Whether the line-of-battle ships would, owing to the depth of water, be able to approach the shore sufficiently near to make the weight of their artillery tell against the fort they did not know, and therefore to ascertain this with other information Captain Spratt in the *Spitfire* was dispatched on October 5 to Kimburn. On arriving there he had to proceed with caution, and sound during the night close up to the beach. But so thorough were the investigations of this most reliable officer that he found the line-of-battle ships could approach within 1200 yards of the fort, and he prepared a plan assigning positions to every part of the flotilla, which was practically adopted on the arrival of the expedition which had sailed the day after the *Spitfire*. The subsequent doings of this are detailed in the following dispatch from Sir Edmund to the Admiralty, dated October 18, 1855—

“ I have the honour to state that we arrived at a rendez-

vous off Odessa on the 8th instant, but owing to strong south-west winds, which would have prevented the troops from landing, it was not until the morning of the 14th that the expedition was enabled to reach the anchorage off Kimburn. During the night the English steam gun-vessels *Fancy*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, and *Clinker*, and four French gun-vessels, forced the entrance into Dnieper Bay, under a heavy but ineffectual fire from the Spit Fort, and on the following morning the British troops under Brigadier-General the Hon. A. Spencer, together with the French troops under the command of General Bazaine, were landed about three miles to the southward of the principal fort, and thus by these nearly simultaneous operations the retreat of the garrisons and the arrival of reinforcements were effectually cut off.

“ In the evening the English and French mortar-vessels tried their ranges against the main fort with excellent effect.

“ The wind having again veered to the southward with a great deal of swell, nothing could be done on the 16th, but in the forenoon of the 17th a fine northerly breeze with smooth water enabled the French floating batteries, mortar-vessels, and gunboats, with the *Odin* and mortar-vessels *Raven*, *Magnet*, *Camel*, *Hardy*, *Flamer*, and *Firm*; and gun-vessels *Lynx*, *Arrow*, *Viper*, *Snake*, *Wrangler*, and *Beagle*, to take positions off Fort Kimburn, and their fire was so effective that before noon the buildings in the interior of the fort were in flames, and the eastern face had suffered very considerably. At noon the *Royal Albert*, *Algiers*, *Agamemnon*, and *Princess Royal*, accompanied by Admiral Bruat's four ships-of-the-line, approached Fort Kimburn in a line abreast, which the shape of the coast rendered necessary, and the precision with which they took up their positions in the closest order, with jib-booms run in, and only two feet of water under their keels, was really admirable. At the same moment the squadrons under the orders of


Rear-Admirals Sir Houston Stewart and Pellion pushed through the passage between Ochakoff and the Spit of Kimburn, and took the forts in reverse; whilst the *St. Jean d'Acre*, *Curacoa*, *Tribune*, and *Sphinx* undertook the centre battery; and the *Hannibal*, *Dauntless*, and *Terrible* that on the point of the Spit.

"The enemy soon ceased to reply to our overwhelming fire, and though he made no sign of surrender, Admiral Bruat and I felt that a garrison which had bravely defended itself against so superior a force deserved every consideration, and we therefore made the signal to cease firing, hoisted a flag of truce, and sent on shore a summons, which was accepted by the Governor, Major-General Kokonovitch. The garrisons, consisting of 1400 men, marched out with the honours of war, laid down their arms on the glacis, and having surrendered themselves as prisoners of war they will be embarked in her Majesty's ship *Vulcan* to-morrow. The casualties in the allied Fleets are very few, amounting in her Majesty's ships to only two wounded. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded is, I fear, very severe. In the three forts which have suffered considerably by our fire we found 81 guns and mortars mounted, and an ample supply of ammunition.

"This morning the enemy has blown up the forts on Ochakoff Point: and we learn from a Polish deserter who escaped in a boat from them during the night, that the commandant apprehended an attack from our mortar-vessels, which would not only have destroyed the forts, but also the neighbouring vessels.

"I have abstained from entering into the particulars of the proceedings of the squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir H. Stewart, as he has so ably described them in the letter which I have the honour to enclose, from which their Lordships will perceive that I have received from him on this occasion, as indeed I have on all others since I have had

Spd Fire General Port Royal Albert Munitions



172 173 174 175

CAPTURE OF KINROCK AND BATTLES OF THE SEA, OCTOBER 17TH, 1881.
 (From a picture by Captain E. A. Ingledel of H.M.S. *Albatross*.)

the good fortune to have him as second in command, that valuable assistance which might be expected from an officer of his distinguished and acknowledged merit; and I beg leave to add my testimony to his in praise of all the officers, and especially of Lieutenant J. H. Marryat and Mr. E. W. Brooker,¹ whom he recommends to their Lordships' favourable consideration.

"To particularize the merits of the officers under my command, where all have behaved admirably, would be a difficult task indeed, but I beg leave to mention that the same officers of the navy, and the Royal Marine Artillery, who were in the mortar-vessels at the fall of Sebastopol are in them now, and that on this occasion, as before, they have been under the direction of Captain Willcox of the *Odin*, and Captain Digby of the Royal Marine Artillery. Nor can I refrain from stating what I believe to be the feeling of the whole Fleet, that on this expedition, as on that to Kertch, the talents and indefatigable exertions of that very valuable officer, Captain Spratt of the *Spitfire*, and of those under his command, entitle them to our warmest thanks, and deserve to be particularly mentioned. I need hardly say that my distinguished colleague, Admiral Bruat, and I have seen with infinite satisfaction our respective squadrons acting together as one Fleet."

The success of this expedition was due to the completeness of its organization and provision for every detail. It is unnecessary to give Sir Houston Stewart's dispatch respecting the doings of the inside squadron. Three of the gunboats—*Fancy*, *Boxer*, and *Clinker*—passed the Spit and Ochakoff Forts, on the night of the 14th, with some French gunboats, and anchored below Fort Kimburn to cover the disembarkation of our troops on that side, and prevent reinforcements being sent to the garrison from the mainland. When the outer squadron took up its position for attack on

¹ Mr. Brooker was an additional Master of the *Spitfire*.

the 17th, Sir Houston Stewart in *Valorous*, with *Furious*, *Sidon*, *Leopard*, *Firebrand*, *Stromboli*, and *Spiteful*, proceeded through the channel at noon, engaging the batteries on each side as they passed. A French squadron under Rear-Admiral Pellion carried out the same operation. We had by this arrangement a powerful force on each side of the Spit, and were able to bring an overwhelming fire against the fort. The line-of-battle ships did not move in until some time after the gunboat, mortar-vessels, and floating batteries had subjected the fort to a heavy cannonade, and then the broadsides of the big ships in a short time completely silenced its fire. The garrison was driven from the guns and took refuge in the casemates. The mortar shells created great havoc in the interior. General Kokonovitch wisely therefore accepted the offer to capitulate, though his second in command—a gallant engineer officer—desired to continue the struggle. Further resistance had, however, become impossible, while retreat was cut off on both sides.

The ironclads proved most effective in this engagement. Writing to the First Naval Lord, Sir Maurice Berkeley, on the 20th, Sir Edmund says—"The French floating batteries have gained golden opinions here by the effect produced by their fire on the ramparts as well as by the little or no effect made upon them by the fire from the fort. They may not have contributed so much to the fall of the place as the mortar-vessels and the gun-vessels, nor can it be denied that the *coup de grâce*, was given by the ships-of-the-line, but it is nevertheless certain that in two or three hours' more firing they would have brought the walls down by the lump and the whole sea-face would have been accessible, whilst the only effect upon them was the appearance of a few rust-like marks where the shot struck and bounded off. Two men were killed by a shot that went in at a port. It was intended to place them within

600 yards, but the shallowness of the water did not admit of their getting nearer than 800 yards. If they had been nearer the effect upon the walls might have been even greater than it was, but on the other hand the effect upon their sides might have been less inconsiderable, and it yet remains to be proved what the effect of heavier shot might have been upon them, for none of greater weight than 24-pounders were fired at them, nor are we quite sure that the powder was of the best quality in the Russian fort. Still you may take it for granted that floating batteries have become elements in amphibious warfare, so the sooner you set about having as many good ones as the French the better it will be for you. I am told that the shells broke into pieces on striking the vessels before they had time to explode. The French¹ no doubt go great lengths in their praises of this favourite weapon of their Emperor's; but make all the allowance you please for that, and there will still remain too much in favour of it to admit of its being discarded without a fair trial." As is well known our naval authorities failed to discern the important bearing of this incident, that if ships so constructed could withstand heavy shell fire from a fort, they would equally be protected if these projectiles were fired from another ship, and that the day of unprotected wooden ships was past from that hour. They continued placidly to go on building the latter even while the French, profiting by this experience, and guided by the genius of two men, Napoleon III. and his naval architect, Dupuy de Lôme, had extended the idea of the floating battery to a sea-going ironclad. While they were constructing *La Gloire* our minds could not advance beyond devising greater perfection to the type which was now obsolete. Public opinion at length brought about the construction of the *Warrior*.

¹ Admiral Bruat in his dispatch said—"Everything may be expected from these formidable engines of war."

Our two floating batteries, the *Glatton*, commanded by Captain Arthur Cumming, and the *Meteor*, Captain F. Beauchamp Seymour,¹ towed by the *Trent* and *Medina*, arrived at Kimburn on October 25, too late to participate in the bombardment, and thus valuable experience was lost to us. The arrival of the allied expedition at Kimburn with its capture and the evacuation of the fort on Ochakoff Point caused alarm in Russia for the safety of Nicolaieff. It was a naval arsenal of great importance, especially for the building of war-ships. It had been constructed twenty-seven miles up the Bug on the banks of a small branch river, the Ingul. In order to ascertain whether the Bug could be ascended by an attacking force, Sir Houston Stewart made a reconnoissance of the lower portion in the *Stromboli*, Commander Cowper Coles, accompanied by Captain Spratt in the *Spitfire*. On reaching the first narrows at Voloisk Spit they found the high banks defended with guns, and the channel so contracted that further progress could not be made without great risk. Fire was exchanged between the ships and the batteries without injury to the former, which then returned to their anchorage. As the banks of the Bug are high nearly the whole way and the river full of shallows it is readily defended, and light-draught vessels would be greatly exposed to fire without corresponding facilities for returning it. In such a case the most effective method of attack is by taking the batteries in rear with a land force. An attack on Nicolaieff by land was what the Russians seem to have feared, and it is said the Czar himself proceeded there at the end of September. He ordered defences to be erected round the town, and Todleben received a summons to go to Nicolaieff.

The presence of the Emperor seems to be in some measure confirmed by the account of an English artilleryman who was taken prisoner by some Cossacks near

¹ The late Admiral Lord Alcester, G.C.B.

Kimburn. On his release and return to our army a month later he made the following statement—"On October 23 I was ordered to start before my battery (as my horse was lame) on our return to the main body of our troops before Kimburn. About an hour and a half after I had started, I was leading my horse when two Cossacks sprang out from a bush upon me. At first I attempted to resist, but thirteen more came up and I was obliged to lay down my sword. They took me to the main body, about six miles in rear of where our army was encamped; it consisted of a regiment of Cossacks and one of lancers. The following day I was sent to Nicolaieff. It is strongly fortified, and from the constant blasting I heard going on I believe they are still increasing its strength.

"I was taken before General Lüders, who examined me himself, speaking English. He asked what was the strength of the allied forces before Kimburn. To this I replied by asking him if he was a prisoner himself, would he think himself justified in communicating what might do injury to his country? He said that was no answer to the question he had asked, and if I did not wish to tell him the truth I was not to tell him any lies. To this I said I preferred the question being put aside, and I was allowed to go.

"The next day I was taken before another person, who examined me on the same point, and I made the same replies. He then asked me if all our artillerymen were as big as myself, and I said, 'Yes, and some bigger.' He also asked me what I thought of the Russian soldiers, and I said they were very good, but not so good as the English; that they were not so good at the hot work. I was then allowed to go, and an Englishman, a book-binder in the town, said that the last person who had examined me was the Emperor.

"I believe the garrison of Nicolaieff consists entirely of

marines and militia. I saw two line-of-battle ships building and four large steamers afloat completed. During the conversation which passed between me and the gentleman, who I found out afterwards was the Czar, he asked me how long I thought the war would last. I answered, 'Seven years more perhaps.' 'Why do you think so?' 'Because we hear your Emperor won't pay the expenses, and as long as he won't do that we'll fight.' He said that he did not think the war would last two years longer, for if it did last seven years longer you and I and all of us will be dead before that time.

"From Nicolaieff I was sent to Odessa, and from there I was exchanged after about twenty days. I was well treated the whole time, except that the Cossacks took my money, a sovereign, from me." This statement was made before Major-General R. Dacres, commanding the artillery.

The man was Gunner Henry Harrison of Captain L. V. Johnson's (P) battery, and he was doubtless taken prisoner on return from a reconnoissance which a portion of the allied forces made towards the interior from Kimburn on October 20 under General Bazaine. They returned on the evening of the 23rd, having seen little of the enemy, though his Cossacks hovered about their flank and rear, evidently on the look-out for stragglers.

In the meantime the engineers with fatigue parties were putting Kimburn Fort in a state of defence again, which was accomplished by the end of October. It being decided that we should remain in occupation of the Spit, 1800 French troops were left as a garrison, supported by a small flotilla of English and French vessels. The rest of the troops re-embarked, and the expedition returned to Sebastopol on November 2.

For a short time Sir Edmund, hoping that another expedition would be undertaken against Kaffa and Arabat, kept the troops on board, but the Generals could not agree

to this, and on November 11 Sir Edmund telegraphs to the First Lord—"Expedition given up. Troops landed. Without troops the unsupported resources of the Fleet are inadequate for any effectual operation. *Algiers* and *Agamemnon* will go to Malta immediately." Our ships had been continuously employed in the Black Sea since the beginning of 1854. Their crews had well and cheerfully performed every service which had been demanded of them. As it was evident no further operations in which they could combine were to be undertaken for the present, the Admiralty were desirous that the ships should go to Malta in turn, and that other parts of the Mediterranean should now be visited by a British squadron. Sir Houston Stewart was therefore directed to proceed with the *Hannibal*, *Princess Royal*, *St. Jean d'Acre*, and *Sphinx* to the Bosphorus, and afterwards to the Ionian Islands.

In the meantime the allied armies remained comparatively inactive. The troops were principally engaged in destroying the arsenal, and making a road from Balaclava to the camp. On this about 9000 men were employed. General Sir James Simpson had resigned the command, and after some delay Lieutenant-General Sir William Codrington was appointed to succeed him. Of this Sir Edmund writing on November 10 to Sir Charles Wood says—"In my humble opinion it was under all the circumstances the best choice that could have been made." The Admiral was an excellent judge of men even outside his own profession. Soon after Lord Raglan's death he was asked who he thought would be the best man to succeed him. He declined to express an opinion on that point, but stated that the officer in the Crimea who appeared to him to have most military genius was Major-General Hugh Rose. All who heard it were astonished, as General Rose was then comparatively unknown, but he afterwards rose to eminence and became Lord Strathnairn. Most military

men will probably acknowledge that he fully justified the Admiral's opinion. All Sir Edmund's letters at this period are full of regrets at the inaction of the allied armies. Sir Charles presses him to go away and take some rest, but he replies, after giving some details about transports—"You see, my dear Sir Charles, that I cannot conscientiously absent myself from the scene of action. I am referred to on all occasions. Already to-day I have had no less than five telegraphic messages, and I don't know how many immediate letters from Head-quarters and Balaclava, all requiring answers involving no little responsibility." Having been the life and soul of the expedition in its time of doubt and trouble, he remained its main-stay in the day of success. All appeared to rely on him, and no mortal body could have stood it much longer. Bruat left to go home at the end of November, but died at sea after a few days. Sir Edmund was much grieved to hear the news. Writing on December 7 he says—"I fear that I may have hardly written coherently, for I am shocked at having just heard of the death of Bruat on his way home. He was a brave and active colleague, and a kind and faithful friend, and if he had lived to reach Paris he would have boldly and frankly told many facts desirable for his Emperor to know."

Amidst these cares it was a gratification to Sir Edmund to receive from the Admiralty his commission as Admiral of the Blue whilst in command of the Mediterranean station, "in consideration of the importance of the command held by you, as well as the important services you have rendered in co-operation with the French admirals in the Black Sea, and more especially looking to the nature of the service requiring such constant communication not only with the General Officer in command of her Majesty's army in the Crimea, but with the French officers in command of the land forces and Fleets of the Emperor of the

French, and with officers of high rank in the Sardinian and Turkish armies." Though the rank thus given was temporary and local, it was a considerable rise to pass from rear to full admiral.

But Sir Edmund needed rest and a change from the constant demand on his mind which the past two years had entailed. Fortunately it came by compulsion. On December 6 Sir Charles Wood telegraphed to him—"We wish you to come home to take part in a Council of War to be held in Paris. Learn General Codrington's opinion of future operations. Make the necessary arrangements for the command during your absence, and come to Marseilles, where you shall have full instructions for your conduct. General La Marmora has been sent for for the same purpose, and you might bring him to Marseilles." An Admiralty order was sent to him at the same time to strike his flag and proceed to England.

The message did not reach Sir Edmund for a week, and on December 13 he replies—"I have just received your dispatch of December 6. La Marmora and I are to be at Malta on December 28, and we proceed immediately from thence to Marseilles in a steam frigate." Sir Houston Stewart was given temporary command of the squadron in the Mediterranean, and Sir Edmund Lyons in the *Royal Albert* left for Constantinople on December 20. Here he transferred with his staff and General La Marmora to the *Caradoc*, and started for Malta on the 23rd. Touching at that island the *Caradoc* continued her voyage, reaching Marseilles on the 30th, when the Admiral and his companions set out for Paris next day. Thus closed the year 1855.

CHAPTER XX

JANUARY 1856 TO MARCH 1857

The Council of War at Paris—Memorandum by Sir Edmund—Statement by Russian officers on effects of the war—Sir Edmund arrives in England—His reception—Gives evidence before the Military Commission—Peace proclaimed—Thanks to Army and Navy in House of Commons—Omission of reference to Sir Edmund—Lord Palmerston's explanation—Offers Sir Edmund a peerage—Accepted—Becomes Baron Lyons of Christchurch—Congratulations—Reception at the Crystal Palace—Goes out again to the Mediterranean—Arrives in the Bosphorus—The Crimea evacuated by the Allies—Testimony to the work done—Visits Sebastopol—Russian opinions on the operations—Detained in the Bosphorus—Changes in the Fleet—Sir Houston Stewart goes home—His characteristics—Admirals Grey and Fremantle—Captain Mends goes home—His services—Visit of the Sultan to the *Royal Albert*—Leaves the Bosphorus.

OUR position in the Crimea at the beginning of 1856 was truly an anomalous one. We had established ourselves at Kertch, Eupatoria, Kimburn, and on the south side of Sebastopol, across the harbour of which, barred to both sides, two hostile camps watched each other preliminary to the next move. To consider what that should be on our side, a Council of War had assembled at Paris. This Council, presided over by the Emperor Napoleon III., consisted of Prince Jerome, Prince Napoleon, the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Cowley, Count Walewski, Marshal Vaillant; Admirals Hamelin, Penaud, Jurien de la Gravière, Sir Edmund Lyons, and the Hon. R. S. Dundas; Generals

La Marmora, Canrobert, Bosquet, Niel, Martimprez, Sir H. Jones, and Sir R. Airey.

Apparently no record of their deliberations has been published, but I gather that the Admirals were asked as to what part the Fleets could play in future operations, and the following memorandum was submitted by Sir Edmund —“As the enemy has no longer any naval forces in the Black Sea or in the Sea of Azoff, it is evident that unless the Allied Powers should find it necessary to discontinue the forbearance that spares Odessa, the services of their Fleets in those quarters must be confined to the maintenance of a strict blockade and to co-operation with the armies.

“In making feints to mislead the enemy the Fleets may be very useful. For the transport of troops and their requirements to the real scene of operations, for landing them and keeping up a communication with them, the Fleets would be indispensable.

“It would appear from the documents read before the Emperor, that after providing for the security of our positions in the Chersonese, in the Straits of Kertch and at Kimburn, there will be a disposable force of more than 160,000 men. What portion of these troops may be employed in driving the enemy out of the Crimea; in operations in Asia Minor or Bessarabia, or on the banks of the Bug and Dnieper, will of course depend upon the decision of the two Governments, but in any case it will be necessary to have by the end of March the means of transporting about 75,000 men at one time; and although there may not be any great difficulty in finding vessels for the conveyance of an army of that size and its material, the most prompt and energetic measures will be required in order to provide in time the means of landing them.

“Experience has proved that troops may be landed at Eupatoria at all seasons of the year. During the months

of January, February, and March 1855, Omer Pacha's army, comprising 55,000 men, 11,000 horses, and 111 guns, was landed there with no loss beyond that of one horse; and during the month of December last Lord George Paget's brigade of cavalry, consisting of 1646 horses, was embarked there without any loss whatever. Kaffa Bay too offers great facilities for landing troops; and at Alma it seldom happens that there are two or three consecutive days between the Vernal and Autumnal Equinoxes when the beach is not practicable."

It is obvious that in a Council of War composed of about twenty people it would be difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion. One idea of the Emperor was to send a large army to the Baltic, and thus perhaps induce Sweden to join the Allies. This he abandoned. Indeed the wish to continue the struggle was not on his part strong, and the Council appears to have separated without having settled any very definite recommendations as to a plan of campaign. Probably all felt that peace was near. Russia, exhausted by the fearful struggle, was ready to make concessions that six months earlier she would have rejected in scorn. This seems confirmed by a letter to the Admiral later from Captain Sherard Osborn in the *Medusa* at Kazatch, May 1856. He writes—"I have met some Russian officers, of late, who were in a position and willing to give much interesting information. They fully confirmed the opinions you expressed to me last year upon many points. The destruction of provisions at Genitchi was, they said, even larger than we supposed. The entry of the squadron into the Sea of Azoff, and the destruction of so much forage along the western shores, taxed their land transport to a fearful extent, caused immense loss of cattle, and raised the price of even the common necessities of life in the Crimea to a fabulous extent.

"During the last bombardment of Sebastopol the loss

in killed and wounded was 2500 per diem, not 1000. Hardships and misery caused the Russian army throughout last autumn to be suffering fearfully from fever (typhus). When the Czar visited the camps on the north, although a most enthusiastic reception was given him by both officers and men, he saw that peace was necessary, and in reply to some expressions of devotion upon the part of the army, was heard to say—'We must have peace for the present at any price.' Every Russian in the Crimea knew that the moment the Allies moved in earnest the Crimea was lost, and they justly boast of the skill which has saved them from such a disgrace. Last December there were 30,000 sick in Nicolaieff, and at this moment some 20,000 cases of typhus render Batchi Serai little else than one huge hospital.

"The enormous sums claimed from the Russian Government as compensation for losses experienced by the towns and villages between Balaclava and the mouths of the Don have created much alarm. The Czar and his Ministers hardly like to say no to the millions asked for, and to pay all would double the expenses of the war. The claimants being for the most part immigrants or influential Russians, adds to the difficulty of the Czar's position.

"The destruction of Kertch—much as it has been talked of—has served the allied cause considerably by striking a panic into all the cities likely to have fallen into our hands had the war continued."

This gives a vivid picture of the straits to which the Russians were reduced, and the strain which the prolonged siege had involved upon them. Whatever faults may have been committed by the Allies in their conduct of the war in the Black Sea, it is doubtful whether even the fall of Sebastopol at an early period would have produced the same result in overcoming the resistance of Russia as that terrible siege, accompanied by the great loss in battle and

from disease, which it entailed. Our soldiers had not suffered in vain, and amid the wrangling of critics their courage and devotion will ever be remembered with gratitude by this country.

Whilst in Paris Sir Edmund Lyons was the guest of our Ambassador, Lord Cowley ; and when the work of the Council of War concluded the Admiralty directed him to proceed to London, in order that the Government might personally confer with him as to the state of affairs in the East. He came over accordingly with the other English officers on January 18, and stayed with his son-in-law, the Earl of Arundel and Surrey, who a few weeks after, on the death of his father, became the 14th Duke of Norfolk.

Sir Edmund's welcome was most enthusiastic and gratifying to him. His native town, Christchurch, hearing he was about to visit his kinsman, Admiral Walcot, erected triumphal arches, and nearly every house was decorated. The inhabitants presented him with a congratulatory address, in which touching allusions were made to his family connexion with Christchurch and his services to the country. The United Service Club gave him a dinner, which was attended by nearly all the principal officers of both Services. The Lord Mayor also gave a banquet, at which Sir Edmund Lyons was the principal guest. In reply to the toast of his health, proposed by the Mayor, the Admiral bore generous testimony to all those who had served under him. The freedom of the City was subsequently voted and presented to him. The incident is thus noticed by the *Morning Chronicle* of March 3, 1856—"The highest honour which the City of London can award has been voted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. The name of Admiral Lyons will henceforth stand beside those of Jervis, Nelson, Collingwood, and other naval heroes on whom the grateful inhabitants of the Metropolis have bestowed freedoms, swords, and gold boxes in recog-

dition of their gallant services against the enemy. By the present recipient it must be allowed the compliment has been quite as well deserved as by any of his illustrious predecessors. Mr. Deputy Dakin, in proposing the vote at the recent meeting of the Common Council, sketched the events of 'a brilliant career which showed that Admiral Lyons was endowed with all the qualities which fit an officer for command and enable him to conquer. Skill, gallantry, vigilance—the faithful and patient discharge of every duty, and the ready activity which seizes and improves every opportunity—had characterized the whole professional life of Sir E. Lyons, and had never been more nobly manifested than during the two last campaigns in the Black Sea, nor had success been wanting to crown his exertions. The incidents of the naval war might indeed have been less dramatic, its chronicles less rich in details of slaughter and victory than those of previous campaigns; but the results are equally important, and the practical triumph achieved by our Fleet is just as efficacious and memorable as any with which it has pleased Providence to crown our arms.'” This appears to me an able summary of the situation and of the character of the man thus honoured. While the recipient of these marks of national favour Sir Edmund was busy in other directions. The Government consulted him on the condition of peace which limited the Russian naval force in the Black Sea and the tonnage of vessels employed therein. He drew up a memorandum for Lord Clarendon, in which he considered five vessels of about 300 tons each for the Black Sea and two of 200 tons each for the Sea of Azoff would suffice for all ordinary purposes.

He also at this time gave evidence before the Military Commission of Enquiry into the War sitting at Chelsea, being desirous of vindicating the memory of Lord Raglan, and showing that the navy co-operated with the army to the utmost of its powers. That he succeeded may be

inferred from the following letter to him by General Sir Harry Smith—

"Manchester, April 23, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR EDMUND LYONS—Except the late dear Duke of Wellington, there was no man on earth to whom I was so much indebted through life as our truly lamented friend Lord Raglan. Judge then, I pray you, what my delight was upon the perusal of your manly, straightforward, common-sense evidence before the Military Commission on the 21st inst. Do not think I take a liberty when it is caused by the love of a lamented friend, if I assert your evidence is the most beautiful thing I ever read. Your able remarks too about the cordial co-operation of the navy express precisely what I ever witnessed in every quarter of the globe, which has ever induced the army to place unlimited confidence in our energetic navy, always abounding in resources.

"Yours faithfully,

"H. G. SMITH."

Peace had been proclaimed, and at the beginning of May Lord Palmerston proposed in the House of Commons a vote of thanks to the army and navy for their services during the war. No allusion was made by him to the services of individual officers then living, an omission which Sir Edmund seems to have felt. This being brought under the notice of Lord Palmerston he wrote as follows to Sir Edmund—"I have learnt with great regret that an impression has been created on your mind that my not having made mention of your name in what I said when moving the thanks of Parliament to the army and navy engaged in the operations of the late war arose from a want of due appreciation by me of the value of your services in your command in the Black Sea. I can assure you that such an impression is wholly unfounded, and that

I, as well as all my colleagues, in common with the country at large, do full justice to your professional merits. But the duty which I had to perform on the occasion in question was of a limited nature. I had to direct the attention of the House to the prominent events of the war, and to the results arising therefrom; to the operations of the military and naval forces, and not to the claims of individual officers. I mentioned the capture of Bomarsund because the successful operation enabled us to obtain in the Treaty of Peace the important stipulation that there shall be no military or naval establishment in the Aland Islands. I mentioned the destruction of Sveaborg because that operation, by indicating the means by which Cronstadt might be assailed, must be considered as having influenced the Russian Government in their decision to accept the conditions of peace which were proposed to them by Austria. In the Black Sea the course of events confined the war chiefly to military operations, at least as far as great engagements were concerned, and accordingly I mentioned only the battles of Alma, Inkerman, Balaclava, and Tchernaya. In regard to persons I confined myself to the names of the general officers whom we have lost, and did not enter into any discussion of the merits and services of the living, and for this reason among others, that although I might have well known where to begin I should have found it difficult to know where to end, and the votes and resolutions which I had to propose were touching the two Services in their respective aggregate, and did not specify any individual officers by name.

"I trust that this explanation will remove from your mind an impression which is entirely at variance with all my feelings towards you both in your personal and in your professional character.

"Yours,

"PALMERSTON."

It was curious reasoning which attributed more influence to our operations in the Baltic in determining the terms of peace than what had been effected in the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff. So Sir Edmund had an interview with Lord Palmerston, at which the latter asked him if he would accept a peerage. Receiving an affirmative reply it was submitted to the Queen, and on June 13 the Prime Minister wrote as follows—

“MY DEAR SIR EDMUND—I have great pleasure in informing you that the Queen has been graciously pleased to give directions that the dignity of Baron should be conferred upon you as an acknowledgment of your public services. Will you let me know what title you wish to have. I am sorry that it is not a case in which we could add a Parliamentary Grant to the dignity conferred by the Crown.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

Sir Edmund chose the title of Baron Lyons of Christchurch in the county of Southampton, and thus he became the first Lord Lyons.

This distinction removed any feeling of unacknowledged service, and to a man actuated by a strong and worthy ambition to deserve well of his country, such as undoubtedly had influenced the whole of the Admiral's career, it was a source of personal gratification. But beyond that, and the pleasure felt in achieving something that would benefit his family, there was the professional gratification of seeing the Navy honoured in him and a testimony to the services of the Fleet in the Black Sea, which a public speech had seemed to minimize. I believe some people have an idea a peerage was conferred upon Sir Edmund Lyons for his diplomatic services. Had

these been continued, instead of his returning to his old profession, he probably would have achieved as high a distinction in that calling, but viewing the events which preceded and followed his quitting Stockholm in the autumn of 1853, there can be no comparison between his naval and diplomatic career as regards the services rendered in each capacity.

The letters of congratulation the new peer received came from all quarters. I select two only for insertion. His old chief, Sir James Graham, writes—"Sir Charles Wood tells me that the honour of the peerage is about to be bestowed on you. Pray accept my cordial and sincere congratulations. You have won this distinction by services which are well known. There are other services, which have not met the public eye, which will never be known : but they are more meritorious still : for I believe that you saved your country from dishonour and disgrace by your personal influence and manly firmness in trying circumstances.

"I rejoice in the reward ; and as a friend I share the gratification of your noble ambition."

Viscount Hardinge, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army writes—"I heartily congratulate you on your elevation to the peerage. I have always felt whenever I have been with you, your high claim to those honours which I have myself been fortunate enough to receive from the hands of the sovereign. I only wish you could or would change your colour from Blue to Red and be *our* best ornament ! I am very glad also you are going back to the Mediterranean. No man knows so well our policy in those waters or can better maintain it."

That the country generally endorsed the selection may be gathered from articles in the Press at that time, while the public had from the first with unfailing instinct given him his due. This was shown unmistakably upon one

prominent occasion. On May 9 her Majesty and the Prince Consort, accompanied by other members of the Royal Family, went down to the Crystal Palace for the inauguration and unveiling of a monument in honour of the heroes of the Crimea and of the restoration of peace. It was the fac-simile of a colossal monument designed by Baron Marochetti for erection at Scutari. Sir Edmund was present, and writing to his son next day says—"The Queen was most kind at the Crystal Palace yesterday, and sent for me, and me only, to come up to the raised platform where she was, and on my appearance there the 13,000 spectators gave me quite an ovation, men and women cheering and the ladies waving their handkerchiefs." The Admiral, like Nelson, was not insensible to popular favour, and this reception touched him exceedingly.

There was now nothing to detain the Admiral longer in England. The Military Commission had completed its inquiry and the Government desired Lord Lyons to resume command of the Mediterranean station. He accordingly left London for Paris on June 28, accompanied by his Secretary, the Earl of Carnarvon, Count Strzlecki, Captain the Hon. F. Egerton, R.N., and other friends who were anxious to visit the scene of the late war. After staying two days in Paris the party reached Marseilles on July 3, where the *Caradoc* awaited them. Here the Admiral embarked and once more resumed his command.

The *Caradoc* left Marseilles on July 4, and touching at Malta arrived in the Bosphorus on the 11th. Here the *Royal Albert* was found at anchor, having just arrived from the Black Sea, but the Admiral being desirous of visiting the scene of the late war went on in the *Caradoc* to Balaclava. How different its appearance now to the view it presented at the end of 1855. The Crimea had been completely evacuated by the Allies, and the order and tidiness of the little harbour made it difficult to believe the

place was a short time previously the base of a large army engaged in a formidable siege. Nor was this last operation, with the embarkation of such a force as we had then collected outside Sebastopol, the least meritorious operation in which our Fleet took a conspicuous part. It had been carried out under the immediate superintendence of Sir Houston Stewart and Rear-Admiral Fremantle, who since the death of Admiral Boxer had been in charge of Balaclava harbour. The evacuation of the Crimea commenced on June 3 by the embarkation of the Coldstream Guards on board the *Agamemnon* and *St. Jean d'Acre*, and then the rest of the troops were distributed among the other ships-of-war and a few transports. From Balaclava, Kazatch, and Kertch 47,000 British soldiers and 5000 horses were thus conveyed, in addition to the Turkish contingent, 18,000 strong, taken to Constantinople, and 9700 Sardinian troops landed at Spezzia. The total number embarked amounted to 74,884 men and 9496 horses. All this effected in seven weeks, and on July 12 Sir Houston Stewart reported the complete embarkation of the army.

While regretting that he could not be present when this important operation commenced, Lord Lyons then desired not to arrive on the scene until the work was completed, that those who had borne the burden should reap the praise. This is alluded to by him in the following interesting letter from Sebastopol to Sir Charles Wood of July 15, describing his visit—"Being unwilling to interfere with the evacuation of the Crimea which had been so nearly completed under the management of Stewart and Fremantle, I arranged so as to arrive here the morning after their departure. I find an old acquaintance in Rear-Admiral Ukarin, who has charge of the place for the present. I tell him and others frankly that my visit is one of pure curiosity to see what their gallant defence prevented my seeing before. They received me very cordially; placed horses and carriages at

my disposal, and accompanied me to the arsenal, batteries, etc., sighing over the demolition of the docks, which is complete, and mourning over the sunken ships, which they say they have no intention whatever of endeavouring to raise. To raise the first five line-of-battle ships and three frigates which were sunk immediately after the battle of Alma would be impossible, for their guns, stores, and provisions of all kinds went down in them. Admiral Ukarin told me that the house he lives in is one of the only five that the bombardment left habitable, and that there are but fifty-seven houses in the whole place—and most of them small ones—which it may be worth while to repair. He describes the loss of life to have been dreadful; certainly not less than 2400 killed on the 7th, and more than double that number on the 8th, the day of assault. Indeed, looking at the shot and shell, and splinters of stone on the ground, it seems impossible that a dog or a cat could have escaped. Everything that I see and hear confirms the opinion I ventured to give in London and Paris. With respect to the bombardment it is evident—and the Russians admit it—that if at any period of the siege we had refrained from firing (as over and over again recommended) until we had the means of continuing it unremittingly for a fortnight, the place must have fallen. But they say that we twice left off at the moment when the damage done was almost—but not quite—irreparable.

“It is beyond all doubt that we might have taken the place by assault—and with but little loss—during the first four days after our occupation of Balaclava, when Mentschikoff was at Simpheropol with his troops. Nor can there be a doubt that the place would have fallen an easy prey after we landed, if St. Arnaud, having been death-stricken at the Katscha, had not defeated Lord Raglan’s desire to cross the Belbec the day we left the field of Alma, instead of going round to Balaclava. The Russians do not seem

to be aware of the cause of our making what they call 'so palpable a mistake,' but they say that the result has been very bad for them, for if we had taken Sebastopol at once they would have evacuated the Crimea and have defied us to follow them into Russia proper; or rather have enticed us to do so, and in that case the war would have assumed a defensive character, which would never have drained their resources to such a point as to have obliged them to make Peace 'such as that of Paris.' The Russians admit too that if we had sent 30,000 men to Nicolaieff and 20,000 to Kaffa and Arabat—as Bruat and I urged Pelissier to do—success would have been certain."

Other thoughts came to the Admiral as he went over Fort Constantine and the Quarantine batteries on the southern side. In a letter to Miss Lyons from the *Caradoc* in Sebastopol harbour he says—"You will readily enter into my feelings on looking at the guns from which the fatal shot was fired at the *Miranda*, as well as on going into the room at head-quarters in which I last saw poor Lord Raglan both before and after his death; but I must not dwell upon this melancholy matter, which is indeed seldom absent from my thoughts either here or elsewhere."

After a visit to the beautiful palace of Prince Woronzoff at Aloupka, and the Emperor's country seat, Orianda near Yalta, the *Caradoc* returned to the Bosphorus, and the Admiral rehoisted his flag (blue at the main) on board the *Royal Albert*.

It was originally intended that the squadron should, after closing the naval establishment at Constantinople, have proceeded on a cruise, and then spent a quiet winter at Malta after all the labour of the past two years. But certain incidents in connexion with the Treaty of Peace detained the Admiral for some months in the Bosphorus. The Russians were reluctant to allow Turkey to retain possession of Serpents Island off the Kilia mouth of the

Danube, and put a small party in possession, though the island had then a Turkish commandant. It was eventually decided that the Ottoman Government should be the owner. Some delay also ensued in the evacuation of Kars, held by the Russians since the memorable siege. To show therefore that we intended to dominate the Black Sea until this was done, Sir Houston Stewart in the *Hannibal* proceeded to Sebastopol with instructions to state that he was about to visit Trebizonde and other places, so as to receive and furnish to his Government the earliest news of the evacuation of Kars. On September 22 Lord Lyons received the following telegram from the Admiralty—"Government consider it highly important that you and the squadron should remain in the Bosphorus and Black Sea until Russia should have fully and faithfully performed her engagements under the treaty. Some of your cruisers to be constantly in the Black Sea, showing themselves off Odessa, Kertch, and other Russian ports." Then another point cropped up in the non-evacuation of the principalities (called the Bolgrad difficulty), so that the Admiral was detained in the Bosphorus until the following March, the presence of our Fleet at the entrance of the Black Sea being a proof that we intended to secure the provisions of a treaty which we had sacrificed so much to obtain.

In the meantime some changes were taking place with those who had been associated with Lord Lyons in the war. His trusted colleague and firm friend Sir Houston Stewart went home in September 1855, and shortly afterwards was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North America and West India station. No man had worked harder to promote his country's cause, and to second the efforts of his chief, than Houston Stewart. When at Malta he laboured incessantly to provide materials for the expedition and to expedite the movements of transports. It was alluding to this work that Lord Lyons said in an

early letter—"If I should name two men who have been conspicuous in assisting this expedition it would be Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart and Captain Spratt." The efforts of the former were equally energetic when he became second in command, while his genial temperament made him a general favourite. Like his chief he had a keen sense of the ridiculous, and his mirth was contagious. His flag-captain in the Black Sea, now Admiral Sir J. D. Hay, gives me an amusing example of this on one occasion when Lord Raglan in the spring of 1855 had convened a meeting at the request of the French General to consider a proposal. "Lord Raglan when they were seated in his room courteously invited Marshal Canrobert to state his proposal. The Marshal with some dignity began, 'Messieurs, nous sommes ici pour la prise de Sebastopol.' The meeting were surprised to hear from Sir Edmund Lyons—"Oh, that's it, is it?' upon which his second in command, Sir Houston Stewart, who was readily moved to unrestrained and boisterous laughter, burst out into an uncontrollable fit. At first the meeting looked indignant; but gradually Lord Raglan smiled, all the others joined in the laugh, and Sir E. Lyons thanked Sir Houston for having brought the meeting to business." In a letter to Lord Lyons from England before proceeding to North America, Sir Houston Stewart says—"I saw Lord Palmerston on Saturday, and was as usual delighted with his clear and clever captivating style. When at Windsor the Queen asked most kindly for you, and expressed a fear that your son's death had hurt your health. I said it had cut you up much, but that the energy of your patriotism and the immediate call for exertion had forced you into activity, but I must tell her Majesty, never had been the sweet balm of sympathy so effectual in soothing sorrow as it had been to yours on receiving the beautiful letter which her Majesty had written to you. And I added there was *plenty* of work in you yet

should her Majesty's service require it, for years to come, I thought." Little did the writer imagine that in less than two years his beloved chief and friend would be laid to rest.

After the embarkation of our troops, and Balaclava harbour had been put in order, the services of Rear-Admiral Fremantle were no longer required there. Lord Lyons testified to the value of those services in the following terms—"I have great pleasure in assuring their Lordships that I hear from all quarters the highest encomiums bestowed upon Rear-Admiral Fremantle, not only for his admirable management upon this occasion, but also for his general administration of affairs at Balaclava during the last twelve months. Nor should I be doing justice to his merits, or my own feelings, if I were not to add that, before I left the Crimea, six months ago, he had already gained golden opinions from all who had witnessed his successful exertions."

Though less conspicuous perhaps, the work performed by Rear-Admiral the Hon. Frederick Grey, at Constantinople, contributed in a great measure to the efficiency of the transport service, which was such a feature in this campaign. Limitations of space have prevented me from dealing with this subject more fully, for a volume might be written on it, and the correspondence—in addition to the personal supervision it entailed—was immense.¹ On completing his work, Rear-Admiral Grey wrote recommending those officers who had been associated with him, and Lord Lyons replied—"I have great pleasure in complying with the request of the Rear-Admiral, for the conduct of the officers whom he recommends has indeed been most exemplary, and at the same time highly advantageous to H.M. Service; but even with the assistance which these

¹ Another officer who rendered most important service was Mr. T. P. Baker, Inspector of Machinery, who helped to establish the steam factory of Kazatch. Owing to his exertions greatly the steamers were kept efficient in their machinery.

valuable officers have rendered, the results we have seen could not have been obtained if the whole Service had not been under the immediate direction of an officer possessing the rare qualities for which the Rear-Admiral is so eminently distinguished." This officer shortly afterwards went out as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, while Sir Charles Fremantle succeeded to the command of the Channel Squadron.

Lord Lyons soon afterwards lost the services of his flag-captain. A reorganization of the coastguard at home took place, and Captain Mends, having been three years away from England, desired one of the new appointments thus created. The Admiral supported his application, and asked for Captain Richard Ashmore Powell—who had been a midshipman in the *Madagascar*—as his successor. Some delay took place, but in March 1857 Captain Mends received his appointment and went home.

On this taking place, Lord Lyons wrote to the Admiralty as follows—"As Captain Mends is proceeding to England to fill the post destined for him by their Lordships, I venture to indulge the desire I feel to place upon record in their Lordships' archives the high sense I entertain of his services as captain of my flagship throughout the late war.

"2. At Varna, in the equipment of the naval part of the Crimean expedition, he had a labouring oar in mastering difficulties occasioned by sickness and other disheartening circumstances.

"3. In the arrangements for embarking, conveying, and landing the expedition, he displayed a degree of genius and energy which materially contributed to encourage Lord Raglan to believe that obstacles which appeared to many to be insurmountable, might be overcome. And the end justified the belief.

"4. The gallantry, energy, and resource evinced by

him as my flag-captain on board the *Agamemnon* before the batteries of Sebastopol on October 17, 1854, as well as in the expeditions to Kertch and Kimburn, distinguish him as an officer peculiarly fitted for command in active warfare.

"5. I was not present when the alarming accident to the screw of the *Royal Albert* placed her in imminent peril, but I learn from eye-witnesses that his presence of mind, resource, and general bearing inspired zeal and confidence throughout the ship.

"6. I feel assured that in their Lordships' desire to form a just appreciation of the qualities of officers, I shall find an excuse for occupying their time with this letter."

The accident alluded to occurred at the end of 1855, when the *Royal Albert* was on her way to Malta. A serious leak occurred through a gland of the screw-shaft giving way. The rush of water into the ship was so great as to overpower all pumping, and Captain Mends put into Port Nicolo in the island of Zea, where the ship was beached. Here the injury was repaired by building a coffer-dam round the stern, so that the portion affected could be got at. Sir Frederick Grey, who was a passenger on board at the time, testified to the skill and resource shown by Captain Mends on this occasion, when, as he said, "the slightest accident to the engines or bilge-pumps would have made the loss of the ship inevitable."

In a letter to his sister, Miss Lyons, the Admiral says—"Captain Mends goes home by the next packet, so you will see him a week or ten days after you get this letter. It has seldom happened that admiral and captain have been three years together without one difference, as we have been, and parting with mutual respect and regard for each other."

Captain Mends continued his distinguished career, and eventually became Director of Transports at the Admiralty, which department he administered with great success for many years. Admiral Sir William Mends died on the day

of the Jubilee Naval Review, 1897, deeply regretted by all who knew him.

As already stated, Lord Lyons desired to have Captain Powell as flag-captain, but that officer had previously accepted an offer to go in a similar capacity with Sir Frederick Grey to the Cape. Lord Lyons then offered it to Captain the Hon. Francis Egerton, son of his old friend Lord Ellesmere, who accepted the appointment, and remained with him until his flag was finally hauled down.

In November 1856, Lord Lyons received a sword of honour from the Sultan of Turkey, accompanied by a flattering letter referring to his services during the late war.

During this period also it was a melancholy pleasure to the Admiral to visit his son's grave. Over it had been erected a handsome tomb, with the following inscription—

Sacred

TO THE MEMORY OF

CAPTAIN EDMUND MOUBRAY LYONS, ROYAL NAVY,

SON OF

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDMUND LYONS, BART., G.C.B., K.C.H.,

Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, under whose orders he engaged the Batteries of Sebastopol in H.M.S. *Miranda* on June 18, 1855, and there was mortally wounded, having just returned from the command of the Squadron in the Sea of Azoff, where his brilliant services were so warmly acknowledged by his Sovereign, who also mourned his loss as one who was "so bright an ornament to the Service he belonged to."

This Tablet is erected in deepest grief by the OFFICERS AND SHIP'S COMPANY

OF

H.M.S. *MIRANDA*,

who had served under him in the Baltic, White Sea, Black Sea, and the Sea of Azoff, and who loved and revered him, possessing as he did every manly attribute, every endearing quality.

He died on June 23, aged 35.

At the end of March 1857, the various matters connected with the Treaty of Paris being satisfactorily settled, Lord Lyons left the Bosphorus. The day before his departure the Sultan visited the *Royal Albert*—a most unusual mark of favour. He was accompanied by his Grand Vizier the Capitan Pacha, and principal Ministers of State, and was received with the highest honours by the Admiral and all the officers, as well as our Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. A correspondent to the *Times* says he wore a coat the collars and cuffs of which were a mass of diamonds, worth about £50,000. He seemed exhausted and nervous, but eventually became more at his ease, and took a great interest in the ship and her crew. On leaving, he expressed the pleasure the visit had afforded him. The following day he gave a farewell audience to the Admiral, after which the *Royal Albert* weighed and, passing through the Dardanelles, anchored off the island of Tenedos. From here Lord Lyons writes to his sister—“I have just cast anchor in the very spot where I was in March 1807, in the *Active*, and really, the recollection I have of the expedition of Sir John Duckworth, with all its episodes, is as fresh as if the events had recently occurred. I see the *Ajax* in flames, and the men jumping overboard in the vain hope of saving their lives; and I remember my feelings on the occasion, as if the whole scene had taken place last night. And yet what an eventful period of fifty years has intervened. How much I have to be thankful for; how much to deplore, and also how many sins to answer for. How different a fate from that of the poor midshipmen of my own age, who were cut short that night: what matter for reflection!

“Nothing could have been more complimentary—and, I really believe, hearty—than the circumstances attending my taking leave of the Bosphorus. Turks and Christians vied with each other in acts of kindness and respect. The

Sultan, to the astonishment of all Constantinople, paid me a visit on board the *Royal Albert*, accompanied by the Grand Vizier and all the great officers of State—a thing wholly unprecedented, for no Sultan ever before visited a foreign ship of war. When I thanked him on leaving for visiting the ship, he said, ‘No, the advantage is on my side: it is no little thing to see such a ship.’ In my audience of the Sultan he spoke to me very feelingly, and said that he hoped I would allow him to make my son a present, as a proof of the value he attached to the services I had rendered to him and his Empire. This was well done, for I wore the splendid sword he had given me, and therefore he could not make me another. What Bickerton’s is to be I don’t know, but I dare say a snuff-box or a coffee-pot.”

CHAPTER XXI

MARCH 1857 TO NOVEMBER 1858

Cruise of the squadron—Rates of sailing—Superiority of the *Royal Albert*—The Victoria Cross—Principle on which it was conferred—Steam tactics—Systems of Commander W. Horton, Captains George Elliot and W. Moorsom—Residence at Malta—Death of Miss Lyons—Successor in command named—Signs of an impaired constitution—Change of Government—Sir Charles Wood leaves the Admiralty—Sir John Pakington becomes First Lord—Delay in sailing of *Marlborough*—Lord Lyons leaves Malta—Is relieved by Admiral Fanshawe at Gibraltar—Arrives in England—Directed to escort her Majesty to Cherbourg—Has Marshal Pelissier as a guest—Changes his Flag to Admiral of the Blue again—Visit to Cherbourg—Entertainments—Illness of Lord Lyons—Returns to England—Hauls his flag down—Letter from Admiralty—Illness—Death—Character of Lord Lyons.

AFTER three and a half years of incessant toil and anxiety, broken only by those months at home at the beginning of 1856, Lord Lyons was now to take up the ordinary avocations of a squadron in time of peace. Sail drill and gun exercise, with a predilection in favour of the former, were the principal duties of a fleet in preparation for war. Steam had not yet come into favour generally, and to handle a ship well under sail constituted the principal ambition of a naval officer. At this occupation none could surpass the Admiral. His present squadron, comprising the *Royal Albert*, *Curacoa*, *Vulture*, *Coquette*, and *Wrangler*, did not afford the factors of competition in this respect, but useful work was done in visiting such

harbours as Smyrna, Vourlah, Scio, and Syra. Proceeding then towards Malta the Commander-in-Chief was joined by the screw two-deckers, *Conqueror*, *Centurion*, and *Brunswick*. The squadron then went into harbour at Malta for refit, etc., and remained until June 3, when it put to sea again for an extended cruise.

Though the line-of-battle ships on the station now were all steamers, the great object still was to get as much as possible out of them under sail. The Admiralty continually impressed upon officers in command that steam was only to be used exceptionally, and the First Lord frequently in his letters to the Admiral bewails the coal bill, and conjures up an indignant Chancellor of the Exchequer when called upon to pay it.

The Admiral writes to the First Lord when they get to sea—"You may depend upon my testing the sailing and other qualities of the ships fully and fairly, and I hope to show the young officers many places that they may have to visit when in command, and to render them familiar with going in and out of harbour *under sail*." In trials of rate of sailing between the ships the Admiral took an extraordinary interest, exercising his consummate skill in varying the trim of his flagship and in other devices if at any time she evinced a tendency to fall off in the competition. In the old days as the frigate sailed faster than the line-of-battle ship, so also it was usual for the two-decker to be swifter under canvas than the three-decker. On this occasion, however, the *Royal Albert* under a master hand usually beat the others, though the *Conqueror* had come out with a great reputation for speed under sail. A week after being at sea the Admiral writes to the First Lord—"The *Royal Albert* maintains her superiority both on a wind and off a wind. Three days ago she beat the *Conqueror* 4430 yards in the wind's eye in a trial during which we went 47 miles through the water at the rate of

7 knots. In a light breeze off the wind the *Conqueror* beat the *Royal Albert* on one occasion 113 yards in a run of 11 miles, but on all other occasions off the wind we have beaten her considerably, and invariably so on a wind." That the Admiralty did not entirely concur that this result was owing to the superiority of the ship herself may be inferred from the following extract from a letter of the First Lord to the Admiral on June 23—"We did not expect the *Royal Albert* to beat the *Conqueror* so much. Are you sure that you have not had something to do with riding the race? The fair thing would be that you should undertake the management of the *Conqueror* and see which wins then!" This shows the reputation the Admiral still had as a seaman, notwithstanding his eighteen years on shore, and how he maintained it though ships and their equipment had materially altered since he learned the art in the old sailing-ships.

At this time correspondence had not ceased on the subject of fit recipients for the Victoria Cross for acts of bravery during the late war. This coveted order having been instituted during the Russian War, the Commanders-in-Chief by sea and by land were directed to furnish the names of officers considered worthy of the distinction. This produced lists so large that the home authorities had to curtail them considerably, causing much heart-burning with those whose names were struck out. Included among them were Commanders Sherard Osborn and Cowper Coles, who had both been recommended by the Admiral. Sir Charles Wood in a letter of April 24, 1857, explains the principle on which the final selection had been based, which is interesting. He says—"The naval list for the Victoria Cross was completed before the War Department had begun theirs, and ours is final. We placed in a list everybody who had been recommended by you, or Lushington, or anybody; and then reduced it; the ultimate

decision being of course with the Secretary of State. The principle of the distinction sought to be drawn is this—that the action should be one which an officer or man could not—or hardly could—be ordered to do. For instance, nobody would have been justified in ordering Buckley, Burgoyne, and Roberts to land at Genitchi and fire the stacks in the face of 30 or 40 Cossacks, whom they dodged round the stacks : Lieutenant Commerell, who escaped Heaven knows how from among about as many of them. Both succeeded. Osborn was exposed to little or no danger in his boat expedition, and did not succeed. He was ordered to try and they never saw an enemy. If Captain Coles had not volunteered to go you might have ordered him or anybody else to perform an act of duty in conveying your orders or message, and it seems to be doubtful whether he was exposed to much more danger than you yourself, or anybody else, on the quarter-deck of the *Agamemnon*, or in the *Sanspareil* or *Albion*. These instances will probably be enough to explain to you the principle which it has been attempted to adhere to strictly. It is not very easy always to keep any line of demarcation very broadly defined, but in every case so far as I know in which the Cross has been given there are circumstances reported of the person receiving it which bring him into the volunteer category and not duty only.” That the Admiral—though of course he accepted the decision—did not altogether concur in the estimate formed by the First Lord of acts performed by certain officers may be inferred from his reply. “It was very kind and considerate to write to me about the Victoria Cross, and I beg that you will accept my best thanks.

“I am naturally much disappointed to find that Captain Osborn, Captain Coles and Mr. Ball,¹ by all of whom I was nobly supported, are not included ; but when the same principle has been acted upon for both Services without favour or

¹ See page 247, *ante*.

affection or regard for persons, no one can have any right to complain, nor would it be proper to indulge in unavailing regret, the less so as I feel assured that both at the Admiralty and at the Horse Guards opportunities will be taken advantage of to show officers whose cases did not come within the rule that their deeds of valour and devotion are nevertheless appreciated.

"I can conceive nothing more remarkable than the devotion to his country evinced by Captain Osborn in attempting to cut off the supplies of the enemy by destroying the Bridge of Tchongar. It was an undertaking of great peril, and much suffering, and there was great risk of being taken prisoner, and thus losing chances of promotion and distinction at the beginning of the war; and yet he went himself, as my poor son had resolved to do.

"The chivalry and importance of Mr. Ball's forlorn hope can only be believed by those who witnessed it, and unfortunately for him it could only be seen from the few ships that were near the batteries.

"The importance of the service that Captain Coles volunteered to perform is proved by the fact that the gallant Captain Jones of the *Sampson* considered it to be his duty to go out in his ship to Admiral Dundas to represent the urgent necessity of sending support to the *Agamemnon* and *Sanspareil*. This, too, on the part of Captain Coles, seemed to be a forlorn hope, but fortune favours the brave.

"Still as these exploits did not come within the rule laid down there is nothing to complain of."

I have introduced this correspondence to add if possible distinction to the memory of several now passed away, and to show with what warmth and generosity the subject of these memoirs advocated the claims of those who served under him where he considered it was deserved. This was one cause of the

attachment to him felt by all who had been under his command. Captain Sherard Osborn went to China, where he further distinguished himself, but writes to Lord Lyons in June 1858—when the Admiral went home—"The rumour of a possible rupture with France, together with your arrival in England, leads me to hope you will command the splendid Channel Fleet of steam liners said to be on the eve of being commissioned. Should you do so and any vacancy occur in which my services could be available under your command, pray remember, dear sir—whether in England or elsewhere—how proud I should be to again serve under you, and how often I, as well as many others in this squadron, look back to the days we passed in the Black Sea Fleet."

Commander Cowper Coles was naturally much disappointed at not receiving the coveted distinction, but it did not diminish his zeal or efforts to improve our methods of construction and gunnery. From the simple but efficient raft carrying a 32-pounder he was led to further developments, so that a committee of officers in November 1855 recommended that he should go home to lay his plans before the Admiralty. He advanced step by step, until a few years later he had worked out the turn-table and turret system, by which the heaviest guns could be trained with ease, while their protection was immeasurably superior to what they obtained when mounted on the broadside. It was a great loss to the country when this talented officer's career was cut short on that fatal night when the *Captain* capsized and sank, taking with her some of Britain's worthiest sons. The squadron under Lord Lyons visited in turn Tunis, Pula, Cagliari, and Leghorn. They then went to Spezia, where the Admiral received a visit from General la Marmora, at that time Minister for War. Proceeding to Genoa, Lord Lyons was invited to visit and dine with King Victor Emmanuel at Turin, who gave him

a most cordial reception. The squadron then went to Toulon and remained five days. Our Ambassador, Lord Cowley, came to Toulon for the occasion. Of this visit the Admiral writes to the First Lord on July 24—"I left Toulon with the squadron this morning, and the Cowleys at the same time returned to Marseilles in the *Vigilant*, highly pleased with their visit. The interchange of hospitality and civility between the French Navy and ours has been all that could be desired: nothing in short could have been more satisfactory."

Though as I have indicated we were forming a steam navy, but continued our old exercises under sail, many minds in the profession saw that a system of steam tactics had become necessary under the altered conditions of navigation. The evolutions open to a ship under sail were few and simple, while the direction in which she could proceed depended upon a wind often fickle. Steam altered all this, and enabled vessels to assume quickly many formations denied to a sailing-ship. The French were credited with being in advance of us in steam tactics, and supposed to possess a complete system, but they also were only in the experimental stage. Among our officers Commander W. Horton, Captain George Elliot, and Captain W. Moorsom had each evolved a system which Lord Lyons was directed to try and report upon. I have read the proposals of each as embodied in a pamphlet at the time, but I do not propose to describe them. That of Commander Horton was ingenious and worked out in great detail with diagrams. The influence of military movements is apparent, for ships are worked as right and left files while they alter direction to right half turn, right front, and so on. It was tried by Lord Lyons's squadron, not without success, but did not become our recognized system.

Captain Elliot's proposal was "that the Fleet should be formed in columns of ships in line ahead, the number of

columns to depend upon the numerical force of the Fleet." This was opposed to the plan proposed in France by Admiral Bouet-Willammez, that a squadron of a given number of ships should form an equilateral triangle, on which system later triangular groups were formed. The line ahead formation is so simple and easily preserved that it has survived all other formations, and remains in force to this day, while the methods of changing direction and other evolutions have been perfected by the tactical genius of successive officers. Captain Moorsom's efforts were more directed to improving the methods of signalling, but he also was in favour of a triangular formation on the ground that "it is much easier to maintain the position of a steamship on the quarter of her leader than right astern of her"—an opinion which further experience of steam squadrons would probably lead the writer to modify.

Thus usefully employed while on passage from port to port, the squadron visited in succession a number of places, returning to Malta on November 7. The cruise had extended over a period of seven months, during which time while at sea, and when not experimenting with steam tactics, the ships were mostly under sail carrying out exercises for the instruction of officers and men. On this point the Admiral, writing to Sir Charles Wood, says—"It is gratifying to me to see you are satisfied with our cruise. It has certainly afforded officers and men opportunities of learning their profession, and they have seen fourteen different harbours and anchorages."

Lord Lyons now took up his residence on shore at Malta, and to assist him in his social duties the sister to whom he had always been so much attached, Miss Catherine Lyons, and her niece, Miss Agnes Pearson,¹ came out from England. Although of simple tastes himself, the Admiral had a strong sense of the duty devolving upon the Com-

¹ Now Mrs. Lister Venables.

mander-in-Chief in the matter of entertaining in addition to his own pleasure in hospitality, which was part of his nature. He was a most excellent and agreeable host, whose brilliant entertainments are not even now forgotten at Malta. In these he was much assisted by the personal qualities of his sister and niece. It was therefore a terrible blow to him, and an inexpressible loss, when Miss Lyons died at the end of the year at Malta; for since the death of Lady Lyons this sister had been the one to whom—as we have seen—he laid bare his inmost thoughts, and who had been his constant companion when not afloat.

About this time and at the beginning of 1858 public opinion at home became greatly excited by the alarming accounts of the Mutiny in India. Lord Lyons therefore took special steps to obtain and forward information as it was received through Egypt by sending ships to Alexandria, while he expedited the passage of reinforcements sent out through the Mediterranean as much as possible. Terrible anxiety existed about Lucknow, and the year 1857 closed in gloom such as we experienced during the winter of 1854.

Lord Lyons had now completed three years as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, in addition to the fourteen months when he had been second in command. Affairs in Europe were quiet, and therefore in the natural course of events the time had come for him to be relieved. On January 25, 1858, the First Lord writes to him—“According to our usual practice your term of command ceased with last year, and I propose to relieve you in the course of the spring. Admiral Fanshawe will be your successor, and I shall commission the *Marlborough* in a few days to replace the *Royal Albert*, which has been a long time in commission. We have so few men-of-war’s-men, however, from the not paying off ships which have not come home from foreign stations, that I am afraid it will be a long time before she is fit for sea.” We were

feeling the ill effect of those reductions in naval expenditure which followed the Russian War, when so many seamen who had attained a high state of efficiency were discharged. At this time besides the Indian Mutiny, in which a Naval Brigade was employed, we had a considerable force in Chinese waters with no reserve of men at home. The old method of manning newly-commissioned ships was still in vogue, and therefore it is not surprising to find the *Marlborough* did not leave England for some months.

The delay did not prove unacceptable to Lord Lyons, because he desired to return home in the *Royal Albert*, but was glad to remain under the genial climate of the Mediterranean until after the spring. His health was far from good at this time, though his mental energy seemed unimpaired. But the severe work of those two years of the war, carried out with an energy that never slackened, coupled with the afflictions that had befallen him in the loss of his son and then his sister, had no doubt impaired a naturally strong constitution. This was evident to those who watched him at this time with affectionate solicitude. He suffered frequently from neuralgia and loss of appetite, which considerably reduced a frame once so robust. The only other outward indication was an extreme irritability temporary in its ebullition, and followed by that kind consideration towards others which banished resentment and led all brought into contact with Lord Lyons to be so much attached to him.

At the end of February a combination of sections in the House of Commons put Lord Palmerston's Government in the minority, and he resigned office. Writing on the 25th to the Admiral, Sir Charles Wood says—"I write to you not so much about your own concerns in the Mediterranean, but to announce to you that the Government is out, and that I shall not have to address you again from my present post. We had a majority against us on a

question connected with the Conspiracy for Murder Bill, in which, as last year, all parties from Disraeli to Bright, including Gladstone and Sir J. Graham, combined, and we were, as then, left in a minority of about 20. So we are out. I am very sorry to quit my post here, having taken so much interest in the navy and naval matters for three years; and having had so much pleasure in my relations with the naval officers with whom I have been brought in contact, and whom I have learnt to admire and esteem during that intercourse.

"I need not say how high a place you hold among them, and I assure you that nothing has given me greater satisfaction than the uninterrupted harmony and good understanding—and since I saw you I hope I may add friendship—which has subsisted between us since the day of my coming to the Admiralty. One of the disagreeable things of quitting office is the interruption of that intercourse, but I trust that the feelings which it has produced will long survive the cessation of our official intercourse." The change involved was a matter of regret to Lord Lyons, who replies—"I will not attempt to describe the grief and disappointment I feel at this provoking interruption of your official intercourse, but rather dwell as I do with pride and pleasure upon the assurances of friendship in your letter of the 25th, which are warmly and sincerely reciprocated by me. I fear it may be something more *than interruption*, for I conclude that when you come into office again you will be pressed to preside over our great Indian interests, where, as Lord Dalhousie says, you would unquestionably be the right man in the right place, though we could ill afford to lose you from the Admiralty, where you have entirely gained the confidence and hearty good-will of a very large majority of the navy, and where your presence is so necessary to direct the great national institution of your own creation." The institution referred to was the

coastguard, which the previous year had been transferred from the Customs to the Admiralty. Sir Charles Wood had a distinguished career afterwards in connexion with Indian Administration, and became Viscount Halifax. He was succeeded as First Lord of the Admiralty by Sir John Pakington, afterwards Lord Hampton.

In the meantime the sailing of the *Marlborough* screw three-decker of 130 guns was terribly delayed by want of men. Vice-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe on his appointment writes to Lord Lyons—"You will have heard from Sir Charles Wood probably his intention to nominate me as your successor, but I am desirous of telling you myself that I have accepted his proposal, proud indeed of the distinction of following you in such an important command, and desirous of treading in the path which you have done with so much honour and credit to our country and our profession, as well as to your own, on which I must take this opportunity of offering you my most cordial congratulations." In March he writes—"I am sorry to say it is true, there are no men, and the entry in the *Marlborough* seems to be about one a day." Again, on May 5, he writes—"Though the weekly entries the last two weeks have been improved as to number (I am afraid not as to quality), the ship is still about 300 seamen short. However, some ships are now paying off, from which I hope we may pick up a few A.B.'s, and enable me to look for a departure in the early part of next month." It was, however, not until June 14 that the *Marlborough* left England, such was the difficulty only forty years ago in manning the Fleet under ordinary conditions.

Previous to this, on April 14, Lord Lyons had left Malta with the squadron for a cruise, and after a visit to Tunis he proceeded to the Ionian Islands, when he was recalled by telegram to Malta, owing to an uneasiness which prevailed at home respecting the sentiments of the

French nation towards England, and the action of France in Morocco. Nothing occurred however to disturb the friendly relations which had been established by the Emperor Napoleon with us.

A further honour was now paid to Lord Lyons by his nomination to a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. With great ceremony he was invested at Malta by the Governor with the order on June 16. This made the seventh Grand Cross he received and with which his distinguished services were rewarded. On the following day the Admiral finally quitted Malta in the *Royal Albert* for Gibraltar to meet the new Commander-in-Chief. His departure was the occasion of many manifestations of regret and regard on the part of all in the island. As the *Malta Times* said on this occasion—"Never has a naval Commander-in-Chief departed with more unmistakable expression of admiration and regard than Lord Lyons. And it has been remarked that never have the Maltese evinced their feelings and regrets more sincerely than on the departure of one who was the same friendly, unaffected, kind-hearted man as Commander-in-Chief and British peer that he was as plain Captain Lyons thirty years ago. Every point where the public could muster, and troops could be massed, was crowded, and the *Royal Albert's* progress was a never-ceasing return of compliments and farewell felicitations in manning her yards to each demonstration from the successive forts and positions of prominence. Hearty cheers resounded from the military who lined the fortifications on each side of Valetta harbour." Thus Lord Lyons took leave of a place associated with his earliest naval service, and it must have called up many recollections, joyful and sad.

The *Royal Albert* arrived at Gibraltar on June 22, and was joined by the *Marlborough* on the 28th. Turning over the command to Admiral Fanshawe, Lord Lyons left

for England two days later, and anchored in Plymouth Sound on July 11. On leaving the limits of the Mediterranean station he hauled down—in accordance with original instructions—his flag as Admiral of the Blue and hoisted that of a Vice-Admiral of the White, his actual rank at the time, and which he had attained on October 2, 1857.

The day after his arrival in England Lord Lyons received the following letter from Sir John Pakington—“I have just heard by telegraph of your arrival at Plymouth. I therefore lose no time in writing to inform you that the Queen will visit the Emperor and Empress of the French at Cherbourg on August 4, and it is her Majesty's wish that your splendid ship shall be one of those which will attend her on this occasion, and that your Lordship shall not strike your flag until after her Majesty's return, in order that you may take command of her escort.


“It gave me great pleasure to submit this arrangement to the Queen. It received her Majesty's very cordial approbation, and I hope your Lordship will consider it as a graceful termination to a command which has been in many other respects so honourably distinguished.” The *Royal Albert* then proceeded to Portsmouth for this service, and two days after her arrival the Admiral was commanded to attend her Majesty at Osborne, in order that the details of the escort might be settled. He received a most gracious reception, and it was decided that the squadron for this service should consist of the two line-of-battle ships, *Royal Albert* and *Renown*, three frigates, *Diadem*, *Euryalus*, and *Curacoa*, and the corvette *Racoon*. All were steam-ships.

The French Ambassador in Great Britain at this time was Marshal Pelissier, Duc de Malakof, a title conferred on him by the Emperor after the fall of Sebastopol. The Marshal became at once very popular over here, and always received an ovation on appearing in public. Though he never acquired our language, this veteran of many fights

was fond of making speeches, in which he considered he excelled. Being directed to accompany her Majesty on this occasion, difficulty arose in finding accommodation for the Ambassador and his suite. Lord Lyons therefore asked his old companion-in-arms to be his guest in the *Royal Albert*, an invitation accepted by the Marshal with pleasure.

On August 1 Lord Lyons was again given temporary rank as Admiral of the Blue, and ordered to escort her Majesty and the Prince Consort to Cherbourg. He the next day dispatched the *Racoon* to that port to inform Vice-Admiral Défosses, in command there, of his approaching visit, and the nature of the squadron, so that anchorages might be allotted to the ships composing it. On the morning of the 4th the squadron weighed and steamed over to Cherbourg, off which it arrived during the afternoon. Soon after the Royal yachts, consisting of the *Victoria and Albert*, *Osborne*, *Black Eagle*, and *Fairy*, were observed approaching, Lord Lyons's squadron formed in two lines, between which her Majesty passed amid a royal salute and the cheers of the crews: then all entered Cherbourg harbour together. Of this visit there are no details or letters among the Admiral's correspondence. He was too unwell at the time to enter into the festivities or write much. We find the following account, however, in Lord Malmesbury's memoirs¹—"August 5, 1858. The approach to Cherbourg very fine. Arrived there at 7 p.m. At eight the Emperor and Empress came on board without any salute. Nobody was admitted. Marshal Pelissier, who went in without any invitation, was immediately turned out by the Emperor. Next morning the Queen, Prince Albert, Prince of Wales, Duke of Cambridge, Sir John Pakington, and myself breakfasted at the Prefecture, after which the royal personages drove over the town. Accom-

¹ Lord Malmesbury was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and attended the Queen on this visit.



SQUADRON UNDER THE ORDERS OF ADMIRAL LORD LYONS ESCORTING HER MAJESTY AND H.R.H. PRINCE ALBERT FROM
CHERBOURG TO PORTSMOUTH, AUGUST 1858. (*From a picture by Oswald Brierly.*)

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panied the Queen to dinner on board the *Bretagne*. Next morning the Emperor came to take leave of the Queen. When the Emperor left the Queen's yacht the previous evening all our ships illuminated in the most brilliant manner with blue lights. The yacht had red, white, and blue, and the electric light was thrown on the Emperor's barge, following it the whole way to the harbour. The effect was beautiful, the light shining only on the barge, while all around remained in darkness. Nothing could be finer than the whole display." Lord Malmesbury does not state which yacht displayed the light, but I believe it to have been the Imperial yacht, *Reine Hortense*, and it is the earliest record to my knowledge of a "search"-light in any navy. I believe a crude apparatus for this purpose had been tried in the Crimean War, produced by a voltaic battery and a parabolic reflector, but it was of little use. Afterwards the *Reine Hortense* was filled with a magneto-electric machine and a dioptric lens, which would give a better result, and may have been the apparatus in use on this occasion. We did not introduce electric search-lights into our navy for some years afterwards.

Shortly before noon on the 6th the squadron under Lord Lyons left Cherbourg and proceeded to Spithead, where it arrived about seven the same evening. This completed the Admiral's naval career, and his flag was finally hauled down on August 9. It was a touching scene when he bade farewell to those who had served with him for the three years and a half during which the *Royal Albert* had carried his flag. Some had been with him in the *Agamemnon*. The incident is graphically described by Admiral T. B. Sullivan, who was a lieutenant of the *Royal Albert* at the time—"The officers were assembled on deck when the Admiral came up. He said: 'I have sent for you to say good-bye. I should have liked to say so to each one, but could not have borne it, and can now only say to

you, God bless you all!’ Tears stood in his eyes, and I do not think many of us were without them.”

On giving up his command the Admiral received the following letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty—“I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that upon a review of the important services which have been conducted by your Lordship during the period of your command, they cannot allow your flag to be struck, and your command to terminate, without conveying the expression of the high sense they entertain of the advantages which the public service has derived from the ability, zeal, and gallantry displayed by you in conducting the naval service of Great Britain in the seas within the Mediterranean during a most eventful period; and they consider that your Lordship’s high qualities as an officer have contributed greatly to the success of her Majesty’s arms.” Such a tribute, just and unstinted, to services which now all must acknowledge, gratified the Admiral, and diminished the pang at the thought—which must have been present with him at this time—that the active pursuit of his profession at any rate was finished. To this gratification he gives expression in replying, and adds—“I will not enter upon a vain attempt to express the deep sense I entertain of the distinguished honour their Lordships have been pleased to confer upon me; but I beg that you will assure them that for the remainder of my days I shall look upon this proof of their approval as one of my most valued possessions, and that I shall hand it down to my son as an heirloom of which he and his successors may be justly proud.”

On striking his flag the Admiral proceeded to Arundel Castle, where it was hoped that with rest and under the devoted care of his beloved daughter, the Duchess of Norfolk, he would regain health and strength. Though his form had been shrinking for some time, his mind was so

clear, his energy so great, and his courage so indomitable that no one realized on that visit to Cherbourg that the end was so near, for not a murmur of complaint escaped his lips. At times during the little over three months which remained to him on earth, he appeared to improve, and took great interest in all concerning his old profession and ship. Sir Charles Fremantle was now in command of the Channel Squadron, with his flag in the *Royal Albert*. He wrote to Lord Lyons on November 9, and it was one of the last letters the Admiral was able to read—"I assure you that I often think of you as I write from the same desk you occupied; indeed, I have all your old furniture, and as I could not improve the cabin arrangements, things remain the same, and if I thought I possessed half your talents and ability I should consider myself more fitted for the responsible situation I now hold; but I shall do my best."

But the constitution of Lord Lyons, tried as it had been by the work of the past three years, had broken down beyond recovery. He had been wasting away, and now his malady took the form of rapid consumption, under which all his strength disappeared. To the inexpressible grief of all who loved him he passed away quietly and without suffering, at Arundel Castle, November 23, 1858, just two days after he had completed his 68th year. His remains were deposited in the vault of the Dukes of Norfolk. The next day the following notice appeared in the *Times*—

"A good Englishman and a brilliant seaman now lies still in death at Arundel Castle. Lord Lyons died there after a short illness yesterday. It was but the other day, after his return from the Mediterranean, that he was summoned to command the squadron of honour which escorted her Majesty to Cherbourg. It was fit that the most illustrious Admiral in the Service should be selected for this duty—the last of a public nature which he was to fulfil. It

was impossible even to look at Lord Lyons without being interested in him ; he was so like Nelson, the hero whom more than all others we regard with a sort of personal attachment. He had the same features, the same complexion, the same profusion of grey inclining to white hair ; the same eager and half-melancholy look. No one could see him without being struck with this resemblance. Not only in appearance but also in reality there was something of Nelson in Lord Lyons. He had the same devotion to his profession ; he had the same activity in duty ; he had the same free and frank bearing ; he had the same art of winning the affection of associates and subordinates alike. He inspired a similar confidence in all with whom he came in contact. If we say that he had not the infallible genius of our greatest naval hero, it is but fair to add that he had not the opportunities which Nelson enjoyed of exhibiting the highest qualities as a commander ; that he was always equal to the occasion, that his services in the Black Sea were not only great, they were much greater than the public generally suppose, and entitled him alone of all the chiefs in the late war to the honours of a peerage."

To me, who did not join the navy until two years after the death of Lord Lyons, and had no personal knowledge of him, but who has been given access to his most private as well as to his public correspondence, by which an estimate of character may be formed, this description in the *Times* seems singularly accurate and just. It is confirmed in a letter to me from the veteran Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Henry Keppel, who served under him in the Crimea, and had good opportunities of judging. He says—"I am so glad you are undertaking the Life of Lord Lyons. You will find it difficult to do him justice. In my humble opinion he comes nearer to the great Nelson than any man I ever met, and at times an extraordinary likeness to pictures of the great hero."

I have heard that Lord Lyons fostered the physical likeness so many saw in him to one whose wonderful career must have largely influenced his own naval life. That his admiration and veneration of Nelson was intense there seems no question. I find among his letters one from the present Earl Nelson in reference to his brother, then in the navy. Lord Lyons in reply says—"The life of the great Admiral is always on my table and often in my hands, and surely no one, much less a naval officer, could read it without feeling a strong desire to be of service to any member of his family, and above all to perpetuate the blood and the name in the profession that, in common with the country, owes so much to him."

It is not sought here to claim undue appreciation of the man whose life has been recorded in these pages. If he was endowed with many of the qualities which distinguished the great Admiral, like him also Lord Lyons had defects, which sometimes appeared to diminish the good points of his otherwise fine character. His impulsive nature and the quickness with which he grasped a subject often led him to go further in expressions of impatience than the occasion warranted, but no one regretted this five minutes afterwards more than he did himself, nor so ready to make amends. This failing was more noticeable in later years, as no doubt worry and ill health had begun to tell upon his constitution. Like Nelson he felt keenly any stinted recognition of his services. On the other hand it must be acknowledged that he spared neither time nor trouble in putting forward the claims of all who served with him when they merited reward. It was the same for a deserving seaman as for the zealous officer. This I can vouch for by the innumerable letters on this subject that have come under my notice. These traits of character are thus described in a letter from Sir Houston

Stewart to Lord Panmure,¹ written just after Lord Lyons lost his sailor son in 1855—"Sir E. Lyons has recovered his spirits greatly. The Queen's most beautiful letter to himself acted like magic, and never I think has her most amiable and gracious consideration been more beneficially bestowed. You will not misunderstand me when I say that my gallant chief and dear friend, with some of the genius of Nelson, possesses also portions of the minor characteristics of our great naval hero, and his love of praise and notoriety is very great, although to his credit be it said, he bestows it on others with no niggard hand. That was the secret of Nelson's great popularity with his officers, and so it is with Lyons."

If Lord Lyons desired praise from his superiors he was not the man to sit down quietly under any slight or implied censure from them when he felt it was undeserved. Two incidents in which the First Lord and First Sea Lord of the Admiralty were concerned during his command, led him to remonstrate strongly and then indignantly when he was exonerated at the expense of others. He remembered, quoted, and acted up to a saying imputed to the Duke of Wellington—"In private life a man who allows an undeserved censure to pass without refuting it is a simpleton: in public life the refutation is a duty."

That the attainments and services of the first Lord Lyons are not better known to the present generation, and especially to his own profession, is doubtless due to those eighteen years in diplomacy, which to a great extent severed him from the navy at a time when those who had also served with distinction in the old war were in command of squadrons or administrators at the Admiralty. The names of Provo Wallis, Masterman Hardy, Sartorius, William

¹ Lord Panmure had succeeded the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary for War.



[To face page 418.]
STATUE OF VICE-ADMIRAL LORD LYONS, G.C.B., IN ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL.

Fanshawe-Martin, and others are more familiar in connexion with the period to which most of our recollections extend. Hence it is well that another name should be added to the list of those whom we may remember as having assisted to build up Britain's naval power, and as having upheld the best traditions of a Service which has produced so many eminent men.

There is a statue of Lord Lyons by Matthew Noble in St. Paul's Cathedral, erected by public subscription in 1860. He was succeeded by his eldest and only surviving son, Richard Bickerton Pemell, who soon afterwards went out as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The second Lord Lyons was successively our Ambassador at Constantinople and Paris. He was raised to the rank of Viscount in 1881, but never married, and on his death in 1887 the title became extinct.

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